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Disclaimers, Copyright and Conflicts of Interest. Your purchases and ad clicks help us pay the bills. BookBites. Use the Executive Pay Issue to Build Support for Proxy Access Phyllis Plitch and Kaja Whitehouse write that "Executives' Pay Faces New Tactics." (WSJ, 2/27/06) Recent resolutions are less prescriptive, seeking to more closely align executive pay with corporate performance, provide more disclosure, and tighten restrictions on extras, such as "golden parachutes." The number of pay proposals is down dramatically from last year (140 so far, compared to 276 for all of last year), because new accounting rules for stock options eliminated proposals on that issue. AFSCME's resolutions to give shareholders a precatory vote on pay policies and Connecticut's effort to seek full disclosure of targets for performance-based pay are steps in the right direction. Although requiring more effort, shareholders should also take advantage of a relatively obscure SEC rule that took effect on January 1, 2004. Target companies could be those where a compensation consultant reports to management, instead of exclusively to the committee (practice should conform with Conference Board recommendations presented in The Evolving Relationship Between Compensation Committees and Consultants); talley sheets fail to disclose all components of compensation; hurdles that must be met are not fully disclosed; or a significant portion of compensation, over 50%, is not based on performance. Compensation policies should also encourage "acquire and hold" practices by key executives and directors. Directors must not only be independent of management, they must be dependent on shareholders. When directors can be held accountable by shareholders, we won't need a mountain of paperwork and an army of government regulators. My hope is that the next proposed rule to provide access will be relatively simple, with the ability to be tailored to specific corporate circumstances like the petition on proxy access Les Greenberg and I filed in 2002, rather than being overly prescriptive and complex, such as the failed SEC rulemaking. Shareholders should be gathering evidence now that can be used to support the next rulemaking on proxy access. Global Conference on Social Responsibility The World Council for Corporate Governance issued a press release on their recent successful conference in partnership with the International Chamber of Commerce, UKs Business in the Community, Transparency International, Canadian Business for Social Responsibility, RSE Portugal and Centre for Social Responsibility of Indias Institute of Directors. I serve as a member of WCCG's advisory board because I endorse their focus on the needs of developing and transition economies. The World Council For Corporate Governance, especially President Madhav Mehra, has drawn corporate attention to the widening gap between rich and poor and the governance strategies required to bridge it. "We have repeatedly argued that the socio-economic disparities are a serious threat to the security and sustainability of business, Mehra argues in his presentation, Tackling Poverty Makes Business Prosperous. "We cannot democratise the commerce if we leave out 5 billion people. Therefore the bottom of the pyramid must become a market. Let us build inclusive capitalism, said Professor C K Prahalad, of the University of Michigan, in his keynote address at the recently concluded Global Conference on Social Responsibility. I also appreciate Tatyana Boikova's focus on the question of "how to ensure the effective participation of the emerging national economies in the global production under the conditions of global competition." She concludes "the rate of integration of a developing economy into the global system through the markets of products and capital shall depend on the activity of the technological partners, their interest in the reinvestment of production." Other speakers emphasized the need for investments in human capital and participatory economics. For a list of papers presented, scroll down to Global Conference on Social Responsibility. See also their list of Conferences & Events. I hope to participate in the 7th International Conference on Corporate Governance in London 13-14 May 2004. If you plan to attend and would like to discuss issues presented on the pages of the Corporate Governance site, please let me know in advance so that we can get together.
Diversity Mindset - Corporate Governance: The complexity of global ethics Friday, 28 April 2006, London, 10am 4pm. A company's success or failure depends much on the performance of its board - an ancient Chinese saying is that "the fish rots from the head." Yet the majority of directors admit they have had no training for their role and are not sure what it entails. As boards' activities are made increasingly transparent under national and international law - particularly following recent corporate scandals - there is an urgent need for directors' competencies to be developed. Abundant Sun invites Directors, Corporate Governance, HR & LD professionals to attend this one day seminar with:
Disturbing Wealth Trends Net household worth averaged $448,200 in 2004, up from $421,500 three years earlier. However it reminds me of Robert Reich's joke that he and basketball player Shaquille O'Neal have an average height of 6'1". That average looks high because it is skewed by very wealthy households. Median net worth -- the point at which half of the nation's households are richer and half poorer -- rose just 1.5% to $93,100. The net worth of the wealthiest 10% of U.S. families rose to a median $924,100 in 2004 from $887,900 three years earlier. Net worth for the poorest 20% of the population fell 11%, to $7,500. Even those figures aren't so solid when you consider that average home values rose 28.1%, producing a dollar gain of $54,200. Average homeowners saw their net worth rise about 1%, whereas the net worth of renters fell 22%. Without the gains in the value of our homes, most of would be slipping backwards. The share of Americans' financial assets invested in stocks dipped to 17.6% in 2004, down from 21.7% in 2001. When you consider that between March 2000 and March 2003 the market lost $8 trillion you can understand why the share of families that held stocks directly or through a retirement plan slipped from 52% to 49%. In contrast, average net worth rose 28.7% between 1998 and 2001 and 25.6% from 1995 to 1998. While net worth barely grew, average household income before tax actually fell 2.3% to $70,700 after adjusting for inflation, the first decline since the 1989-1992 period. Median incomes were up 1.6 percent to $43,200. "Three key shifts in the 2001-04 period underlie the changes in net worth," said the Fed researchers involved in the study. "First, the strong appreciation of house values and a rise in the rate of homeownership produced a substantial gain in the value of holdings of residential real estate." Second, the rate of ownership of stocks in direct and indirect forms (such as through mutual funds) declined, as did the typical amount held. Third, the amount of debt relative to assets surged, notably debt secured by real estate. The upshot: "Families devoted more of their income to servicing debts, despite a general decline in interest rates," the researchers said. (based on a Google news search of "Federal Reserve family wealth" Federal Reserve says average real income of American families fell 2.3% in 2001-2004; Median income at $43,200; Why consumer pocketbooks had a rough start this millennium; Families made less in 2001-04: Fed survey, Reuters, 2/23/2006) If this pace keeps up, how long will it be until we see class warfare? Can democracy endure without a solid middle class base? Peekaboo, the Constitution Doesn't See You Stephen Bainbridge's article had such a clever title, I couldn't resist posting it directly. Regarding the complaint filled by the Free Enterprise Fund that the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB, nicknamed "Peekaboo") is unconstitutional, Bainbridge appears to make good points despite the fact that the Board serves an important function and should continue to do so. Interesting post by Broc Romanek and a rebuttal by Bainbridge. P&I Editorial Leaps to Illogical Conclusion In an editorial entitled Reform Tenacity, Pensions & Investments (2/26/2006) properly credits major public and union pension funds with reforms in executive compensation disclosure, majority-vote election for directors, and expensing of executive stock options. However, the editorial leaps to an illogical conclusion, when it announces that "if the proposal for enhanced disclosure is adopted, shareholders will have only themselves to blame if executive compensation at any company continues to be excessive and out of alignment with shareholder interests and corporate performance." Most institional investors are under no illusion that better disclosure of executive compensation will automatically lead to better alignment of pay and performance. They support disclosure so they won't have to search every footnote to find out how much executives are being paid. However, disclosures will not onlly make it easier for investors to make comparisions between companies, it will also make it easier for executives and compensation committees to do so. The result may be an accelerated surge in pay if compensation committees continue to believe their firm's executives are above average, even if that assessment is not supported by the facts. GAO Studies Pension Conflicts of Interest The GAO will study potential conflicts of interests in pension fund management and how such conflicts may affect their solvency, especially those taken over by the PBGC. (GAO to study pension conflicts, Pensions & Investments, 2/26/2006) 401(k) Participation Down Employee participation in 401(k) plans continued to decrease in 2005, to a participation rate of 70%, down 12.5% from 80% in 1999, and the percentage of salary contributed has fallen 20% in that time, from 8.6% to 6.9%, according to the Spectrem Group study "2005 Defined Contribution Market Needs." Employers might want to consider adopting a Quick Enrollment program, which gives employees the option of enrolling in the savings plan by opting into a default contribution rate and asset allocation pre-selected by the employer - as compared to the typical opting out procedure common in auto enrollment. Hedge Fund Democracy? Alan Murray writes in the WSJ that hedge funds control more than a trillion dollars, and they are desperately searching for good ideas to make big returns. If the idea is right, the money will be there. Companies can't sit on cash without risking a hedge-fund attack. The Time Warner episode shows that the funds won't attack en masse unless they have very good reason. And if they have good reason, we should all cheer them on. "Shareholder democracy" has never proven itself to be very potent at holding corporate leaders accountable. Maybe hedge-fund democracy has more promise. I like this response from Les Greenberg, Chairman of the Committee of Concerned Shareholders.
ISS Blog ISS launched a new Corporate Governance Blog. As ISS says the ISS Corporate Governance Blog is expected to be the Webs most comprehensive compilation of institutional level corporate governance content, including information on emerging corporate governance trends, proxy voting, social and environmental issues, shareholder meeting commentary, compliance considerations and other areas of interest to both global institutional investors, corporate issuers and industry constituents. Along with TheCorporateCounsel.net Blog, those interested in corporate governance have a growing number of important sources for news and commentary. Better Governance Yields Greater Market Value From the ISS blog. A recent study of 5,300 U.S. companies has found that there is a strong positive correlation between improved governance and greater market value. The value of a company increased by 4% for each attribute of better governance that the firm implemented, according to a working paper, "Did New Regulations Target the Relevant Corporate Governance Attributes?" by Reena Aggarwal and Rohan Williamson, who are both professors at the McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University. "The bottom line is we came to the conclusion that there is a very strong positive relationship between firm value and corporate governance," Aggarwal told a Feb. 15 webcast hosted by the ISS Center for Corporate Governance. Director's Compensation Survey Pearl Meyer's 2005 Director Compensation report of thew top 200 largest US industrial and service companies had some interesting observations, among them are the following:
Social Security Option There has been no recent movement on Social Security but a proposal from the National Conference on Public Employee Retirement Systems (NCPERS) is worth consideration. They recommend:
NCPERS offers a proposal that provides solvency for the Social Security system, retains current benefits, does not increase payroll taxes on middle and lower income workers, and does not place workers' benefits at risk. Fifth Third Bancorp Ahead of the Curve? From 2003 to 2005, a time when Fifth Third's stock price dropped by about 30%, CEO George Schaefer Jr. collected $6.5 million in salary, bonuses, a restricted-stock award and other perks. Facing pressure from investors, Fifth Third's board last week recommended that shareholders approve a proposal at the annual meeting in March that would require the entire board to face re-election every year. The board also is recommending that investors approve a proposal that would allow shareholders to remove a director "without cause" with a simple majority vote instead of a two-thirds "super majority." The Paul Hodgson, senior research associate for the Corporate Library say about 55% of the 2,080 corporate boards it studies have staggered terms, so from that standpoint Fifth Third Bancorp may be getting "ahead of the curve." However, as Daniel Lee's article implies, the compensation committee has to learn to be more than "a cuddly poodle." (Investors ask: What have you done for me lately?, Indianapolis Star, 2/20/2006) Wanted: More Women on Nominating Committees The key to getting more women on corporate boards is getting more women on board-nominating committees, according to a study released Thursday on diversity in corporate governance. Success depends on "who makes the lists," said Vicki Kramer, a Philadelphia management consultant who is chairwoman of the InterOrganization Network. Just more than a quarter of the 536 companies studied have women on the nominating committees. Women head the nominating committees in about 5% of those companies. Minority women continue to hold few board seats, from 0.1% to 1.9% in companies studied. (Study: More women needed to name women to boards, Ledger-Enquirer.com, 2/20/2006) Call Their Bluff and Put a Face on Activism Lets put a human face on shareholder activism. Instead of precatory shareholder resolutions on specific individual reforms, from reports on global warming to repealing classified boards, why not attempt to run candidates who can articulate a vision, not only those issues but on corporate business plans and other value-enhancing issues?
CalPERS, CalSTRS, SRI funds, and others that supported the SECs proxy access proposal should attempt to make use of the adopted disclosure provisions to put forth shareholder nominees. Activists should exhaust every avenue available to improve the accountability of corporate directors. The current attempt of shareholders to govern based on precatory resolutions is like trying to govern a state by proposition, instead of focusing on electing good representatives. Nomination campaigns could generate substantial publicity, build important alliances and, could lay the foundation for a future rulemaking that would provide shareholder access. theCorporateCounsel.net has a "Sample Policy on Security Holder Recommendation of Candidates for Election as Directors," as well as dozens of examples of corporate policies in their practice area under nominating committees. Examples are also relatively easy to find on the Internet, such as for Aetna, Duke Energy, Trinity Capital, and Johnson & Johnson. What is much more difficult is finding examples where shareholders have proposed nominees to a board's nomination committee and the committee has accepted or even seriously considered them. Yes, Carl Icahn may have gotten KT&G to put three candidates to a vote but that happened in Korea and Carl Icahn is not your typical shareholder. (KT&G accepts Icahn nominees for board, MSNBC, 2/14/2006) $ Left on Table Two Duke law professors, Francis McGovern and James Cox, documented in separate studies that big institutional investors do not claim money due them in litigation settlement pools of cash. Professor Cox, for example found that 72% do not claim money due them from the proceeds of successful class action lawsuits. Making claims is technically complex but does not excuse leaving money on the table. (Institutional Investors Do Not Make Claims, Business Law Prof Blog, 2/17/2006) Back to the top Ethics Alert Business Ethics: The Magazine of Corporate Social Responsibility, reports the number of cases brought under the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act have more than doubled from 7 in 2002 to 18 in 2004. Titan paid penalties more than 8 times the $28.5 million they used to bribe an agent in Benin. In the same issue, Business Ethics reports more American's are observing ethical misconduct in the workplace, but fewer are reporting it. 52% of employees observed at least one incident of misconduct. Of those, only 55% reported to management, versus 65% in 2003. The National Business Ethics Survey found that 70% of employees in organizations with weak ethics cultures observed misconduct, versus 30% in those with a strong ethics culture. The Winter 2005 edition also includes a guide to SRI retirement planning, review of top SRI funds and an interview with Jacqueline Brevard, Merck's ethics officer, and other features. Noisy Exits on Rise Pierce Roberts Jr. said his warnings about a "significant chance of a crisis on the horizon" at XM Satellite Radio Holdings had been ignored by the board and senior management. Roberts thinks the company should rein in spending rather than focus on the faster subscriber growth favored by the board. Revenue more than doubled to $177 million, and the company signed up more than 2.7 million new subscribers, bringing its total to more than 6 million. But the average cost of acquiring those customers rose to $141 - up from $104 in the same period last year. That increased XM's loss to $268.3 million, or $1.22 a share, up from $188 million, or 93 cents, last year. Reporter Anna Driver points out the noisy exit by Roberts may be part of a growing trend. His departure follows the loud exit by Barbara Kaczynski, the audit committee chairwoman at Take-Two Interactive Software in January who accused management of failing to keep the board informed on key issues related to the discovery of sex scenes in its "Grand Theft Auto" video game series. While noisy exits may demonstrate a degree of director independence, "directors have a fiduciary obligation to stick around in good times and in bad times," said Roger Raber, head of the National Association of Corporate Directors. Charles Elson, who has personal experience as a director facing a difficult situation agrees, "frankly, once you commit to a job, you should stick with it unless you have an extraordinary reason." "You can dissent, but you are not helping by taking yourself out of the equation." (XM bombshell signals new boardroom attitude, reuters.com, 2/17/2006) (New setbacks rock XM satellite radio, Sacbee.com, 2/17/2006) Maybe directors who aren't being heard should be talking with shareholders about the need for new directors in extraordinary circumstances. I'm not sure these rise to that level, but I can think of circumstances where it might. Stock Picking Tip What's the secret of picking stocks with superior returns? According to Tim Hanson, writing for The Motley Fool, 57 of the 100 best-performing small caps of the last decade have greater than 5% insider stakes. Fully 66 of the best had founders or a CEO who had more than five years of experience at the helm of the company 10 years ago, and who had stayed ever since. An additional 18 had the same CEO at the helm throughout the company's years of incredible performance. Bottom line: "While today's average CEO tenure has dropped to less than five years, 84 of the 100 top-performing small caps of the last decade had either a founder or experienced and devoted CEO leading it to market-trouncing results." (The Secret of Superior Stocks, Fool.com, 2/15/2006) Convergence In Proxy Votes and the Power of Transparency, (Stratfor.com, 2/16/2006) Bart Mongoven discusses a 'perfect storm,' which "appears to be brewing on the corporate horizon, with several elements coming together to create new challenges for CEOs and senior managers of public companies. If this storm actually develops, the standard relationship between shareholders and corporations could undergo fundamental changes in the next few years." Reproduced below are select paragraphs. One of the elements of this storm is a movement toward "majority rule" -- the election of corporate directors by shareholders. This movement, which is gaining momentum, is led by large unions. A second movement is strengthening among "social shareholder activists," meaning those seeking to press a social agenda through corporations on issues such as climate change, executive compensation or diversity among board members. Among the most important of the issues in play this year is an SEC ruling that forces mutual funds and pension funds to publish their proxy votes. The ruling actually dates back to January 2003, but shareholder activists have only belatedly noticed that the voting records are available and that they have strategic value. It is only this year that social shareholder activists appear to have realized that this regulation gives them a new way to place pressure on target corporations. Organized labor, as is so often the case, was the vanguard, and in 2005 the AFL-CIO organized demonstrations at the retail storefronts of Fidelity Investments in New York and Boston to protest the company's vote on a corporate proxy. Currently, shareholders in mutual funds generally seem not to recognize their own power, and they certainly do not hold their mutual fund managers accountable for their proxy votes. However, if activists on social issues can actually succeed in politicizing mutual funds -- "Do you want your mutual fund company to support resolutions on climate change or the Universal Declaration on Human Rights?" -- the shareholder activist game would change markedly. Classified Boards I got a call the other day from Daniel Lee, a business columnist for the Indianapolis Star. He was writing an article on a local bank that is initiating declassification of its board. He asked if I knew what proportion of boards are staggered. After a little looking, I found a report from Glass Lewis that approximately 50% of companies have classified boards, down from approximately 90% a few years ago. This does seem to be one area where shareholders have made progress. Activists like John Chevedden have introduced so many resolutions with so much success that companies have started eliminated them to avoid having to deal with shareholder proposals. ISS reported last year that for the first time, "the number of management proposals (49) on board declassification has exceeded those (42) filed by shareholders. This represents almost twice the number of total proposals on this issue filed only three years ago; almost all of the increase was accounted for by management proposals, which increased seven-fold in this time period." ISS then went on to cite a 2002 study covering hostile bids between 1996 and 2000. It showed that "classified boards nearly doubled the odds of a target remaining independent. However, the findings revealed that a staggered board structure did not provide any countervailing benefits in terms of higher acquisition premiums. In fact, for the period covered, it resulted in the loss of $8.3 billion for target shareholders by impeding value-creating transactions without any offsetting increases in alternative transactions or stand-alone target returns." (Anti-Entrenchment Efforts Bring Changes in U.S.) In the current issue of Governance Weekly (2/17/2006), ISS updates previously reported numbers. Companies filed about 60 such proposals at meetings during the first half of the 2005, compared to roughly 50 shareholder resolutions calling for annual board elections. This year activists have again taken the lead. "As of Feb. 15, ISS was tracking 78 such proposal filings, compared with just 44 over the same period last year and 45 in 2004." "Support for board declassification has generally been broad, so activist shareholders may sense an easy victory in light of last year's trend, observers say." With so many setbacks, it is good to see shareholder winning in at least one area. Stastics From the 1-2/2006 NYSE Magazine, 56% of Fortune 1,000 senior executives indicated in a study commissioned by Liz Clairborne that they are aware of employees who are affected by violence against women. The National Association of Corporate Directors reported last year that 5.1% of surveyed public company directors say their boards have separate ethics or compliance committees. From the Economic Apartheid In America: A Primer on Economic Inequality & Insecurity, Revised and Updated Edition Internet Radio CorpWatch is now producing a weekly radio show/podcast. This week, they interview CorpWatch's military researcher, David Phinney, about subcontracting in Iraq. Business At the Next Level radio, together with Corporate Directors Forum, recently featured R.W. Smith & Co., one of the most recognized names in the hospitality industry. Corporate Watchdog Radio interviewed Felice Yeskel, author of the recently published second edition of Economic Apartheid in America: A Primer on Economic Inequality & Insecurity, about the root causes for the widening gulf in wealth disparity and the social impacts of this phenomenon. NASDAQ to Have Highest Listing Standards The Nasdaq announced plans to create a new market tier for public companies that will have the "highest initial listing standards in the world." NASDAQs view is that the best companies globally will migrate to the markets with the best standards. We believe that the best, most intelligent standards come about when markets and companies recognize what is good for investors and initiate improvements from within, said Bob Greifeld, NASDAQ President and Chief Executive Officer. "This is the latest in a series of moves by NASDAQ to achieve our mission of being the premier market in the world. It is an outgrowth not only of governance rule changes and enforcement, but improved technology and transparency in the trading day. In addition, we have recently achieved exchange status, which will allow NASDAQ to separate from its regulator, removing any perception of conflict of interest, commented Greifeld. Governance rule changes and improved transparency? It sounded as if the NASDAQ might be requiring that to be listed on the new market tier with the "highest" standards in the world, shareholders would have a greater voice in corporate governance...maybe no staggered boards, supermajority requirements or requiring election of directors by majority vote. Maybe their adopting some of the features of Kathleen Keenan's H.716. No such luck; Vermont hasn't come to Wall Street. The new tier will require average market value of at least $825m and three-year aggregate pre-tax earnings in excess of $11m. Float requirements will include a minimum of 1.25m shares outstanding, with a market value of at least $100m. The minimum bid price will be $5. How's that for increased transparency and accountability? They certainly aren't vying for the highest standards in the corporate governance world. (NASDAQ Creates New Market Tier with Highest Listing Standards In the World, 2/15/2006 and Nasdaq hopes top tier will attract listings, MSNBC, 2/15/2006) Be Mine From Bruce Carton's Securities Litigation Blog: Happy Valentines Day to my Nephew Smitmie. Hell be 12.5 on thursday. When I take him shopping, he just wants to buy-out everything in the store. Hes so cute and much smarter than most. You'd never guess it from its face, but the bizarre message above actually was the basis for the SEC"s insider trading case filed and settled recently against one William A. Day, a.k.a. "auntbetty1234." The SEC's litigation release explains that on February 14, 2002, London, England-based Smith & Nephew, plc. and Oratec Interventions, Inc. publicly announced that they had entered into an agreement for Smith & Nephew to acquire all outstanding shares of Oratec through a tender offer of $12.50 per share. The SEC says that on February 13, 2002, approximately twenty-four hours before the acquisition was publicly announced, Day made the anonymous posting above using the online alias auntbetty1234 on an internet message board dedicated to Oratec, the contents of which revealed that he possessed material, nonpublic information regarding the tender offer, including: - the name of the acquiring company ("Nephew Smitmie"); "Much smarter than most?" I don't think so. Day agreed to pay disgorgement in the amount of $42,631.90, prejudgment interest thereon of $9,200.69, and a civil penalty of $42,631.90, for a total payment of $94,464.49. The settlement is subject to the court's review and approval. Clark Kent to Keep Reigns at CalPERS CalPERS board president Rob Feckner is likely to be reelected this week and will continue to lead the fight against runaway executive pay, promote investments in fledgling clean technology companies and China, as well as tackling rising health care costs - all with minimal fanfare. (CalPERS planning quieter battles, Sacramento, Bee, 2/14/2006) Shareholder-Friendly Institutional Investor magazine identified America's Most Shareholder-Friendly Companies. The results for 62 industry sectors, published in the February issue of Institutional Investor is based on a survey of more than a thousand portfolio managers and analysts in the U.S. and abroad who were asked to name the companies in their areas of expertise that are the most attentive to shareholders. The survey instructed respondents to consider the quality of the companies governance and investor relations practices when voting. (Institutional Investor Identifies America's Most Shareholder Friendly Companies in its First-Ever Survey, 2/15/2006) Below is a sampling of top companies in specific industry sectors. BASIC MATERIALS Back to the top ValueAct TheStreet.com runs an interview with Jeffrey Ubben, former manager of the $5 billion Fidelity Value Fund and who started ValueAct Capital in 2000. "By making large bets and working with management and boards to increase shareholder value, ValueAct has returned an annual 18.1% net of fees over the past five years, vs. 6.3% for the Russell 2000." He describes the development of a current fight at Acxiom. He approached the board in the spring of 2005 with concerns and made a case for having a shareholder in the board room. They came back and said they didn't think it was right ever to have a large shareholder on the board. That told him it was a founder's board that was not going to make the transition necessary to avoid being a structural underperformer. Now both sides are lined up for a proxy fight. He then goes on to describe his developing position at ADP. (Q&A: Activist Interview, 2/12/2006) SRI That Pays Gets Endorsement Pensions & Investments runs a current editorial which opines "SRI-type activity that helps advance and sustain the corporate mission to make profit for shareholders deserves pursuit." The editorial lists adaptations by companies, pension funds, global money managers and consultants, including the Enhanced Analytics Initiative. "Concern about the high price of oil is driving innovation of alternative energy sources" and the push for greater disclosure empowers academics and consultants to conduct research that will feed back, "bringing further accountability of their value to the market. (Mainstreaming of SRI, 2/6/2006)
Board Minutes Companies can look to the recent high-profile corporate scandals for guidelines in keeping minutes, according to Thomas B. Chandler, a partner in the law firm of Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP. Chandler believe that minutes should have the following components:
There is no consensus on whether directors should keep their personal notes from board meetings, says Chandler. The argument in favor of retaining notes is that they validate the director's care and accountability. The opposing argument is that any gaps or open issues in notes may evidence lack of care. (Hawley Troxell Ennis & Hawley LLP, press release, 2/13/2006) Lawsuit Challenges SOX The Free Enterprise Fund and Beckstead and Watts LLP filed the suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia claiming creation the PCAOB under SOX violates the Constitution's separation of powers principles as well as the Appointments Clause. Institutional Investors Take Center Stage in Korea In Korea, the Peoples Solidarity for Participatory Democracy has declared they will not attend general stockholders meetings this year. Instead, questions will come from institutional investors and their demands for more stockholder value. The number of listed companies with more than 5% of their stakes in the hands of institutional investors increased 61.1% compared to last year. In particular, the number of asset management companies that own more than five percent of the stake in a company is up by 172.1% in the stock market. Korea Investment Trust Management recently sent inquiries to 120 investment companies asking them whether they will implement policies to strengthen stockholder value, and about the current state of their businesses, this years business plan, dividend policies, and buy-backs. Others are doing likewise. (Stockholders Meetings Focus on Value, BBCWorld, 2/14/2006) Indians Optomistic Due to Corporate Governance Improvements Among investors in Brazil, Russia, India and China those in India were the most optimistic about their home investment market. As many as 55% from India said they were highly optimistic and 39% somewhat optimistic. In China, 16% were highly optimistic and 53% somewhat optimistic, since investors trust and confidence are still not in place. In Brazil, 15% were highly optimistic and 62% somewhat optimistic. In Russia, 17% expressed pessimism about their investment market, although 11% were highly optimistic and 53% somewhat optimistic. Only in India do any investors consider corporate governance standards among resident listed companies to be excellent (4%). Chinese and Russian investors are severely critical of standards among their companies. 46% of India respondents felt their governance standards were "good" or "excellent," whereas in China, 68% of respondents felt governance standards were "poor." (Indians most bullish among growing markets, Business Standard, 2/14/2006) Protection from Disclosure The Capital Group recently sought and won an order to seal practically all divorce-trial proceedings of one of its top fund managers, Timothy D. Armour. "To have [Armour's] compensation made public is not only a violation of privacy, but is bad for morale," says Capital Group spokesperson Chuck Freadhoff, adding that it would be "very difficult" and "counterproductive" to try to explain Armour's pay. (Keeping Compensation under the Covers, CFO.com, 2/3/2006) Exec Entertainment Pay Even as performing-arts groups struggle, star salaries are soaring -- with music directors making almost $2 million. Can orchestras afford to conduct themselves this way? At the San Francisco Symphony, musicians just ended 10 months of bargaining with a 15% raise over the next three years and a 21% increase in annual pension payments. In the previous five years, conductor Michael Tilson Thomas' salary grew 31%, compared with 22% for the musicians. (Executive Pay Takes the Stage, WSJ, 2/11/2006) Can we expect growing resentment to lead to a slowdown? Not as long as America worships charismatic CEOs. Allegiance to charismatic leaders is antithetical to an open democratic society. The cult of personality around superstars comes with risks of abuse, misconduct, and incompetence. Lessons still unlearned from Enron. Pig Through the Python "The pig may have moved through the python," said Joseph Grundfest, director of the Class Action Clearinghouse at the Stanford Law School, after reporting the number of securities fraud class actions filed in 2005 declined 17% to 176 from the previous year, while the total value of cases settled during 2005 grew to a record $3.5 billion. "Two factors are likely responsible for the decline. First, lawsuits arising from the dramatic boom and bust of U.S. equities in the late 1990s and early 2000s are now largely behind us. Second, improved governance in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom frauds may have reduced the actual incidence of fraud," said Grundfest. (Shareholders rewarded by companies that practice good governance, San Diego Source, 2/10/2006) Mutual Assured Destruction A survey by the Civil Society Institute shows a 79% of US mutual fund investors think companies should analyze the long-term financial impacts that global warming will have on their businesses and on the potential value of their stock to people who either own shares directly or indirectly through a mutual fund. Yet, None of the 100 largest U.S. mutual funds supported any of the 33 global warming resolutions filed with US companies in 2005. Alisa Gravitz, executive director of Co-op America, said: "Mutual funds, whic h are responsible for the retirement investments of millions of investors, should join in with their institutional investor peers like those leading institutions in the Investor Network on Climate Change representing $3 trillion. Mutual funds should be at the forefront of investors encouraging companies to address global warming. Instead, all of the largest funds at America's major mutual fund families including Fidelity, Vanguard, and American Funds -- failed to vote in favor of any resolutions in 2005 encouraging companies to address global warming. (Ceres Study Shows that Nation's 100 Largest Mutual Funds Sitting on Sidelines on Climate Change Issue, 2/26/2006) Investment Company Institute President Paul Schott Stevens delivers Valentine's Day remarks before the National Press Club in an address focusing on how to harness the Internet to better inform mutual fund shareholders. Stevens will address how to leverage new modes of communications to help investors including America's 91 million mutual fund owners gain much greater access to the key information they need to educate themselves and reach their financial goals. (ICI President Will Discuss the Role of the Internet in Fund Disclosure in Live Webcast, 2/13/2006) Let's hope one of their goals is leaving a habitable world for their children. Chinese Insurance Companies Get More Independent Directors Chinese insurance companies must have at least two independent directors, according to a new regulation promulgated by the insurance industry watchdog, the China Securities Journal reported on February 8. The regulation, aimed at improving the management structure of insurance companies, was released by the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC). It tries to enhance the role of the board of directors in insurance and will gradually make independent directors account for more than one third of the total board, CIRC Chairman Wu Dingfu told the journal. The CIRC will set in place a series of follow-ups and detailed provisions to make the regulation more feasible, said Wu. (estandards forum.com, 2/13/2006) - 9% When pensions and other retiree benefits graduate from footnotes to the balance sheets, shareholder equity in the S&P 500 is going to decrease by about 9%, according to at article in CFO.com. (So Long Footnoted Liabilities, 2/2006) In November, the Financial Accounting Standards Board voted to move toward a proposal that would require companies to report the difference between the net present value of their pension, and other retirement-benefit obligations, and the amount the company has set aside to meet those obligations. The top 5 underfunded plans are GM ($69M), Ford ($45M), Verizon ($21M), ExxonMobil ($16M) and AT&T ($15M). Middle East Institute for Corporate Governance Hawkama includes a comprehensive website dedicated to best practices of corporate governance and business ethics in the Middle East & North Africa in Arabic. Cooperating international institutions include the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), UAE Ministry of Finance and Industry, Centre for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Union of Arab Banks (UAB), Dubai School of Government (DSG), Young Arab Leaders (YAL), and the Institute of Management Development (IMD). Hawkama aims to promote corporate sector reform and good governance, assist the countries of the region in developing and implementing sustainable Corporate Governance strategies, with the aim of facilitating the economic and financial integration of the region with the rest of the world. Back to the top Governance Ratings for the Masses From Jeff Brown of the Philly.com (How good companies go bad, 2/12/2006), the median CEO got raises of 9.5 percent in 2002, 15 percent in 2003 and 30 percent in 2004. Don't count on the trend changing when the 2005 figures come in over the next few months...it shows that the era of the imperial CEO is not over." Brown suggests using CII policies, such as the following: Executive pay should be tied to performance. That means hitting financial targets that require skill, not just luck. The CEO shouldn't get richer just because the company's stock follows the market upward; he should have to beat the market or industry.
Brown also recommends Morningstar's new "stewardship grade" of A through F, based on how well managers and directors look after shareholder interests. Of the 1,459 stocks in the system, only 86 were graded A, while 615 received Bs. As I have previously reported, shareholders can also access ISS ratings by going to Yahoo Finance, entering your stock symbol, and then clicking on "company profile" near the bottom of the page. Two CGQ ratings are generated on each company. Each company's "corporate governance quotient" (CGQ) is compared with other companies in the same index and industry group. Hopefully, we will soon get behind Mark Latham's concept of paying professional proxy voting advisors with corporate funds directed by shareowner vote. When that happens, we'll not only get access to a single score, but also to a more meaningful analysis of corporate and proxy issues. (see Vote Your Stock, draft 5/5/2005 or later papers as they are posted at the Corporate Monitoring Project) Evidence Mounts: Good CorpGov Pays Companies with the poorest earnings quality and corporate governance underperformed the S&P 500 Index by 11% in 2005, according to a study by RateFinancials, an independent risk research firm that evaluates the financial reporting of publicly held companies. Here's an interesting quote from the press release:
Companies with the poorest earnings quality on RateFinancials' watch list lost 8% of their market value in 2005, while the S&P 500 Index gained 3%. A previous RateFinancials study also found that companies with poor earnings quality, aggressive accounting and poor governance standards have lower equity returns and more volatility than companies with stronger practices in these two key areas. RateFinancials identified more than 50 companies whose financial statements should give investors "pause for concern." The companies range in size from General Motors and Ford Motor to Helen of Troy, whose products include hair dryers, curling irons and foot baths. (Shares of companies with poor earnings lag S&P 500, Reuters.com, 2/10/2006) Shareholder Rights Bill Interesting item in the Rutland Herald (Shareholder rights bill sparks business opposition, 2/9/06). Kathleen Keenan, a nurse from St. Albans, introduced H.716 in the Vermont legislature sponsored or at least supported by Carl Icahn and the coalition Corporate Governance Council. "The ultimate purpose of the legislation is fundamentally pro-business: to make American corporations more profitable," says a presentation prepared for lawmakers by William Clark Jr., a Philadelphia lawyer who is heading the Corporate Governance Council coalition. According to the article, the "bill would give shareholders greater ability to get questions placed in a proxy statement, the annual ballot that stockholders in a publicly traded company use to elect officers and decide corporate policy. It would require the full board of directors of a corporation to be elected annually, instead of on a staggered basis. And it would limit management's or a board's ability to require super-majority votes of shareholders to decide certain questions." The hope is that Vermont could attract businesses to incorporate in the state by offering a legitimate alternative that would be friendlier to shareholders. However, five publicly traded corporations based in Vermont have quickly lined up against the bill, even though the proposal would exempt them from having to comply with the new rules. My own quick look at the bill reveals that it places some limitations on poison pills and, like the UK, allows shareholders to call a special meeting to conduct business. UK law allows 10% of shareholders to hold an emergency meeting; the Vermont proposal would require such a meeting only upon the demand of 20% of the votes entitled to be cast. Shareholders with at least a majority of all shares entitled to vote can take action without a meeting. The bill would outlaw supermajority requirements, require equal voting rights per-share and would allow limited shareholders access to the proxy to nominate candidates (including 500 word statements) for groups that have held more than 5% of outstanding shares continuously for the last two years. Directors would be elected by plurality but nominees who receive more votes against than for would not be eligible to be elected. It also provides reimbursement for the costs of solicitation in proportion to the number of shareholder candidates elected and appears to give additional rights with regard to shareholder proposals. My question to Kathleen Keenan is simple, what can we do to help? ExxonMobil According to a report in the WSJ (Exxon Greenhouse-Gas Report Allays Shareholder Concern, 2/9/06), Christian Brothers Investment Services will withdraw a shareholders' resolution it had hoped to put on Exxon's annual proxy statement that asks the company to disclose more details about Exxon's view of global-warming science. Exxon, in contrast to several other big oil companies has repeatedly stressed its doubts about the science behind. Now it has issued a report that says atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide have increased, the Earth is getting warmer, and fossil-fuel emissions are a factor. "Human activities have contributed to these increased concentrations," including "through the combustion of fossil fuels for energy use," says the report, which Exxon filed on 2/2/06 with the SEC. Preliminary feedback from others in the SRI community indicates that not all are placated. Concerns remain with ExxonMobil's inadequate corporate governance and poor disclosure on climate risk - Shareholders coordinated by ICCR and Ceres have been asking Exxon (and other companies) to meet at least three objectives:
BP and Shell were praised by evangelical Christians on 2/8/06 in their nationally-publicized evangelical statement on climate change. What if evangelicals around the world decide BP and Shell are good and Exxon is bad - what if evangelicals decide to lead a global boycott of Exxon? Exxon could be facing major reputation risks with evangelicals worldwide if it is does not manage climate risk properly. Meetings The Council of Institutional Investors will hold its spring 2006 meeting at the LEnfant Plaza Hotel, located at 480 LEnfant Plaza, SW, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 29 through Friday, March 31, 2006. The Conference Board, in conjunction with the Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals, is putting on a two day "Crash Course" in corporate governance and compliance. March 21-22, 2006, in New York City. Public Getting Education on Exec Pay Because of the SEC's proposed Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure, newspapers all over the country are educating their readers on executive pay and the sham of the corporate election process. From the "Executive-Pay Debate Highlights Minimal Power of Shareholders" published in the WSJ on 2/7/2006, which starts out recounting a battle at Fairchild where the presiding judge refused to accept a settlement over executive pay, saying it wasn't enough to protect shareholders from "a grotesque lack of controls in a company that has no profits." It was the third fight over executive pay in a decade between the firm and its shareholders. The authors of the article, Kaja Whitehouse and Pyllis Plitch note that "investors' control over executive pay is limited. Shareholders can directly approve or veto just two forms of compensation: Stock plans and certain tax-advantaged performance-based plans. Shareholders have no direct influence over most forms of pay, including salary, perks, retirement plans, severance or how gains on certain stock grants might inflate other forms of compensation down the road."
Activists, frustrated by the SEC's refusal to go forward with its proxy access proposal, are now moving to acquire a direct vote on total compensation packages. If we can't get access to the proxy for the purpose of nominating directors, we will have to try to shift power issue by issue. Could shareholder activism make a difference? Yes, according to a study by Lucian Bebchuk, Jesse Fried and Yaniv Grinstein, finds the aggregate compensation paid by public firms to their top-five executives during 1993-2002 was about $250 billion. Aggregate top-five compensation was equal to 10% of aggregate corporate earnings in 1998-2002, up from 6% during 1993-1997. That isn't a relatively small abount. (Executive Comp: Pay Without Performance) Virtus InterPress We are delighted to add two publications by Virtus InterPress to our Stakeholders page. Virtus InterPress publishes Corporate Ownership and Control, which deals with issue of separation of ownership and control and Corporate Board: role, duties and composition, which is devoted to the problems in the corporate board practices appearing as a result of both well-known "separation of ownership and control" problem and new ones such as overcompensation of directors, lack of accountability, weak social responsibility. Sovereign Management Protections Members of the Pennsylvania Legislature voted recently to shield Sovereign Bancorp Inc. from a campaign by Relational Investors LLC to unseat Sovereign's directors and block the company's plan to sell a 19.8% stake to Spain's Banco Santander Central Hispano SA. One of the changes would make it harder for shareholders of Pennsylvania companies to push for removal of directors without cause. The other change narrows an antitakeover law that had the potential to interfere with Sovereign's stake sale to Santander, a Spanish bank. The bill moved through the Legislature in about a day. From an article in the WSJ, Pennsylvania Bill Comes Under Fire (2/6/06), it doesn't appear many of those who voted for it understood the current campaign by Relational. Although many are urged Gov. Rendell not to sign the measure, the governor has in the past praised Sovereign CEO Jay Sidhu, who co-chaired a banking committee that advised the governor. Maybe if they understood what they were voting for, members would strengthen democracy in corporate governance; instead their action threatens to weaken it. Overpaid CEOs BusinessWeek reports that 90% of recently surveyed institutional investors think corporate executives are overpaid. About 85% believe the executive system hurts Corporate America's image. (The Stat, 2/13/06) A study of the market between 1992 and 2001 by economists at Rutgers and Penn State found the more a CEO was paid, relative to peers, the more likely their company was to underperform in the stock market. The economist David Yermack, of NYU, found companies that allow their CEOs to use corporate jets for personal reasons fall short of market benchmarks by 4% annually. Jarrad Harford and Kai Li, found very highly paid executives more likely than their peers to make acquisitions and to receive major financial rewards for doing so, even when the acquisition ends up destroying corporate value. Overpaid CEOs are also more likely to commit fraud that props up stock pricesperhaps because the more you have to gain from criminal activity, the more likely you are to engage in it. (Overcompensating, The New Yorker, 2/13/06) CalSTRS Jumps to #2 Fueled by hefty gains in real estate and private equity investments, the California State Teachers' Retirement System boosted assets to a record $137.1 billion, which propeled them past the $131.9 billion New York State Common Retirement Fund to become the nation's second largest public pension fund. CalSTRS sets an 8% annual return as the goal to meet projected pension obligations for its 776,000 members. Last year, the Dow Jones industrial average finished with a 0.61% drop while the Standard & Poor's 500 index increased 1.37%. CalPERS posted an 11.2% increase in 2005. The fund reaped the biggest gain, 36.45%, from its $8.3 billion real estate portfolio. That was followed by a 34.34% jump in the $7.45 billion private equity portfolio. US stock investments gained 6.16%; international stocks achieved a 17.34% return. (It's banner year for CalSTRS, Sacramento Bee, 2/1/2006) Dell Moves to Majority Vote Previous post: Last July, Dell management opposed a shareholder proposal by the United Brotherhood of Carpenters Pension Fund requiring director candidates in uncontested elections to receive a majority of the votes cast in the election because it was "unnecessary to the achievement of sound corporate governance at Dell." Yet, as the trial of Enron executives opened in Houston, the Texas-based company reportedly adopted a strict standard requiring directors to receive a majority of the shares outstanding or to resign, a much stricter standard than the usual majority of those voting. (Dell gets strict on electing directors, Chicago Tribune, 2/2/2006) (Disclosure: The publisher of corpgov.net holds stock in Dell.) Correction: According to their Form 8-K, Dell adopted the same majority vote standard as Intel (contrary to media reports that Dell took it one step further and adopted a standard under which nominees must receive favorable votes from holders of a majority of the shares entitled to vote, rather than from those that actually vote). Thanks much to Broc Romanek, Editor of TheCorporateCounsel.net, for alerting me to this error. (Dell Adopts Same Majority Vote Standard as Intel, TheCorporateCounsel.net Blog, 2/3/2006) Accept a no-risk trial to CompensationStandards.com and check out their comprehensive Practice Areas. Back to the top Alarcon Introduces Majority Vote Bill To require corporate directors to be elected by majority vote, we can either file binding bylaws proposal with each and every corporation, or we can change the laws one state at a time. Senator Richard Alarcón introduced SB 1207 on January 26, 2006. Please give it your support. From the Legislative Counsel's digest:
It appears the default would become election by a majority of those voting. If an incumbent director fails to get a majority of the vote, they would be required to resign within 90 days. Subscribe to leginfo service, to get an e-mail whenever action is taken on SB 1207. E-mail a message to Senator Alarcón. The bill could be heard in its first committee as early as February 26, 2006. I sent the following: Dear Senator Alarcon: I write in support of SB 1207. The default in corporate Director elections should require election by a majority of those voting. On August 1, 2002, Les Greenberg and I petitioned the Securities and Exchange Commission for the right of Shareholders to place their nominees on the corporate proxy. The Council of Institutional Investors said our petition "re-energized" the "debate over shareholder access to management proxy cards to nominate directors." The SEC introduced a very complicated rulemaking, S7-19-03, to allow Shareholders limited access to the proxy. Although the rulemaking received more support than any in the SECs history, it has been shelved because of opposition from the Business Roundtable and the Chamber of Commerce, both dominated by CEOs. Although I believe Shareholder access to the proxy would be an even more positive step, SB 1207 is a good interim measure that will make Directors much more dependent on the will of shareholders. Impediments to Improving Corporate Governance With the Enron trial just beginning, many are still seeking ways to improve corporate governance. Solutions, which seek better disclosure and stiffer penalties, miss the big picture. Tweaking rules and regulations at the margins will only minimally improve the quality of corporate governance. Yours is a much more effective approach because it transfers at least a minimal level of democratic power to Shareholders, allowing them to hold directors accountable. The discussion on the need for independent Directors often misses the point. Yes, we need Directors who are independent of Management. However, more important than that, they need to be dependent on Shareholders who own the company. What Happened To Democracy? Nobody decided one day to remove the element of democracy from corporations. Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means pointed out in their classic 1932 book, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, simply that it had already occurred. Much has been written about this phenomenon over the past seven decades but there has been virtually no change in law or practice to reflect a shift in control from Shareholders to Management. While the corporation laws of every state solemnly recite that Shareholders elect the Directors, each year Shareholders of American corporations are asked to participate in an exercise which bears little resemblance to the word "election" as commonly used in any democratic country. Shareholders generally have no real choice in the election of Directors. Even if an overwhelming majority of Shareholders oppose a Director-nominee, that person will serve as Director so long as he or she gets one vote, unless an expensive proxy contest is undertaken. The real election for Directors occurs within the boardroom, with Shareholders relegated to a rubber-stamp process of affirmation. When intelligent, honest professionals repeatedly use a legal term in a manner contrary to its commonly accepted usage, we are entitled to ask why. When the corporation laws of 50 states indicate that Shareholders "elect" Directors, that Shareholders "vote" for their choice of "nominees," that proxies are solicited for the "election" of Directors, we are given an impression contrary to actual practice. The "independent" Board of Directors is supposed (and assumed) to hold power granted to it by the owner Shareholders. Its actual power, in fact, often derives from the CEO - which tends to dilute its legitimacy. It is well known that the vast majority of Board vacancies have been filled via recommendations from the Chairman of the Board. Further, given that in the vast majority of companies the Chairman is also the CEO, it is clear the CEO plays a dominant role in the selection of Directors. The fact that we speak of Directors as "representing" or being "elected" by Shareholders when Shareholders play no real role in their nomination or election is evidence of the challenges we face in corporate accountability. Since it is the duty of a Director to supervise Management, there is little likelihood that Management will select a candidate who is inclined to ask "tough questions," especially, as we read in the daily headlines, questions concerning CEO pay. A Director who does not cooperate with Management will, in all likelihood, not be asked to serve an additional term. However, while dependent on Management and/or fellow Directors for his/her longevity, a Director still has a fiduciary duty to the Shareholders to monitor Management's actions. Until Directors can be held personally accountable, e.g., removed from office by irate Shareholders, they will not be responsive to the desires of Shareholders. However, it is almost impossible for Shareholders to replace Directors who they deem to be incompetent and/or corrupt. Other potential means to achieve accountability of Directors are ineffective. The threat of potential litigation, through class-action lawsuits and/or derivative actions brought by Shareholders, is highly overrated as a deterrent to corporate malfeasance and waste corporate assets. Corporations themselves and/or the SEC generally reveal corporate improper acts before civil litigation is commenced. Shareholder lawsuits rarely result in the perpetrators, themselves, paying damages. If damages are recovered, it is paid out of insurance policies and out of corporate assets. Shareholders end up paying themselves from corporate assets after plaintiffs' attorneys recover substantial sums. Such does not even consider exorbitant legal fees generated by defense attorneys before an inevitable settlement is reached. Near Insurmountable Hurdles to Shareholders Who Wish to Elect Directors In essence, most hurdles to engaging in an effective proxy solicitation effort occur because the name of Shareholders' Director-nominees will not appear on a corporation's ballot. Under applicable state corporate law, Shareholders can easily nominate a candidate for a corporate Directorship, but, under present SEC Rules, only the names of those persons nominated by the corporation need appear on the corporation's ballot. The assets of all Shareholders are expended by Management to distribute those ballots. With plurality voting laws, as currently exist in California, 99% of Shareholders can vote against a Director but they are still elected. Investor Reaction to Difficulties of Shareholder Election of Directors I have widely discussed the current state of corporate election laws. Most public investors are shocked to learn how Directors are selected/elected. Unfortunately, the general investing public gives little thought to such issues. However, when informed, investor confidence in corporate governance tends to decline. Many written responses to our petition were received. The following, from an investor in Germany, is a sample response sent to Mr. Greengerg. "When I have started to invest in the USA about 3 years ago I was sure that elections of directors are fair. ... So when I have discovered that elections of directors of USA public companies are not democratic I was very surprised and disappointed. ... This is EXACTLY how voting in communist countries worked. Everyone could vote, but there was just NO CHOICE of candidates. The point was not how to be elected, but how to get on the election list. With this system no changes were possible, so there was no motivation to improve the governance." (Emphasis in original.) Conclusion The following are a few articles Mr. Greenberg and I cited in our petition to the SEC almost four years ago. Most still ring true today:
Entrenched Managers and Directors will improve corporate governance to the best of their abilities only when they can be held personally accountable, e.g. voted out of office and replaced by candidates acceptable to Shareholders. I urge the Legislature to pass SB 1207 in order to bring some semblance of democracy to the election of corporate Directors. Please call on me if I can provide any assistance in moving this measure through the California Legislature and on to the Governor for signature. Respectfully, Back to the top SEC Proposal on Exec Pay Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) will hold a special Governance Forum webcast 2/2/2006 at 12:00 noon EST. Experts will share their views on the SEC's proposed Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure. To attend the online forum, you must register. Panelists Ted White, Deputy Director of the Council of Institutional Investors; Ronald Mueller, Partner at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher and; Jesse Brill, Chairperson of The National Association of Stock Plan Professionals, will share their views. ISS' executive vice president and special counsel, Patrick McGurn, will moderate the panel discussion on the issue of how companies disclose pay and perks awarded to their CEOs, top executives and directors and what benefits the proposed rule changes might hold for shareholders. Lipton Speaks Out Against "Imperial Stockholders" Marty Lipton, who defended companies under attack by corporate raiders during the 1980s, recently went after regulations designed to prevent the kind of scandals that brought down Enron, Adelphia and WorldCom. Lipton says corporate America is now subject to the whims of "the imperial stockholder." Corporate boards have become "monitors" of management, rather than "collegial coaches." Those opinions appear consistent for the inventor of the "poison pill," which continues to plague shareholders. Lipton said new the SEC's proposed Executive Compensation and Related Party Disclosure proposal would likely lead to more litigation by disgruntled shareholders, such as unions accusing management over underperforming. ( | ||||