ProxyDemocracy.org was very helpful, with several funds reporting their votes in advance. Also very helpful was CalPERS’ site, which provided reasons for their votes. I voted for most of the directors, along with most of the funds who reported voting in advance on ProxyDemocracy. However, I joined with CalPERS in withholding my vote from the following two, since I found CalPERS’ reasons compelling:
Director Andrew N. Liveris – I joined with CalPERS in voting against Liveris, since he served as members of the audit and risk committee prior to the financial crisis when there was a failure to ensure appropriate corporate governance practices pertaining to risk management were in place. Additionally, Mr. Liveris is a current CEO while serving on an excessive number of public company boards.
Director Judith Rodin – Like Liveris, he served as members of the audit and risk committee prior to the financial crisis when there was a failure to ensure appropriate corporate governance practices pertaining to risk management were in place.
Along with most of the funds, I voted to ratify the auditors, support the omnibus stock plan, and approve TARP repayment shares. I voted against the Advisory Vote to Ratify Named Executive Officers’ Compensation, since CalPERS believes the company does not adequately disclose the process by which executive compensation is determined.
Along with most of the funds, I voted to Amend NOL Rights Plan (NOL Pill). Generally, I vote against such plans, but CalPERS believes the poison pill is in shareowner best interest. Additionally, the company has indicated the adoption is not for anti-takeover purposes.
I joined with the funds to Approve Reverse Stock Split. I voted with most of the funds in favor of Affirm Political Non-Partisanship, a proposal by Evelyn Y. Davis. CalPERS voted against it. They believe the proposal is unnecessary because Citigroup indicates it adheres to all state and federal regulations on this matter. That doesn’t seem like a convincing reason to me but I’m not very firm in my support. In glancing at the proposal, it may well be that everything in the resolution is already covered by law. If so, it does no harm to vote in favor of it.
Along with most of the funds, I voted in favor of all the shareowner proposals. Report on Political Contributions, by the Firefighters’ Pension System of the City of Kansas City. CalPERS believes this proposal poses no long-term harm to the company. According to MoxyVote.com, the Center for Political Accountability also supports this proposal.
Report on Collateral in Derivatives Trading, by the Sisters of Charity of St. Elizabeth. CalPERS believes this proposal poses no long-term harm to the company. It seems to me this has the potential to reduce risk. That’s better than posing no long-term harm. In fact, if shareowners had listened to the Sisters of Charity and members of the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility there is a good chance we would have missed the Great Recession. See this 2008 press release about ICCR sounding the alarm for 15 years. Why weren’t shareowners and management listening? Rev. Seamus Finn, director, Justice, Peace & Integrity of Creation, Missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate and an ICCR board member, said:
The U.S. government controls over a quarter of outstanding Citigroup shares today. It has an extraordinary opportunity here to send a clear message to Wall Street that more derivatives disclosure is vital. Even more to the point, the Treasury Department really has no choice other than to support our resolution since a failure to do so would directly undercut its campaign for critical financial reform.
ICCR Executive Director Laura Berry said:
To adopt an inconsistent posture at this critical juncture on derivatives disclosure would be disastrous both in terms of how Wall Street reads the signals from Washington and how seriously Congress sees the Obama Administration as being in its support of vital financial services reform. (Shareholders: Treasury Should be Consistent on Capitol Hill and on Wall Street by Voting Citi Shares for More Derivatives Disclosure, press release, 4/16/2010)
Ability to Call Special Meetings, by William Steiner. CalPERS believes shareowners should be able to call special meetings. So do I. I’ve even submitted proposals myself on this issue and, like William Steiner, I often work with John Chevedden on these submissions.
Proposal Regarding Stock Retention, by AFL-CIO. CalPERS is a firm supporter of stock ownership guidelines that require executives to satisfy minimum levels of ownership after leaving the company. It should be noted the proposal mandates that executives hold 75% of their equity awards for two years after retirement or termination. CalPERS prefers that guideline specifics be designed and implemented through the company’s Independent Compensation Committee. I favor holding most equity awards until after retirement.
Shareholder Proposal Regarding the Reimbursement of Expenses in a Contested Election, by AFSCME. CalPERS believes this proposal poses no long-term harm to the company and would be a benefit to shareowners. I think this proposal could increase the ability of shareowners to have additional influence on nomination and election of directors.
I voted using MoxyVote.com. I you agree or disagree with my votes, you can leave comments here on CorpGov.net or on my wall at MoxyVote, search James McRitchie. If you use ProxyDemocracy, keep in mind that you can post how you’ve voted or any other advice regarding a company right on the site. For and example, see the bottom of the Citigroup page. When it becomes technologically feasible, it would be great if sites like MoxyVote and ProxyDemocracy can tell users who sponsored each resolution. Having to look that information up on the proxy takes an extra minute or so. Just as many will vote with various funds because of their “brand” reputation, we will also vote based on the brand of the sponsor.