Shareholder Collaboration is a new ECGI working paper by Jill Fisch and Simone M. Sepe. Fisch is one of my favorite researchers, being insightful and less predictable than many of those in the primary academic hubs of corporate governance (Harvard, Stanford, and Delaware). In Shareholder Collaboration, the authors discuss the growing importance of a collaborative model, in contrast to models based on management power or shareholder power. (download paper in pdf) Continue Reading →
Author Archive | James McRitchie
NAM Board Targeted
Investors led by Walden Asset Management, New York Common and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) called on 45 companies sitting on the Executive Committee and Board of the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) to end the trade association’s attacks on shareholders.
The investors’ letter asks the companies to distance themselves from NAM’s recent attempts to discredit shareholder engagement, particularly on climate change. These efforts have been undertaken primarily through NAM’s membership in the Main Street Investors Coalition (MSIC) and through a report NAM funded and distributed that wrongly asserts that shareholder resolutions diminish company value. MSIC represents no investors. In my opinion, it is a front group for corporate managers attempting to generate fake news, stirring public opinion against investor rights.
Quotables on NAM
“The irony is that many companies on the NAM board are active business leaders on climate change,” said Timothy Smith, Director of ESG Shareowner Engagement at Walden Asset Management.
They understand the very real risk to our environment and have active forward-looking policies and programs on climate. Yet their dues to NAM are funding an aggressive attack against the very investors they meet with regularly to address climate change. We are appealing to these companies to clearly state their opposition to these positions taken by NAM and Main Street Investors Coalition. It is important to do so to protect their company reputations and integrity.
“Environmental risk consideration is part of the evolution of investing. Whether a retail or institutional investor, assessing the risks of investments is a standard practice,” said CalSTRS Portfolio Manager in Corporate Governance Aeisha Mastagni.
NAM appears out of touch with its own constituents. Over the last decade more than 75 percent of the environmental-related proposals CalSTRS filed were withdrawn because the companies were willing to negotiate a mutually agreeable outcome.
The Letter’s Key Paragraph
The MSIC perpetuates the myth that incorporating environmental, social and governance (“ESG”) factors inherently conflicts with protecting and advancing shareholder value. However, the 1,200 members of the United Nations-backed Principles for Responsible Investment – including Fidelity, BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street – with over $70 trillion in assets under management, have committed to consider ESG issues in the investment decision-making process since these factors may affect shareholder value. There is ample evidence that incorporating ESG issues into investment decisions is part of responsible management as a fiduciary. Moreover, hundreds of global companies demonstrate leadership and transparency on sustainability issues. These companies’ action are not guided by “political and social interests” but by what is good for their investors and stakeholders over the long term.
NAM is a trade organization that represents and advocates for manufacturers across industrial sectors. Many NAM members are taking active steps on climate issues as a result of shareholder engagement. Nevertheless, NAM has established significant ties to MSIC, which purports to speak for investors, but which instead appears to be engaged in an attempt to undermine shareholders’ rights by denouncing ESG-related shareholder proposals and by suggesting shareholders’ concerns are politically motivated.
Why NAM is Attacking Shareholders Now
The investor letter noted that, “The emergence of MSIC and the release of this report come at a time when investor support for shareholder proposals is growing” because the “business case behind them is clear and convincing.” The signatories requested that the companies explain their views on MSIC’s public attempts to discredit investor engagement and shareholder proposals.
Over 80 institutional investors, including state and city pension funds, investor trade associations, investment firms and mutual funds, foundations and religious investors added their organization’s names in support of the letter.
Investors are actively engaging companies in their portfolios as concerns over climate risk grow. Most recently, investors representing approximately $30 trillion urged some 150 companies to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions, disclose their assessment of climate risks, and explain what actions they plan in response to climate risk.
Investors like BlackRock, Vanguard and State Street have made it clear that they want the companies in which they own shares to address climate risk.
“It is extremely bad timing for NAM and by implication the members of its board to be attacking investors addressing climate change at a moment when we desperately need to work together,” said Smith.
Since I am older than most of my readers, I offer the following historical perspective. The investor letter sent to the Executive Committee and Board NAM is correct in assuming that shareholder rights are under attack because their proposals are winning. The current fight on climate change and social issues reminds me of an older one on proxy access. In 1977 the SEC held a number of hearings to address corporate scandals. At that time, the Business Roundtable (BRT) recommended amendments to Rule 14a-8 that would allow access proposals, noting such amendments
… would do no more than allow the establishment of machinery to enable shareholders to exercise rights acknowledged to exist under state law.
The right to pursue proxy access at any given company was uncontroversial. In 1980 Unicare Services included a proposal to allow any three shareowners to nominate and place candidates on the proxy. Shareowners at Mobil proposed a “reasonable number,” while those at Union Oil proposed a threshold of “500 or more shareholders” to place nominees on corporate proxies.
One company argued that placing a minimum threshold on access would discriminate “in favor of large stockholders and to the detriment of small stockholders,” violating equal treatment principles. CalPERS participated in the movement, submitting a proposal in 1988 but withdrawing it when Texaco agreed to include their nominee.
Early attempts to win proxy access through shareowner resolutions met with the same fate as most resolutions in those days – they failed. But the tides of change turned. A 1987 proposal by Lewis Gilbert to allow shareowners to ratify the choice of auditors won a majority vote at Chock Full of O’Nuts Corporation and in 1988 Richard Foley’s proposal to redeem a poison pill won a majority vote at the Santa Fe Southern Pacific Corporation.
In 1990, without public discussion or a rule change, the SEC began issuing a series of no-action letters on proxy access proposals. The SEC’s about-face was prompted by fear that “private ordering,” through shareowner proposals was about to begin in earnest. It took more than 20 years of struggle to win back the right to file proxy access proposals.
Let’s hope the current attack on shareholder rights by NAM and the fake Main Street Investors Coalition does not set investor rights back by another 20 years.
In June I submitted a proposal to WDFC to allow special meetings.
WDFC to Allow Special Meetings: The Proposal
Provide Right to Call Special Shareholder Meeting
RESOLVED: The shareholders of WD-40 Company (‘WDFC’ or ‘Company’) hereby request the Board of Directors take the steps necessary to amend our bylaws and each appropriate governing document to give holders with an aggregate of 15% net long of our outstanding common stock the power to call a special shareowner meeting. This proposal does not impact our board’s current power to call a special meeting. Continue Reading →
The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced the agenda for the September 13th meeting of its Investor Advisory Committee (SEC-IAC). The meeting will begin at 9:00 a.m. in the Multipurpose Room at SEC headquarters at 100 F Street, NE, Washington, D.C., and is open to the public. The meeting will be webcast live and archived on the committee’s website for later viewing. The committee will hold panel discussions with outside speakers on two topics. These topics, especially the first, take on increased importance as Trump Administration appointment fill out the SEC and as the SEC seeks input on its strategic plan. Continue Reading →
“Impact investing” – financial investments designed to generate a measurable, positive impact on society, while also providing potential returns – is growing in popularity, according to new research conducted by American Century Investments. The “appeal” of impact investing reached 49% among 2018 survey participants, compared to 38% in 2016. At 56%, Millennials find impact investing most appealing, followed by Gen Xers and Baby Boomers at 52% and 44%, respectively. Continue Reading →
The deceptive title of a recent op-ed in the Wall Street Journal would not keep politics out of the boardroom. Instead, the recommendations would deny shareholders the right to request boards disclose those politics, in addition to denying many other long-standing rights. Read the op-ed and weep that such trash gets published in the Journal.
This is my response to the 7/18/2018 op-ed “Keep Politics Out of the Boardroom” by Phil Gramm and Mike Solon. I waited before publishing this, in case WSJ chose to publish my rebuttal. They did not. Continue Reading →
In a tweet this morning, President Trump said he had asked the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to study changing required financial reporting for public companies from a quarterly system to reporting every six months.
The Council of Institutional Investors (CII) believes that public companies should continue to report quarterly on their financial performance. Said Amy Borrus, CII’s deputy director; Continue Reading →
Microcap Board Governance, a study conducted by Board Governance Research LLC commissioned by the Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute (IRRCi), examines microcap board governance at 160 companies. That represents about ten percent of all companies with less than $300 million in market capitalization traded on major U.S. stock exchanges. Continue Reading →
WBA Stock Buyback Proposal is my latest submission in an attempt to address CEO pay and long-term performance. As mentioned previously (Stock Buyback: Shareholder Initiative) this is a new type of proposal for me. I welcomed feedback from readers and certainly got it. The wording of this proposal is substantially better, thanks to your many suggestions! Continue Reading →
An updated 2018 AFL-CIO Key Votes Survey form is now available for completion by investment managers. Please note that the previously announced vote at Amazon will not be included in the 2018 AFL-CIO Key Votes Survey as the proposal was withdrawn before the annual meeting. The survey form can be downloaded as an Adobe Acrobat PDF file here: Continue Reading →
For far too long, labor and its progressive sympathizers have sought to transform the market from outside the market: from courts, from legislatures, from regulators, from street protests, from strikes. These tools are important. But ultimately, it is not possible to transform the market from the outside. It must be transformed from within. (xiv)
A Nation of Small Shareholders: Marketing Wall Street after World War II (Studies in Industry and Society) by Janice M. Traflet (link to buy) explains how an ad campaign began to transform American finance. With all the current focus on Main Street investors, A Nation of Small Shareholders could be revisited and transformed to include more Americans in a dynamic capitalism that embraces the values of American citizens. Continue Reading →
Netflix Approach to Governance: Genuine Transparency with the Board (download) by David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan takes a look at one aspect of corporate governance at Netflix and finds “a radically different approach to information sharing” by management with the Board. Shareholders are largely left out of the equation.
Netflix Approach to Governance: Management
Netflix Approach to Governance has the appearance of a balanced look at how management shares information with the Board. There is no suggestion the approach can be widely copied. Says Larker,
I think it would be hard to put this type of system in place at older and more mature organizations. Innovative organizations that want and need the insights from board members can clearly adapt this type of approach. You need a CEO who wants a high level of discussion about strategy, etc., and is open to alternative points of view.
Transparency works at Netflix, at least in part, because CEO Reed Hastings understands board members would not have the confidence to make tough calls unless they have a better understanding of the company.
Transparency is hard to argue against, unless it leads to directors leaking information that reaches competitors. Larcker and Tayan interviewed CEO Reed Hastings and most of the board members. They describe two key features of what they appear to believe is remmanagement transparency.
Board members attend monthly and quarterly senior management meetings as observers. Communications to the board take the shape of approximately 30-page memos that are heavy on analysis and contain links to all relevant data on the company’s internal computer systems. (Another Netflix Disruption: A Transparent Board)
More frequent meetings with senior staff and more information allows Netflix directors to work more effectively, since they are better able to assess strategic developments. It is hard to tell what impact transparency is having on the company but,
Netflix has been enormously successful over the last five years. Revenues have nearly tripled, increasing to $11.69 billion from $4.4 billion at the end of 2013, while the market cap soared to $133 billion from $4.4 billion.
Directors like the approach.
The overall tone Reed has set, really from early days, is around transparency. … There is no editorializing. There’s no censorship.
It’s just a deep desire to hear rational, well-argued pros and cons of any decision.
No censorship and frank discussions between management and board; if other companies are not operating that way, why not? Equally important, why does that approach not carry through to the relationship between shareholders and the board?
Netflix Approach to Governance: Shareholders
Their research, part of the informative Stanford Closer Look Series, begins with the following sentence:
The hallmark of good corporate governance is an independent-minded board of directors to oversee management and represent the interests of shareholders.
The only other significant reference to shareholders comes later in the following sentence:
While fiduciary rules allow directors to rely exclusively on information provided by management, dynamics such as these can reduce the quality of that information and impair their ability to make good decisions on behalf of shareholders.
Even through the law allows directors to rely on what the CEO and other senior executives tell them, directors make better decisions when the company is more transparent – when they can observe meetings further down the chain and have more direct access to company relevant data. Yet, the Netflix approach to governance appears one-sided. Transparency and dialogue are missing when it comes to management and shareholders.
As I pointed out in a recent post, Netflix has repeatedly ignored shareholder votes. (Will Netflix Ignore Stockholders Again?) While proxy proposals are generally precatory, most companies implement those receiving a majority vote and often those that do not. The Netflix approach to governance appears to ignore proxy votes whenever legally possible.
- In 2014 a majority voted to declassify the board and to require a majority vote to elect directors.
- In 2015 similar proposals were voted and won. A majority of shareholders also voted against director Barton, who, although he lost, was up for reelection this year.
- In 2016 a majority of shares were voted in favor of proxy access, reducing supermajority vote requirements, and declassifying the board.
- In 2017 a majority of shares were voted in favor of proxy access, to declassify the board, to require a majority vote for electing directors and to eliminate all supermajority voting requirements. As far as I know, none of those proposals were implemented by the Board.
- In 2018 a majority of shares were voted in favor of the following:
- Reduce Ownership Threshold for Shareholders to Call Special Meeting (57%)
- Adopt Proxy Access Right (58%)
- Provide Right to Act by Written Consent (52%)
- Adopt Simple Majority Vote (85%)
- Amend Bylaws (72%) This was a binding proposal to require directors in uncontested elections to be elected by a majority of shares voted
Given the Netflix approach to governance with regard to shareholders, I expect the only proposal that will be adopted from this year is the binding proposal to require a majority vote in uncontested directors elections. The vote in favor surpassed the bylaw requirement of a two-thirds threshold.
Although I do not question the scholarship of Larcker and Tayan, their discussion of the Netflix approach to governance would benefit from an examination of shareholder relations with the board. We hope that is on their agenda for a closer look.
Netflix Approach to Governance: Other Views
- Netflix Shareholders Again Fail to Change Rules to Elect Board Members by Simple Majority Vote
- Consider Director Conduct at the 2018 Netflix annual meeting when you vote regarding directors in 2019
- Netflix Rejects Claims That Exec Bonuses Hurt Shareholders
- Netflix investors, once again, seek change in proxy access, voting rules
We have an early partial victory at Clorox (CLX). Real victory at Clorox will depend on getting out the vote. Yes, that is the same as what is required for government elections in November if we want change. The Clorox meeting is also expected in November.
High voter turnout is required at Clorox because we seek, now with the Board’s endorsement, to overturn a supermajority provision in the Certificate of Incorporation that requires 80% of the voting power vote FOR repealing supermajority requirements for approval of business combinations. For that provision to be repealed, we need to turn out a huge percentage of shareholders and get the to vote in favor. Following is the “Resolved” portion of our proposal: Continue Reading →
A stock buyback can increase senior executive pay, unrelated to performance. First, stock buybacks increase the value of long-term performance stock options and other forms of equity pay. Second, senior executives sometimes time their own stock sales to take advantage of the bump in price that usually accompanies stock buyback announcements. Such behavior defeats the purpose of incentivizing a long-term focus. To address our concern that performance pay should not be artificially boosted by a stock buyback, I recently submitted a proposal to Cisco Systems and expect to submit similar proposals to other companies.
Last year, I submitted a similar proposal to GE. The updated submission to Cisco Systems adds a provision to address market timing. As always, I welcome suggestions and comments from interested readers. How can such resolutions be improved? What have I missed? Or, if you disagree, why are my concerns unwarranted? Use the comment section below the post or email me. Continue Reading →
SEC Strategic Plan
SEC Strategic Plan focuses on helping “Main Street“make “informed investment decisions.” Little or no attention is paid in the draft Plan to helping us make informed governance decisions. Continue Reading →
Environmental health program manager wanted by my favorite nonprofit, As You Sow. Austin Wilson is leaving for a period of extensive travel. I will certainly miss him and hope when he returns he will find similar employment. Looking to make the world a better place and have the right skills and experience? There is probably no better place you could be working. Official job announcement. Continue Reading →
Eliminate Supermajority Voting Requirements
Proposal #6 asks the Board to eliminate supermajority voting requirements, seeking instead, that decisions by shareholders be made based on a majority of the votes cast for and against proposals. Continue Reading →
Celgene 2018 meeting, 6/13. Vote AGAINST several directors; FOR proxy access & independent board chair to enhance long-term shareholder value. Informed voting in 10 minutes. Continue Reading →
The Salesforce 2018 (CRM) annual meeting is June 12. CRM is on the right track. It needs a few good governance measures, including special meeting rights and an end to supermajority requirements. You can vote FOR both in the Salesforce 2018 proxy. Continue Reading →
The Biogen 2018 annual meeting is June 12. I voted AGAINST several directors and the pay package. Vote FOR the auditor and both shareholder proposals to enhance value.
Biogen Inc. (BIIB) discovers, develops, manufactures, and delivers therapies for the treatment of neurological and neurodegenerative diseases worldwide. Most shareholders do not vote because reading through 80+ pages of the proxy is not worth the time for the small difference your vote will make. Below, I tell you how I am voting and why.
If you have read these posts related to my portfolio for the last 22 years, have values aligned with mine, and trust my judgment, go immediately to see how I voted my ballot. Voting will take you only a minute or two and every vote counts.
Netflix Statement Re Proposal #4: Right to Call Special Meetings
This proposal simply asks for a shareholder right to call a special meeting. Special meetings are a way to bring an important matter to the attention of both management and shareholders outside the annual meeting cycle. That is important because there could be 15-months between annual meetings. The 15% threshold is still well above the 10% allowed by law, which many other companies provide. Emergencies do happen. 64% of S&P 500 companies provide for special meetings.
Let me also put this proposal in context.
Last year a majority of shares were voted in favor of proxy access, to declassify the board, a majority vote for electing directors and to eliminate all supermajority voting requirements. As far as I know, none of those proposals were implemented by the Board. Continue Reading →
Tesla Proxy Access, item #4
Tesla shareholders meet Tuesday, June 5, 2018, at 2:30 p.m. Pacific Time, at the Computer History Museum located at 1401 N. Shoreline Blvd., Mountain View, CA 94043. In the interest of more accurate press coverage of Tesla Proxy Access, item #4, I (James McRitchie) am posting the text of my draft presentation on Tesla Proxy Access in advance. Continue Reading →
Genomic Health 2018 annual meeting is June 6. Will 40% owner Baker Brothers Advisors LP allow proxy access? Genomic Health (GHDX) provides actionable genomic information to personalize cancer treatment decisions worldwide. If Baker Brothers eventually hopes to sell its shares into the market, they would do well to vote for proxy access. Other shareholders will pay a premium for shares of a company with proxy access and other corporate governance provisions that enhance board accountability.
Most shareholders do not vote because reading through 20+ pages of the proxy is not worth the time for the small difference your vote will make, especially when one shareholder has such control. Below, I tell you how I am voting and why.
If you have read these posts related to my portfolio for the last 22 years, have values aligned with mine, and trust my judgment (or you don’t want to take the time to read it), go immediately to see how I voted my ballot. Voting will take you only a minute or two and every vote counts.
Tesla 2018 annual meeting is June 5, 2018. Tesla, Inc. (TSLA) designs, develops, manufactures, and sells electric vehicles, and energy generation and storage systems in the United States and internationally. If Tesla is to survive and thrive, it needs a more independent board. The vote of shareholders will be crucial in deciding Tesla’s future.
Most shareholders do not vote because reading through 50+ pages of the proxy is not worth the time for the small difference their vote will make. I have done the work for you.
Below, I tell you how I am voting and why. If you have read these posts related to my portfolio for the last 22 years, have values aligned with mine, and trust my judgment (or you don’t want to take the time to read most of the post), go immediately to see how I voted my ballot. Voting will take you only a minute or two. Every vote does count. I voted against the Board’s recommendations 100% of the time on the Tesla 2018 proxy. View Proxy Statement via SEC’s EDGAR system (look for DEF 14A). Continue Reading →
Corporate governance at Facebook is much closer to being a dictatorship than a democracy. Who is the better model, George Washington or Vladimir Putin? Continue Reading →
Alphabet and Facebook shareholders will once again vote on shareholder proposals at their 2018 annual shareholder meetings related to unequal voting structures. With growing concerns about data and privacy issues, shareholders will weigh in on how other company governance issues are also at play.
Voting results will influence whether America will continue its long course toward “democratic” corporate governance or will revert to corporate governance by oligarchs.
Explained NorthStar Asset Management CEO Julie Goodridge.
Through these shareholder resolutions, common shareholders have been showing concern for years regarding managements’ outsized voting rights at both companies, and this year’s proposal couldn’t be timelier given the recent fallout from seemingly endless data mismanagement issues at Facebook.
A proposal brought by socially responsible investment firm NorthStar Asset Management, Inc. at Facebook and Alphabet, with corporate governance activist and author James McRitchie as a co-lead filer at Alphabet, seeks to change this arrangement.
We are asking both Facebook and Alphabet to recapitalize the shares so that each share gets one vote. Alphabet and Facebook are publicly traded, and we believe that status as a public company should come with an equal right to vote. Given the scandals this year at Facebook, it is clearly time for shareholders to have meaningful input on company management issues.
At Alphabet, which has three classes of stock, insiders like Sergey Brin, Larry Page, and former chairman Eric Schmidt control 58% of the vote while owning less than 13% of economic stake combined. Similarly at Facebook, ordinary shareholders buying shares on public markets have access to shares with one vote (class A), while insiders like CEO Mark Zuckerberg own shares with 10 votes per share (class B). Critics of the voting structures at these companies point out that it would be essentially impossible for class A shareholders to “out-vote” the founders, even on significant or concerning matters.
According to Mari Schwartzer, NorthStar’s Director of Shareholder Activism and Engagement,
We can see this in results of the 2016 annual meeting in which Facebook proposed a new non-voting class of stock in order to allow Mr. Zuckerberg to give away the lion’s share of his wealth without losing control of the company. Our estimates indicate that about 71% of outside shareholders voted against the creation of this new class of stock, yet Mr. Zuckerberg moved forward with attempting to create it. To stockholders, this is evidence that Facebook does not take common shareholders’ wishes seriously.
Mr. Zuckerberg owns almost 14% of stake in the company but controls nearly 53% of the vote, which allowed the company proposal to pass; a shareholder lawsuit halted that aspiration last fall.
At last year’s annual meetings, NorthStar estimates that over 61% of Facebook class A (outside) shareholders and over 88% of Alphabet class A shares voted in favor of the recapitalization plan to one vote per share. NorthStar hopes those figures continue to stay strong at the upcoming annual meetings – Facebook shareholders vote this Thursday, May 31 while Alphabet shareholders will vote next week on June 6th.
This year is monumental for Facebook in particular, but for tech companies in general. The Cambridge Analytica scandal illustrated how risky and potentially damaging it can be to manage user data, but these issues aren’t at rest yet. Amazon’s personal assistant Alexa just hit the news last week when a private conversation was recorded and sent to a couple’s contacts. Clearly, these data privacy issues are concerns that shareholders should pay close attention to when they vote their proxies and think about how company governance plays a role here.
NorthStar’s Goodridge went on to explain that shareholder interests are not just about fairness:
We are very concerned about shareholders’ inability to deal with this issue at the board level. Mr. Zuckerberg has formed a board with close ties and loyalties to him. We do not believe that the board would step in to ask him to step down if another scandal were to wrack shareholder value further. Shareholder input is crucial for long-term value and company growth.
NorthStar Asset Management, Inc. is a wealth management company based in Boston with a focus on socially responsible investing. At NorthStar, creative shareholder engagement is a positive force for change.
Alphabet and Facebook are clearly trendsetting companies. As Alphabet and Facebook go, so goes the nation. Will our country increasingly be the headquarters of corporate dictatorships? Will corporate dictatorships support a strong democratic government in these United States of America, or will they continue to seek short-term power and profits for the few at the expense of conditions that favor the long-term broader interests of all their shareholders and users?
How shares are voted at Alphabet and Facebook could send a clear message to those in power. Help put an end to democratic-free zones. The oligarchs at both Alphabet and Facebook would do well to end their sovereign rule for their own self-interest.
Even if their votes were strictly tied to their economic stake, the founders of Alphabet and Facebook would still wield considerable power. Instead of being dictatorships they would have to listen to other shareholders and share power.
Instead of what some might consider “lapdog” boards, Alphabet and Facebook could attract more knowledgeable, independent directors, not afraid to speak their minds. Turning around corporate governance at Alphabet and Facebook could also preserve the reputations of these companies and their founders as leaders and avoid cumbersome regulations.
George Washington was encouraged to continue as President for life but stepped down for the good of the country. The founders of Alphabet and Facebook should take a page from history.
Amazon 2018 annual meeting is May 30th. View proxy. I do not have time to go through my usual voting rationale. I am too busy with companies where I have a proposal. However, I want to bring to your attention a very important proposal from Bruce Herbert at Newground Social Investments, starting at page 18. The topic is vote counting for shareholder proposals and it goes to the heart of democracy, or lack thereof, at Amazon. Vote today, especially for item 6. Do no let Amazon’s Board rig the vote. Continue Reading →
FB, Facebook, provides various products to connect and share through mobile devices, personal computers, and other surfaces worldwide. Most shareholders do not vote because reading through 60+ pages of the proxy is not worth the time for the small difference your vote will make. Below, I tell you how I am voting and why. If you have read these posts related to my portfolio for the last 22 years, have values aligned with mine, and trust my judgment (or you don’t want to take the time to read it), go immediately to see how I voted my ballot.
Voting will take you only a minute or two and every vote counts. The annual meeting is coming up on May 31, 2018. I voted with the Board’s recommendations 0% of the time. Facebook’s corporate governance needs a makeover, away from dictratorship. View Proxy Statement via SEC’s EDGAR system (look for DEF 14A). Continue Reading →