Tag Archives | CEO Compensation

Chipotle Mexican Grill Proxy Guide

Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc. (CMG), together with its subsidiaries, operates Chipotle Mexican Grill restaurants. As of December 31, 2017, it operated 2,363 Chipotle restaurants throughout the United States, as well as 37 international Chipotle restaurants; and 8 non-Chipotle restaurants. Most shareholders do not vote because reading through 70+ pages of the proxy is not worth the time for the small difference your vote will make.

Below, I tell you how I am voting and why. If you have read these posts related to my portfolio for the last 22 years, have values aligned with mine, and trust my judgment (or you don’t want to take the time to read it), go immediately to see how I voted my ballot. Voting will take you only a minute or two and every vote counts. The annual meeting is coming up on May 22, 2018. I voted with the Board’s recommendations 38% of the time. View Proxy Statement via SEC’s EDGAR system (look for DEF 14A). Continue Reading →

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PayPal Holdings Proxy Recommendations

PayPal Holdings (PYPL), operates as a technology platform company that enables digital and mobile payments on behalf of consumers and merchants worldwide. Its payment solutions include PayPal, PayPal Credit, Braintree, Venmo, Xoom, and Paydiant products.

Most shareholders do not vote because reading through 100+ pages of the proxy is not worth the time for the small difference your vote will make. Below, I tell you how I am voting and why. If you have read these posts related to my portfolio for the last 22 years, have values aligned with mine, and trust my judgment (or you don’t want to take the time to read it), go immediately to see how I voted my ballot. Voting will take you only a minute or two and every vote counts. The annual meeting is coming up on May 23, 2018. I voted with the Board’s recommendations 44% of the time. View Proxy Statement via SEC’s EDGAR system (look for DEF 14A). Continue Reading →

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Intel Proxy Voting Recommendations

Intel Corporation (INTC), designs, manufactures, and sells computer, networking, data storage, and communication platforms worldwide. Most shareholders do not vote because reading through 100+ pages of the proxy is not worth the time for the small difference your vote will make. Below, I tell you how I am voting and why. If you have read these posts related to my portfolio for the last 22 years, have values aligned with mine, and trust my judgment (or you don’t want to take the time to read it), go immediately to see how I voted my ballot. Voting will take you only a minute or two and every vote counts. The annual meeting is coming up on May 17, 2018. I voted with the Board’s recommendations 53% of the time. View Proxy Statement via SEC’s EDGAR system (look for DEF 14A). Continue Reading →

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United-Guardian Proxy Rule Violation

United-Guardian (UG), United-Guardian, Inc. manufactures and markets cosmetic ingredients, personal care products, pharmaceuticals, medical lubricants, healthcare products, and specialty industrial products in the United States and internationally. Most shareholders do not vote because reading through the proxy is not worth the time for the small difference your vote will make, although this one is only 16 pages Below, I tell you how I voted and why. The annual meeting is coming up on May 16, 2018. I voted with the Board’s recommendations 0% of the time, since our Company flagrantly violated regulations. View Proxy Statement via SEC’s EDGAR system (look for DEF 14A). Continue Reading →

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Charles Schwab Proxy Voting Guide

Charles Schwab Corporation (SCHW), through its subsidiaries, provides wealth management, securities brokerage, banking, asset management, custody, and financial advisory services. Most shareholders do not vote because reading through 100+ pages of the proxy is not worth the time for the small difference your vote will make. Below, I tell you how I voted and why.

If you have read these posts related to my portfolio for the last 22 years, have values aligned with mine, and trust my judgment (or you don’t want to take the time to read it), go immediately to see how I voted my ballot. Voting will take you only a minute or two and every vote counts.

The annual meeting is coming up on May 15, 2018. I voted with the Board’s recommendations 60% of the time. View Proxy Statement via SEC’s EDGAR system (look for DEF 14A). Continue Reading →

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3D Systems Proxy Voting Guide

3D Systems Corporation (DDD), through its subsidiaries, provides three-dimensional (3D) printing products and services worldwide. Most shareholders do not vote because reading through 50+ pages of the proxy is not worth the time for the small difference your vote will make. Below, I tell you how I voted and why. If you have read these posts related to my portfolio for the last 22 years and trust my judgment (or you don’t want to take the time to read my rationale), go immediately to see how I voted my ballot. Voting will take you only a minute or two and every vote counts.

The annual meeting is coming up on May 15, 2018. I voted with the Board’s recommendations 67% of the time. View Proxy Statement via SEC’s EDGAR system (look for DEF 14A).

Read Warnings below. What follows are my recommendations on how to vote the proxy in order to enhance corporate governance and long-term value.

3D Systems: ISS Rating

From the Yahoo Finance profile:

3D Systems Corporation’s ISS Governance QualityScore as of April 1, 2018 is 4. The pillar scores are Audit: 2; Board: 3; Shareholder Rights: 1; Compensation: 10.

Corporate governance scores courtesy of Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Scores indicate decile rank relative to index or region. A decile score of 1 indicates lower governance risk, while a 10 indicates higher governance risk. Therefore, we need to pay closer attention to executive compensation.

3D Systems: Board Proposals

1. 3D Systems Proxy Voting Guide: Directors

Egan-Jones Proxy Services recommends “For,” with the exception of: William E. Curran (1A), Kevin S. Moore (1I) and Jim D. Kever (1F) because they have served for more than ten years (with compromised independence) and sit on key committees, which should be composed only of independent directors. Although I agree with the thrust of their arguments, I am not ready to set that as my policy.

Since I voted against the pay package, I also voted against all members of the compensation committee: William E. Curran, William D. Humes, and Kevin S. Moore. I also note, there are no women on the board. I am inclined to vote against the nominating committee next year, if that continues.

2. 3D Systems: Executive Compensation

3D Systems’ Summary Compensation Table shows the highest paid named executive officer (NEO) was CEO Vyomesh I. Joshi at $1.9M. I’m using Yahoo! Finance to determine market cap ($1.3B) and I am roughly defining large-cap as $10B, mid-cap as $2-10B, and small-cap as less than $2B. 3D Systems is a small-cap company. According to the Equilar Top 25 Executive Compensation Survey 2015, the median CEO compensation at small-cap corporations was $3M in 2014, so pay was under that amount.

3D Systems shares substantially underperformed the Nasdaq over the most recent one, two, and five year time periods. For 2017 the ratio of the annual total compensation of Mr. Joshi, our CEO, to the annual total compensation of our median employee was 35 to 1.

Egan-Jones Proxy Services rates compensation practices as “Neutral” and recommends For.
Egan-Jones

However, to me it looks like 3D Systems is gaming the system, since they substantially reduced pay from $8.1M to $1.9M in one year. I feel I cannot ignore this recent history of overpaying. That factor and continued underperformance led me to vote “AGAINST” the say-on-pay item, as well as members of the compensation committee.

3. 3D Systems: Ratify Auditors

I have no reason to believe the auditor has rendered an inaccurate opinion, is engaged in poor accounting practices, or has a conflict of interest.  However, Egan-Jones notes the auditor has been serving as the Company’s auditor for more seven years and their independence is compromised. I also believe that the companies should consider the rotation of their audit firm to ensure auditor objectivity, professionalism and independence. I have not set a specific number of years. In this case I voted FOR.

3D Systems: Shareholder Proposals

4. REDUCE THE OWNERSHIP REQUIRED FOR STOCKHOLDERS TO CALL A SPECIAL MEETING 

This proposal is from Myra Young, as written and recommended by me (James McRitchie), so we certainly voted in favor. Most states allow 10% to call a special meeting. Before we submitted the proposal 3D Systems had a threshold of 50+%, so we have already won substantial ground prior to this vote. We believe 15% is a reasonable compromise above the 10% standard.

Vote FOR.

3D Systems CorpGov RecommendationsProxy Insight

Proxy Democracy was down. Proxy Insight reported on CalSTRS. which also voted AGAINST the pay package and compensation committee. They voted FOR all other items, including our shareholder proposal to lower the requirements for calling a special meeting.

CorpGov Votes:

  1. Directors: Vote AGAINST William E. Curran, William D. Humes, and Kevin S. Moore.
  2. Auditor: Vote For.
  3. Ratify Executive Pay: Vote Against.
  4. Reduce Ownership Requirement to Call a Special Meeting; Vote FOR

3D Systems: Issues for Future Proposals

SharkRepellentLooking at SharkRepellent.net for other provisions unfriendly to shareowners:

  • Special meetings can only be called by shareholders holding not less than 25% of the voting power.
  • Proxy access provisions are Lite.  A shareholder or group of no more than 20 shareholders holding at least 3% of the outstanding common stock continuously for at least three (3) years may nominate directors, so long as the number of directors elected via proxy access does not exceed 20% of the board.

3D Systems: Mark Your Calendar

Under Rule 14a-8 of the Exchange Act, certain stockholder proposals may be eligible for inclusion in our proxy statement and form of proxy for our 2019 Annual Meeting. The date by which we must receive stockholder proposals to be considered for inclusion in the proxy statement and form of proxy for the 2019 Annual Meeting of Stockholders is November 28, 2018 or, if the date of our 2019 Annual Meeting is changed by more than 30 days from May 15, 2018, a reasonable time before we begin to print and mail the proxy materials for the 2019 Annual Meeting.

Warnings

Be sure to vote each item on the proxy. Any items left blank are voted in favor of management’s recommendations. (See Broken Windows & Proxy Vote Rigging – Both Invite More Serious Crime). I generally vote against pay packages where NEOs were paid above median in the previous year but make exceptions if warranted. According to Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Grinstein, Yaniv (The Growth of Executive Pay), aggregate compensation by public companies to NEOs increased from 5 percent of earnings in 1993-1995 to about 10 percent in 2001-2003.

Few firms admit to having average executives. They generally set compensation at above average for their “peer group,” which is often chosen aspirationally. While the “Lake Woebegone effect” may be nice in fictional towns, “where all the children are above average,” it doesn’t work well for society to have all CEOs considered above average, with their collective pay spiraling out of control. We need to slow the pace of money going to the 1% if our economy is not to become third world. The rationale for peer group benchmarking is a mythological market for CEOs. For more on the subject, see CEO Pay Machine Destroying America.

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Ford Motor Company Proxy Voting Guide

Ford Motor Company (F) designs, manufactures, markets, and services a range of Ford cars, trucks, sport utility vehicles, and electrified vehicles; and Lincoln luxury vehicles worldwide. Placing a big bet on the continued profitability of gas guzzling SUVs and trucks, they recently announced phasing out most sedans. Most shareholders do not vote because reading through 100+ pages of the proxy is not worth the time for the small difference your vote will make. Below, I tell you how I voted and why. If you have read these posts related to my portfolio for the last 22 years and trust my judgment (or you don’t want to take the time to read my rationale), go immediately to see how I voted my ballot. Voting will take you only a minute or two and every vote counts.

The annual meeting is coming up on May 10, 2018. I voted with the Board’s recommendations 52% of the time. View Proxy Statement via SEC’s EDGAR system (look for DEF 14A). Continue Reading →

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Invesco Proxy Voting Guide

Invesco Ltd. (IVZ) provides investment management services to retail clients, institutional clients, high-net worth clients, public entities, corporations, unions, non-profit organizations, endowments, foundations, pension funds, financial institutions, and sovereign wealth funds. Most shareholders do not vote because reading through 70 pages of the proxy is not worth the time for the small difference your vote will make. Below, I tell you how I am voting and why. If you have read these posts related to my portfolio for the last 22 years and trust my judgment (or you don’t want to take the time to read it), go immediately to see how I voted my ballot. Voting will take you only a minute or two and every vote counts.

The annual meeting is coming up on May 10 2018. I voted with the Board’s recommendations 35% of the time. View Proxy Statement via SEC’s EDGAR system (look for DEF 14A). Continue Reading →

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Gilead Sciences Proxy Voting Guide

Gilead Sciences (GILD), a biopharmaceutical company, discovers, develops, and commercializes therapeutics in the areas of unmet medical needs in the United States, Europe, and internationally. Most shareholders do not vote because reading through 80+ pages of the proxy is not worth the time for the small difference your vote will make. Below, I tell you how I voted and why. If you have read these posts related to my portfolio for the last 22 years and trust my judgment (or you don’t want to take the time to read my rationale), go immediately to see how I voted my ballot. Voting will take you only a minute or two and every vote counts.

The annual meeting is coming up on May 9 2018. I voted with the Board’s recommendations 61% of the time. View Proxy Statement via SEC’s EDGAR system (look for DEF 14A). Continue Reading →

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3M Company Proxy Voting Guide

3M Company (MMM) operates as a diversified technology company worldwide. Most shareholders do not vote because reading through 80+ pages of the proxy is not worth the time for the small difference your vote will make. Below, I tell you how I voted and why. If you have read these posts related to my portfolio for the last 22 years and trust my judgment (or you don’t want to take the time to read my rationale), go immediately to see how I voted my ballot. Voting will take you only a minute or two and every vote counts.

The annual meeting is coming up on May 8, 2018. I voted with the Board’s recommendations 44% of the time. View Proxy Statement via SEC’s EDGAR system (look for DEF 14A). Continue Reading →

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Compensation: The Difference it Makes

Compensation:  The Difference it Makes

Compensation. Most Americans think CEOs of the 500 largest publicly traded corporations are overpaid, even though they think CEOs made less than a tenth of what they actually earn. The Rock Center for Corporate Governance at Stanford University conducted a nationwide survey of 1,202 individuals — representative by gender, race, age, political affiliation, household income, and state residence — to understand public perception of CEO pay levels among the  Key takeaways are:

  • CEOs are vastly overpaid, according to most Americans
  • Most support drastic reductions
  • The public is divided on government intervention

Americans and CEO Pay: 2016 Public Perception Survey on CEO Compensation found 74% believe that CEOs are not paid the correct amount relative to the average worker. Only 16% believe that they are.

A brave panel tackled the topic, Compensation: The Difference it Makes, at the Corporate Directors Forums I attended in San Diego last month. Like all Corporate Directors Forums, this one operated under the Chatham House Rule, so you will not find any direct quotes below. These are my notes on Compensation: The Difference it Makes. As such, they include my opinions as well observations made by speakers panelists and others in attendance at the Forum. This is certainly not a transcript. However, I hope even those who attended the Forum will find the post useful, especially my attempt to provide additional context through links and commentary. Continue Reading →

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The CEO Pay Problem

CEO Pay ProblemHere in the first days of autumn, it seems that every day there is another article about the sorry extreme that executive compensation has become at so many companies. With the many tools now at the disposal of the proxy voter, one has to ask, how did we get here, and how do we fix it?

Of course, when asking the question of how did we get here, there is the standard answer, “greed,” but there has always been greed in corporate America, I don’t believe that the captains of industry at the beginning of the 20th century where any less greedy at heart than those of today.Egan-Jones Ratings Continue Reading →

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Say-On-Pay Key Coordination Issues

Say-on-Pay (SOP)A recent paper [Miriam Schwartz-Ziv and Russ Wermers,  Do Small and Large Shareholders Have a Say-on-Pay? (October 15, 2014) available at SSRN] investigates the voting patterns of shareholders on Say-On-Pay and finds that ‘small’ shareholders are more likely than large shareholders to use the non-binding Say-On-Pay vote to govern their companies, are more likely to vote for an annual Say-On-Pay vote, and are more likely to vote “against” Say-On-Pay (i.e., to vote against the pay package). Continue Reading →

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Board or Shareholders – Who Should Determine Management Compensation? A Model of Compensation Governance

The efficacy of boards of directors as a critical governance institution has attracted increasing scrutiny in the wake of the recent financial meltdown. CEO compensation which consequentially determines overall management compensation in a firm, is a key governance decision entrusted with the board. A relevant, though unexplored question would be whether shareholders are better served by making the compensation decision themselves.

In this paper, in a game theoretic set up, we analyze shareholder payoffs under the traditional delegated- governance structure wherein shareholders set the compensation of the board, but delegate the management compensation decision to the board, and contrast such delegated- governance with an alternate owner-governance structure wherein shareholders determine the compensation contracts for both the board and management. Under unobservable effort, we consider both deterministic and stochastic firm performance, jointly determined by the effort of the board and management.

We find that shareholders are never worse off under owner-governance, though management wages as well as effort are higher under certain conditions. Within a deterministic setting, board wages as well as effort are equal or higher with centralized governance. Under extreme stochastic effects, which might describe boom or bust environments, it does not pay to incentivize the board or management to expend effort. In a stochastic environment where output is determined primarily by board effort, it does not pay to incentivize management for effort. Our analysis suggests a possible explanation for the puzzling observation of rising managerial compensation, often not in congruence with firm performance, as the board faces no penalty for misaligned managerial wages under delegated-governance. We show that owner-governance generally eliminates non-aligned incentive structures.

via SSRN-Board or Shareholders – Who Should Determine Management Compensation? A Model of Compensation Governance by Shivendu Shivendu, Joseph Vithayathil.

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