Tag Archives | controlled companies

BuyThisPlatform: Twitter Explores Co-op Capitalism

Twitter has been an important tool to promote democracy – think #ArabSpring#BackLivesMatter, BuyThisPlatform#OccupyWallStreet#WomenOnBoards, etc. Now, through #BuyTwitter @ BuyThisPlatform, Twitter is being called on to explore its own form of corporate governance – how the company itself can be more democratic and inclusive. The results could have implications for the future of capitalism.

Take Action: On May 22 shareholders (owning as of March 30) will decide if Twitter should study and report on the feasibility of “selling the platform to its users via a cooperative or similar structure with broad-based ownership and accountability mechanisms.” Voting by proxy on the proposal has already begun. As one of the authors, I hope you will consider voting “For” our Proposal #4. Continue Reading →

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Controlled Companies Underperform, Overpay

Controlled CompaniesControlled companies generally underperformed non-controlled firms in terms of total shareholder returns, revenue growth, and return on equity, according to a new reportControlled Companies in the Standard & Poor’s 1500:  A Follow-up Review of Performance & Risk, commissioned by the Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute (IRRCi) and conducted by Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS).

The study also finds that average chief executive (CEO) pay is significantly higher at controlled companies with multi-class stock structures:  three times higher than that at single-class stock controlled firms and more than 40% higher than average CEO pay at non-controlled firms. In addition, director tenure typically runs longer, board refreshment is generally slower, and boardrooms are less diverse at controlled companies. Continue Reading →

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SVDX/Stanford Rock: Two Classes of Common Stock: Qui Bono?

In light of the IPOs and subsequent performances of Facebook, Groupon, Zynga, etc., there has been renewed discussion in Silicon Valley. When two classes of common stock that place control of the board in the hands of the founders and not the investors, do investors benefit or does it just entrench management? One argument in favor of two classes of common stock is that it allows the founders to run the company without interference from activist shareholders who are “short-termers.” One argument against is that a founder who is a poor CEO cannot be removed by the board — and hiring and firing the CEO is the raison d’etre of a corporate board. SVDX‘s panel of seasoned experts hold divergent views on this topic. This program, like all SVDX programs, was subject to the Chatham House Rule. I’ve added a few links that might be helpful. Continue Reading →

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