Tag Archives | democracy

Shareholder Democracy: A Bad Idea?

At the corporate governance level, the problem is that things like say-on-pay introduce complicated elements into proxy elections. These complexities make it difficult for ordinary shareholders, typically equipped with only a passing interest and knowledge of the issues at hand, to form preferences, much less vote their preferences. (Why Shareholder Democracy Is a Bad Idea – CNBC, John Carney, 2/18/2011)

Carney goes on to say that shareowners are too simple-minded to use rank-choice voting.

By Carney’s logic, we’d all still be peasants because the King is the only one with time to figure out what is in our best interests. Thankfully, democracy took hold… although we are still far from living in a truly democratic world since corporations are so powerful and so undemocratic.

Ordinary shareowners are increasingly turning to MoxyVote.com, ProxyDemocracy.org, ShareOwners.org and ProxyExchange.org to help them sort through “complex” issues. Don’t turn the clock back. Hard to believe that while people all across the world are in the streets expressing their desire for democracy Carney tries to convince readers that corporate managers know best.

As for rank-choice voting (instant run-off or alternative vote), even children at the age of five can pick there top three and rank them. I can’t wait to start using the system when I vote for corporate directors. Imagine having choices, let alone having to go through the complex task of ranking them!

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Video Friday: Estate Tax & Madisonian Democracy

Andrea Coombes of The Wall Street Journal MarketWatch blog talks estate tax with venture capitalist and tech company founder, Jerry Fiddler, in this video interview. Fiddler “consider[s] it a point of pride to be able to pay back into the public good…[not] a point of pain.”

Noam Chomsky: A Critique of Madisonian Democracy – On Corporations

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DC Plans and Employee Input

The UK’s industry-led Investment Governance Group (IGG) recently published a best practice guidance for defined contribution (DC) pensions, which include six principles for DC schemes designed to encourage better investment governance and decision making by all stakeholders, including trustees, employers, advisers, providers, and members.

As I glance at this guidance it makes me realize how little I know about how my own plan is run and where opportunities for input are for plan participants. I contacted the administrator years ago, asking about how the funds vote their stocks and if the program has any requirements in that regard. The answer came back that they must be voted in the interest of fund holders (which, in practice, generally means in the interest of fund and corporate management).

I just got a statement the other day and was looking at how poorly my international investments have been doing this year. I concluded it is probably because the only options they offer are heavily invested in Europe and Japan, instead of emerging markets like China, India, Brazil and Indonesia.

How does your fund operate? The UK best practices guidance could be used as a framework for questions to understand how your program operates and what input you/we, as those who have invested our hard earned dollars, have in the system.

Ten years ago, James P. Hawley and Andrew T. Williams wrote extensively about “universal ownership” and the likely shift in norms (see The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism: How Institutional Investors Can Make Corporate America More Democratic).

Since universal owners internalize positive and negative externalities of the firms in their portfolios and since they bear the consequences of firms’ norm based liabilities, their fiduciary duty requires universal monitoring of their portfolio. It is in their long-term interest and the interest (by definition) of their investors and beneficiaries to maximize the positive externalities of their holdings and minimize the negative externalities. This may create direct costs (e.g. pollution abatement, product and process redesign) for some firms and sectors of the economy, but will generate gains to other sectors and firms. However, as a general proposition, negative externalities impose costs on affected firms that outweigh – sometimes greatly outweigh – the benefit to polluting firms. Thus it is in the long-term interest of a universal owner, one that owns all firms, to pursue externality monitoring in an attempt to reduce negative externalities and to encourage positive externalities among portfolio firms. This should be combined with portfolio wide norm shift linked risk monitoring resulting in universal portfolio analysis and universal monitoring. (Norm Shifts, Center for the Study of Fiduciary Capitalism)

During the last ten years there’s been a shift away from defined contribution plans, where trusteeship is often held jointly with union or other employee based or elected representatives, toward DC plans where such influence is often less direct. While union and employee representatives seem to give a lot of thought to issues like the need to minimize negative externalities, many management dominated DC plans do not appear to do so. Movement in the direction of a more equitable and environmentally sustainable economy isn’t likely to come about on its own. Change depends on informed public participation, political will, and acquiring the democratic tools necessary so that those who invest our funds on our behalf are more fully accountable to us.

I’d love to hear from readers about their DC plans. If it is mostly invested in stock of the company you work for you, do they pass voting rights along to you? If your plan is like mine, with several fund alternatives, how are those funds chosen? What input opportunities are provided to you on that decision or others? Please let me know.

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Giant Stirs: Fidelity Backs an Environmental Proxy Proposal

Four Fidelity funds recently backed an environmentalist proxy proposal for the first time on record, Ceres research found.

Even though the votes cast by Fidelity funds at MGM Mirage Fidelity’s usual abstentions on shareholder environmental proposals, it is a start. Reuthers (Fidelity records first ‘green’ proxy votes, 10/9/10) goes on to note:

Ceres found that like Fidelity, Pioneer Investments shifted to favor environmental resolutions for the first time this year, and that companies like T Rowe Price Group increased their support for such proposals. But a few managers including BlackRock Inc reduced support for climate-change resolutions this year, Ceres found.

Further movement by the likes of Fidelity could result in real transformation. Imagine if they begin to take a long term approach that says there’s little point in earning a bit more during the next quarter if doing so would contribute significantly to an inhabitable planet. Combine that with the idea that we will eventually be getting proxy access not only to the corporate proxy but to the mutual fund proxy.

Jennifer Taub of UMass Amherst recently wrote Access to the Mutual Fund Proxy, noting the mutual funds hold 24% of US corporate equity. Although access to mutual fund proxies has also been postponed, pending outcome of the lawsuit, eventually we can expect to get there. When we do, Taub notes:

Adding some competition to the board nomination process may increase board dependency upon fund shareholders. This may create more bargaining power in board negotiations with fund advisers over fees, expenses and other related matters. Given that boards are loathe to use the “nuclear option” and fire the fund adviser, gaining extra leverage to negotiate more strongly on behalf of fund investors is essential.

Mutual funds that are actually beholden to their shareowners. Isn’t that what the whole mutual concept was intended to accomplish?

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Entrepreneurs and Democracy: A Political Theory of Corporate Governance

“From the unstable equilibrium between entrepreneurial force and social fragmentation emerges corporate governance that is both legitimate and performing,” directing the “productive action of people who want to stay autonomous and free.” The quick takeaway: corporate governance must increasingly become more democratic to be seen as legitimate. Continue Reading →

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Populism Begins in the Boardroom

There is an intriguing place where we might begin the work of a renewed economic populism: in corporations, not the capital. If the goal of populism is the amelioration of life for the many, then President Obama could strike a confounding (in a good way) pose by calling on the private sector to take up an idea put forward this week by Fareed Zakaria: unleash a corporate stimulus. “The Federal Reserve recently reported that America’s 500 largest nonfinancial companies have accumulated an astonishing $1.8 trillion of cash on their balance sheets,” Fareed writes. “By any calculation (for example, as a percentage of assets), this is higher than it has been in almost half a century. And yet, most corporations are not spending this money on new plants, equipment, or workers…[Such] investments would likely have greater effect and staying power than a government stimulus.” A populism that begins in the boardroom—that would really be change we could believe in. (The Right Kind of American Populism and Obama’s CEO Problem, Newsweek, 7/12/10).

I’m not sure Obama has the power to get the private sector to start spending. Congress certainly didn’t do a good job of tying bank bailouts to bank loans. However, I certainly agree with Jon Meacham and Fareed Zakaria, populism could begin in the boardroom.

Imagine a political system in which the incumbents get to select all election candidates, and voters have no choice but to vote for these nominees, or not vote at all. Such “democracy” rules the US proxy process by which investors elect corporate board members. Now, an “open ballot” movement among big shareholders is working to shake up how boards are elected.

The Magna Carta was drafted in response to the excessive use of royal power, while the move for proxy access stems from the abuse of power by management at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and others.

The first clause of the Magna Carta guarantees “freedom of elections” to clerical offices of the English church to prevent the king from making appointments and siphoning off church revenues. A shareholder’s Magna Carta would prevent managers from having undue influence over corporate boards and will prevent them from using corporate coffers as their personal bank accounts.

Think markets and proxy contest are the answer? Who has enough to buy BP? Even after much of the wealth has been destroyed, the takeover and transition of poorly governed corporations back to profitability is also expensive, generally estimated to range between two to four percent of the value of the firm. There may be very heavy transaction costs for employees through layoffs, lost wages, increased divorce and suicide rates, as well as to communities in the form of lost taxes and charitable contributions. In contrast, the cost of proxy driven changeovers have run considerably below one percent.

In August of 1977, the Business Roundtable recommended “amendments to Rule 14a-8 that would permit shareholders to propose amendments to corporate bylaws, which would provide for shareholder nominations of candidates for election to boards of directors.” Their memo noted such amendments “would do no more than allow the establishment of machinery to enable shareholders to exercise rights acknowledged to exist under state law.” Now the BRT seems to think proxy access will be the end of the world.

In “Toward Democratic Board Elections,” published by The Corporate Board (7-8/2003) I noted, “After years of allowing shareholder proposals concerning elections, the SEC in 1990 issued a series of no-action letters ruling that proposals concerning board nominations could be excluded. Proposals by institutional investors were beginning to win majority votes. Perhaps the SEC realized failing to issue no-action letters could soon have consequences.” The court in AFSCME V. AIG came to the same realization three years later.

Competition for board positions has traditionally stimulated share value. Researchers have found that firms with stronger shareholder rights had higher firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower capital expenditures, and fewer corporate acquisitions. Investors who bought firms with the strongest democratic rights and sold those with the weakest rights would have earned abnormal returns of 8.5 percent per year during a sample period.

It is paradoxical that the standard justification for autocratic practices in industry is its alleged efficiency, since empirical research results do not support that conclusion. Increased rank-and-file responsibility, increased participation in decision-making and increased individual autonomy are all associated with greater personal involvement and productive results.

The keys to creating wealth and maintaining a free society lie primarily in the same direction. Both require that broad-based systems of accountability be built into the governance structures of corporations themselves. By accepting the responsibilities that come with ownership, pension funds and other institutional investors have the potential to act as important mediators between the individual and the modem corporation. Indeed, populism that begins at the boardroom could change populists could believe in.

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Q&A on Client Directed Voting

Historically, most retail shareowners have tossed their proxies. During the first year under the “notice and access” method for Internet delivery of proxy materials, less than 6% voted. This contrasts with almost all institutional investors voting, since they have a fiduciary duty to do so. “Client directed voting” (CDV), a term coined by Stephen Norman is seen by many as a solution for getting more retail shareowners to vote, ensuring companies get a quorum, and helping management recapture much of the broker-votes cast in their favor that evaporated with recent reforms.

The SEC has indicated that CDV will, among other “proxy plumbing” matters, be the subject of a forthcoming concept release. Therefore, it is critical that shareowners become familiar with this term. The SEC can shape their concept release to facilitate management entrenchment or their framework can further the interests of shareowners. My intention with this Q&A is to help readers understand some of the surrounding issues and be better prepared to judge proposals.

Since Stephen Norman coined the phrase in 2006, the concept of CDV is generally attributed to him and his work with NYSE’s Proxy Working Group.  On October 24, 2006, the NYSE filed a proposed rule change with the SEC to eliminate all broker voting on the election of directors. Two months later in December 2006, Steve Norman presented a proposal called Client Directed Voting at an investor communications conference.  The main feature of CDV is that it allows  shareowners to instruct their broker how to vote in the event they fail to return a proxy and it severely limits their default voting options.

Recent posts on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial Regulation by John Wilcox (Fixing the Problems with Client Directed Voting, March 5, 2010) and Frank G. Zarb, Jr. and John Endean (Restoring Balance in Proxy Voting: The Case For “Client Directed Voting,” February 14, 2010) have helped to expand and popularize the concept beyond Norman’s initial concept. See also: CDV vs FAVE: More Proxy Voting Options,  2/17/2010 and Comparison of “Proxy Plumbing” Recommendations, 11/8/09.

Mark Latham, a member or the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee (SECIAC), actually proposed something similar at least as far back as 2000 (see The Internet Will Drive Corporate Monitoring and other papers at http://www.votermedia.org/publications) and his system provides more of an open framework, instead of leaning to management. Tbis post builds on his work, especially the Q&A he recently posted on the subject. My main contribution is to simply highlight some relatively small differences and to call out some additional concerns.

See Latham’s recent post Client Directed Voting Q&A on the VoterMedia.org Publications page at http://www.votermedia.org/publications. His post provides more online references as well as an interesting introduction to frame the topic. Here, I simply dive into frequently asked questions. The questions and Mark Latham’s responses are in black. My responses are in dark red. Caution: Where my response significantly differs from his, you won’t necessarily know, without comparing this post to Latham’s paper.

1. What do you view as the most significant merits and drawbacks of CDV?

Merits of the Open Proposal:

Quality of voting is more important than quantity of voting (voter turnout). The Open Proposal will increase both the quality and the quantity of voting by both retail and institutional investors. But I think its most significant impact will be to increase the quality of voting by both individuals and institutions. This will happen because of the implicit competition among various voting opinion sources, and their evolving reputations in the eyes of retail investors. Opinion sources will include institutional investors, retail investors, bloggers, activists and professional proxy voting advisors funded by possible new mechanisms discussed later in this questionnaire.

Retail investors are the principals in the principal-agent system of corporate governance. We are the beneficial owners of all equities – in the U.S., 25 to 30 percent via direct purchases, and 70 to 75 percent via our ownership of shares in mutual funds, pension funds and other intermediaries. (By “share” of a pension fund, I mean the fraction of the fund’s assets that funds a person’s expected future benefits.) The agents in our corporate governance system include CEOs, boards of directors, institutional investors, proxy advisory firms, compensation consultants etc. The Open Proposal will improve the accountability of all these agents to the principals, by empowering retail investors with better information and voting tools.

Drawbacks: The Limited Proposal has the substantial drawback of severely limiting retail investors’ choices for standing instructions on voting. The Centralized Proposal likewise has the drawback of limiting our choices to only the decisions shared by institutional investors. The Open Proposal has no drawbacks that I can think of.

The key issue is to let shareowners control where their electronic ballots are delivered, just as there is no question they can control where hardcopy ballots are delivered. This simple requirement would give third party content providers an opportunity to compete and improve content.

2. In your view, how viable a solution is CDV to increase retail participation in proxy voting in the short term? How long do you think it would take before CDV materially increased retail participation rates?

Once the Open Proposal is implemented by more and more retail brokers, I expect the quality of all voting and the quantity of retail voting to increase materially within 2 years. The increase in quality is more important, but I expect our retail voting rate to increase steadily and substantially in the long term, eventually surpassing 70%.

Any implementation schedule would be heavily influenced the need for fees to be delivered to third-party providers and the need for a requirement that brokers must follow client instructions to deliver ballots electronically to third-party platforms. I’ve had personal experience with a broker reluctant to deliver proxies according to my instructions.

3. What other complementary reforms would you view as essential to ensure the success of any CDV approach that were to be implemented?

We should fund various competing sources of proxy voting advice that would be available free to all investors. We should also fund some infrastructure for sharing voting opinions. Funds should be allocated among competing providers by retail investor vote. Sources of funds are discussed in my responses to later questions below.

Retail Shareholder Participation

1. In your view, would CDV be more likely to cause retail shareholders to engage with or disengage from proxy voting? Why? Do you think that either of the Limited Proposal or Centralized Proposal would be more likely to engage retail shareholder participation? Why?

I don’t think the Limited Proposal would engage retail participation significantly. A wider range of voting choices is needed for that, so the Centralized Proposal would engage more retail participation, and the Open Proposal would engage the most retail participation.

The Open Proposal will cause retail shareowners to engage with proxy voting because it offers several new and powerful ways for us to do so. Most will just choose a voting feed and instruct our brokers to implement it for our shares. That is powerful because it takes little time, yet can implement intelligent voting based on reputations of the voting feeds – reputations that will become conveniently available in the financial media, just as the reputations of car makers and computer makers are widely available.

Many third-party platforms or voting feeds will be designed around “issues,” rather than harder to understand policies and procedures. That will naturally appeal to a broader base of retail shareowners.

A small but important percentage of retail shareowners will get more involved in helping to determine those reputations of voting feeds. They will compare feed quality by such means as creating focus lists at ProxyDemocracy – see for example http://proxydemocracy.org/fund_owners/focus_lists/25.

Additionally, institutional investors will begin to discuss their votes with each other more frequently, as well as with beneficial owners. Both are already happening, mostly as a result of votes disclosed at ProxyDemocracy. I’ve personally initiated such dialogues with several funds and have increasingly been met with a favorable response.

2. Assume there are three groups of retail shareholders: (i) those who participate in proxy voting currently, (ii) those who would participate but find the process too time consuming and onerous and (iii) those who are unlikely to ever participate in proxy voting. (a) In your view, how many retail shareholders would switch from category (ii) to category (i) if CDV were implemented? Would it make a difference in your view if the Limited Proposal or Centralized Proposal were implemented?

My rough guesses for long term participation rates: Limited Proposal: 25% increase, with most votes going automatically to management. Centralized Proposal: 50% participation. Open Proposal: 70% participation. Of course, these numbers depend on the promotion, regulation and disclosure of whatever CDV system is implemented. Engagement requires either a fiduciary obligation, which we won’t have for retail shareowners, the perception of value in the process (which may take a while) or passion around relevant issues. Of the three, passion around relevant issues will be the easiest to ignite.

(b) In your view, would CDV have a meaningful impact on the level of category (iii) investors?

Yes – the Open Proposal in particular will significantly reduce category (iii). Most shareowners are passionate about at least some specific issues. Once engaged, they are likely to engage further.

3. In your view, would implementation of CDV increase retail shareholder engagement with the annual meeting process? Why or why not?

Yes. The most important part of the AGM is voting, so in my view engagement with voting is one type of engagement with the annual meeting process, even if the shareowner doesn’t physically attend the meeting. (See answer under #1 above). Director elections will be more closely watched, once shareowners gain a sense of empowerment.

If brokers are required to deliver proxies as directed by their clients, another whole model could emerge around proxy assignments. Proxies assigned to organizations or individuals, for example, could give AGMs a new meaning. See http://contingencyanalysis.com/home/papers/suffrage.pdf.

In the 1940s and 1950s thousands of shareowners frequently showed up for shareowner meetings because they sometimes actually deliberated issues and some of those in attendance held proxies from others. Lewis Gilbert, for example, was often given unsolicited proxies, which he used to negotiate motions at meetings.

We are a long way removed from those days. Voting is important, but having a say in setting the agenda on what will be voted on is even better. If a significant number of proxies are assigned or even if shareowners routinely follow specific voting advisors or institutions, leading voices can actually begin to influence how agendas for annual meetings are set.

4. Do you think a CDV arrangement that called for individualized marked proxy cards, as contemplated under the Limited Proposal, would encourage or discourage retail shareholder engagement in the proxy process?

The Limited Proposal would take us at least part way back to broker votes. In the absence of meaningful choices, most shareowners will defer to management. Although that would result in votes, I don’t see it resulting in “engagement.” It might be a plus for shareowners to be able to pull up a pre-filled ballot to show them this is how they are about to vote, according to registered preferences.

However, I wouldn’t ask them to affirm every single pre-filled ballot. That could be a deal breaker for people with stock in lots of different companies or who would just rather spend their time on other activities. Under an Open Proposal, feeds will offer the ability for retail shareowners to essentially build a “voting policy” just as institutional voters are able to do. That model will increase participation and the quality of the vote.

5. In your view, would CDV encourage sufficiently informed retail shareholder voting or would it effectively discourage retail investors from reading the proxy statement and understanding the particular proposals in the context of a company’s particular circumstances? What criteria do you use in determining whether retail shareholder voting is sufficiently informed? Does your answer differ as between the Limited Proposal and Centralized Proposal?

In my view, the Open Proposal will encourage sufficiently informed retail shareowner voting. In order for retail voting to be sufficiently informed, it is not necessary for all retail shareowners to read the proxy statement and understand the particular proposals in the context of a company’s particular circumstances. Most retail shareowners won’t read proxy statements.

Open Proposal CDV enables retail shareowners to implement a specialization strategy similar to that of institutional investors. Most fund managers do not read the proxy statement and understand the particular proposals in the context of a company’s particular circumstances. They have specialized staff for that, some in-house, some out-sourced. Likewise a few of us retail shareowners will read proxies, but most will not. Those who do not read them will be informed by those who do, and by the many other sources of voting opinions who read the proxies.

The criteria for determining sufficient information are in general too complex and subjective to describe concisely. But some features I would look for in an effective retail shareowner information system include:

(a) a wide range of voting opinion sources;

(b) open access for any new opinion sources to publish their opinions;

(c) open access for shareowners to choose any opinion source for our standing instructions on voting;

(d) sufficient funding for professional voting opinion sources that compete for funding allocated by retail shareowner vote.

Thus the Limited Proposal would not inform shareowners sufficiently; the Centralized Proposal would be better; and the Open Proposal would be best in facilitating the ability of retail shareowners to align with groups they trust and that share their values.

6. What investor education measures would you recommend to ensure investors were sufficiently informed about CDV? Who should undertake those and bear the cost?

I would recommend an ongoing competition open to any providers of investor education, who would compete for funding allocated by retail investor vote. This could be limited to education about voting issues (informing about CDV, providing voting opinions, organizing voting opinion data feeds, discussing reputations etc.), or voting could be included in a broader retail investor education competition. For more explanation, please see http://votermedia.wordpress.com/2010/01/23/voter-funded-investor-education-proposal/ .

This would benefit us retail investors, so we should pay for it. Since the benefit is shared broadly, it should not be paid by retail investors one at a time, but rather by funds that we own collectively – corporate funds. (See my answer to General question #1 above – “Retail investors are the beneficial owners of all equities.”) There are several possible ways of arranging this. One example is the “Proxy Advisor” proposal at votermedia.org/proposals. In the near term, the agents in our corporate governance system may try to prevent us from using our funds to empower ourselves this way, so a helping hand from regulators may be needed to get it started. Public funds earmarked for retail investor education and advocacy could be used for the first such initiatives.

Implementation and Ongoing Administration

1. Should retail shareholders have to renew their agreement with their brokers with respect to standing voting instructions annually or on some other basis? Why? Is your conclusion affected by the lower incidence of retail voting following the introduction of “notice and access” (i.e., even asking shareholders to take the time to access the proxy statement online resulted in a significant drop in participation)?

Yes, it’s reasonable to require retail shareowners to renew their standing instructions annually. This renewal should only require a simple mouse-click, once the investor has logged in to the broker’s website and gone to the standing instructions page. The renewal could be done at any time, and be valid for one year from the last time the investor clicked to renew. It also affirms the channel of communication… the e-mail address is still valid.

The quality and reputation of voting feeds will change over time, so retail investors should review their choice of feed at least annually.

No, the “notice and access” participation dropoff may not be relevant here, since it occurred in a system without CDV. CDV is likely to fundamentally change retail investor attitudes and behavior regarding proxy voting.

2. Should the renewal process be an affirmative one – that is, the arrangement would drop away, absent shareholder action to renew his / her voting preferences? Does the fact of a rapidly changing governance landscape affect your decision? Why or why not?

My answer to the previous question covers this question also.

3. How should CDV address director slates, in contested and uncontested elections?

I don’t think director slates in contested and uncontested elections would make any difference to the implementation of CDV. All such cases can be handled the same way, with the retail shareowner voting as per standing instructions to use a specified voting feed.

4. Which matters should be eligible for inclusion in a CDV arrangement (e.g., only uncontested matters)? How would those matters be defined (e.g., shareholder proposals are almost always “contested” by management and the board)? How should the fact of significant variation among proposals on a given matter, particularly in light of a company’s particular circumstances, affect the decision about whether a matter is appropriate for treatment within a CDV arrangement?

Like my answer to #3 above: All matters should be eligible for inclusion in a CDV arrangement. All can be handled the same way, with the retail shareowner voting as per standing instructions to use a specified voting feed. Competition among voting feeds will encourage those who create them to constantly try to improve their voting quality and reputation. One improvement is to adapt their analysis and voting decisions to the significant variation among proposals on a given matter.

5. If only selected matters are eligible for inclusion in a CDV arrangement, will CDV materially improve the retail investor’s engagement in the annual meeting process or the administration of proxy voting, given that there could be other matters on the proxy card as to which the shareholder would have to vote?

Limiting CDV to selected matters only would lessen the benefits of CDV, so I don’t recommend such limits. It would be better not to implement any CDV that severely limits voting options, since once such a system is enacted it would be difficult to amend, given that those who would benefit from such limitations will be in an even stronger position to fight opening up the process.

6. Should preferences be indicated on a portfolio or per stock basis?

Preferences should be indicated on a portfolio basis. That is simplest for retail investors and for brokers when they offer CDV to clients. Changing preferences stock-by-stock can be handled by those who create the voting feeds. So brokers need not build systems for stock-by-stock customization of standing instructions.

With the Open Proposal, anyone can create a voting feed, just as anyone now can create a blog. One way to create a feed is to remix other feeds, just as blogs often post or link to material from other blogs. A remixed feed can select different source feeds for different stocks or different industries or different categories of voting matters (director elections vs shareowner proposals etc.). In the article “The Internet Will Drive Corporate Monitoring” I called remixed feeds “meta- advisors”.

7. The Limited Proposal is constructed such that retail investors could provide standing voting instructions to their brokers in their brokerage agreements. If standing voting instructions were indicated on a portfolio basis, should the instructions cover only those companies in which a retail investor owns shares at the time the brokerage agreement is signed or all subsequent purchases of stock as well? If instead preferences were indicated on a per stock basis, when would retail investors indicate their preferences with respect to stocks purchased after the investor’s brokerage agreement was signed? At the time of purchase or some other time?

Standing voting instructions on a portfolio basis should cover all subsequent purchases of stock in that portfolio.

8. What choices should a retail shareholder have when deciding its standing voting instructions? (a) Only those from the Limited Proposal, namely (i) vote against management, (ii) vote for management, (iii) abstain on all matters, and (iv) vote proportionally with the firm’s other clients’ instructed votes? (b) Vote in accordance with the brokerage firm’s published guidelines? (c) Various institutional investor voting guidelines? (d) Proxy advisory firm guidelines? What do you see as the pros and cons in providing each of these choices to shareholders (e.g., insufficient number of choices, information overload, likely absence of action when too many choices)? Are there other choices that are appropriate?

Because we retail investors are principals not agents, there are few reasons to regulate how we vote our stock. One valid reason is to prevent vote-selling. The tried-and-true way to prevent vote- selling is to keep voting decisions confidential, as we do in democracies. Only when an agent is voting other people’s stock do we require vote disclosure, even though that opens the door to vote-selling.

Therefore retail shareowners should be able to vote any way we choose, subject only to a prohibition on selling our votes. So I recommend the Open Proposal, where we can choose any voting feed. The potential information overload problem can be handled well enough by the market for public reputation. Most retail investors will only pay attention to perhaps the top ten best known voting feeds. A small minority of retail investors, along with writers in the financial media, will be the opinion leaders helping to determine public reputations, and thus which of the hundreds of voting feeds deserve to become the best known.

9. The Limited Proposal, as originally conceived, calls for the default choice to be proportional voting with the brokerage firm’s other instructed votes. Do you agree or disagree with this default choice and, if the latter, what should the default choice be (e.g., no vote)?

This question arises for all three CDV proposals discussed here: what about investors who don’t give standing instructions, or whose instructions have lapsed after one year with no renewal? The default choice should either be whatever the shareowner selects or it should be a “no” vote, just like if a voter fails to mark an item on the proxy, that item should be left blank.

Counting a blank vote as anything else would make mounting campaigns to deny companies a quorum much more difficult. Neither brokers nor anyone else should be permitted to vote on any ballot item in the absence of voter instructions (i.e., all items should be considered non-routine matters in NYSE rules). This is one reason why the Limited Proposal is such a poor choice. It would be better not to have CDV at all than it would be to go with the Limited Proposal. Again, once adopted, it will be hard to change because those who benefit from severely limiting options will have a vested interested in continuing to limit the voice of shareowners.

10. What administrative steps would brokers have to take to implement CDV? What step is most likely to provide an obstacle for CDV (e.g., individualized marked proxy cards, having information from companies about proposals to be voted on a timely basis)? How would broker obligations affect the company’s own obligations under Rule 14a-8 (e.g., would those obligations have to be accelerated)?

Brokers would have to create a page on their website for retail investors to indicate which voting feed they want to use for standing instructions. Brokers would have to store their clients’ instructions and transmit them to Broadridge (or other service provider). I don’t think individualized marked proxy cards are necessary, but could be provided if an investor requests them. Broadridge could handle the details of getting the voting decisions from the selected voting feeds, matching them with client shareholdings, and offering electronic and paper-based ways for investors to override their feed-based instructions if desired. I don’t think broker obligations would affect the company’s own obligations under Rule 14a-8.

Brokers/banks, transfer agents should be capable of passing through or delivering proxy votes to all valid electronic platforms. If that is the case, they don’t need to do much more than be aware and make their clients aware of the options.

11. In your view, would brokers in fact increase their engagement with retail investors about matters subject to a vote at a company’s next annual meeting? Would liability considerations affect your conclusion? Should brokers who do engage be exempt from the solicitation rules?

I don’t think it would be the brokers’ role to increase engagement with retail investors on voting matters, unless a broker wants to develop a reputation as a voting “brand.” (see Proxy Voting Brand Competition at http://votermedia.org/publications) There will be plenty of engagement in the public shared realm, for example via sites like moxyvote.com. Brokers could just link to such sites from their client web interface.

12. Should brokers be able to delegate responsibility for fulfilling their obligations under a CDV approach such as that contemplated by the Limited Proposal (i.e., filling out individualized proxy cards, maintaining lists of customer standing voting instructions, etc.) to a third party agent? Are there any obligations brokers should not be able to delegate to an agent?

I’ve addressed most of these issues in my response to question #10 above. Brokers should not be forced to take on CDV responsibilities. Other third-party firms will do a better job. The key is to ensure that brokers or their agents deliver ballots to wherever the shareowner directs.

13. What level of responsibility and liability should be attached to intermediaries for properly completing a proxy card for CDV, if that feature were adopted as part of a CDV arrangement? If brokers are able to delegate such responsibilities to a third party agent, what liability, if any, should attach to the agent?

I have no particular view on this, beyond the obvious general principle that there must be enough responsibility to make the overall CDV system work. I’m not sure which design will best balance cost, integrity and ease of use.

14. Should a clear audit trail and related reporting be required elements of CDV? Who would bear responsibility for assuring the quality of the audit trail and producing related reports? Who should receive the reports in the first instance (e.g., only the company and the tabulation agent)?

Same answer as for #13 above.

15. What costs would you foresee in implementation of CDV? Who should bear those costs? If the costs should be shared, how should that decision be made? Why should companies wish to pay for CDV, given that they may view CDV as a reductionist approach to complex issues of governance (i.e., indirect subsidies by smaller companies with fewer issues or larger institutional ownership, as compared to larger companies that attract greater attention and have potentially larger retail ownership)?

Cost categories include: (a) creating voting opinion feeds; (b) system development for brokers; (c) vote processing by Broadridge and similar service providers.

If the SEC publicly encourages the development of CDV, many organizations are likely to build the necessary systems voluntarily at their own cost. Voting opinion websites have already started appearing (ProxyDemocracy.org, TransparentDemocracy.org, MoxyVote.com). These can easily start sharing voting opinion feeds. To enhance their quality, public funds earmarked for retail investor education and advocacy could be allocated by investor vote among such competing providers of tools for CDV.

Once we have a broad choice of publicly available voting feeds, it will not be expensive for brokers and Broadridge to adapt their existing proxy vote systems to use the feeds. Some adjustment to the existing system of issuer fees for vote processing will help shift payments from paper mailings to electronic submission via CDV standing instructions.

CDV will increase the quality of voting and decrease the quantity and costs of paper mailings. These benefits will outweigh the costs of building CDV systems. Standardized data tagging will likewise streamline the system and reduce costs in the long run, although it will require some up- front investment.

In your question “Why should companies wish to pay…?”, I’m not sure if you mean “Why should the owners of companies wish to pay…?” or “Why should senior employees of companies (e.g. CEOs) want companies to pay…?” So I’ll answer both questions: We owners of companies should wish to pay (with our companies’ funds) because for us, the benefits of better voting, increased accountability, better corporate governance, and resulting higher investment returns will outweigh the costs. Some employees (e.g. some CEOs) may not want companies to pay, because the increased accountability would reduce their power and influence over their own pay and tenure as CEOs.

NYSE rules require payment by issuers for the cost of voting electronically but issuers may not always be doing so. See NYSE Rules 450-460 pertaining to proxy distribution.  The Rules are actually written for “member organizations” (i.e., brokers) and specify what brokers or their agents (e.g., Broadridge) can charge for distribution and collection of proxy-related items.  The rules are very clear that Issuers are supposed to pay for all of the distribution (and collection) costs and that brokers can expect to collect from them. These rules should also apply to Issuers when shareowners choose to take delivery of proxies or to vote through sites like RiskMetrics, ProxyGovernance and MoxyVote.

The fees that Broadridge is charging to electronic voting platforms (RiskMetrics, ProxyGovernance, MoxyVote, etc.) should be paid by the issuers as part of the overall collection costs (like postage).  The electronic platforms, in this function, are merely an extension of the proxy distribution agent and it’s odd that fees are payable to Broadridge (beyond a nominal fee covering their costs).  It’s also notable that Broadridge charges on the order of 10X for electronic vote collection from these platforms than it is permitted to charge the issuers, from what I understand.

If Broadridge is offering a “value-added” service to these electronic platforms, where is the “baseline” service that costs less?  The answer is that one does not exist. Perhaps the value-added services revolve around the ability to turn blank vote into votes for management without following the rules that apply to proxies. (See my blog post, Jim Crow “Protections” for Retail Shareowners at https://www.corpgov.net/wordpress/?p=1459 and the petition I filed with the SEC for a rulemaking on “blank votes” at https://www.corpgov.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/SECpetitonOnBlankVotes.pdf)

A key point here is also that fees are charged to electronic platforms on a “per ballot” basis (generally one fee per position per year).  Electronic platforms are generally passing along these costs to voters.  That becomes much more difficult, perhaps impossible, when trying to service retail shareowners with small position sizes.

This is, in effect, a system where the voter is paying to vote, like the old Jim Crow poll tax.  It also inhibits progress (i.e., the development of electronic platforms for retail shareowners) because voting through the mail and through the phone is free. Why should retail shareowners have to pay when voting online, which is inherently the least expensive method of voting? Why should services like MoxyVote have to front such expenses? Without a change, it is hard to see how they can ever turn a profit and it seems even less likely that nonprofits, such as ProxyDemocracy, would ever be able to offer users the option of voting on a ProxyDemocracy platform.

16. What ongoing costs would there be in the use of CDV? Who should bear those costs?

My answer to the previous question applies to this question also. The NYSE should consider forcing Broadridge to direct some of its “paper suppression fees” to firms like MoxyVote.com that should be sharing in this incentive, since shifting to electronic from paper voting saves money.

17. Do websites such as ProxyDemocracy.org, TransparentDemocracy.org or MoxyVote.com (or even a new database of institutional decisions) make CDV, or at least the need for tailored proxy cards, less necessary as a method?

These websites are the first steps toward Open CDV. For the sake of improved accountability, corporate governance and investment returns, we should build on these pioneering initiatives and develop a complete Open CDV system to empower all retail shareowners. I don’t think hard-copy proxy cards are important, but could be offered to those investors who request them. We should have online systems that let investors manually override their standing instructions. All CDV proposals include this feature. We can preserve the manual online voting systems we already have, as an option that each investor could use if and when desired. Ballots can land in electronic mailboxes of choice blank and can then be pre-filled based on the “voting policy” or “brand” loyalty program created by the user (i.e., just as institutional voters have been doing for years).

Centralized Proposal

In this section, I try to answer the questions in two contexts – for the Centralized Proposal and for the Open Proposal (which I also call Open CDV).

1. In your view, would institutional investors be willing to provide their voting decisions in advance of a meeting? Are there obstacles to institutional investors’ providing this information (e.g., confidentiality considerations, considerations relating to proprietary investing strategies or investments)? (Note that some mutual funds do this now.)

If predisclosing their voting decisions is voluntary, then some institutional investors would do so and some would not. One reason could be to maintain confidentiality of their voting decisions, for example to avoid improper influence on them from corporate management. Another may be to avoid revealing their holdings (and thus proprietary investing strategies) at that moment.

In the Open Proposal which I favor, it’s not a problem if many institutional investors don’t predisclose their votes.

There is already a healthy base with Florida SBA, CalSTRS and CalPERS  covering most companies. In addition, there will be plenty of other sources of voting advice besides institutional investors, many of which will be focused on a limited number of issues. Some can already be seen at MoxyVote.com.

2. In your view, is it feasible to receive institutional investor voting decisions sufficiently in advance of an annual meeting to input into a database as contemplated in the Centralized Proposal? What operational concerns might you have?

Yes, with automated networked systems, timeliness should not be a problem. This would be less of a concern with the Open Proposal, since its numerous sources of voting advice can be used as fallbacks in case some voting decision sources are too late or missing. MoxyVote.com has already built its system that way, where users specify a priority list of decision sources, and the highest priority one with a decision available is used.

A fundamental operational issue is data standardization across all users in this shared networked system. The SEC Investor Advisory Committee’s Proxy Voting Transparency proposal, passed unanimously on February 22, 2010, advocated standardized data tagging that should resolve this issue. Additionally, I understand that on electronic voting platforms, the vote doesn’t necessarily get submitted until very near the final deadline. However, if votes are simply being filled out according to the guidance of third-parties, votes can be compiled and cast very quickly.

3. Should retail investors be given notice when new institutional investors add their voting decisions to the database after a retail investor has provided its standing voting instructions? What sort of notice should be provided? Who should be responsible for providing the notice?

CDV will induce an active public discussion in the financial media about the reputation of various sources of voting opinions. Most of us retail investors will not need to pay attention to every new source of opinions. Most of us will pay attention to the opinion leaders in this public discussion, who will let us know, for example, their top ten recommended and/or popular opinion sources, and their general characteristics – e.g. degree of emphasis on financial vs environmental vs social/political considerations. It will be like brand reputation for makers of complex products like cars or computers.

So no, there is no need for notice to be sent to retail investors when new institutional investors add their voting decisions but investors should be able to seek and find such information easily and should be able to subscribe to a news feed like google, alerting them to new participants. The new providers have every incentive to get the word out. Again, this issue is less of a concern in the Open Proposal, with its greater breadth of available voting opinion sources. Annual review and/or confirmation will help those who do not pay attention to keep up more than they otherwise might.

4. Would you allow any institutional investor who wanted its voting decisions to be in the database to be included? Why or why not? If not, what criteria should be used to decide which voting decisions would be available? Should there be an ownership threshold? If so, what threshold would you recommend? Should they be paid a license fee?

Likewise, these kinds of concerns are a good illustration of why the Open Proposal is better than the Centralized Proposal. In the Open Proposal, anyone can publish a voting feed for free, just as anyone can now publish a blog for free. There is no centralized database of blogs; there is just a data standard, which we should soon have for proxy votes.

5. Should a CDV database of voting decisions provide background about the nature of the contributing institutional investors, so that retail investors could place the voting decisions in context (e.g., determine whether the institutional investor likely has a bias)? If an institutional investor’s voting guidelines or decisions are reported, should it be required to provide context for the guidelines or decisions (e.g., conflict of interest disclosure)? If so, what contextual information would be appropriate? Should liability attach to that information?

An unregulated public market for reputation of voting opinion sources can probably handle most of these issues well enough, especially in the Open Proposal where it is easy for new entrants to compete by building better reputations for serving retail investor interests. Additional disclosures, especially regarding potential conflicts of interest, should be encouraged but not required until we see abuses that may make such requirements advantageous. Normal contract law should cover liability requirements.

6. In your view, should a proxy advisory firm’s guidelines on voting various measures be included in a database of voting decisions? Why or why not? Would your view change if the SEC regulated proxy advisory firms?

If I answer in the context of the Centralized Proposal, I would favor making it as much like the Open Proposal as possible: free voluntary access by all who want to participate, as providers of voting decisions and receivers of voting decisions. If a proxy advisory firm wants to publish its guidelines and/or its specific voting recommendations, they should be allowed to do so, as at least some do now. The Open Proposal does not depend on a centralized database, so the inclusion question does not arise. My views here do not depend on SEC regulation of advisory firms.

7. How easy or difficult would it be to develop the technology for the voting decision database and proxy-voting platform contemplated in the Centralized Proposal?

Not difficult. ProxyDemocracy and Moxy Vote have already built much of this, on a very low budget. Both systems can be readily enhanced if additional data standardization is adopted by the SEC and if cost reimbursement is forthcoming from issuers. See discussion by MoxyVote.com at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-22-09/s72209-8.pdf.

8. Who should bear the costs of maintaining any database of voting decisions? Who would determine what fees could be charged for use of the database? Should CDV be premised on retail investor willingness to pay for access to the database (as is the case for existing proxy advisory firms)?

Voting systems are a collective benefit to all shareowners of a company. So it does not make sense to make each individual voter pay to be able to vote. That’s why democracies don’t charge their citizens a fee to use a polling booth when there is an election. Citizens pay for election administration costs as a group, not one by one.

Likewise the information systems to enable intelligent voting are a collective benefit, and should be paid collectively, not one user at a time. To encourage competition among information providers, collective funds (i.e. corporate funds) should be allocated among them by the voters. Thus retail shareowners should allocate at least some of the CDV infrastructure funds by vote. This could pay for professional proxy voting advice that could then be shared freely. It could also pay for some infrastructure, such as free shared databases if they are needed. There is a large cost differential between delivering proxies by U.S. mail and through the internet. This cost savings should be used to pay the costs of Open CDV.

Institutional Investor Perspective

1. Why should institutional investors care about CDV? Isn’t this a retail shareholder issue?

Building reputations will build followers; institutions successful in creating “brands” will gain following and influence. As mentioned above, CDV will create a new public debate about the quality of institutional investor voting. Institutions are voting on behalf of retail shareowners now. So this retail issue is also an institutional issue.

2. If a database of institutional investor voting decisions were made available as contemplated under the Centralized Proposal, would other, smaller, institutional investors make use of this database?

Under either the Centralized Proposal or the Open Proposal, I expect that many smaller institutional investors would make use of the voting opinions available. Proxy advisory services may try to curtail disclosure by larger institutional investors in order to maintain their business and avoid disseminating research for free to smaller institutional investors but I expect they will have a difficult case, since many of these larger institutions subscribe to multiple services and have their own staff. They will be able to argue and show that disclosure of their votes is not giving the proxy advisory services they paid for directly to smaller institutions, since their final votes will often differ.

Management Perspective

1. In your view, would corporate managements generally be willing to support CDV as a means to increase retail shareholder participation or does the diversity of issues facing public companies in light of their particular circumstances make it less likely that they would favor participation over informed participation? Do you think CDV would be more or less likely to promote a “one size fits all” approach to governance and other issues?

Some corporate managements would be willing to support CDV as a means to increase retail shareholder participation. Other corporate managements may oppose CDV (especially the Open Proposal) because it will reduce their power while empowering the firm’s beneficial owners.

Some managers and entrenched directors may prefer participation by “sheep” in a relatively constrained environment where a few sizes fit all. However, an Open CDV system would encourage management to participate in these platforms as well. Management and existing boards want the ability to communicate with shareowners. Open CDV systems could provide the platform in a space of higher trust.

It will enable more informed voting by networking and sharing the information available. This is similar to the way institutional investors vote stock, where typically a staff of specialists make the voting decisions on behalf of fund managers and beneficial owners.

One key difference with CDV however, especially under the Open Proposal, will be that we beneficial owners will have the power to choose among competing sources of voting opinions. We will also have more opportunity to contribute to the voting opinions and the reputation assessment of opinion sources. Open CDV will increase informed participation by retail investors in the voting decisions of stock we beneficially own through institutional investors. At a minimum, we will be able to express more informed opinions about how institutions are voting our stock.

Open CDV would be less likely to promote a “one size fits all” approach to governance and other issues, since it offers maximum competition among sources of voting opinions. Competition will enhance voting quality, and “one size fits all” is a low quality approach which will thus be used less and less.

For example, when I find conflicting votes between CalPERS and another advance discloser, I often go with CalPERS because they most frequently provide a reason for their vote. As this becomes more popular, more care will be put into the reasons disclosed.  Canned votes and reasons will sway fewer votes as disclosures become more sophisticated and value their brand following.

2. In your view, would you expect that solicitation expenditures would decline, increase or stay the same if CDV were implemented? Why?

I expect that that solicitation expenditures will decline under Open CDV, especially in terms of just getting participation. Solicitation will be replaced by and/or migrate to elements of the CDV system, which will be supported by collective funds, becoming free or low cost to all users. Solicitation will focus on convincing the CDV opinion leaders and large funds of the relative merits of each possible voting decision, just as solicitation now gives emphasis to convincing proxy advisory firms.


1. Are other approaches that are comparable to CDV more desirable?

a. Creating a system of “public” proxy advisory firms to increase public availability of professional voting advice?

This would be a valuable adjunct to CDV. Even under the Open Proposal where anyone can contribute voting opinions to the public, I expect we will still need professional voting advice. Widespread sharing of free advice via the internet is likely to undermine the business model of existing proxy advisory firms (PAFs), just as free sharing of news is now undermining business models of the mainstream media. So to raise the overall quality of voting, a system of “public” PAFs makes sense. That was the reason for the title of my article “The Internet Will Drive Corporate Monitoring”. “The Internet” was a reference to internet-based CDV, and “Corporate Monitoring” was a reference to public PAFs and enhancements thereof.

For such a system to work, it is important for the public PAFs to be chosen by shareowner vote, to give PAFs a strong incentive to serve the owners’ interests. They should be paid from the shareowners’ corporate funds. The SEC should encourage the development of PAFs by amending rule 14a-8(i)8 to allow shareowner proposals that would allocate corporate funds to PAFs that undertake to offer proxy voting advice, including advice on director nominees, that is made freely available to all of a companies shareowners. See examples at http://www.corpmon.com/corporations/proposals.html that could be substantially modified based on more recent experience with university and municipal governance to make them more easily implemented.

b. Changing the pop-up on proxyvote.com to allow for other choices besides voting for management?

This too would work best as an adjunct to CDV. A potential difficulty with the pop-up approach is, which choices should be offered? With Open CDV, there will be potentially hundreds of choices – too many for a pop-up. But the proxyvote.com pop-up could show the choices being selected by those retail investors who are using the full CDV system by rank and another alphabetically.

c. Allowing shareholders to “plug in” to a voting feed or electronic voting platform (e.g., by requiring companies to permit shareholders to direct the proxy card or VIF to the desired platform)?

Voting feeds and electronic voting platforms like Moxy Vote are not “comparable” to CDV. They are CDV – ways for clients to direct voting by giving standing instructions. I think the best design for CDV is the Open Proposal with voting feeds. It is scary to me that CDV systems that don’t allow shareowners to dictate where their electronic proxy ballots are to be delivered are actually being contemplated. NYSE rules already allow the shareowner to control delivery to a physical address, why would this not extend to electronic mailboxes?

2. Would you be in favor of additional regulation to facilitate the creation of public voting databases, such as data-tagging of proxy and vote filings and further relaxation of solicitation rules?

I would be in favor of data tagging mandates. They are a mild and inexpensive form of regulation, just a transparency requirement. In the long run, Open CDV will make it feasible to reduce many other more expensive and intrusive forms of regulation, that try to limit abuses by the agents in our corporate governance system. It is cheaper and more effective to empower the principals with a better information system.

I also favor relaxation of solicitation rules. That would be less regulation, not “additional regulation”. Certainly, it would be good to have clarification that making voting decisions known in advance of AGMs does not constitute solicitation.

Further Comments

The development and implementation of Open CDV seem to me both desirable and inevitable. The SEC Investor Advisory Committee has created momentum toward data standards (like XBRL) for proxy votes. General principles of free speech would support allowing anyone with an opinion on any proxy voting issue to share that opinion with others, such as in a voting feed published on the internet. When a range of well informed voting feeds become available, some brokers will start offering CDV, and retail clients at other brokers will start demanding it too. In “The Internet Will Drive Corporate Monitoring”, I described the inevitability this way: “Would you outlaw software that makes voting easy? Would you outlaw advice?”

Not only will CDV improve our corporate governance system, but “public” voting advisors will make agents more accountable to principals in corporations and in democracies. We will have competitive markets for shared information. Voting advisors that compete for public funds allocated by citizen vote in democracies are called “Voter Funded Media” or VFM. They make political leaders and bureaucrats more accountable to citizens.

The VFM system has been developed and tested at the University of British Columbia for the past four years – see “Global Voter Media Platform” at votermedia.org/publications. Its success provides a live illustration of how a new competitive voter information system can influence the older less competitive system, even when the older system has far more funding. If the new system is more closely aligned with the principals’ interests, it will put competitive pressure on the old system.

The established campus newspaper, The Ubyssey, receives an annual fee of $5 from each student, totalling over $200,000 per year. In the new VFM system, blogs compete for slices of an award pool averaging less than $10,000 per year for the past four years. Not surprisingly, the bloggers appreciate this support, even though they have to compete hard for a piece of it. The voting system does not guarantee positive shares for all; many receive nothing – see votermedia.org/communities/82-ubc-ams. Perhaps more surprising however, is the reaction of The Ubyssey’s Coordinating Editor Justin McElroy [Video interview, 2010-04-30]:

…the established media, the one that students are giving their money to, and are more or less bound to giving, you know, that media wasn’t doing its job, and so competition is always good. It ensures that people do their best, and try to break the stories first, and get that information out there. And from a simple standpoint of, does it ensure that The Ubyssey does a better job meeting the needs of students and getting stories out there, VFMs ensure that, because it provides accountability to us, simply because if a story’s out there by a VFM that’s better than ours before us, you know, we have egg on our face. So, we’re paid way more money, we have way more resources…

…the fundamental questions of whether, does VFM work for students? I think yes. Does it increase campus discussion and student engagement? I think absolutely. Does it ensure that established media, you know, does a better job? Yeah. Are students and is this campus better off because of that? Well, absolutely.

The new equilibrium is one of cooperative competition. The Ubyssey now cooperates with VFMs on joint news media productions. These media competitors often link to each other. Student journalists comment on their competitors’ news stories, and sometimes leave one media group to join a competing media group.

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Corporate Governance: More Important than Ever with Supreme Court Decision

As the New York Times put it, “Sweeping aside a century-old understanding and overruling two important precedents, a bitterly divided Supreme Court on Thursday ruled that the government may not ban political spending by corporations in candidate elections.” (Justices Overturn Key Campaign Limits, 1/22/10)

Off to the right on the blog site of CorpGov.net, we quote from Power and Accountability by Robert A.G. Monks and Nell Minow, “Corporations determine far more than any other institution the air we breath, the quality of the water we drink, even where we live. Yet they are not accountable to anyone.” When I’ve quoted that statement in the past, I’ve often prefaced it with something like, “with the slight exaggeration suitable for book covers…” Not anymore. Now, whoever rules corporations rules the United States of America.

“With its ruling today, the Supreme Court has given a green light to a new stampede of special interest money in our politics. It is a major victory for big oil, Wall Street banks, health insurance companies and the other powerful interests that marshal their power every day in Washington to drown out the voices of everyday Americans,” said President Obama, who most certainly would not have been elected if the ruling were in force when he ran.

“This is the most radical and destructive campaign finance decision in the history of the Supreme Court,” said Fred Wertheimer, President of Democracy 21. “With a stroke of the pen, five justices wiped out a century of American history devoted to preventing corporate corruption of our democracy.” (Supreme Court’s “Radical and Destructive” Decision Hands Over Democracy to the Corporations, AlterNet.org, 1/21/10) I think Mr. Wertheimer is being too cautious; this decision may turn out to be the most destructive decision in the history of the Supreme Court, period. We look to the courts to protect our rights, not to give them away. Corporations are not people.

Back in August of last year Bob Monks and Peter Murray wrote an essay addressing judicial activism and its likely impact on our election system. “It’s difficult to conceive at this time of corporate overreach and abuse of power that the United States Supreme Court would go out of its way to remove all obstacles to ‘corporate speech’ in the social and political life of our country,” Monks said. “Corporate speech is not derived from the language of the Constitution, and is in fact, a conjury of the Court. There is something grotesque about our Supreme Court having a special hearing so as to expand the already questionable legitimate category of ‘corporate speech’.” Read the essay and weep for democracy.

Over the course of history, there has been toward democracy. As Pierre-Yves Gomez and Harry Korine wrote in their wonderful book Entrepreneurs and Democracy, “the more the entrepreneurial force becomes concentrated in ever larger corporations, the greater the need for social fragmentation to maintain the legitimacy of governance – so as to ensure that corporations are governed according to the liberal spirit.” Democracy has begun to spread into every sphere. They asked a key question, “does it serve economic performance or is it imposed by political attitudes against the economic interests of society?” Their conclusion gives some hope. “There are good economic reasons to think that democratization of corporate governance and the growth of economic performance go hand in hand.” (my emphasis)

We can thank God that, at least up until now, more democratic economies have generally had better economic performance. Therefore, it is in the best interests of business to continue democratizing itself and to maintain democracy as a system of governing civil affairs.

Corporate control of government will introduce a more integrative effect. Elected officials may soon be a lot more like managers… technocrats, whose legitimacy is based on their special competences. As our corporations and government become more integrated and monolithic, will we still have the agility to deal with the increasing complexity of the problems we face, like global climate change? Have we turned our destiny over to the masters of public opinion? Aren’t those the same folks who drive us at an ever increasing pace toward each speculative bubble? Corporate crowd control, will it work?

Think of the deliberation that now occurs in Congress and in your state legislature. Now think of the highest deliberative body of corporations… the annual meeting. We’re obviously headed for trouble. We, as shareowners must begun to look at concepts like fiduciary duty with renewed vigor. Further democratization of the structures of representation within the corporation takes on new urgency. What about the nationality of corporations and their shareowners, what part will that play? Which corporations are really American or does it make a difference?

Whereas corporations are largely global, we are not. We have to work, live, breathe the air of one country or another. The flexibility of labor isn’t nearly as great as the flexibility of our capital. While countries can knit themselves together into the United States, the United Nations, etc. to resolve differences, will corporate combinations be viewed with the same legitimacy… especially if they join together to battle parochial concerns, like ours?

Frankly, I’m a little frightened. However, I’m also resolved that transforming corporations into more democratic entities is more important than ever. So, for me that means going back into the weeds of proxy mechanics… how democratic are corporate voting systems, even if we accept that those with more shares get more votes?

A recent study of more than 12,000 companies, led by University of Minnesota professors Rajesh Aggarwal, Felix Meschke, and Tracy Wang, found that corporate political expenditures were typically linked with lower shareholder value. The survey suggested that donations were based in part on managers’ political preferences, not on what might benefit their businesses. see Corporate Political Contributions: Investment or Agency? http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=972670 Shareowners get a very limited version of proxy access soon; managers get unlimited corporate funds to buy more politicians. Who’s winning?

We either need a law like in the UK so that companies must get permission from their shareowners in advance to make political contributions in excess of some amount or we need a massive number of shareowner resolutions at each company to accomplish the same.

“More than 70 companies, including Microsoft Corp., Time Warner Inc., and Campbell Soup Co., have adopted disclosure policies. This year, shareholders have filed disclosure resolutions at 47 companies, said Bruce Freed, president of the Washington- based Center for Political Accountability, a nonprofit organization that works with shareholder groups.”

“Companies now will be under tremendous pressure from Republicans and others to pony up,” Freed said. “The corporate governance route now is the only way for companies to avoid this pressure.” (‘Free at Last,’ Business Says as Court Opens Campaign Spending, Business Week, 1/21/10)

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How to Include Employees in Decision-Making

WorldBlu looks at this important issue within a long series aimed at implementing democracy in the workplace. This segment looks at DaVita, a FORTUNE 500 company comprised of 35,000 employees with nearly $6 billion in annual revenue. It is the largest independent provider of dialysis services in the United States, operating over 1300 clinics.

On a regular basis, DaVita teammates are asked to vote on various aspects of the company, including program names and logos, new practices, and initiatives being considered for the upcoming year. DaVita’s Chairman and CEO, Kent Thiry, explains  “At DaVita, we are truly a community first and a company second.” (Disclosure: James McRitchie, CorpGov.net Publisher, is a DiVita shareowner.)

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Can We Change Voting Behavior?

We Own You!: How technology can help stockholders take control of the corporations they own, Slate.com, 1/12/10.  Eliot Spitzer writes,  “Twitter, text messages, YouTube, and other technology transformed politics in 2008. This success raises a compelling question: Can the same technology awaken the more dormant world of corporate democracy?… Could proxy voting in 2011 generate the same enthusiasm as actual voting did in 2008?” It just might if we can get a few people with Spitzer’s star power to focus attention.

Good to see Eliot Spitzer talking up use of ProxyDemocracy.org, MoxyVote.com and Shareowners.org. He gets his facts slightly wrong, Both ProxyDemocracy.org AND MoxyVote.com intend to be neutral information providers. MoxyVote.com labels its information sources as “advocates” but that doesn’t mean MoxyVote.com agrees with them.

Both work on the concept of trusted brands to help shareowners vote more easily and more intelligently. In the case of ProxyDemocracy.org, their “respected institutional investors” spend considerable resources investigating not only resolutions but also director nominees. By announcing their votes in advance, they allow retail shareowners to benefit from their research and they create brands with a larger following than they would have voting alone.

Spitzer says there are at least two critical hurdles that still have to be overcome:

  1. “First, most shareholders don’t vote because they assume their votes don’t matter; shareholder votes are almost never close.” However, this year that is changing. With most of the Fortune 500 using majority vote requirements to elect directors and with “broker votes” no longer allowed when retail shareowners fail to vote within 10 days of the annual meeting, your vote counts more than ever. We are sure to see several directors turned out of office. That doesn’t stop them from replacing tweedle dee with tweedle dum, but its a good start.
  2. “There is no water cooler for corporate democracy. A presidential or mayoral race prompts conversations among friends and colleagues and generates daily press coverage. A corporate proxy vote doesn’t. We don’t all own the same shares, and even if we did, we probably wouldn’t talk about it.” That’s where sites like Shareowners.org and my own blog come in. People should be talking about how they are voting. It would be great to have TV shows like the Nightly Business Report actually providing analysis of the issues facing owners, rather than tips for the next bet. If PBS doesn’t do it, Spitzer could do it through Slate.com.

Of the two problems, the second is more important. When shareowners start talking to each other about how they’re voting, more will vote… and, more will vote intelligently. We will also start taking on more of the issues that currently send the system off balance.

For example, this morning I received a copy of a letter from Goldman Sachs to the SEC referencing my resolution to allow shareowners to ask the board to amend the bylaws, allowing owners of 10% of the company’s stock to call a special meeting. Management at Goldman Sachs wants to omit the resolution from the proxy on the basis that they intend to submit a proposal to the 2010 annual meeting to allow shareowners of 25% to hold a special meeting.

They argue that Rule 14a-8(i)(9) allows them to exclude the proposal from its proxy, since the proposal directly conflicts with their proposal. In the past, the SEC has allowed such exclusion based on confusion that would reign if shareowners passed both resolutions. That is nonsense. If both pass, the lower threshold applies. If we can ever get the “water cooler” discussions going around corporate democracy, shareowners won’t stand for a system that tips the balance of power to management at every turn. We will see if the SEC under Mary Schapiro acts to protect shareowners by allowing the resolution, or if they protect management by issuing a “no action” letter.

“Street name registration” undermines our culture, turning investors into gamblers by providing them “security entitlements,” instead of real ownership rights. Just as poker chips allow us to play under rules which often favor the house, those holding “security entitlements” do not acquire the rights of share owners. For example, one right sharowners have is to receive a proxy, whereas those of us registered in street name receive a voter instruction form (VIF). SEC rules guarantee certain rights to proxy holders but not, it is argued, to those voting through VIFs. (see
Investors Against Genocide Fighting American Funds, Broadridge and Vague SEC Requirements: More Problems Solved Using Direct Registration.

On January 13th I will post a draft petition to the SEC that I have been working on with Glyn Holton, of the United States Proxy Exchange, and others to convert from “street name” to a system of direct registration. I hope you will consider signing on as a co-filer. Can we change voting behavior? Yes, we can! Just give us the rights of ownership and see how democracy transforms the world of corporations.

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Whole Foods: Progress But Still a Lapdog Board

As I previously posted, Whole Foods Splits Positions, WFMI’s shareowners are making progress. Now, I see from their SEC filing they did more than split CEO and Chair positions.

Additionally, our board of directors amended Article IX of our bylaws to provide that, in order for shareholders to approve an amendment to, or a Bylaw inconsistent with, certain bylaw provisions, the amendment or inconsistent Bylaw must be approved by the affirmative vote of a majority of the outstanding shares. This requirement applies to the advance notice bylaws, written consent procedures bylaws, vacancies bylaws, Article III, Section 1 of the Bylaws which pertains to the composition of the Board of Directors, Article VII of the Bylaws which pertains to indemnification, and Article IX of the Bylaws which pertains to bylaw amendments. Previously, the affirmative vote of 75% of the outstanding shares was required to amend, or adopt a Bylaw inconsistent with, those provisions.

That’s great news. Leroy McDowell provided coverage of the change for Westlaw (Corporate Governance Watch: Activist Pushes Whole Foods Toward Simple Majority Voting, 12/29/09). McDowell attributes the change to be the result of “a longer standing shareholder proposal, submitted by the infamous John Chevedden.” McDowell fails to note that Chevedden’s last resolution on the topic won 57% support. Yet, the Board took no action until a few days ago.

Frustrated by the Board’s inaction, I submitted a resolution for the 2010 annual meeting that calls on the Board to establish an independent board committee to meet with me and to obtain any additional information needed before presenting a recommendation to the full Board. Perhaps this pushed the Board to act. While I’m pleased with the move to split positions and do away with supermajority requirements, I’m not so pleased with the explanation offered in the SEC filing.

Whole Foods Market always has strived to maintain high corporate governance standards. In keeping with this goal, the Board added the Lead Director designation in 2000, and since that time, has shifted all of the responsibilities of the Chairman of the Board to the Lead Director. Despite this shift in responsibilities which has rendered the Chairman role to a mere title, the Company repeatedly has received proposals from corporate activists to separate the Chairman and CEO roles. To avoid unnecessary distraction and protect the Company’s corporate governance profile, Mr. Mackey believes giving up the Chairman title to be in the best interests of the Company and its stakeholders. (my emphasis)

From the language, it would appear that Whole Foods is making the changes, not because they believe in good governance but because they want to avoid unnecessary distraction. Additionally, although the changes were made by the Board, it is obvious Mr. Mackey was “the decider,” as our former President would say. On his blog (12/29/09), Mr. Mackey writes, “Was I forced to give up the Chairman’s title? Absolutely not! Both the idea and the decision to give up the title were completely my own… At no time has anyone on the Board or in management ever asked me to give up the title.”

As I indicate in my resolution to Form a Majority Vote Committee, WFMI’s Lead Director, John Elstrott now Chairman, has been on the board for 14-years. That should be a red flag to shareowners. Back in 1996 the relatively conservative National Association of Corporate Directors, in its Report on Director Professionalism, called for term limits. The NACD suggested a term limit of between 10 and 15 years.

After about 10 years, most directors have been completely captured by the CEOs who brought them to the board and who decide their pay and perks. Long-term directors also get too comfortable. They are not generally innovating against themselves.

If Elstrott ever was independent, he should no longer be considered so. Additionally, according to a report from The Corporate Library, three other directors are  outside-related and three owned no stock (Jonathan Sokoloff, Jonathan Seiffer and Stephanie Kugelman). Shareowners should continue to push on directors to invest a substantial portion of their own wealth in the company (not through grants for board service but from their own savings) and should also push on them to act independently.

Mackey was ahead of most with his vision of a shift toward natural food and his adoption of decentralized decision-making, something of an experiment in workplace democracy. Team members meet regularly to decide everything from local suppliers to who should get hired. Democracy seems to have worked well for Whole Foods at the shop floor level. It is time the company also adopted more of a democratic approach with regard to the Board and its shareowners.

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Fix the Boards – Fix the System

Money for Nothing: How the Failure of Corporate Boards Is Ruining American Business and Costing Us Trillions by John Gillespie and David Zweig begins with a story familiar to just about everyone on the globe — corporate and economic collapse brought on by greedy CEOs. The authors look behind the headlines to reveal and document the systematic failure of corporate boards who are supposed to look out for shareowner interests but are still too often picked by the very ones they are supposed to advise and monitor… the CEOs.

They discuss how companies spend enormous sums of shareholder money to fight off reforms, either directly or through organizations like the US Chamber of Commerce or the Business Roundtable. According to the authors, “corporate boards remain the weakest link in our free enterprise system.”

A brief overview is provided on how we got here and what it means for shareowners and society. Much of the book is given over to example after example of conflicts of interest, overlapping boards, and a world driven by the greed and status needs of CEOs. Studies have shown that 80% of acquisitions fail to deliver and many fail outright. Too often they are driven by incentives that reward empire building over the generation of profits.

Jennifer Lerner, the only psychologist on the faculty of Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, finds that “Americans tend to exhibit anger more readily than those in many other cultures, and the effects of being in power closely resemble those of being angry.” CEOs and other executives, it turns out, have substantially larger appetites for risk and are more optimistic about outcomes. Changing the context can improve outcomes, especially where the environment demands “predecisional accountability to an audience with unknown views.” In the case of corporations, that would be a diverse independent board, not predictable lapdogs of management.

Later chapters review “The Myth of Shareholders’ Rights” and other issues, including proxy mechanics that allow moving shares to be voted multiple times based on the “day of record,” when large blocks of stocks may be most likely to have several different owners. They document that not only do shareowners have little power, the gatekeepers and guardians paid to protect shareowner interests are almost always conflicted, leading to de facto control by management. At the same time, laws like the “business judgment rule” make it nearly impossible to hold fiduciaries accountable. Pension assets that are turned over to plan managers who provide kickbacks back to corporations earned 29% lower returns, according to a cited 2009 GAO report. The failures documented by Gillespie and Zweig cost investors and the public trillions, bringing the world economy to its knees.

It is time boards stopped being the CEOs friend and instead took on the role of the CEO’s boss. After a thorough examination of the issues, documented with an abundance of real-life examples, Gillespie and Zweig close with a list of recommendations that could go far in changing the culture of the boardroom, strengthening accountability, reducing conflicts of interest, and getting shareowners involved. In a very abbreviated form:

  • Create a new class of public directors and a training consortium
  • Insist of gender, ethnic, and perceptual diversity
  • Limit directors to three or fewer boards and require substantial “skin in the game”
  • Initiate more communication between directors and shareowners
  • Split chair/CEO roles & learn lessons from nonprofits
  • Allow 10% of shareowners to call an extraordinary general meeting
  • Add clout to say-on-pay, reform executive compensation, and shareholder approval of golden parachutes
  • Ban staggered boards and require majority votes elections
  • Proxy access for shareowners, daylight nominating & election processes, & require real board evaluations
  • Require board risk committees & empower boards to gather independent information
  • End conflict of interest in mutual fund voting by allowing third party voters per Investor Suffrage Movement
  • Reform voting mechanics to end manipulation by management
  • Reform auditor business model & Fix “up the ladder” provision of SOX
  • Reform rating agency model, fully disclose lobbyist expenses, provide real funding for SEC enforcement
  • Federalize corporate law
  • Better coverage of governance issues by the financial media
  • Better financial education, including how corporate governance works

Gillespie and Zweig hit all the bases for a solid home run. They tell us how the game is fixed and how the rules can be changed to play fair. After all, shareowners own the “ball” and all the other equipment. Will we listen? Even more importantly, will we act?

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CorpGov Bites

Check out the CorpGov Blog, a work in progress. After years of demands that we have indexed articles, an RSS feed and other advantages of blogs, we’re finally beginning to adapt. With our 15th anniversary coming up in 2010, maybe it is time to join the 21st century. Your feedback is appreciated, either via e-mail or through your comments on the blog. I’m still not sure about the look, how it should be organized, how to maintain the number one search status we’ve had on the term “corporate governance” since before google, how to change the URL’s, how to add an e-mail subscribe function, etc., etc. Your suggestions, especially when accompanied with instructions, are more than welcome.

WorldBlu discusses How to Democratize Corporate Ownership, using Equal Exchange as an example of a for-profit Fair Trade company in the US that owned and governed by employees on a one-person/one-share/one-vote basis.

Faith and finance: Of greed and creed (FT, 12/23/09) explores the morals of the financial sector. Was it a “greedy focus on the short term?” Others cite a diminished a sense of responsibility, allowing personal and institutional self-interest to overshadow customer service and risk management. “The root problem, Lord Turner, free-thinking chairman of the Financial Services Authority, the UK industry regulator, famously said this summer, is that too much business over the past decade has been ‘socially useless.'” The article reports mixed responses as to lessons learned.

I would ask, just how useful is the entire financial sector? As Simon Johnson discussed in The Quiet Coup (theAtlantic, May 2009) “From 1973 to 1985, the financial sector never earned more than 16 percent of domestic corporate profits. In 1986, that figure reached 19 percent. In the 1990s, it oscillated between 21 percent and 30 percent, higher than it had ever been in the postwar period. This decade, it reached 41 percent. Pay rose just as dramatically. From 1948 to 1982, average compensation in the financial sector ranged between 99 percent and 108 percent of the average for all domestic private industries. From 1983, it shot upward, reaching 181 percent in 2007.”

A new report from Ceres and Mercer, Energy efficiency and real estate: Opportunities for investors, identifies efficiency as a significant front in mitigating climate change, and recommends that investors focus on efficiency measures in their real estate holdings. The report recommends that as a first step, investors launch energy efficiency initiatives by developing benchmarks and then create achievable targets in the implementation of projects. (Investing in Energy-Efficient Buildings Can Reduce Emissions While Strengthening Portfolios, Sustainability Investment News, 12/24/09)

A study by Pascual Berrone and Russell Reynolds Associates of Spainish companies found 60% of board chairs said institutional investors exercised little or no involvement in corporate governance. (The Need for Investors to Wield More Board Influence, IESE Insight) How different is it elsewhere?

“Everybody who works with retirement plans should presume that they will owe a fiduciary duty or they will owe a duty for loyalty to those who they service,” says Matthew Hutcheson, an independent pension fiduciary quoted in Coming soon: Broader definition of fiduciary under ERISA (InvestmentNews, 12/23/09). “Brokers who haven’t viewed themselves as fiduciaries need to ask what they might need to do differently.”

The common statement that the world was becoming flat was questioned at the Global Ethics Forum held at the UNOG-United Nations Office at Geneva. In our many problems of poverty, environment, Ponzi schemes, growing income gaps – speakers emphasized how civil society had lost confidence in business and in its leaders.

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October 2002

Webster Named

The US Securities and Exchange Commission voted to approve five members of a new national accounting oversight board to be headed by ex-FBI-CIA chief William Webster whose only experience in accounting, as far as we know, was heading the auditing committee of U.S. Technologies, now bankrupt and facing fraud accusations. Shortly before Webster was appointed he told Harvey Pitt but Pitt chose not to tell the other four commissioners prior to their vote.

Webster edged out the much better qualified pension fund chief John Biggs, who would have done much to restore trust. The vote was 3-2. Webster becomes the first chairman of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, expected to get up and running early next year.

In addition to Webster, the commission approved former CalPERS attorney Kayla Gillan; accountant and former SEC general counsel Daniel Goelzer; former congressman Willis Gradison; and SEC Enforcement Division Chief Accountant Charles Neimeier. Continue Reading →

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Review – The New Global Investors & Working Capital Contrasted

Monks, Robert A. G., The New Global Investors: How Shareowners Can Unlock Sustainable Prosperity Worldwide, Capstone Publishing, 2001.

Like many, Robert Monks recognizes that corporations have become the most dominant institution of our time. While they appear to be the most effective tool for creating wealth ever created, they also exact a growing cost…primarily the corruption of government and externalization of risks and responsibility with growing social and environmental damage. Continue Reading →

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CalPERS muzzles critics


CalPERS Ballot rules protect board, keep others in the dark

“Self-serving” is what one critic called the vote last week to sharply limit what candidates for the California Public Employees Retirement System board can include in their ballot statements. Certainly, “self-serving” is one word that characterizes that vote. “Anti-democratic,” “chilling” and “wrong” are among the others.

In a decision sweeping in its arrogance and disregard for First Amendment speech rights, the CalPERS board voted 9-4 to restrict ballot statements to “a recitation of the candidate’s personal background and qualifications” — and nothing more. Incredibly, board members even voted to delete a proposal by their staff that would have allowed ballot statements to include “candidates’ opinion or positions on issues of general concern to the system’s membership.” Continue Reading →

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