Tag Archives | Edward Kamonjoh

CII: Climate Competency & Risk

Shifting Investor Perspectives on Climate Risk & Board Climate Competency

These notes on climate competency are my last post from the Council of Institutional Investors Fall 2017 conference.  Find more at .  As a member of the press, I was excluded from the policy-making meetings. Still, it was a great opportunity to touch base with members of CII and to learn of recent developments and where we may be headed.

The panel discussion on climate risk and board competency hosted by the 50/50 Climate Project and the New York City Comptroller’s Office. From the program: Continue Reading →

Continue Reading ·

Kamonjoh Leads 50/50 Climate Project

Edward Kamonjoh

Edward Kamonjoh

The 50/50 Climate Project, a not-for-profit resource and action center for institutional investors focused on increasing the climate competency of boards of directors of large publicly traded corporations, is pleased to announce the appointment of Edward Kamonjoh as its inaugural Executive Director.

Kamonjoh joins the 50/50 Climate Project from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) where he served most recently as head of U.S. Strategic Research and Analysis. He previously led ISS’ ESG Research team and was a member of ISS’ Global Policy Board. Kamonjoh brings more than 14 years of experience working with some of the world’s largest institutional investors on corporate governance and ESG topics. Continue Reading →

Continue Reading ·

Controlled Companies Underperform, Overpay

Controlled CompaniesControlled companies generally underperformed non-controlled firms in terms of total shareholder returns, revenue growth, and return on equity, according to a new reportControlled Companies in the Standard & Poor’s 1500:  A Follow-up Review of Performance & Risk, commissioned by the Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute (IRRCi) and conducted by Institutional Shareholder Services Inc. (ISS).

The study also finds that average chief executive (CEO) pay is significantly higher at controlled companies with multi-class stock structures:  three times higher than that at single-class stock controlled firms and more than 40% higher than average CEO pay at non-controlled firms. In addition, director tenure typically runs longer, board refreshment is generally slower, and boardrooms are less diverse at controlled companies. Continue Reading →

Continue Reading ·

Powered by WordPress. Designed by WooThemes