Kellogg 2019 annual meeting is April 26th. Stock price fared poorly for the last five years, so the CEO should not be paid as if he had average performance. Vote AGAINST pay. The Compensation Committee should not be reelected, since they recommended average pay for below average performance. Vote AGAINST Laschinger and Tasted. Vote AGAINST ratifying the auditor. They have served for more than seven years, so independence is questionable. Vote FOR declassifying the board, so that we can hold each member accountable every year.
Tag Archives | executive pay
Intuitive Surgical 2019 annual meeting is April 25th. Vote AGAINST (1F) Alan Levy and (1H) Mark Rubash. Vote FOR #5 Eliminate Supermajority Provisions.
The Northern Trust 2019 annual meeting is April 23rd. Vote AGAINST Bynoe, Richards, Slark, and Tribbett; AGAINST Executive Pay & Auditor: FOR Disclose Political Contributions and Right to Call a Special Meeting.
The FedEx 2018 annual meeting is September 24th. Vote AGAINST John A. Edwardson, Paul S. Walsh, Marvin R. Ellison, John C. (“Chris”) Inglis, Shirley Ann Jackson and Susan C. Schwabas, as well as the pay package. Vote FOR all three shareholder proposals. Continue Reading →
A stock buyback can increase senior executive pay, unrelated to performance. First, stock buybacks increase the value of long-term performance stock options and other forms of equity pay. Second, senior executives sometimes time their own stock sales to take advantage of the bump in price that usually accompanies stock buyback announcements. Such behavior defeats the purpose of incentivizing a long-term focus. To address our concern that performance pay should not be artificially boosted by a stock buyback, I recently submitted a proposal to Cisco Systems and expect to submit similar proposals to other companies.
Last year, I submitted a similar proposal to GE. The updated submission to Cisco Systems adds a provision to address market timing. As always, I welcome suggestions and comments from interested readers. How can such resolutions be improved? What have I missed? Or, if you disagree, why are my concerns unwarranted? Use the comment section below the post or email me. Continue Reading →
The Progenics Pharmaceuticals 2018 annual meeting is June 13. Vote AGAINST Crowley and Kishbauch, the stock incentive plan and FOR proxy access amendments to enhance long-term shareholder value. Vote to make our great company even better. Continue Reading →
The Caterpillar 2018 annual meeting is June 13. Vote AGAINST the pay package and FOR the shareholder proposals to enhance long-term value. Your vote can help make a great company even better. Continue Reading →
Netflix 2018 annual meeting is June 6, 2018. Vote FOR all of the shareholder proposals to enhance long-term value. The Board keeps ignoring our votes. We need to keep reminding them we want the normal shareholders rights.
Netflix (NFLX), an Internet television network, engages in the Internet delivery of television (TV) shows and movies on various Internet-connected screens. Most shareholders do not vote because reading through 70+ pages of the proxy is not worth the time for the small difference your vote will make. Below, I tell you how I am voting and why. If you have read these posts related to my portfolio for the last 22 years, have values aligned with mine, and trust my judgment (or you don’t want to take the time to read it), go immediately to see how I voted my ballot. Voting will take you only a minute or two and every vote counts.
Ford Motor Company (F) designs, manufactures, markets, and services a range of Ford cars, trucks, sport utility vehicles, and electrified vehicles; and Lincoln luxury vehicles worldwide. Placing a big bet on the continued profitability of gas guzzling SUVs and trucks, they recently announced phasing out most sedans. Most shareholders do not vote because reading through 100+ pages of the proxy is not worth the time for the small difference your vote will make. Below, I tell you how I voted and why. If you have read these posts related to my portfolio for the last 22 years and trust my judgment (or you don’t want to take the time to read my rationale), go immediately to see how I voted my ballot. Voting will take you only a minute or two and every vote counts.
The CEO Pay Machine: How it Trashes America and How to Stop it (Amazon) by Steven Clifford should be mandatory reading for all compensation committees and those who vote proxies for large funds. The book is easily read and understood by the layperson. It also includes the fact-based evidence needed to convince fiduciaries that voting against most executive pay packages is one of the first steps to restoring shareholder value, company sustainability and the very foundations of American democracy.
Why combine CEO and chair positions or pay executives with options when both practices lead to poor results? We don’t except “everyone else does it” as an excuse for harmful behavior from our teenagers; why should we accept it as a reason from compensation consultants and the former CEOs sitting on most corporate boards? Clifford also outlines possible remedies but nothing will be done unless we shift public opinion. If widely read and discussed, The CEO Pay Machine could be central to change. Continue Reading →
Tesla Motors Inc $TSLA, designs, develops, manufactures and sells electric vehicles and energy storage products. Their annual meeting is coming up on May 31, 2016. ProxyDemocracy.org had collected the votes of two fund families when I checked. Vote AGAINST compensation committee; FOR Reduce Supermajority. I voted with the Board’s recommendations 71% of the time. View Proxy Statement via iiWisdom. Continue Reading →
BlackRock Inc (NYSE:BLK) provides investment and risk management services to institutional and retail clients across the world. Its product offerings include single- and multi-asset class portfolios investing in equities, fixed income, alternatives and money market instruments..
Their annual meeting is coming up on May 25, 2016. ProxyDemocracy.org had collected the votes of three fund families when I checked. Vote AGAINST pay plan, compensation committee, director with poor attendance; FOR Proxy Access, Report on Proxy Voting and Executive Compensation. I voted with the Board’s recommendations 59% of the time. View Proxy Statement. Continue Reading →
Publisher’s Note: Yes, you’ll find many broken links in the material referenced below. After 5, 10 and 15 years, the internet moves on. Many of the organization’s linked have since gone under. We’re just glad to still be here, offering our readers a sense of the history we have shared. More about the WABAC machine.
Five Years Ago in Corporate Governance
- The Treasury is injecting $125 billion into nine big banks and making a like amount available for other banks that apply. Those financial giants owed their executives more than $40 billion for past years’ pay and pensions as of the end of 2007, a Wall Street Journal analysis shows. (Banks Owe Billions to Executives, 10/31/08) How much of our $250 billion bailout will go to pay for special executive pensions and deferred compensation, including bonuses? Will our disgust with those who brought us the financial melt-down lead to an upsurge in mutual banks and credit unions?
- Jackie Cook, the founder of Fund Votes, told SocialFunds.com, “Executive compensation is at the heart of a growing problem Continue Reading →
In a recent Stanford “Closer Look” publication (How ISS Dictates Equity Plan Design), Ian D. Gow (Harvard but graduated from Stanford), David F. Larcker, Allan l. Mccall, and Brian Tayan argue ISS dictates pay equity plans. ‘Nonsense,’ was my first reaction. ISS policies generally reflect the will of its customers. The authors have a point but they miss the main problem. Their arguments begin in familiar territory. Continue Reading →
This unique “must have” two volume set traces the development of corporate governance thought around the core issue of the separation of ownership and control while also touching on the board of directors, executive pay, shareholder activism and the regulatory structures that shape corporate governance in the U.S. I include the index to both volumes at the bottom of this review for your reference. The word “modern” in the title refers roughly to the post 1970 world.
Although referenced, the set does not stem directly from The Modern Corporation and Private Property by Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means. And of course, scholars continue to explore the consequences of this rift in books such as Citizens Continue Reading →
This is the last in my series on the Corporate Directors Forum 2013. See materials, slideshow, Corporate Directors Forum 2013: Bonus Session, and Corporate Directors Forum 2013 – Day 1, Part 1, and Corporate Directors Forum: Day 1, Part 2. The program was subject to the Chatham House Rule, so there will be little in the way of attribution below but I hope to provide some sense of the discussion. I throw in a lot of opinions. Some are those of panelists, some are mine, and some came from the audience. Continue Reading →
On Friday, January 18th, The Conference Board Governance Center hosted a debate on Executive Compensation and the Utility of Peer Groups in collaboration with the University of Delaware’s John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance. Latham & Watkins provided the venue for the program. Continue Reading →
Hostess In the process of complete liquidation, Hostess essentially admits it robbed the pensions of 18,000 unionized workers and put it toward executive pay for winding down the company. According to AlterNet,
Just last month, a judge agreed to let Hostess executives suck another $1.8 million out of the bankrupt company to pay bonuses to CEOs.
The common belief that firms exists to maximize shareholder value has led to massive growth in stock-based compensation for executives and a naive and wrongheaded coupling of the “real” market (the business of designing, making and selling products and services) with the “expectations” market (the business of trading stocks, options and complex derivatives). It’s a bit like confusing winning the Super Bowl with winning a bet on the Super Bowl. Continue Reading →
How Not to Argue for Bonuses. Reprinted with permission from PIRC Alerts, 17 July 2012. PIRC is the UK’s leading independent research and advisory consultancy providing services to institutional investors on corporate governance and corporate social responsibility. Continue Reading →
For future reference, I’m bookmarking 2012 Say-on-Pay Votes: Fulfilled Expectations, Though Not Without Surprises by Shirley Westcott of Alliance Advisors, LLC, originally published in the corporate governance newsletter VIPsight.
Richard L. Trumka, President, AFL-CIO announced an update to their PayWatch website—this year’s version is called CEO Pay and the 99%. Trumka says it’s your one-stop shop for the most recent information on out-of-control CEO pay and what you can do to stop it. Continue Reading →