Tag Archives | IRV

Future Corporate Voting

Keith Paul Bishop writes: Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires companies that are subject to the SEC’s proxy rules to include in their proxy statements “a separate resolution subject to shareholder vote” to determine whether a shareholder vote on executive compensation will occur every 1, 2, or 3 years.   When the SEC was considering amendments to its rules to […]

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Shareholder Democracy: A Bad Idea?

At the corporate governance level, the problem is that things like say-on-pay introduce complicated elements into proxy elections. These complexities make it difficult for ordinary shareholders, typically equipped with only a passing interest and knowledge of the issues at hand, to form preferences, much less vote their preferences. (Why Shareholder Democracy Is a Bad Idea […]

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