Keith Paul Bishop writes: Section 951 of the Dodd-Frank Act requires companies that are subject to the SEC’s proxy rules to include in their proxy statements “a separate resolution subject to shareholder vote” to determine whether a shareholder vote on executive compensation will occur every 1, 2, or 3 years. When the SEC was considering amendments to its rules to […]
Tag Archives | IRV
Shareholder Democracy: A Bad Idea?
James McRitchie, February 19, 2011 ,
At the corporate governance level, the problem is that things like say-on-pay introduce complicated elements into proxy elections. These complexities make it difficult for ordinary shareholders, typically equipped with only a passing interest and knowledge of the issues at hand, to form preferences, much less vote their preferences. (Why Shareholder Democracy Is a Bad Idea […]
Proxy Access Avoidance: Subversive or Accelerating Preemption?
James McRitchie, August 3, 2010 ,
The other day I included mention of a project by J.W Verret (Truth on the Market) who promises 16 posts in a series of strategies on how to avoid complying with proxy access once it is enacted. His postings are defended by someone I normally consider at least somewhat rational, Stephen Bainbridge. One of Verret’s […]