CEO Incentives can boost short-term stock price but destroy long-term value, according to the two winning academic papers of the Investor Responsibility Research Center Institute (IRRCi) annual investor research competition. The winning academic research teams share a $10,000 award. (more…)
Can We Really Govern for the Long-Term vs the Quarterly Fixation? This is Part 3 of my coverage of Directors Forum 2017 in San Diego, which was billed as Directors, Management, & Shareholders in Dialogue. I was also hoping to learn more about President Donald J. Trump and how his administration might impact corporate governance. See Part I and Part 2. As […]
Norges Bank published their second annual report on responsible investment of the Government Pension Fund Global. They clarified expectations towards companies in 2015 and are creating a model I hope many will follow The report provides a comprehensive review of work by Norges Bank on responsible investment in the management of the fund. Key areas […]
The Conference on the Use and Misuse of Stock Price will take place on Friday, September 19, 2014, from 9:00AM-5:30PM at Columbia Law School in New York City and will be hosted by the Millstein Center and IRRC Institute. Mark your calendar. (more…)
Directors & Boards ran an important series of articles in its 1st quarter 2011 magazine on Fixing the Annual Meeting. Some excellent ideas are put forward, especially if we parse out the thoughtful from the conventional. (Link through the Shareholderforum to a compilation of most of the articles cited below from Directors & Boards and […]
A recent brief from the National Institute on Retirement Security, Who Killed the Private Sector DB Plan?, finds the following are the main factors that contributed to the decline in private pension funds: Increased regulation, which has had the unintended consequence of impacting both the cash flow of the firm and volatility of plan funding; […]
In Reining in Excessive Risk Taking by Executives: Experimental Evidence, researchers Mathieu Lefebvre and Ferdinand Vieider find that excessive risks are likely to be reduced by aligning executives’ interests with those of shareowners. (paper available at SSRN, March 2010) Abstract follows: Compensation of executives by means of equity has long been seen as a means […]