Tag Archives | REED

Reeds, Inc Wants Democratic-Free Zone

Reeds, Inc fights to deepen its a democratic-free zone through dilutions to strengthen the grip of insiders and by opposing proxy access. They are headed for private control, while keeping the company public. Last year, the founder picked a new board. Is it really independent?

Reed’s, Inc (REED) develops, manufactures, markets, and sells natural non-alcoholic carbonated soft drinks in the United States and internationally. Reeds, Inc is one many stocks in my portfolio. ProxyDemocracy.org had collected no votes (company may be too small).

The annual meeting is coming up on September 29, 2017.  I would be happy to meet readers, especially Reeds, Inc shareholders, in the vicinity of 13000 South Spring Street, Los Angeles, California 90061 either the evening or morning before the 1 pm meeting. (contact me) Vote today. If you have already voted, you can change your vote. Your last vote will override any previous vote. More than 90% of retail shareholders don’t bother to vote, so think of yourself as voting for 10.

I voted FOR Proxy Access, AGAINST excessive equity compensation, proposed dilution for financing undisclosed transactions, and the related proposal approving a change in control. I don’t think I have ever seen such a bundle of proposals aimed at entrenchment and reducing shareholder voice. See how and why I voted other items below. I voted with the Board’s recommendations 47% of the time. View Proxy Statement via SEC’s EDGAR system (look for DEF 14A).

Read Warnings below. What follows are my recommendations on how to vote the proxy in order to enhance corporate governance and long-term value.

Reeds, Inc Proxy Voting Guide: ISS Rating

From the Yahoo Finance profile: Reed’s, Inc’s had no ISS Governance QualityScore. Perhaps too low to score? More likely, too small to be on the radar.

Reed’s, Inc Proxy Voting Guide: Compensation

Reed’s, Inc provides for a say-on-pay vote only every three years. Shareholders have no vote this year on compensation. However, in reviewing the information provided on Valentin Stalowir’s employment agreement as the new CEO, I am concerned about the following:

  • Automatic accelerated vesting if there is a change-in-control. This provides an incentive for windfall profits even if such a change disadvantages other shareholders or even if Stalowir’s employment does not terminate.
  • I see no evidence of clawback provisions, stock ownership guidelines, or a required holding period for board members or executives. In their opposition statement to my proxy access proposal, Reed, Inc claims “We have an established record of best governance practices that are responsive to shareholders.” Their idea of what constitutes “best governance practices that are responsive to shareholders” appears to be a very low bar.

Reed’s, Inc Proxy Voting Guide: Board Proposals

Reed’s, Inc Proxy Voting Guide: Directors

I am concerned about carryover directors. I think they were all picked by Chris Reed last year without the benefit of input from the nominating committee that existed when the Committee to Rescue Reeds challenged one man rule. However, I will give most the benefit of the doubt, knowing they face a difficult situation in any attempt to provide an independent voice.

By way of background:

  • 4/19/2017 Chris Reed resigned as CEO and became chief innovation officer. He continues to serve on the board. Stefan Freeman named interim CEO.
  • 6/28/2017 Valentin Stalowir appointed CEO and director. Freeman named COO.
  • Freeman is not standing for reelection to the board. James Bass and Scott Grossman have been nominated for election as directors.
  • After twice reelecting a director who was defeated and opposing my proposal to put teeth into their majority vote bylaw, on 8/25/2017, the board amended the bylaws to require director nominees to resign if they do not receive a majority of votes cast in uncontested elections.

I voted Withhold on Charles Cargile, since he not only is a CEO of a publicly traded company but servers on three public company boards. He is overcommitted. Reeds, Inc will need more of his attention than he has time available. See Who Wins When CEOs Sit on Multiple Boards? Not Investors. Large investors, of which Reeds, Inc has very few, are cracking down on overboarding (Big Investors Want Directors to Stop Sitting On So Many Boards); retail should do the same.

I also voted Withhold on Christopher Reed. We don’t need two inside directors at Reeds, Inc, we need genuinely independent directors… preferably nominated by shareholders, instead of picked by Christopher Reed. Mr. Reed had decades to bring his company to profit and failed. Even without a board seat, he will have substantial influence, since he and his family hold almost 25% of the stock… probably even more if proposed stock plans are approved.

Reed’s, Inc Proxy Voting Guide: Item 2, Omnibus Stock Plan

The board seeks approval to issue 3M shares to be available for award to all employees, officers, non-employee directors and consultants. Issues about:

  • Excessive cost
  • Duration of available and proposed shares exceeds 6 years (expires 9/29/2027)
  • Plan permits liberal recycling of shares
  • Allows broad discretion to accelerate vesting
  • Silent on cash buyout without shareholder approval

Vote AGAINST.

Reed’s, Inc Proxy Voting Guide: #3, Increase Authorized Stock

The board seeks approval to increase the number of authorized shares of common stock by over 100%, from 19.5M to 40M shares.

The board seeks to implement its growth strategy, attract and retain talent, regain compliance with listing standards before 12/22/2017 and meet an agreement with Raptor/HarborReeds to increase common stock by 5M shares. The reasons for the increase in authorized stock lack specificity and the company has a history of repricing options without shareholder approval. Nonetheless, they need the money to continue in business and to stop borrowing a usurious rates.

Vote FOR.

Reed’s, Inc Proxy Voting Guide: #4, Increase Authorized Preferred Stock

The board seeks approval to increase the number of authorized blank check preferred stock by 400%, from 500,000 shares to 2.5M shares.

The board provides no specifics but appears to want flexibility to take advantage of opportunities that may arise.

On the plus side, such stock could be used to finance growth or acquire other companies.

On the minus side, it dilutes the voting power of existing shareholders and could be considered a back-door poison pill, since it can be issued to parties friendly to management. Very little in the way of specifics are provided and the board admits the stock could be used as an entrenchment devise.

Vote AGAINST.

Reed’s, Inc Proxy Voting Guide: #5, Issuance of Shares for Private Placement

Reeds, Inc seeks approval to issue 6M shares (39% of shares as of the record date) at a maximum discount of 25% for consideration not to exceed $8M on or before 12/28/2017. The company states it entered into an agreement with Raptor/HarborReeds on July 13, 2017, but provides little in the way of specifics. Reeds, Inc stock price fell 30% from $2.35 on July 13 to $1.65 on July 14, 2017. Since the specifics concerning any specific proposed transaction were not disclosed, the market did not approve. Neither do I.

Vote AGAINST.

Reed’s, Inc Proxy Voting Guide: #6, Change of Control as a Result of Private Placement

Reeds, Inc seeks prior approval from shareholders of any change of control that could result from the potential issuance of securities pursuant to #5 above. NYSE rules require companies to obtain shareholder approval prior to a change in control.

In my experience, those seeking a change in control often offer a premium to buy out other shareholders or the market signals such a change as positive. In this case, no premium was offered and the market priced the change by cutting the value of stock by 30%.

Vote AGAINST.

Reed’s, Inc Proxy Voting Guide: #7, Establish Range for Board Size

The board seeks approval to set the range of the size of the board between a minimum of 5 and a maximum of 9 at its sole discretion.

Frankly, I do not know the board’s motivation. They could be expanding the potential number of board seats for entrenchment purposes to block potential dissidents engaged in a contest from gaining a change of control.

Without knowing the purpose and seeing no threatened takeover, I will give them the benefit of the doubt.

Vote FOR.

Reed’s, Inc Proxy Voting Guide: #8, Auditor

I have no reason to believe the auditor has rendered an inaccurate opinion, is engaged in poor accounting practices, or has a conflict of interest. However, Weinberg & Company has served as Reeds, Inc auditors for 8 years. It is time to switch to avoid any appearance of capture or lack of independence. Although when I vote against a committee’s recommendation, I would normally vote against the committee, I have decided not to do so this year for lack of audit rotation, since this is a relatively new stance.

Vote AGAINST.

Reed’s, Inc Proxy Voting Guide: Shareholder Proposal

Reed’s, Inc Proxy Voting Guide:  #9, Proxy Access Bylaw Amendments

I submitted this proposal and will speak to it at the annual meeting. The proposal closely follows the 2010 SEC rule requiring proxy access at public companies that was struck down by a conservative DC Circuit Court. The US Chamber of Commerce and Business Roundtable argued the SEC’s cost estimates for implementation were low. Companies would spend considerable sums to keep any shareholder nominees off the proxy.

Since then, more than 60% of S&P 500 companies have adopted proxy access. Out of 13 proxy access proposals going to a vote last year, 13 received majority support. The 1 proposal that failed was at Reed’s Inc, with 33%. The average support for all such proposals, including Reeds, was 66.6%.

The proposal would allow groups of shareholders holding 3% or more of Reeds, Inc common stock held for 3 years to place 2 nominees on the proxy (up to 25% of the board). This would provide direct competition for leadership at minimal cost. The exchange of ideas should drive innovation and lower risk.

Research suggests three women may constitute a critical mass for reframing the decision-making culture of boards. Similarly, having two shareholder-nominated directors may help ensure not only participation on each of the committees but a critical mass for bringing a shareholder perspective to Board decisions. Research also finds that director insulation from removal is associated with lower firm value and worse performance. Proxy access is the surest way to remind directors they can be removed and replaced by shareholders.

Reeds, Inc argues proxy access is not needed, since they have an “established record of best governance practices that are responsive to shareholders,” “majority voting,” and “an annual “say-on-pay” vote.”

However, Reeds failed to provide their opposition statement 30 days in advance of filing their proxy as required by law. Additionally, their opposition statement includes “false and misleading statements,” also prohibited by law. The real “established record” includes:

  • not allowing board candidates to be evaluated by the nominating committee.
  • not removing a director who failed to achieve a majority vote two years in a row
  • opposing my proposal to put teeth in their majority vote bylaw
  • no history of a board evaluation process
  • no history of a succession plan for CEO position
  • failure to notify board or shareholders of voluntary FDA recall regarding exploding bottles of ginger brew or the loss of lucrative contract with Trader Joe’s
  • no annual say-on-pay; only such a vote every three years

If there ever was a company in need of proxy access, it is Reeds, Inc.

Vote FOR.

Reed’s, Inc Proxy Voting Guide: Votes Against Board Position in Bold

As mentioned above, Reeds, Inc may be too small to be in the ProxyDemocracy.org database. That also appears true of Egan-Jones and Proxy Insight. I fully expect institutional investors at Reeds, Inc, like Goldman Sachs and Vanguard will vote for proxy access, since they have a record of doing so. However, institutional investors only hold about 13% of the shares. The largest shareholders at Reed, Inc are Christopher Reed, Robert Reed, and Raptor/Harbor Reeds SP LLC with 25% of the vote, not counting other insiders. The Reeds will probably vote. Will other shareholders bother to vote? Stay tuned.

My votes against the board’s recommendations are in bold below.

# PROPOSAL TEXT CorpGov
1.1 Elect Director John Bello For
1.2 Elect Director Valentin Stalowir For
1.3 Elect Director Lewis Jaffe For
1.4 Elect Director Charles F. Cargile Withhold
1.5 Elect Director Christopher J. Reed Withhold
1.6 Elect Director Scott R. Grossman For
1.7 Elect Director James Bass For
2 Approve Omnibus Stock Plan Against
3 Increase Authorized Common Stock Against
4 Increase Authorized Preferred Stock Against
5 Approve Issuance of Shares for a Private Placement For
6 Approve Change of Control as a Result of Private Placement Against
7 Establish Range For Board Size For
8 Ratify Weinberg & Company, P.A. as Auditors Against
9 Adopt Proxy Access Right FOR

SharkRepellent

Reeds, Inc Proxy Voting Guide: Issue for Future Proposals

Looking at SharkRepellent.net for other provisions unfriendly to shareowners. The main outstanding issue is proxy access:

  • No proxy access, as discussed above.
  • Shareholders cannot call special meetings.
  • Blank check perferred stock may also board to create a poison pill or a new series of stock with special voting power.

Reeds, Inc Proxy Voting Guide: Mark Your Calendar

Stockholder proposals for inclusion in our proxy statement: If a stockholder wishes to present a proposal to be included in our proxy statement and form of proxy for the 2018 Annual Meeting of Stockholders, the proponent and the proposal must comply with the proxy proposal submission rules of the SEC and namely, Securities Exchange Act Rule 14a-8. One of the requirements is that the proposal be received by our Secretary no later than May 4, 2018, which is 120 calendar days before September 1, 2018 – the anniversary date of this Proxy Statement was released to stockholders in connection with the 2017 Annual Meeting. If the date of next year’s annual meeting is changed by more than 30 days from the anniversary date of this year’s Annual Meeting on September 29, 2017, then the deadline is a reasonable time before we begin to print and mail proxy materials. Proposals we receive after that date will not be included in the proxy statement for the 2018 Annual Meeting of Stockholders.

Why You Don’t Fail When You Fail with Chris Reed

Even if he fails with Reeds, Inc, Chris Reed views it as a success. That might be a great personal philosophy, but is it one we want to continue to dominate our board?

Warnings

Be sure to vote each item on the proxy. Any items left blank are voted in favor of management’s recommendations. (See Broken Windows & Proxy Vote Rigging – Both Invite More Serious Crime). I generally vote against pay packages where NEOs were paid above median in the previous year but make exceptions if warranted. According to Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Grinstein, Yaniv (The Growth of Executive Pay), aggregate compensation by public companies to NEOs increased from 5 percent of earnings in 1993-1995 to about 10 percent in 2001-2003.

Few firms admit to having average executives. They generally set compensation at above average for their “peer group,” which is often chosen aspirationally. While the “Lake Woebegone effect” may be nice in fictional towns, “where all the children are above average,” it doesn’t work well for society to have all CEOs considered above average, with their collective pay spiraling out of control. We need to slow the pace of money going to the 1% if our economy is not to become third world. The rationale for peer group benchmarking is a mythological market for CEOs. For more on the subject, see CEO Pay Machine Destroying America.

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Reed’s Inc: Proxy Score 55

Reeds IncReed’s Inc. (REED), develops, manufactures, markets and sells fantastic natural non-alcoholic carbonated soft drinks and other confectionaries, such as Reed’s Ginger Brews; Virgil’s Root Beer, Cream Sodas, Dr. Better and Real Cola, including ZERO diet sodas; Culture Club Kombucha; China Colas; Reed’s Ginger candy and ice creams, and Sonoma Sparkler and other juice based products.

Their annual meeting is coming up on November 29, 2016. Unfortunately, the company is too small for ProxyDemocracy.org to follow, so no help there. However, I have been heavily involved with the Committee to Rescue Reed’s, so am intimately familiar with many of the issues. Vote FOR proxy access, split chair/CEO, forcing zombie directors to resign, all new board nominees and pay. Vote AGAINST Christopher J. Reed,  Auditor, and Repricing options. I voted with the Board’s recommendations 55% of the time. View Proxy Statement; again, the company to small to pull up proxy via iiWisdom. Continue Reading →

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Committee to Rescue Reed’s: Proxy Vote

Committee to Rescue Reet's - Room for More Shareholders

Committee to Rescue Reed’s Declares Victory

The Committee to Rescue Reed’s declares victory and states how members intend to vote their proxies. With the annual meeting now set for November 29, I will post a more detailed analysis of the proxy by tomorrow. I have already received a number of inquiries from those asking how I will vote. Advice to me? Use the comment box below.

The Committee to Rescue Reed’s Announces That It Has Completed Its Near-Term Objectives at Reed’s and Is Therefore Withdrawing Its Board Nominees and Proxy Contest

Gratified That its Involvement Led to a Reconstituted Board with Four New Independent Directors

Rescue Reed’s Members State Their Intention to Vote Against Chairman & CEO Chris Reed for Failing to Work in Good Faith with the Committee to Appoint Shareholder Nominees to the Board

Rescue Members Intend to Remain Vigilant in Monitoring the Performance of the Company, its CEO and New Directors Continue Reading →

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Rescue Reed’s Discussions Stall

Committee to Rescue Reet's - Room for More Shareholders

Committee to Rescue Reed’s – Room for More Shareholders

Severely Disappointed that CEO Chris Reed Has Stalled the Process Aimed at Reaching a Mutually Agreeable Slate of Board Candidates

The Committee Has Tried to Work Constructively and in Good-Faith with Mr. Reed for Many Weeks to Reach a Compromise Board and Avoid a Proxy Contest, but to No Avail

The Committee Is Left with No Choice But to Proceed with Next Steps for Seeking the Election of its Five Highly Qualified Director Candidates at Reed’s 2016 Annual Meeting

Remains Open to Working with Mr. Reed to Arrive at a Unified Director Slate as Proxy Deadlines Loom Continue Reading →

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The Committee to Rescue Reed’s Nominates Five Highly Qualified Director Candidates for Election at Reed’s 2016 Annual Meeting

Risks at Reed'sBelieves That Immediate and Meaningful Change Is Required to Ensure Reed’s Is Being Run in a Manner Consistent with the Best Interests of All Shareholders

States That the 2016 Annual Meeting Represents a Critical Opportunity for Shareholders to Elect Independent, Highly Qualified Directors

Believes That Now is the Moment for Shareholders to Send a Clear Message to Chairman and CEO Chris Reed That the Value-Destroying Status Quo is Unacceptable


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Reeds Board: Commonsense Principles

Can't Find a Photo of Reeds Board

I Can’t Find a Photo of Reeds Board ($REED)

Reeds Board (REED); is it functional? As indicated in a previous post, it might be useful to try and apply the recently announced Commonsense Principles of Corporate Governance to Reed’s Inc. and their board of directors. This will probably be something of an exercise in futility with mostly blank spots, since Reeds is a very small company, with little coverage and I don’t know much about what the Reeds Board actually does, only something about what they should be doing. I’m not a very large shareholder, so it isn’t financially worth a major effort for me to mount a challenge to the current Reeds Board or management. However, I am hoping this exercise may be helpful to others considering such a challenge or even just a simple books and records request at Reeds or elsewhere.

The business leaders who authored the Commonsense Principles hoped that, “at the very least, these principles will serve as a catalyst for thoughtful discussion.” That’s the intent here. I hope that my very quick review of the Commonsense Principles might be a catalyst for discussions between the Reeds Board and concerned shareholders. I don’t have time to go through all the Commonsense Principles, so I will just highlight a few that seem relevant to the Reeds Board. Like the authors of the Commonsense Principles, my hope is that this post and other communications will lead to thoughtful discussions between the Reeds Board and the shareholders of Reeds Inc. Continue Reading →

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Reeds Inc: Proposals Due Monday – Update

Chris Reed of Reeds Inc: What Happened to Culture Club Kombucha?

Chris Reed of Reeds Inc: What Happened to Culture Club Kombucha?

Update 7/12/2016: Reeds Inc received two faxed proposals from two shareholders before the deadline for submissions. It looks like shareholders will get to vote on both proxy access and creating an independent chairman. Maybe shareholders can help to turn our company around. Institutional investors only hold about 14% of Reeds Inc and insiders hold 26%, so retail shareholders will need to do the heavy lifting. We’d better get in shape. Hope springs eternal; stock up over 6% for the day.

Reeds Inc doesn’t have their annual meeting until December but proxy proposals are due Monday. I’m submitted a proposal on proxy access but almost submitted a proposal to split the chair and CEO positions. Reeds Inc really needs both. I’m hoping another shareholder will submit a proposal to split the chair and CEO positions. If you own shares in Reeds Inc but aren’t sure how to file a proposal, check out our Shareowner Action Handbook. Still can’t figure it out how to submit a proposal or want some help? Please get in touch. I would be happy to help.

In preparation for December’s annual meeting, I’ll be building more arguments about why change is needed at Reeds Inc but the following are a few thoughts off the top of my head. Continue Reading →

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Zombie Director Voted Out at Reed’s – Again

Reed'sOnce again, Reed’s (REED) zombie director Daniel S.J, Muffoetto was voted off the board by shareholders at the annual meeting. This time, it has impact. The board, or at least the controlling founder Christopher Reed, got the message.

As I have noted previously, neither Mr. Muffoetto nor Michael Fischman (who was reelected) report owning any stock in Reed’s. Neither earn enough through Reed’s to incentivize active monitoring. Assuming they put in average director hours, as reported by NACD, Mr. Fischman got paid about $3.62/hour for his board work, while Mr. Muffoletto earned about $44.78/hour. How much monitoring and advice would you provide under such circumstances?   Continue Reading →

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Reeds Delivered a Corrected Proxy for Christmas

Reeds Delivered a Corrected Proxy for Christmas

Reeds Delivered a Corrected Proxy for Christmas

There it was under my tree, Reeds delivered a corrected proxy for Christmas!

Santa has finally been good to Reeds (REED) shareholders.

I’m tacking notification of the corrected proxy as a sign that Founder/CEO, Christopher Reed might be at the start of a new attitude toward  SEC rules and corporate gReed's Mugovernance, I changed my vote. I voted for Mr. Reed, the auditors, my own proposal to require a majority vote to elect directors and against the rest of the board and the “incentive” stock option plan. The incentive plan lack specificity.

Of course, my proxy didn’t magically appear under my Christmas tree. Reeds Inc. had to pay to have the link to their revised proxy sent out by Broadridge to brokers and banks all over the country. After being reminded several times, Reeds finally did the right thing. Unfortunately, their reluctance and delay necessitated postponing their annual meeting for more than a week but, despite the additional cost to company and shareholders (including me), it is good to see our company now following the law. Continue Reading →

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Reed’s – REED: Reject the Board

REED Supplement 2015mtgReed Tshirt12nd update, 12/20/2015: Unpack your bags, cancel your flight and hotel. Reeds Inc. (REED) has postponed tomorrow’s annual meeting to 12/30/2015. Although the move may be costly to shareowners and our company, it may pay dividends in the long-run if REED finally starts paying more attention to shareowners, corporate governance and their legal obligations. REED made a material error in their proxy materials and ballot. Although they filed a revised proxy, they didn’t pay to send a new ballot or link to shareowners. The supplement they issued on Friday includes a new ballot but so far that has not gone out to most shareowners.  I am hoping they will do so this week through Broadridge’s proxyvote.com platform. Continue Reading →

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Reeds Renominates Zombie Director Muffoletto

Daniel Muffoletto

Daniel Muffoletto, Zombie Director

A majority of shares voted to turn them out of office, off the island, you’re fired… but unaccountable boards frequently reappoint a zombie director. Reeds Inc. (REED) flaunts the will of shareholders in renominating Daniel S.J. Muffoletto.  According to the Council of Institutional Investors:

The vast majority of zombies are legally elected due to an outmoded plurality vote requirement that guarantees a candidate’s victory upon receiving a single favorable vote. CII encourages all companies to embrace a majority standard, and the number of companies doing so continues to increase every year. (Zombie Directors Still Haunt Boardrooms Despite New Era of Engagement, 10/29/2015)

The only viable solution to the zombie director phenomenon is to require public companies to adopt a majority voting regime that imposes reasonable limits on the ability of boards to reject the resignation of losing directors. (July 8, 2014, letter to SEC’s Keith F. Higgins)

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Gordon Gekko and Governing Small-Caps: Greed Works

Greed Works

Greed Works

    Few who have seen it can forget the iconic scene from the movie Wall Street when Michael Douglas’s character Gordon Gekko stands up, microphone in hand, at Teldar Paper’s shareholder meeting and says: “The point is, ladies and gentleman, that greed, for lack of a better word, is good. Greed is right, greed works.” Cinematic legend. What if it’s also the key to better small-cap corporate governance? Continue Reading →

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    Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance Professionals: Part 1

    Society of Corporate Secretaries & Governance Professionals

    What a mouthfull. The 2015 National Conference in Chicago, 6/24-27, was my first time attending one of their events. Even though I’ve been blogging about corporate governance for almost 20 years, I didn’t know what they call themselves?  SCSGP? Even that is a mouthful; without vowels how would I pronounce it? Maybe “Corporate Secretaries?” It turned out to be just the “Society.” Like Modonna, Yanni, Sher, Twiggy, Enya, Charo, Bono and Voltaire, only one name is needed.  All those other societies will have to come up with other options to avoid confusion.  Continue Reading →

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    Reeds: Proxy Access Still Needed

    ReedsLast Year’s Proxy Access Proposal

    Last year I introduced a proxy access proposal at Reeds (REED) calling on the Board to allow 1% shareowners holding for two years to place their director  nominees (up to 24% of the board) on the proxy. It also would have allowed a party of 25 or more $2,000 one year shareowners to place an equal number of nominees on the proxy. Since Reeds had a five member board, the proposal would have allowed for up to two shareowner nominees from two non-coordinating parties. Continue Reading →

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    Reeds Inc (REED): Examining The Vote

    ReedsTshirt1

    Reeds Hippie T-Shirt

    ReedsRedAs some readers noted, I put in more effort at Reeds Inc. (REED) than at many of my other holdings, proposing proxy access and writing about the problems at Reeds four times before the annual meeting, even doing a short video.

    My rationale is that while I am a small shareowner at both Apple and Reeds, for example, my proportionate share at Reeds is much larger. So, focusing more on Reeds makes sense for me personally. In addition, while other companies in my portfolio get plenty of attention from the financial press and often from other shareowner activists, Reeds does not. Additionally, although Reeds has great products, it is far from reaching its full potential.

    I recommended against directors Muffoletto and Fischman because they own no shares, for a say-on-pay frequency of once each year to ensure annual accountability and, of course, I favored my own proxy access proposal to give shareowners a stronger voice going forward. Glancing at the 8-K report filed by Reeds after the AGM, you might think shareowners were in complete agreement with management. However, further analysis reveals otherwise. Continue Reading →

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    Last Opportunity to Vote for Proxy Access at Reeds Inc. (REED)

    ReedsRedReeds, Inc $REED; you read the Proxy, the crazy Preliminary Proxy, and the rationale for proxy access. You’ve seen the movie, where I  explained the need for proxy access Now, don’t forget to vote! The annual meeting is December 20, 2013.  According to ProxyVote.com, Internet voting is accepted up to 11:59 p.m. (ET) the day before the meeting/cut off date. That’s Thursday! Below are my proxy recommendations.  Continue Reading →

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    Video Friday: Vote "For" Proxy Access at Reeds Inc. (REED)

    REEDGojiGinger_KombuchaMy first effort to record a video on corporate governance is about my proxy access proposal, now being voted on at Reeds Inc. (REED).  The video below explains Reeds’ great potential and why I submitted a 2013 shareholder proposal to allow shareholders proxy access for up to two director nominees.

    Did you know 40% of our Board members own NO stock in our company or that directors are expected to show up for 10 Board meetings a year (plus various committee meetings) but are paid as little as $750 for their service? For that kind of work, with such little financial reward, what is their motive? Are they really Continue Reading →

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    Using Sharegate: The Next Great Shareholder Communications Platform

    sharegateOne way to use Sharegate is to announce your proxy votes. Far too many retail shareowners just trash their proxies instead of using them. A common misconception is that shareowners should take the Wall Street Walk and sell if they are displeased with any aspect of a company they own. That is like saying you should pack up and move out of the neighborhood if you think there should be a stop sign at the end of the block.  Continue Reading →

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    Reeds Inc. (REED): The Case for Proxy Access & How I Voted

    ReedsIn mid-July I e-mailed investor relations at Reeds Inc. $REEDGojiGinger_Kombucha ([email protected]) asking if REED had a classified board or plurality requirements for director elections. Can shareowners call a special meeting or act by written consent? What supermajority requirements are in place re M&A or other actions? No response. This surprised and disappointed me since they were prompt in answering previous e-mails: Make kombucha; we’re already working on it. Try one with coconut water and ginger; good idea. Where can I find Reeds Kombucha in Sacramento?; here’s a list.

    According to FactSet Research Systems, “insider/stake ownership” at REED is 33.5% of the company’s float. Being almost a controlled company, maybe they don’t feel the need to respond to inquiries from ‘outside’ shareowners about the firm’s corporate governance.  They not only didn’t answer me, they blocked me from following their Twitter feed. Maybe management and the current board think the less outside shareowners know, the better for them? Continue Reading →

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    Investor Forums

    forumInside Investor Relations (IR) had an important article on July 30th, On the Way to the Investor Forum that raised the question: do companies really want to encourage their shareholders to chat about them in online forums? Wouldn’t it create a lot of work for investor relations officers (IROs) “who are responsible for monitoring these online groups, responding to any misinformation posted on them, dealing with legal and other consequences?” Continue Reading →

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    Reeds, Inc. (REED): My 1st Attempt to Collaborate Through Sharegate

    sharegateReedsI’ve started to use Sharegate.com to network with other shareowners around specific companies. The first company I’m working on through Sharegate is Reeds (REED). I think our company’s product line is strong but management and the board appear to be weak in distribution skills. After years of refining and growing their fine products, #REED still is not profitable.

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