Citigroup Inc. (Citi, NYSE: C), a diversified financial services holding company, provides various financial products and services for consumers, corporations, governments, and institutions worldwide. Citi is one of the stocks in my portfolio. ProxyDemocracy.org had collected the votes of three fund families when I checked and voted. Their annual meeting is coming up on April 25, 2017.
Tag Archives | SEC
International Business Machines Corporation (NYSE: IBM) provides information technology (IT) products and services worldwide. IBM is one of the stocks in my portfolio. ProxyDemocracy.org had collected the votes of two fund families when I checked and voted. Their annual meeting is coming up on April 25, 2017. I voted FOR Proxy Access, Special Meeting amendments and report on lobbying. See how and why I voted these and other items below. I voted with the Board’s recommendations 42% of the time. View Proxy Statement (index on page 4). Continue Reading →
Starbucks Corporation (NASD: SBUX), together with its subsidiaries, operates as a roaster, marketer, and retailer of specialty coffee worldwide. SBUX is one of the stocks in my portfolio. ProxyDemocracy.org had collected the votes of four fund families when I checked and voted. Their annual meeting is coming up on March 22, 2017
The Walt Disney Company (NYSE:DIS), together with its subsidiaries, operates as an entertainment company worldwide.
The Walt Disney Company is one of the stocks in my portfolio. ProxyDemocracy.org had collected the votes of three fund families when I checked and voted. Their annual meeting is coming up on March 8, 2017.
I voted AGAINST pay, comp committee members, auditor. FOR Proxy Access Amendments. See why below. I voted with the Board’s recommendations 57% of the time. View Proxy Statement via iiWisdom. Continue Reading →
Gadfly proposal on your corporate proxy? One implicit conclusion from a recent academic study is that you should short the company as soon as the SEC disapproves the company’s no-action request, since a proposal from a gadfly is likely to reduce the company’s value. Even though their intent is primarily to show why managers generally oppose proposals, that is the takeaway investment strategy one might conclude from a paper by John G. Matsusaka, Oguzhan Ozbas and Irene Yi entitled Why Do Managers Fight Shareholder Proposals? Evidence from No-Action Letter Decisions. (Why Do Managers Fight Shareholder Proposals, pdf)
Investors Skeptical of Gadfly Proposals
Researchers found a statistical correlation between Securities and Exchange Committee (SEC) staff decisions to block a no-action request and negative abnormal returns over the period of 2007-2016, “suggesting that investors agree with managers that these proposals are value-destroying.” “[O]ur main finding is that the market responded positively to the granting of a no-action letter.” “Investors are not particularly skeptical of proposals by unions and public pensions, but appear to view proposals by individual ‘gadfly’ shareholders as value-destroying.” Continue Reading →
As I indicated yesterday, I have been contacted by several reporters for comments on the latest screed from the Business Roundtable seeking to muzzle the rights of shareholders. Although I have much more productive ways to occupy my time, it does make sense for me to provide at least some response, since the Business Roundtable names me among those “pursuing special interests… frequently at a significant cost to the company.”
Their statistics do not come from an objective third party, such as Proxy Insight, but from the conservative Manhattan Institute‘s Proxy Monitor (funded in part by the Koch Family Foundations), covering only 250 out of thousands of American companies. The Business Roundtable titled their report Responsible Shareholder Engagement And Long-Term Value Creation: Modernizing the Shareholder Proposal Process. Don’t be fooled by the numbers they use, claiming few proposals pass. The Business Roundtable doesn’t count proposals that don’t make it to the proxy because proponents and companies have reached agreement. They don’t count proposals filed at the thousands of small companies, which tend to have poorer corporate governance practices. ‘Modernization’ for the Business Roundtable means moving the SEC further and further from its primary mandate of ‘investor protection’ by creating a democracy-free zone for entrenched managers. Continue Reading →
Yesterday, several reporters asked me to comment on no-action requests and the SEC’s denial to Apple, as well as the Business Roundtable’s fanciful notions regarding the need for reform of the proxy proposal process. I am reluctant to give the Business Roundtable’s proposal, Modernizing the Shareholder Proposal Process, any more ink but will just touch on one of their issues here as I explain the Apple decision.
No-Action Requests: Apple and Proxy Access Lite
The SEC has consistently denied no-action requests to companies where the proponent asks for modifications to bylaws when the companies have made no modifications in the direction requested. See H&R Block and Microsoft as prior examples. Apple is no exception. This is nothing new. Continue Reading →
#ICGN16 was the hashtag for tweeting about the 2016 annual meeting of the International Corporate Governance Network held in San Francisco, June 27 – 29th, 2016. Check Twitter for additional posts to #ICGN16. What follows are a few of my rough notes from the conference. Accuracy for details isn’t one of my noted strengths, so I’m tempted to say the notes are for entertainment purposes only but I do hope readers will get some sense of the proceedings.
#ICGN16: PreConference Rethink of ‘One Share, One Vote’
Even before the ICGN16 (International Corporate Governance Network annual conference) met in San Francisco last month, two prominent former board members kicked off lively debate by proposing a radical rethink of what has been a guiding principle for many in the movement for good corporate governance. Peter Clapman and Richard Koppes argued in a WSJ opinion piece that longterm shareholders should have greater voting rights.
…the shareholder-rights agenda has been largely achieved. Only 10% of S&P 500 boards are classified today, while some 90% are elected by majority vote. Only 3% have a poison pill in force. More than 35% of S&P 500 companies have adopted proxy access…
Activists increasingly demand board representation to implement their agenda, often meaning that short-term investors take and quickly relinquish boards’ seats. Boards frequently settle with activists out of fear of losing a proxy battle—or worse, winning a Pyrrhic victory. (Time to Rethink ‘One Share, One Vote’?)
Substantial implementation, that’s the deception companies have been arguing in order to obtain ‘no-action’ relief under SEC Rule 14a-8(i)(10) after implementing proxy access ‘lite.’ Law firms have been touting recent no-action letters released on February 12, with more in March 2016. It looks like a clear win for entrenched managers and directors for implementing only proxy access lite. In reality, such deception will cost companies more in legal fees and will reduce board discretion, since shareholders will increasingly file binding bylaw resolutions to obtain the same robust proxy access promised under vacated Rule 14a-8(i)(10). Continue Reading →
Corporate lobbying disclosure remains a top shareholder proposal topic for 2016. At least 66 investors have filed proposals at 50 companies asking for lobbying reports that include federal and state lobbying payments, payments to trade associations used for lobbying, and payments to any tax-exempt organization that writes and endorses model legislation. Political activity remains a top investor topic for the sixth consecutive year, with more than 90 proposals filed for 2016 that seek disclosure of either lobbying or political contributions. Continue Reading →
RIA hands untied by Newground Social Investments team and the SEC’s refusal to grant a no-action letter to Baker Hughes (BHI, $BHI) on February 22, 2016. Congratulations to Bruce Herbert and staff at Newground, as well as to their advisors.
We have discussed the importance of not counting abstentions before at Simple Majority Vote Counting Initiative for Proxies. Bruce has worked tirelessly in chipping away at vote counting deception for years… making some progress. However, what we are celebrating here are two precedents established that will ease the burden faced by Registered Investment Advisors (RIAs, Investment Advisor or Investment Adviser?) and their clients: Continue Reading →
The SEC protects the 2%. No, I am not writing about the top 2% of America in terms of wealth or income, although there is probably some correlation. I am writing about the 2% of shares that are still registered. While the SEC is protecting shareholders who own that 2% of shares, they are falling down on the job with respect to protecting the rights of shareholders owning the other 98%. Yesterday, I asked the SEC to invalidate the proxy ballot sent out by Qualcomm (QCOM). I’ve raised this issue before, filing a rulemaking petition on the subject in 2009 but can’t let the SEC’s inaction slide. A few examples of previous posts are as follows:
- Reforms at ProxyVote Don’t Go Far Enough
- Steris Corporation’s Proxy Voting Deflate-Gate
- Biased Ballots: Oshkosh Vote Questioned – Take Action
- Broken Windows & Proxy Vote Rigging – Both Invite More Serious Crime
- If I Were on the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee: Recommendations to Help Retail Investors
- Don’t Let Them Get Away With Stealing Elections
Apple shareholders rejected real proxy access at their meeting on February 25, 2016. Maybe shareholders thought they already have it. Recent decisions by the SEC could lead shareholders to believe proxy access was “substantially implemented.”
Maybe they wanted to support Apple’s management while the company is under attack from the FBI.
ISS recommended a “For” vote. Shouldn’t that have guaranteed passage?
We probably won’t know for months which Apple shareholders rejected real proxy access… and maybe that’s the key point.
Disney ($DIS), together with its subsidiaries, operates as an entertainment company worldwide. Disney is one of the stocks in my portfolio. Their annual meeting is on March 3, 2016. ProxyDemocracy.org had collected the votes of three funds when I checked. I voted against the pay proposal and compensation committee and in favor of shareholder proposal to eliminate supermajority requirements and to report on lobbying. I voted with the Board’s recommendations 62% of the time. View Proxy Statement.