Proxy Proposals

Employee Assembly to Study Partial Employee Ownership at PANW

I recently listened to Freakonomics Radio: Does Democracy Really Need Elections? In it, Stephen Dubner examines sortition, the ancient Athenian practice of filling public bodies by lottery rather than election. The episode is about government. As someone who has filed shareholder proposals since 2000, I kept hearing a description of corporate governance. It also gave me a concrete idea: Palo Alto Networks could carry out the study requested in my current proposal, a study of partial employee ownership, through an employee citizens’ assembly.

Employees to Study Partial Ownership at PANW – and Music for a Democratic Corporate Governance

The Case for Government by Lottery

Dubner’s guests are Yale political theorist Hélène Landemore (Politics Without Politicians) and former Vermont legislator Terry Bouricius (Democracy Without Politicians). They argue that competitive elections reward ambition and self-promotion, and that the pool of people who can run is heavily skewed toward those with time, money, and connections. Bouricius once found only one renter among the 150 members of the Vermont House, though nearly a third of Vermonters rent. Both point to research suggesting that groups with diverse perspectives often solve problems better than groups of similar experts.

Their alternative is the citizens’ assembly. Somewhere between 100 and 1,000 randomly selected people meet over several weekends. They hear from experts, deliberate in facilitated small groups that keep the loudest voices from dominating, and then reach decisions. Ireland used assemblies to resolve same-sex marriage and abortion, issues politicians would not touch, and both recommendations passed by referendum. France convened assemblies on climate and end-of-life care. This year, about 100 Connecticut residents, each paying $1,200, approved 10 recommendations on property taxes, which the state legislature will now consider.

The record also shows how incumbents resist. British Columbia’s 2004 assembly recommended a new voting system, and 57% of voters approved it. It still failed because legislators had required 60% approval.

Sound Familiar?

Anyone who has watched a majority-supported shareholder proposal fail against a supermajority requirement will recognize British Columbia. The other parallels are just as close:

  • Who controls the slate controls the outcome. Most director elections are uncontested, and incumbents choose the nominees. Aristotle called elections oligarchic. Many board elections prove his point.
  • Rational ignorance. Bouricius notes that in a large electorate, voters have little reason to study the issues because one vote rarely decides anything. That is the retail-shareholder problem, and a big reason institutional voting often defaults to proxy advisors or management.
  • Conflicted rulemakers. British Columbia’s leaders admitted their conflict of interest and handed electoral reform to citizens. Bouricius proposes a rules body that writes rules it will never use itself. Contrast that with boards writing their own advance notice bylaws, the problem behind my Right to Cure proposals.
  • Advisory before binding. Most citizens’ assemblies, like most Rule 14a-8 proposals, are precatory. Bouricius’s strategy is to make advisory bodies familiar first, then move one issue at a time to binding authority. Shareholder rights have generally advanced the same way.

An Employee Assembly to Study Partial Employee Ownership at Palo Alto Networks

My Proposal 6 at Palo Alto Networks asks the Board to prepare a report evaluating the feasibility, costs, and benefits of a potential transaction through which a broad-based employee ownership vehicle would acquire an ownership interest in Palo Alto Networks or a substantial business unit. The report would be prepared at a reasonable cost and would omit proprietary or privileged information. See PANW_Exempt_Solicitation_2_Employee_Assembly. Vote your PANW proxy by December 7th)

The key word is partial. The proposal does not ask Palo Alto Networks to study selling itself to its employees. It asks the Board to study whether a broad-based employee vehicle should hold part of the company, or part of a substantial business unit, alongside public shareholders. Public shareholders would remain owners; employees would become co-owners. No single interest would dominate.

Shareholder proposals are precatory (advisory). They request a study but don’t dictate how it is conducted. The usual approach is to hire consultants, have management review their findings, and publish a report. That approach sidelines the people the study is about.

The Freakonomics episode points to a better method. Palo Alto Networks could study partial employee ownership through an employee citizens’ assembly.

Here is how it could work, following the model Landemore and others have refined:

  • Random, stratified selection. Invitations would go to a large, randomly selected sample of employees. Participants would be drawn from those who accept, so the group mirrors the workforce by function, seniority, location, tenure, and pay level. Engineers, support staff, sales, and administrative employees would sit alongside managers. The group would include people who would never volunteer for a committee or speak up at an all-hands meeting.
  • Paid time and independent facilitation. Participants would serve on company time or be paid for it. Facilitators independent of management would keep any single voice, including senior executives, from dominating.
  • A learning phase. Before deliberating, the assembly would hear balanced presentations on ways employees could hold a partial stake: employee stock ownership plans, employee ownership trusts, cooperative models, broad-based equity grants, and improvements to the company’s existing equity programs. Presenters would include finance and HR staff, independent experts, practitioners from employee-owned companies, and skeptics.
  • Deliberation and decision. The assembly would weigh how large a stake makes sense, whether it should be in the whole company or a business unit, and the costs, dilution, tax treatment, retention effects, and what ownership would mean to employees. Following the Connecticut practice, a recommendation would need a two-thirds vote.
  • A public report. The assembly’s recommendations, with minority views, would go to the board and be published for shareholders. The board would remain free to accept, modify, or reject them, but it would have to explain its reasons.

Why do it this way?

  • Better information. A consultant can model dilution. Only employees can say whether a partial ownership stake would change how they work, whether they would stay longer, and which designs they would actually value. As Bouricius argues, a diverse group surfaces knowledge a homogeneous one never sees.
  • Legitimacy. Recommendations from a representative cross-section of employees carry more weight than a management-commissioned report. As one Connecticut assembly member put it, it’s hard to ignore 100 of your fellow citizens. The same goes for 100 of your colleagues.
  • Buy-in. Any ownership program depends on employees understanding and valuing it. A plan employees helped design starts with their support.
  • Ownership in practice. Employee ownership is about agency, giving workers more say over their own lives. Studying it through employee deliberation puts that principle to work from the start.
  • Low cost. Connecticut’s assembly paid 100 residents $1,200 each, about $120,000 in stipends, all raised from individual donors. For a company the size of Palo Alto Networks, even a well-run assembly with professional facilitation would be a rounding error.

Landemore describes skeptical, guarded strangers who, within two weekends, listened patiently and treated each other like family. Imagine that happening across a company’s departments and pay grades. Even if the board ultimately decided against a partial employee ownership transaction, the process would build trust and give management feedback that no engagement survey could.

If you hold PANW shares, I hope you will vote FOR Proposal 6, the study of partial employee ownership. If the board adopts it, I encourage the directors to consider using an employee assembly to carry out the study.

A Shareholder Assembly?

The same approach could work for investors. A company could convene a shareholder assembly: a stratified random sample of its retail holders, paid for their time, given balanced briefings from management, proponents, and independent experts, and asked to deliberate on executive pay, a contested proposal, or long-term strategy. Its report would go to the board and to all shareholders before the vote.

This matters more now. If the SEC rescinds Rule 14a-8, retail investors lose one of the few channels for a governance voice that doesn’t require hiring proxy solicitors. A deliberative assembly would give ordinary owners a voice based on reasoning together rather than money. A real tension remains: sortition gives each person an equal voice, while corporate voting counts shares. An assembly would advise; the binding vote would stay share-weighted.

Government Oversight of Corporations

The episode also raises questions about how governments regulate corporations. After the 2008 crash, Iceland barred politicians from its constitutional rewrite because they had colluded with the banks. In France, ministries diluted citizen recommendations such as a tax on corporate dividends. Bouricius warns that once lottery-selected bodies have real power, lobbyists and billionaires will find new ways to apply pressure. Anyone who has watched pay-to-play up close knows that money finds a way.

Still, imagine the SEC convening a randomly selected panel of retail investors to deliberate on shareholder rights before it rewrote Rule 14a-8. Would ordinary investors agree to eliminate their proposals? I doubt it. That’s probably why no one has asked them. However, such an assembly could help weigh alternatives to rescission, such as amending Rule 14a-8 to encourage more negotiated, less costly approaches.

Caveats

Sortition is no cure-all. Its record of producing lasting policy is mixed. Accountability for bad decisions is still an unanswered question. Dj Hairston, the defense lawyer from Dubner’s trial, warns that you could end up with a bad jury. In a company, another risk is that employees may not speak freely if they fear retaliation, so independent facilitation and protections for participants would be essential. But the core insight, that power is safer in the hands of people who didn’t seek it, deserves a place in governance debates.

Listen to the full episode at Freakonomics Radio. Would you trust a randomly selected panel of your coworkers to study whether you should become part owners? Let me know.

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James McRitchie

James McRitchie publishes CorpGov.Net, a popular corporate governance portal since 1995. According to the Council of Institutional Investors, McRitchie’s 2002 SEC petition "re-energized" the debate over proxy access to nominate directors. Now he filing shareholder proposals and is working on systems to further empower retail and institutional shareowners. McRitchie is frequently quoted in the press and has addressed audiences in Asia and Europe, funded by business associations, the Asian Development Bank and the U.S. State Department.

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