When the SEC proposed rescinding Rule 14a-8, the obvious question was why now? In 2020, the Commission amended the rule. In 2021 and 2023, it told federal courts it had full authority to regulate shareholder proposals. Then, in September 2026, it said the opposite. Part of the answer is in a footnote of the proposing release, and I’ve filed a supplemental comment about it.
This letter builds on my November 14 comment, “What the Commission Told the Courts”. That comment asked the Commission to say what has changed in the law or the facts since September 2023. The new letter covers two executive orders. One explains part of what changed. The other sets standards the Commission says it is following but has not shown it has met.
Footnote 26 of the Release discloses that Executive Order 14366 (Dec. 16, 2025) directed the SEC Chairman to consider revising or rescinding all rules, guidance and bulletins on shareholder proposals, including Rule 14a-8. The footnote supports the Release’s conclusion that keeping any version of the rule is “unwarranted.”
On November 14, I wrote that the Commission’s composition and its views had changed since 2023. I should have added a third change: a presidential directive.
A new administration’s priorities can be a legitimate reason for an agency to revisit a rule. But three things limit how far that goes:
The Release calls itself an “economically significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866, reviewed by the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) at the Office of Management and Budget. It also notes that Executive Order 14215 requires the SEC to comply with EO 12866. Two of that order’s requirements matter here.
Alternatives. For economically significant rules, EO 12866 requires an agency to assess the costs and benefits of reasonably feasible alternatives, including improving the current regulation, and to explain why its chosen action is better. The Release looks at only one alternative to rescission: a rule that defers entirely to state law. It doesn’t consider improving Rule 14a-8, as the Commission did in 1983, 1998, and 2020. It also ignores the alternatives commenters have proposed in this file.
OIRA disclosure. Once a rule is published, EO 12866 requires the agency to make public the cost-benefit and alternatives assessments it gave OIRA, the substantive changes between the OIRA draft and the published version, and any changes OIRA suggested. The Release was published on September 21, 2026. I haven’t found any of these materials in File No. S7-2026-32 or in the Release. If they are public somewhere else, the Commission should say where.
EO 12866 does not create rights that anyone can enforce in court, and I don’t claim it does. But the Commission chose to invoke it. A court reviewing the final rule will look at how the agency describes the standards it applied. If the SEC relies on analysis it shared with OIRA, the public has to see that analysis first. That’s the holding of Chamber of Commerce v. SEC (D.C. Cir. 2006).
At first glance, these appear to be procedural objections, and the Commission can cure them. It can explain what role the order played, put the OIRA materials in the file, and reopen the comment period. If it finalizes the rule without doing those things, the rule will be harder to defend in court.
But the procedure protects something more. The Administrative Procedure Act treats repealing a rule the same as adopting one. In Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm (1983), the Supreme Court struck down a rescission because the agency never considered the obvious alternative of amending the rule instead. In DHS v. Regents of the University of California (2020), the Court held that an agency ending a long-standing program must weigh the reliance interests built around it. Companies, investors, and proxy advisors have built more than 80 years of practice around Rule 14a-8. The Release considers one alternative. It needs to consider more and explain how it weighed what rescission would take away.
The SEC’s own history points the same way. In Business Roundtable v. SEC (D.C. Cir. 2011), the court threw out the Commission’s proxy access rule for inadequate economic analysis. A standard that sank a rule giving shareholders more voice should apply at least as strictly to a rule taking that voice away.
There is also a question of accountability. The SEC is an independent commission. If a presidential directive drove this decision, investors deserve to know that and to see the Commission’s own reasoning on the statute and the record. Otherwise, the next investor protection can go the same way: an order to consider repeal, a footnote, and no analysis.
For more than 80 years, the shareholder proposal process has given retail investors like me a way to raise governance issues with boards and fellow owners. If that process ends, it should end for reasons the public can see and test. I’ve asked the Commission to provide them. If it can’t, it shouldn’t finalize the rule.
Linkedin
BlueSky
Facebook
Mastodon
Substack
X (formerly Twitter)
Today I filed a supplemental comment in the SEC's Rule 14a-8 rescission proceeding (File No.…
When I started filing shareholder proposals in 2000, the hostile tender offer was already fading.…
The SEC's proposal to rescind Rule 14a-8 (File No. S7-2026-32) rests on a simple measure:…
I recently listened to Freakonomics Radio: Does Democracy Really Need Elections? In it, Stephen Dubner…
A new Harvard Law School Forum post by Anteris Advisors describes how AI is becoming…
On December 8, Palo Alto Networks (PANW) shareholders will vote on Proposal 6, which asks…