SEC

The Value of Shareholder Proposals Goes Far Beyond the Vote

The SEC’s proposal to rescind Rule 14a-8 (File No. S7-2026-32) rests on a simple measure: roughly 90 percent of voted shareholder proposals fail, so most must not reflect broadly shared concerns. Yesterday, I filed a supplemental comment (add URlL when posted) McRitchie_S7-2026-32_Market_Data_2026-11-12_v9 submitted testing that measure against Diligent Market Intelligence (DMI) records. It was not a sample: 9,795 shareholder proposals on U.S. ballots from 2009 through 2026, 6,633 with recorded votes since 2014, 50,856 governance proposals boards put to shareholders, and 75,695 charter and bylaw amendments reported since 2012.

The result demonstrates the value of shareholder proposals reaches far beyond majority votes, which are just the tip of the iceberg, or more accurately comparable to the headwaters of a river. They account for fewer than one in five of the governance reforms that flowed from shareholder proposals.

Figure 1: Where the reforms came from

I tracked seven governance reforms: board declassification, eliminating supermajority voting, majority voting for directors, proxy access, the right to call special meetings, the right to act by written consent, and an independent board chair. Companies adopted them 2,075 times.

  • 381 adoptions (18%) followed a shareholder proposal that won a majority, the only kind of success the SEC’s pass-rate measure can see.
  • 481 more came at companies that received proposals but acted before a vote, put their own version on the same ballot, or acted after proposals that lost.
  • 1,213 (58%) came at S&P 1500 companies that never received a proposal on the topic, and their timing tracked majority votes elsewhere.

Shareholder proposals are not the whole river of governance reform, but they are the headwaters. Cut them off and much of what flows downstream dries up.

Much of the work happens before any vote

By the SEC’s own figures, about 283 of the 786 proposals submitted in 2025, more than a third, never reached a ballot. Many were withdrawn after companies agreed to act. The Release counts every one of those as a cost and none as a benefit.

My own record shows why that is backward. In the 2025 and 2026 seasons, 22 of my 30 successful proposals ended in agreements in exchange for withdrawal; only 8 succeeded by winning a vote (see CorpGov.net 2025 Proxy Season Results). Chairman Atkins himself has praised such behind-the-scenes agreements as evidence that the system is functioning as it should. They belong on the benefit side of the ledger.

Losing proposals change companies too

Across the seven reforms, 586 of the 986 companies that received proposals later adopted at least one requested reform, 862 in all. Four in five acted within a year of the first proposal. Where a proposal won a majority, the company later adopted the reform 79 percent of the time. Where proposals never won, companies still adopted in about one case in five.

Severance policies offer a clear example. After proposals asking for shareholder approval of cash severance above 2.99 times salary plus bonus drew between 36 and 49 percent at Electronic Arts, Colgate-Palmolive, NCR, Southwest, AES, Lincoln National, Chemed, TEGNA, and Adobe, each board adopted the policy anyway. None of those count as a success in the SEC’s measure.

Political spending disclosure tells the same story. Those proposals won only 37 of 714 votes since 2014. Yet the number of S&P 500 companies disclosing or prohibiting at least one type of political spending rose from 243 in 2015 to 391 in 2025, according to the CPA-Zicklin Index.

Reforms spread to companies that never got a proposal

Proxy access is the clearest case. After proposals won 48 majority votes in 2015 and 41 in 2016, S&P 1500 companies that never had a proxy access proposal on their ballots adopted it 110 times in 2016 and 94 times in 2017, almost all using bylaw amendments. Year after year from 2014 through 2026, these adoptions rose and fell almost in lockstep with the number of proxy access proposals that had won majorities elsewhere the season before. The statistical correlation was 0.93; a correlation of 1.0 would mean the two always moved together perfectly.

Industry peers matter. Companies with no proposal of their own adopted reforms at 2.52 percent per year when an industry peer had adopted a proposal, versus 1.37 percent when no peer had adopted one. For proxy access, the rates were 6.34 and 2.67 percent.

Individual investors are the backbone of the rule

Individual investors filed 40.9 percent of voted proposals from 2014 through 2026 but won 46.2 percent of all majority votes, more than any other proponent type. Their proposals averaged 34.0 percent support, compared with 29.7 percent overall, and about 91 percent of their wins were on governance.

The Chairman has criticized concentration, noting that one individual was the lead proponent on about 41 percent of voted proposals in 2025–2026, while only 8 percent won majorities. The data confirm the concentration but not the inference. John Chevedden and associated individual proponents, including Myra K. Young and me, filed 33.5 percent of voted proposals but won 42.2 percent of majority votes. In 2026, Chevedden’s 8.0 percent win rate was nearly identical to everyone else’s 8.5 percent, while his proposals averaged 33.8 percent support, nearly double everyone else’s 18.0 percent.

Our group’s proposals preceded 323 of the 862 adoptions at companies that received proposals. When boards put those reforms to their own shareholders, 235 of 236 passed, with a median of 99 percent support. It was boards and other owners, not proponents, who decided these ideas had merit. That is not tyranny of the minority. A precatory proposal binds no one; it simply asks the other owners. It is the spring at the headwaters of corporate governance.

Individuals are also the proponents least able to use the alternatives the SEC suggests. The Release itself estimates even a basic solicitation at about $14,000. Rescission would fall hardest on the group whose proposals most often win.

The benefits dwarf the projected savings

The Release estimates rescission would save about $49,000 per proposal, roughly $38.5 million a year, or about $693 million over the 18 seasons studied. Assign that entire cost to just the 635 reforms shareholders approved or boards adopted on their own, ignoring every other benefit, and each reform needs to add only about $1.1 million in value to pay its way.

Published research puts the value of adopting such governance reforms at about 2.8 percent of market value, an estimate the Release itself cites. At that rate, a reform pays for its share of the rule’s cost at any company worth more than about $39 million. A single reform at a company at the S&P 500 entry threshold would be worth roughly $636 million, close to the entire 18 years of projected savings across all companies.

Even the study in the record most favorable to rescission finds no statistically significant harm from governance proposals, the kind behind most majority wins and every reform I tracked.

What I asked the SEC to do

  • Withdraw the proposed rescission and retain Rule 14a-8.
  • Before final action, measure benefits using proposal-level data: by proponent type, over each topic’s life cycle, for reforms adopted with or without a winning vote, for reforms that spread to companies never receiving proposals, and for withdrawn proposals. Do the same for environmental and social proposals.
  • Require controlled and multi-class companies to report vote results both in total and for outside shareholders alone.

The votes the Release counts are only the visible part of the process. For every reform adopted at a company that received a proposal, the data show about 1.4 more at companies that never did. Nothing in the Release replaces that source, and nothing in its economic analysis measures what would be lost.

Read my full comment letter (add URL when SEC posts) and my earlier letters on File S7-2026-32.

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James McRitchie

James McRitchie publishes CorpGov.Net, a popular corporate governance portal since 1995. According to the Council of Institutional Investors, McRitchie’s 2002 SEC petition "re-energized" the debate over proxy access to nominate directors. Now he filing shareholder proposals and is working on systems to further empower retail and institutional shareowners. McRitchie is frequently quoted in the press and has addressed audiences in Asia and Europe, funded by business associations, the Asian Development Bank and the U.S. State Department.

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