CorpGov.net 2025 Proxy Season Results exceeded our historical average, likely because we filed only 20 proposals directly. As you can see, we failed at five companies but won at fifteen, mostly by reaching agreements. “Winning” by agreement required more careful deliberation and cooperation than winning by vote. Disproportionately, those won by vote may never be implemented due to other obstacles, such as supermajority requirements at Tesla.

This post wraps up our 2025 season and discusses the categories of those filings, strategy, and the future. While I do file and support environmental and social proposals, I continue to believe Corporate governance is key. Get that right, and we can elect directors who care about growing our companies and our wealth by engaging employees and operating sustainably. Companies run by dictators oppress workers, externalize costs, and support presidents who act like dictators. To ensure a harmonious society and a salubrious environment, we need to democratize corporations.
CorpGov.net 2025 Proxy Season Results in SongCorpGov.net 2025 Proxy Season: Right to Cure
The six “Right to Cure” shareholder proposals, influenced by prior “Fair Elections” proposals, sought to enhance shareholder rights in the director-nomination process. The language covers both proxy access and universal proxy candidates and is the result of consultations with Abbott Cooper. Cooper is known for his aggressive tactics, but he also practices a form of private “constructivism,” working behind the scenes to persuade boards to take actions that enhance shareholder value without resorting to public confrontation.
While many of our earlier proposals sought to prevent companies from excluding shareholder nominees on subjective “suitability” grounds, the “Right to Cure” initiative refines this by emphasizing procedural fairness. Specifically, shareholders should be notified of any defects in their nomination submissions promptly and allowed to correct (or “cure”) those issues before proxies are finalized.
These proposals are rooted in the principle that shareholders’ ability to elect directors is meaningless if they are denied a fair chance to nominate candidates. Current corporate bylaws often demand detailed disclosures from nominating shareholders but lack provisions to inform them of any defects in their submissions or to offer a cure period. Courts have generally held that, absent explicit bylaw provisions, companies are not obligated to notify or allow cures. This creates a situation in which minor procedural missteps can be used to disqualify shareholder nominees without recourse, effectively undermining shareholder rights.
The proposal introduced at Costco in 2024 exemplifies this reform effort, calling for a 14-day notice period for defect identification and a 14-day cure window. This balances corporate needs for orderly disclosures with shareholders’ rights to nominate. It does not eliminate advance notice or disclosure requirements but ensures a reasonable and transparent process. By adopting these changes, companies would promote accountability and avoid disenfranchising shareholders through technicalities, fostering a more democratic nomination and election process.
Costco was a leader in 2024. That example helped us reach agreements with other companies, especially when they were willing to speak with Abbott Cooper, who is more knowledgeable than I am about the law and various cases. Not every company we reached an agreement with used the same approach, but all addressed the issue to our satisfaction.
CorpGov.net 2025 Proxy Season: Declassify the Board
Addressing classified boards is a critical step in strengthening director accountability and corporate governance. When boards are declassified, all directors must stand for election annually, allowing shareholders to evaluate and promptly replace underperforming or misaligned board members. In contrast, a classified board structure—where only a portion of directors is elected each year—can insulate directors from consequences, allowing weak governance or mismanagement to persist unchecked for years.
Declassification aligns with widely accepted corporate governance best practices endorsed by leading proxy advisors and institutional investors. It enhances shareholder rights by reducing entrenched power structures that limit investor influence over board composition. With annual elections, directors are more responsive to shareholder concerns, company performance, and external pressures such as activist campaigns or M&A opportunities. This fosters a more dynamic and accountable boardroom, where directors must remain attentive to shareholder interests.
Empirical research supports the governance and performance benefits of declassified boards. Studies show they are linked to higher firm valuations, greater responsiveness to market dynamics, and reduced reliance on structural takeover defenses that can harm shareholders. Given that over 90% of S&P 500 companies have now declassified their boards, momentum is clearly in favor of this reform.
Adopting annual elections not only aligns companies with prevailing governance standards but also signals a commitment to transparency, accountability, and long-term shareholder value. I have continued to file such proposals for the 2026 season and recently identified more than 500 companies where such proposals should be filed. See Declassify Boards: Become an Advocate.
We “won” at all six companies where we filed. However, as I discussed earlier with reference to Tesla, we will need to circle back and ensure implementation by filing proposals to eliminate or substantially reduce the use of supermajority requirements for shareholders to amend entrenching bylaw provisions, such as classified boards. If the right of shareholders to file precatory proposals is taken away, as proposed, we will turn to binding bylaw proposals, withhold campaigns, proxy access, and proxy contests.
CorpGov.net 2025 Proxy Season: Other Proposals
We filed two other corporate governance measures. One sought to end Pinterest’s dual-class structure. Two people essentially control Pinterest. They both submitted affidavits stating they would vote against any move to change the charter. Therefore, the board is powerless, and my proposal was mute. Since neither Class A shareholders nor the board has any power, and the company has underperformed, I have placed a sell order.
The other governance proposal sought to establish a majority-vote standard for electing unopposed directors at BioMarin Pharmaceuticals. We reached an agreement.
Tax transparency shareholder proposals in the U.S. have gained votes and attention, but none have secured majority shareholder approval or become corporate policy to date. Our filing at Bristol-Myers Squibb was no exception. Unlike in the EU, where public Country-by-Country Reporting is required, the U.S. has no comparable tax disclosure regulation. I likely hold off on this topic for the next few years. However, I hope others continue.
Lobbying disclosure matters to shareholders because, if undisclosed or misaligned, it can pose reputational, legal, and financial risks. Greater transparency also promotes stronger board oversight and accountability, helping investors assess whether corporate lobbying serves long-term shareholder interests. We filed five proposals seeking better reporting on lobbying expenditures and disclosures.
I was a legislative advocate with Cal/EPA, so I have direct experience with companies. Transparency into how companies handle disagreements with trade associations is particularly critical. Many companies remain silent on crucial issues with public support, relying on trade associations to do the heavy lifting to prevent needed reforms.
CorpGov.net 2026 Proxy Season and Beyond
This year, my primary goal is to encourage others to begin filing select proposals. I have already mentioned Declassify Boards: Become an Advocate. I have also written Proxy Access Needed: Become an Advocate and Special Meetings: Become an Advocate. There will be others. During my retirement, I’ve spent decades filing shareholder proposals.
I have also been thinking of new types of precatory and binding proposals, as well as the possibility of reviving proxy access.
As I wrote in With All the Brains in the Room, “one proposal, one small voice, can change what boards assume.” We face several existential problems as a society and as a world community. I would feel a lot better about slacking off on shareholder proposals if I knew others were filing proposals on many of the same issues.
Beyond Proxy Filings

In the 1960s, as a student of the sociology of knowledge, I was taught that critical child-rearing policies and educational institutions are crucial in shaping the framework through which we view and reconstruct our everyday reality. Missing was any deep analysis of the impact of corporations on our development as individuals and societies. We spend most of our productive lives guided by bureaucracy and corporate governance.
Scientists have long known that such organizations would generate more wealth by adopting more democratic structures. For example, back in the 1970s, a panel of experts reviewed the extensive findings of 57 field experiments in job satisfaction and productivity for the National Science Foundation (NSF) and concluded:
Human involvement at the workplace in all facets of the work is a prerequisite for the enhancement of quality of life as well as performance and satisfaction…. The organizational policy, therefore, should work towards enhancing such aspects of work which encourage people’s ownership of the workplace as well as the work itself, collaborative efforts among coworkers, and decision-making processes based on participatory models.
The usual justification for autocratic workplace structures and corporate governance is supposed efficiency. Yet empirical research shows that greater rank‑and‑file responsibility, participation, and autonomy are associated with higher involvement and productivity. The authors of that NSF study concluded that most decision‑making structures “are designed around status needs related to dominance and control over others,” creating “a widespread dynamic over time which shapes the organization to move the locus of control upward.”
In other words, corporate governance structures are often built to satisfy needs for status and dominance. They systematically limit workers’ control over their jobs and underutilize their capacities, even though broader participation tends to increase wealth creation. Suresh Srivastava and the co-authors of that NSF study and many subsequent studies concluded that we would all benefit if we redesigned organizations, including corporations. Decision‑making should be pushed to the lowest practical level, “taking advantage of all the brains” in the organization. Ownership, information access, and participatory decision-making processes for both employees and external shareholders should be widely and fully embedded.
I intend to continue filing shareholder proposals, but will spend more time exploring other avenues to achieve similar goals. As I approach my eighties, I am reflecting on how my mentors spent their later decades. Severyn Bruyn, who chose me for an NIMH grant back in 1979 for my work on democratizing the workplace, provides one such model. After retiring, Bruyn wrote a novel, painted, set famous poems to song, wrote oratorios, operas, and a musical.
He also slipped onto the playing field and joined the cheerleaders. Maybe I’ll loosen up a bit. Approaching corporate governance from multiple perspectives may be more effective in moving the ball down the field. I’ve been toying with music. I also like the video Sarah Haan recently posted on industrial democracy, the democratization of shareholding, and non-voting stock.
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CorpGov.net 2025 Proxy Season: Related Posts


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