Individual Investors Drive Corporate Governance Reform

Individual Investors Drive Corporate Governance Reform Through the Proxy Process

Individual investors who file shareholder proposals have played a significant and consequential role in advancing sound corporate governance. Yet their contribution is often overlooked.

Recent debate over the shareholder proposal process has drawn strong responses from institutional investors, faith-based investors, and pension funds seeking to protect shareholders’ ability to engage companies through proposals. Missing from much of that discussion is the impact of individual investors – particularly John Chevedden and James McRitchie.

Together, Chevedden and McRitchie have filed thousands of proposals asking companies to improve their governance policies and practices. Institutional investors frequently support these reforms, regardless of whether the proposal comes from a prominent institution or an individual shareholder. Some of the practices they championed have become widely accepted; others remain contested. Not every proposed reform is necessarily right for every company, but each deserves thoughtful scrutiny and consideration.

Guest post by Timothy Smith, Senior Policy Advisor, Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility. research assistance by Sehr Khaliq, ICCR Director of Evaluation. Originally posted to ICCR on August 21, 2026. EDITORIAL NOTE: The source narrative says 125 proposals received more than 25% support, but the complete source tables contain 123 such entries. This version uses 123 so the prose matches the supplied data. Confirm with ICCR before changing the count. I also bolded the links and created more of them, as well as adding the big attention grabbing graphic and following song. (Both added using AI).

  • Voices in the Proxy Light
  • Persistent proponents, measurable influence

    Companies respond to individual proponents in sharply different ways. Some engage constructively and adopt full or partial reforms. Others seek to exclude their proposals through the Securities and Exchange Commission’s no-action process or through litigation.

    SEC Chair Paul Atkins recently criticized the concentration of filings by one individual. In a July 2026 speech to the Society for Corporate Governance, he noted that one person was the sole or lead proponent for approximately 41% of shareholder proposals voted on during the season. He treated that concentration, and the fact that only 8% of those proposals won majority support, as evidence that the system needs reform.

    That framing misses the larger point. A proposal need not win a majority to identify a governance weakness, attract substantial investor concern, or prompt a board to act. Support from one-quarter, one-third, or nearly one-half of votes cast is consequential. It signals that a significant portion of the company’s investors believes the board should address the issue.

    Even skeptics have acknowledged Chevedden’s influence. In a 2013 Reuters special report, James Copland of the Manhattan Institute described him as “leading the intellectual curve, getting proposals out there before they start to get traction.”

    For more background, see ICCR’s The Power of Individual Investors to Catalyze Change, McRitchie’s John Chevedden: Economy-Class Investor Advocate, and Three Shareholder Rights Advocates: Gilbert, Chevedden, McRitchie.

    What the 2026 votes show

    In 2026, Chevedden filed more than 200 shareholder proposals. Some were challenged, some did not reach a vote, and others were withdrawn following discussions with management. The data supplied for this article identify 123 proposals that received at least 25% support, including several that won majority support and one that approached 98%.

    The proposals covered familiar but important governance subjects: majority voting in director elections, equal voting rights, political-spending disclosure, shareholder rights to call special meetings or act by written consent, independent board leadership, executive equity retention, golden parachutes, and poison pills.

    These results rebut the idea that frequent individual proponents merely clutter corporate ballots with idiosyncratic demands. Large numbers of investors repeatedly supported the reforms. The proposal may originate with one person, but the vote reflects the judgment of the broader shareholder base.

    Ownership thresholds would silence useful ideas

    The SEC and corporate trade associations have debated whether shareholders should be required to own substantially more stock before submitting a proposal. Texas has gone further. Senate Bill 1057, effective September 1, 2025, permits an eligible publicly traded Texas corporation to opt into a regime under which a proponent must hold at least $1 million in voting shares or 3% of the company’s voting shares, maintain that holding for at least six months through the meeting, and solicit holders representing at least 67% of the voting power entitled to vote on the proposal.

    Those requirements would effectively exclude most individual investors. They rest on a mistaken premise: that the value of an idea depends on the wealth of the person advancing it. The history of corporate governance shows otherwise. Individual proponents have repeatedly identified reforms that later gained broad investor support and became accepted practice.

    The shareholder proposal process gives investors an orderly, nonbinding mechanism to raise issues and test support across the ownership base. Boards remain free to explain their opposition, and shareholders remain free to vote no. Silencing smaller investors before their ideas can be considered does not protect shareholder democracy; it impoverishes it.

    The 2026 voting results below demonstrate the important role individual investors play. That role should be protected, not eradicated.


    John Chevedden proposals receiving at least 25% support in 2026

    Source: Data supplied by John Chevedden and cross-checked against ICCR’s database. Vote percentages are reproduced from the source document.

    Annual Board Election (1)

    ResolutionCompanyLead filerVote
    Annual Board ElectionFortune BrandsJohn Chevedden74.20%

    Annual Vote Regarding Executive Pay (1)

    ResolutionCompanyLead filerVote
    Annual Vote Regarding Executive PayMeta (Facebook Inc.)John Chevedden27.10%

    Give Each Share an Equal Vote (3)

    ResolutionCompanyLead filerVote
    Give Each Share an Equal VoteFord Motor CompanyJohn Chevedden43.10%
    Give Each Share an Equal VoteUnited Parcel Service (UPS)John Chevedden40.20%
    Give Each Share an Equal VoteLennar CorporationJohn Chevedden36.70%

    Majority Vote (9)

    ResolutionCompanyLead filerVote
    Majority VoteBJ’s WholesaleJohn Chevedden27.40%
    Majority VoteDatadog, Inc.John Chevedden42.30%
    Majority VoteHenry Schein, Inc.John Chevedden57.60%
    Majority VoteCalixJohn Chevedden90.60%
    Majority Voteonsemi (On Semiconductor)John Chevedden97.90%
    Majority VoteNVIDIAJohn Chevedden86.00%
    Majority VoteOGE Energy CorporationJohn Chevedden79.80%
    Majority VoteWEC Energy Group Inc.John Chevedden37.30%
    Majority VoteWells Fargo & CompanyJohn Chevedden47.90%

    Political Contributions (7)

    ResolutionCompanyLead filerVote
    Political ContributionsBooking HoldingsJohn Chevedden35.00%
    Political ContributionsKnight-Swift Transportation Holdings Inc.John Chevedden39.40%
    Political ContributionsOtis Worldwide Corp.John Chevedden39.70%
    Political ContributionsAkamai Technologies, Inc.John Chevedden45.40%
    Political ContributionsSteel Dynamics, Inc.John Chevedden39.30%
    Political ContributionsO’Reilly Automotive, Inc.John Chevedden44.20%
    Political ContributionsSonoco Products CompanyJohn Chevedden41.50%

    Require Shareholder Approval for Excessive Golden Parachutes (2)

    ResolutionCompanyLead filerVote
    Require Shareholder Approval for Excessive Golden ParachutesHumana Inc.John Chevedden41.10%
    Require Shareholder Approval for Excessive Golden ParachutesCF Industries Holdings, Inc.John Chevedden50.90%

    Right of Shareholders to Call Special Meetings (41)

    ResolutionCompanyLead filerVote
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsGoldman Sachs Group Inc.John Chevedden36.80%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsFirst Solar, Inc.John Chevedden43.00%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsMeritage Homes Corp.John Chevedden25.50%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsL3Harris TechnologiesJohn Chevedden33.20%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsIDEXX Laboratories, Inc.John Chevedden41.20%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsMarketAxess Holdings Inc.John Chevedden28.40%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsPayPalJohn Chevedden41.10%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsCBRE Group, Inc.John Chevedden33.90%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsEquinix, Inc.John Chevedden30.20%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsHubSpot, Inc.John Chevedden79.20%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsAutodesk Inc.John Chevedden47.50%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsMarkel CorporationJohn Chevedden37.30%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsAGCO CorporationJohn Chevedden48.60%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsMKS InstrumentsJohn Chevedden32.60%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsMedpace HoldingsJohn Chevedden34.10%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsMasco CorporationJohn Chevedden42.60%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsGroup 1 Automotive, Inc.John Chevedden25.30%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsEPAM Systems, Inc.John Chevedden43.40%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsTimken CompanyJohn Chevedden41.40%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsGraphic Packaging HoldingsJohn Chevedden42.10%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsArrow ElectronicsJohn Chevedden37.00%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsRegions Financial CorporationJohn Chevedden43.70%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsBoston Scientific CorporationJohn Chevedden42.60%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsS&P GlobalJohn Chevedden40.80%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsAES CorporationJohn Chevedden34.70%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsICU MedicalJohn Chevedden40.70%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsEastman Chemical CompanyJohn Chevedden27.80%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsEquifax Inc.John Chevedden36.30%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsEntegris Inc.John Chevedden31.20%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsCincinnati Financial Corp.John Chevedden27.20%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsAlbemarle CorporationJohn Chevedden57.50%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsAdvanced Micro Devices, Inc.John Chevedden37.40%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsAlly FinancialJohn Chevedden29.40%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsMurphy Oil CompanyJohn Chevedden33.90%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsNRG Energy, Inc.John Chevedden55.50%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsNVR, Inc.John Chevedden47.10%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsSherwin-Williams CompanyJohn Chevedden43.30%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsTransUnionJohn Chevedden72.00%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsQualcomm Inc.John Chevedden42.10%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsKeysight TechnologiesJohn Chevedden65.00%
    Right of Shareholders to Call Special MeetingsMicron Technology, Inc.John Chevedden42.90%

    Right To Act By Written Consent (31)

    ResolutionCompanyLead filerVote
    Right To Act By Written ConsentNetflix, Inc.John Chevedden44.40%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentCaterpillar Inc.John Chevedden39.20%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentDelta Air Lines, Inc.John Chevedden31.10%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentCognizant Technology Solutions Corp.John Chevedden39.00%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentUnited Airlines Holdings, Inc.John Chevedden38.50%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentAT&T Inc.John Chevedden32.00%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentZoetis, Inc.John Chevedden46.70%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentWestern Union Company (The)John Chevedden27.20%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentHoneywell International Inc.John Chevedden31.90%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentAssurant, Inc.John Chevedden29.10%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentVertex Pharmaceuticals IncorporatedJohn Chevedden57.00%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentServiceNow, Inc.John Chevedden36.50%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentCBOE Holdings, Inc.John Chevedden42.50%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentCrown Holdings Inc.John Chevedden42.60%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentCMS Energy Corp.John Chevedden36.00%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentThe Hartford Financial Services GroupJohn Chevedden45.00%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentAnnaly Capital ManagementJohn Chevedden26.60%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentMcDonald’s Corp.John Chevedden41.60%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentMasterCard IncorporatedJohn Chevedden29.70%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentDT Midstream, Inc.John Chevedden30.10%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentGlobal Payments Inc.John Chevedden25.80%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentIBMJohn Chevedden37.30%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentThe Boeing CompanyJohn Chevedden39.30%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentTexas Instruments Inc.John Chevedden44.60%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentCignaJohn Chevedden47.80%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentSynopsys, Inc.John Chevedden40.00%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentDeere & CompanyJohn Chevedden38.30%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentJabil Circuit, Inc.John Chevedden38.40%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentVisa Inc.John Chevedden32.80%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentCVS Health CorpJohn Chevedden40.20%
    Right To Act By Written ConsentVerisk Analytics, Inc.John Chevedden52.10%

    Senior Executive Equity Retention (1)

    ResolutionCompanyLead filerVote
    Senior Executive Equity RetentionEdison InternationalJohn Chevedden37.40%

    Separate Chair & CEO (26)

    ResolutionCompanyLead filerVote
    Separate Chair & CEOMarvell Technology, IncJohn Chevedden36.00%
    Separate Chair & CEOMondelez International, Inc.John Chevedden31.20%
    Separate Chair & CEOMorgan StanleyJohn Chevedden27.30%
    Separate Chair & CEOHome Depot FoundationJohn Chevedden25.90%
    Separate Chair & CEOEcolab Inc.John Chevedden25.90%
    Separate Chair & CEODover CorporationJohn Chevedden35.90%
    Separate Chair & CEOCDW Corp.John Chevedden42.60%
    Separate Chair & CEOLincoln National Corp.John Chevedden28.60%
    Separate Chair & CEODana Holding CorporationJohn Chevedden27.60%
    Separate Chair & CEOJ.P. Morgan Chase & Co.John Chevedden35.10%
    Separate Chair & CEOQuest DiagnosticsJohn Chevedden25.50%
    Separate Chair & CEOCorpay, Inc.John Chevedden29.90%
    Separate Chair & CEOPPG Industries, Inc.John Chevedden32.00%
    Separate Chair & CEOAMN Healthcare ServicesJohn Chevedden25.10%
    Separate Chair & CEOPower Integrations, Inc.John Chevedden45.20%
    Separate Chair & CEOGilead Sciences, Inc.John Chevedden27.10%
    Separate Chair & CEOPrudential Financial Inc.John Chevedden30.50%
    Separate Chair & CEOBristol-Myers Squibb CompanyJohn Chevedden27.40%
    Separate Chair & CEOAvery Dennison CorporationJohn Chevedden39.10%
    Separate Chair & CEOFirstEnergy CorporationJohn Chevedden32.80%
    Separate Chair & CEOLockheed MartinJohn Chevedden35.20%
    Separate Chair & CEOEversource EnergyJohn Chevedden26.50%
    Separate Chair & CEOColgate PalmoliveJohn Chevedden28.60%
    Separate Chair & CEOWest Pharmaceutical Services, Inc.John Chevedden46.40%
    Separate Chair & CEOPfizer Inc.John Chevedden28.50%
    Separate Chair & CEOHuntsman CorporationJohn Chevedden25.80%

    Shareholder Vote on Poison Pill (1)

    ResolutionCompanyLead filerVote
    Shareholder Vote on Poison PillLumen Technologies (formerly CenturyLink)John Chevedden47.80%

    Timothy Smith is Senior Policy Advisor at the Interfaith Center on Corporate Responsibility. Research assistance for this article was provided by Sehr Khaliq, ICCR Director of Evaluation.

    Collaborate with CorpGov.net on Social Media (or Leave a Reply at the bottom)

    Linkedin
    BlueSky
    Facebook
    Mastodon
    Substack
    X (formerly Twitter)

    Posts Related to Individual Investors Drive Corporate Governance Reform

    Three Shareholder Rights Advocates: Gilbert, Chevedden, McRitchie

    The Costs and Benefits of Shareholder Democracy

    Main Street Investors: Battle Coming

    Gadfly Importance Key to Democratic CorpGov

    July 2009 News Archives

    ESG Via UPC – Amazon

    , , , , , , , , , , ,

    Comments are closed.

    Powered by WordPress. Designed by WooThemes