ISS Annual Survey 2024

ISS Annual Survey 2024: Suggested Responses Due 9/5/24

ISS Annual Survey 2024: A Call for Systemic Proxy Advice

ISS, a leading proxy advisory firm, is seeking input for its annual survey, which will close on September 5. This presents a crucial opportunity for investors to shape proxy advice considering the systemic impact of votes across diversified portfolios. Glass Lewis had a similar survey, but it closed on August 30. Although I responded to both, I am late getting up with this post. Even though it is now closed, you might try submitting it to Glass Lewis anyway.

You do not need to be an ISS or Glass Lewis customer to complete their surveys. By summarizing some model answers for systemic stewardship, The Shareholder Commons (TSC) hopes to transform “what could be the noise of unaided individual voting by disparate investors into a signal approximating a consensus viewpoint.” This post draws heavily on a slightly longer version at TSC, ISS & Glass Lewis Need Your Help!

You can certainly jump to the TSC post and use their advice directly. However, I urge you also to read my “Addendum” below, which addresses the issue of overlapping management and shareholder proposals. Although TSC, ISS, or Glass Lewis do not address this issue, you can raise the issue and solution in the final comment area of both surveys.

ISS Annual Survey 2024: The Importance of a Systemic Lens

Diversified investors need proxy voting advice that incorporates the impact of votes on their entire portfolio, not just on individual companies. This approach recognizes that practices threatening social and environmental systems can harm the broad economy upon which diversified portfolios depend

By providing thoughtful input to the ISS survey, investors can help shape proxy advice that better serves the interests of diversified shareholders and promotes long-term economic stability.

ISS Annual Survey 2024: How to Participate

Complete the ISS survey before September 5. Use the TSC-provided model answers as a guide, modifying language as needed. Emphasize the need for proxy advice that addresses system-wide threats.

TSC prepared model answers for specific questions in the surveys here (ISS) and here (Glass Lewis). These are suggestions. You may wish to modify the language or expand on it. The goal is to highlight the need for investors and their advisors to address systemic issues. TSC encourages you to use the type of argument illustrated in the model answers to support any request for a sustainability policy that addresses system-wide threats.

The question numbers in the model responses correspond to the questions in the surveys, with original questions in Roman type and model responses in italics. In several places, TSC didn’t answer questions regarding specific standards. Instead, they provided additional information to explain why the advisor should account for portfolio effects when deciding what standard to apply.

ISS Annual Survey 2024: Key Points for Consideration

Executive Compensation: ISS’s qualitative review should include performance criteria that ensure companies are not profiting from practices creating systemic risk. For instance, equity vesting should be contingent on meeting climate targets or addressing inequality risks.

Climate Change: ISS’s standards should account for alignment with the Paris Accords. Recent studies suggest that the current emissions trajectory could lead to a 30-40% rerating of the entire equities market compared to a Paris-aligned economy.

Human Capital Management: ISS’s analysis should ensure that metrics capture the risk a company’s practices pose to the global economy through contribution to inequality and other systemic risks.

Addendum: Address Overlapping Management and Shareholder Proposals

This comment below was written for ISS, but it would be equally applicable if you replaced ISS with Glass Lewis. 

Since some shareholders typically vote as boards recommend and others leave items blank, defaulting to board recommendations results in a thumb on the scale in favor of management proposals. ISS and Glass Lewis need to encourage clients not to default to voting in favor of both such proposals.

We encourage ISS to recommend in favor of shareholder proposals and against management proposals where both represent progress, but the shareholder proposal is better, and vice versa.

For example, we see many instances where shareholders vote in favor of a management proposal to lower the threshold to call a special meeting to 25% of shares outstanding AND they also vote in favor of a shareholder proposal calling for a threshold of 15%. In such instances, ISS should encourage clients to vote for the shareholder proposal and against the management proposal.

Additionally, ISS needs to get more granular in its analysis. For example, management proposals on special meeting rights sometimes require that only shares held for more than a year count toward meeting the threshold to call a meeting. As of 2022, the average holding period for U.S. stocks was just ten months. As of 2022, the average holding period for U.S. stocks was just ten months. Therefore, a 20% threshold, with a minimum ownership requirement of one year, might result in the equivalent of a 40-50% threshold without such time requirements.

ISS Annual Survey 2024: Related Posts

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Glass Lewis 2018 Proxy Advice Update

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