Proxy Power and How to Squash the Voice of Shareholders would have been a better title for the September 10, 2025, House Committee on Financial Services hearing. The hearing examined the SEC’s Rule 14a-8, which governs the submission of shareholder proposals to publicly traded companies. While some witnesses argued the rule is exploited by activists pushing social agendas at the expense of corporate performance, those who believe owners should have more say than those they hire defended Rule 14a-8 as a vital tool for shareholder democracy and corporate accountability.
Proxy Power: Managers and Boards vs Shareowners
According to the Pro-Reform Republicans, Rule 14a-8 is being used to push non-financial political agendas, draining company resources. A small group of activists often submits proposals. Reforms will improve “efficiency” and focus on shareholder value.
Pro-Democracy Democrats & Advocates argued that ESG-related proposals highlight material risks. Limiting them is anti-democratic and anti-market. Corporate managers should not be the arbiters of relevance or materiality. By law, materiality relates to what facts a “reasonable investor” would consider in investing in a particular security.
Proposal exclusions under consideration seek to censor shareholder concerns, especially on climate, diversity, and political spending. They want to limit shareholder voices to “financial materiality.” Yet they refuse to acknowledge that materiality, by law, is defined by individual investors as the facts they consider when making investments. Managers, and indeed politicians, should not be the arbiters of what is material. Investors can and should speak for themselves. More and more investors recognize their returns and ties more to the market and the overall economic system than to individual companies. Systems-related issues have a greater impact on their total returns. Tightening Rule 14a-8 would eliminate early warning signals from investors to other investors, as well as to managers and boards.
Proxy Power: Key Quotes
- Rep. Jamie Raskin (D-MD): “Efforts to narrow Rule 14a-8 are the corporate governance equivalent of voter suppression.”
- Andy Behar (CEO, As You Sow): “Shareholder proposals are the canary in the coal mine—they alert companies to material risks before regulators or markets catch up.”
- Kathy Mulvey (Union of Concerned Scientists): “Climate proposals aren’t political—they’re about the survival of companies, markets, and society.”
- Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY): “When CEOs block proposals on political spending or environmental risk, they’re silencing the owners of the company—the shareholders.”
- Lisa Woll (CEO, US SIF): “Shareholder rights are under attack by those who fear transparency and accountability.”</blockquote>
- Brandon Rees (AFL-CIO): “Without 14a-8, corporate managers become the sole gatekeepers of what concerns investors can raise. That’s dangerous.”
- Bruce Herbert (Newground Social Investment): “Entrenched interests want to define ‘materiality’ to exclude anything they don’t like.”
- Rep. Katie Porter (D-CA): “If a small investor can’t raise a concern, and large investors won’t, who speaks for the future?”
- Jon Lukomnik (Investor & Author): “ESG is not a political movement. It’s a recognition that systemic risks affect all investments.”
- Mindy Lubber (CEO, Ceres): “The most financially material issues today—climate, water risk, supply chain disruption—were all once ‘non-financial’ shareholder proposals.”
- Rep. Sean Casten (D-IL): video clip Casten eviscerated arguments raised by a panel of corporate lawyers and financial “experts” in their testimony.
Proxy Power: Implications for Rule 14a-8 Reform
Retail investors, especially John Chevedden, James McRitchie, and groups like As You Sow, have played foundational roles in Pay transparency, ESG risk disclosure, and Political spending transparency. Institutional players (public pensions, ESG mutual funds) have more voting power, but often act after retail filings gain traction. Coalitions (e.g. labor unions + ESG retail funds + institutional investors) have been most effective in recent high-profile wins.
Rule 14a-8 changes that raise ownership thresholds or allow companies to exclude proposals more easily would disproportionately silence retail investors, who have historically:
- Filed first on systemic risks
- Proven prescient and influential
- Acted as catalysts for broader reforms
Proxy Power: Conclusion
Proposed reforms—like higher ownership/resubmission thresholds—would
- Effectively ban filers like Chevedden and McRitchie
- Shift control to corporate management
- Remove a crucial early-warning and accountability function from corporate governance
Proxy Power: My Two Cents
Many Republicans on the Committee and their witnesses appear to believe that “gadflies” with “small holdings,” like John Chevedden and me, shouldn’t be able to file shareholder proposals. However, consider that only 15–21% of American families own any stock directly. The average broker account holds stocks in 4 individual companies. John and I each hold stock in hundreds of companies. That easily puts us in the top 1% of households, if not in wealth, certainly in knowing best practices in corporate governance. Removing our eligibility to file would leave that right to large passive funds, which have never filed a shareholder proposal, to a small number of public pensions, religious communities, and the very rich.
In McRitchie v. Zuckerberg, the Delaware Court of Chancery stated:
[T]he directors’ duties run to the corporation for the ultimate benefit of the shares… The ultimate human beneficiaries of that value are incidental.
That decision starkly illustrates a central problem that Vice-Chancellor Laster and Republicans on the Committee ignore. Shares have no agency, no ethics, and no voice. Only shareholders – real people – can steer companies toward resilience and responsibility. Disabling shareholder rights mechanisms, such as the annual submission of proposals, cedes control to entrenched insiders and undermines the legitimacy of corporate capitalism itself.
“Materiality,” which in the U.S. legal framework relates to what facts a “reasonable investor” would consider in making a particular investment, is a social construct and requires affirmation by investors over time through mechanisms like ESG proposals to set what is or is not considered material at a specific time for a particular market, industry, or company.
Should determining materiality be left to corporate directors and Congress? Are they now the only “reasonable investors?” I don’t like where this is going. When I was sent by the State Department to Japan and Korea at the turn of the century in an attempt to get them to open their markets to US investment, I argued that investors expect to have a voice in governing the companies they own and predictable rules of law. Will there soon be delegations sent to the US to argue the same?
Epilogue
Here’s another tactic I became aware of this morning: allow shareholders to vote with management automatically. If you want to vote on all proxy items with management, do nothing. We’ll take care of it. If you want to vote against management on anything, you’ll have to jump through a number of hoops and maybe stand on your head. If you actually file a proposal that management doesn’t like, we may sue you. Sure, you can take Exxon or Donald Trump to court, but it will cost you. When a company sued me for filing a shareholder proposal, one of the many attorneys working for the company told me that if I lost, they would take my house to defray their expenses. Fortunately, I won and was awarded costs. I didn’t incur any costs because I represented myself pro bono.
Collaborate with CorpGov.net on Social Media (or Leave a Reply at the bottom)
Linkedin
BlueSky
Facebook
Mastodon
Substack
X (formerly Twitter)
Proxy Power and Proposal Abuse: Related Posts

Comments are closed.