Reclaiming fiduciary duty is essential if corporations are to serve humankind.
Historically rooted in protecting human investors, fiduciary duty must evolve beyond the narrow confines of “entity primacy.” Modern diversified shareholders—known as ‘universal owners’—have economic and ethical interests that extend across the full system of firms, markets, and societies. Delaware jurisprudence, culminating in Chancellor Travis Laster’s decision in McRitchie v. Zuckerberg (Meta Platforms Inc.), defines directors’ duties as running to the corporation and its shares, rendering shareholders ‘incidental.’ This framing, though doctrinally coherent, detaches fiduciary duty from its original human purpose… requiring individuals in positions of trust to act with integrity, transparency, and diligence in the best interest of the beneficiaries they represent.
The fiduciary duty that once safeguarded the investor has inverted, to become a duty to the institution that employs the investor’s agents.
Reclaiming Fiduciary Duty: From Shareholder to Entity Primacy
Fiduciary duty originated in trust and partnership law to protect those who entrust capital to others. In early corporate law, directors were seen as trustees for shareholders. The classic case of Dodge v. Ford (1919) clarified that shareholder profit maximization is the default legal purpose of corporate governance. Over time, however, Delaware courts shifted the focus: Directors owe fiduciary duties to the corporation (entity primacy) and its shareholders as a class of beneficiaries; creditors do not have direct claims in insolvency. The corporate entity is the duty-holder’s principal Gheewalla (2007). With McRitchie v. Zuckerberg (2024), the focus shifted to the corporate entity and its shares, with shareholders being “incidental.”
This shift institutionalizes ‘entity primacy,’ prioritizing the firm as a legal person over its investors. Directors owe duties to a single firm and its shares, but beneficiaries invest in a portfolio economy and live in the real world, negatively impacted by corporations externalizing costs.
Reclaiming Fiduciary Duty: Mismatch in an Age of Universal Ownership
Institutional investors—CalPERS, BlackRock, Norges Bank, and others—are universal owners. Likewise, most individuals hold stock indirectly through large index funds invested mostly in large companies. We have positions across the market and are exposed to systemic risks that transcend any single firm.
Under entity primacy, directors maximize enterprise value for the corporation, even if doing so imposes external costs (e.g., pollution, wage suppression, political instability) that harm the rest of the investor’s portfolio, or the viability of a salubrious environment. This creates a fiduciary mismatch: corporate directors are bound to firm-level optimization, while asset managers supposedly owe a fiduciary duty to the long-term welfare of their human beneficiaries.
Yet, it seems that asset managers often vote proxies as directors at each company. I haven’t seen evidence that they systematically seek to increase portfolio values by voting for measures that would reduce externalized costs. Therefore, like corporate directors, fund managers treat individual investors as “incidental” to the equation.
The ultimate beneficiary of fiduciary duty should be the human person, not the corporate entity or a short-term increase in stock value.
Re-Humanizing Fiduciary Duty
Fiduciary duty should be redefined to reflect the primacy of individual owners and human beneficiaries over abstract entities. Directors should act as stewards of the corporation as an instrument for collective wealth creation, not as guardians of corporate autonomy.
Asset owners and trustees, in turn, should align their governance practices with system-level sustainability. The moral and legal origins of the fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and good faith require that fiduciaries act to preserve the systems that sustain human prosperity, including a salubrious environment and individual human agency.
The economy must serve its ultimate beneficiaries—people—not the abstract entities that manage their capital.
Reclaiming Fiduciary Duty: Legal Changes Needed
Below, I am throwing out some ideas for discussion. I was trained in social economy, not in writing law, although I have contributed to writing hundreds of laws and rules on environmental protection.
Delaware Corporate Law Amendment [Delaware Code Title 8. Corporations § 141(a)]
Directors shall manage the business and affairs of the corporation in good faith and in a manner reasonably believed to be in the best interests of the corporation and its beneficial owners collectively, taking into account the material effects of corporate conduct on the long-term common financial, environmental, and social systems in which such owners’ capital is invested.
Institutional Investor Fiduciary Code
Fiduciaries shall exercise their duties of loyalty and care to advance the long-term, risk-adjusted financial interests of their beneficiaries as a whole, considering the impact of portfolio companies’ activities on the stability, fairness, and sustainability of the common economic, social, and environmental systems upon which overall portfolio returns depend.
Universal Owners’ Charter
As universal owners representing the long-term interests of human beneficiaries, we recognize that our fiduciary responsibility transcends any single enterprise. We therefore commit to:
- Preserve and enhance the integrity of the common economic, social, and ecological systems upon which portfolio returns depend.
- Support governance reforms aligning directors’ duties with these systemic interests.
- Exercise stewardship consistent with the welfare of current and future beneficiaries.
- Advocate for legal recognition that a fiduciary duty’s ultimate beneficiary is the human person.
Sustainability & Fiduciary Integration Bylaw (Believed to be Delaware-compatible)
The Board shall, in discharging its duties under Section 141(a), consider the comon interests of shareholders as diversified, long-term investors and the potential material effects of the corporation’s conduct on the broader economic, environmental, and social systems that support the creation of shareholder value across portfolios.
Reclaiming Fiduciary Duty: Further Reading
- Shareholder Primacy and the Meta Decision (2025) by Rick Alexander
- Responsible Asset Managers: New Fiduciary Rules for the Asset Management Industry (2021) by Lenore Palladino, Rick Alexander
- Universal Ownership in Practice: A Practical Guide for Asset Owners (May 28, 2020) by Ellen Quigley
- Universal Owners in the Anthropocene (2025) Ellen Quigley on the Future of Finance podcast
- Toward Fair and Sustainable Capitalism (Harvard, 2019) by Leo E. Strine Jr.
- OECD Principles of Corporate Governance (2023 Revision)
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Reclaiming Fiduciary Duty: Related Posts
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