Rebalancing Capitalism Requires Rebalancing Power

Rebalancing Capitalism Requires Rebalancing Power

The recent UK-based EY analysis, How capital allocation can rebalance capitalism in a changing world, offers a timely and largely accurate diagnosis of the system’s current tensions. Capitalism, the authors argue, is not failing; it is delivering precisely what its incentives reward—efficient allocation of capital toward short-term financial returns, scale, and market dominance. This framing is correct as far as it goes. However, it does not go far enough.

The central challenge is not merely the misalignment of incentives. It is the misalignment of power—specifically, the growing gap between those who bear the long-term risks of the system and those who exercise control over corporate decision-making. Recent scholarship describes this as a “rights–power gap,” in which shareholders retain formal rights but lack meaningful influence over how those rights are exercised (see Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci & Christina M. Sautter, Corporate Disenfranchisement). Without addressing this structural divide, efforts to rebalance capitalism risk remaining aspirational rather than operational.

Music: Rebalancing Power Now

 

Rebalancing Power Now and Music for a Democratic Corporate Governance 

From Incentives to Power

The EY paper’s core insight, that “the current capitalist system delivers what its incentives reward,” is consistent with decades of economic and governance scholarship. Yet incentives do not arise in a vacuum. They are embedded in institutional structures that determine who sets them, who monitors them, and who benefits from them.

Today, those structures are increasingly concentrated. A small number of asset managers exercise voting power over a substantial portion of public equity markets. As Lucian Bebchuk and Scott Hirst document in The Specter of the Giant Three (2019), index fund managers such as BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street collectively wield outsized influence over corporate governance.

At the same time, beneficial owners—workers, retirees, and diversified investors—bear the consequences of systemic risks such as climate change, inequality, and geopolitical instability. This divergence between economic exposure and control echoes longstanding fiduciary concerns articulated in Meinhard v. Salmon, where Justice Cardozo emphasized the “punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.” Today’s institutional arrangements fall short of that standard when those exercising power are insulated from system-wide harms.

The Limits of Stakeholder Capitalism

The paper’s proposed shift from shareholder to stakeholder value reflects a growing consensus that corporations must account for a broader set of impacts. However, this shift faces significant legal and practical constraints.

Under prevailing corporate law, directors’ fiduciary duties run to the corporation and its shareholders. Courts in the United States have consistently reinforced this principle. In Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., the court made clear that a corporation is organized primarily for the profit of its shareholders. More recent Delaware jurisprudence continues to emphasize firm-level value. In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., the court held that directors must maximize shareholder value in change-of-control transactions.

Similarly, eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark rejected a corporate governance structure designed to privilege community values over shareholder value, reaffirming that directors of for-profit corporations cannot subordinate stockholder interests to other constituencies absent clear statutory authorization. More recently, McRitchie v. Zuckerberg underscored that fiduciary duties run to the corporation and its shares, not directly to broader stakeholder groups. Even the beneficial owners of those shares and their desires are deemed “incidental.”

These precedents create a structural constraint. Stakeholder considerations are typically permissible only if they can be justified as enhancing long-term shareholder value. Thus, while the EY paper calls for internalizing externalities and investing in resilience, directors may be constrained from doing so where such actions reduce firm-level value. Without changes to fiduciary doctrine or governance structures, stakeholder capitalism risks becoming a normative overlay on an unchanged legal foundation.

Erosion of Shareholder Voice

The feasibility of rebalancing capitalism also depends on the mechanisms available to investors to influence corporate behavior. Here, recent developments are troubling.

The shareholder proposal process under SEC Rule 14a-8 (17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8) has long served as a critical mechanism for shareholder engagement. The SEC has emphasized that this rule is intended to provide shareholders with a meaningful avenue to present proposals for inclusion in company proxy materials (see SEC Release No. 34-40018 (May 21, 1998).

Judicial decisions have reinforced the importance of full and fair disclosure in proxy processes. In Virginia Bankshares v. Sandberg, the Supreme Court held that materially misleading statements in proxy solicitations can violate federal securities laws. Earlier, in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., the court emphasized the importance of transparency in securities markets to ensure investor protection and market integrity.

However, recent policy shifts—particularly the SEC Division of Corporation Finance’s November 17, 2025 guidance indicating that staff may decline to express views on many no-action requests, effectively transfers interpretive authority to issuers. This development risks weakening the shareholder proposal process by increasing uncertainty and enabling more aggressive exclusions.

If the channels for shareholder voice continue to erode, the prospect of investor-driven reform diminishes. A system that depends on investor engagement to rebalance incentives must preserve and strengthen the tools that enable such engagement.

Employee Ownership as Governance Infrastructure

One of the more promising elements in the EY framework is the recognition that employee ownership can improve outcomes. However, the paper treats such ownership primarily as a distributional mechanism rather than a governance innovation.

Broad-based employee ownership, particularly when paired with voting rights, can function as governance infrastructure. Employees possess firm-specific knowledge that can improve oversight and long-term decision-making. Organizations such as Ownership Works and NCEO have documented improvements in performance, retention, and workplace outcomes associated with shared ownership models.

More importantly, employee ownership can help close the rights–power gap by distributing governance authority more broadly. Allocating a meaningful but non-controlling stake (e.g., 3–20%) to employees, with voting rights exercised directly rather than through intermediaries, can enhance accountability while preserving market discipline. See Shared Capitalism: Supercharge Economy and Democracy.

Rebalancing Capitalism Through Governance Reform

The EY paper correctly emphasizes that rebalancing capitalism requires coordinated changes across governments, investors, and companies. To that list should be added a fourth dimension: governance reform.

Several reforms could help align incentives with long-term, system-level value creation. Pass-through voting initiatives—such as those being explored by BlackRock reconnect beneficial owners with voting rights. Enhanced disclosure of ownership structures, including employee ownership levels, can improve transparency. iconik helps shareholders automatically vote in alignment with the policy of each asset manager or individual’s policy.

Fiduciary frameworks may also need to evolve. Scholars and practitioners, including The Shareholder Commons, have argued that fiduciary duty should account more explicitly for portfolio-wide impacts and systemic risks. Hybrid ownership models that combine institutional oversight with employee participation offer a practical pathway to align governance with long-term value creation.

From Incentive Design to Implementation Constraints

The EY analysis ultimately extends beyond capital allocation to encompass broader reforms in resource allocation, trust formation, and productivity growth. It highlights the importance of pricing externalities, investing in human and intellectual capital, and rebuilding trust as economic infrastructure. These are not peripheral ideas; they represent the operational core of the proposed “rebalanced capitalism.”

Yet across these domains, a common assumption persists: that adjusting incentives—through policy, market signals, or voluntary shifts in behavior—will be sufficient to redirect outcomes at scale. That assumption underestimates the constraints imposed by existing governance structures and legal frameworks. For example, pricing externalities such as carbon or biodiversity loss may be economically sound, but firms remain bound by fiduciary duties that prioritize firm-level value, as reinforced in cases such as Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.. Similarly, proposals to increase long-term investment in human capital or innovation may conflict with short-term performance pressures embedded in executive compensation and capital markets, pressures that boards are often obligated to respect.

The same tension arises in the paper’s emphasis on trust and broader stakeholder value. Trust may function as a form of intangible capital, but its accumulation depends on credible accountability mechanisms. Where shareholders lack effective tools to influence corporate behavior—whether due to concentrated voting power, weakened proxy processes, or regulatory retrenchment—trust becomes difficult to sustain. Disclosure and transparency requirements, long central to securities regulation (see SEC Release No. 34-31326 (Oct. 16, 1992), can mitigate this problem, but only if paired with mechanisms that enable investors to act on the information provided.

In short, the later chapters of the EY framework reinforce rather than resolve the central challenge. Expanding what markets measure and reward is necessary, but it is not sufficient. Without corresponding changes in who exercises control—and how that control is constrained—new incentives may be filtered through existing power structures that continue to favor concentration and short-term outcomes. Rebalancing capitalism, therefore, requires not only better incentives but governance mechanisms capable of implementing and sustaining them.

Why Incentive Reforms Fail Without Shifting Control

Even well-designed reforms falter when they leave underlying control structures untouched. Incentives—whether carbon pricing, enhanced disclosure, or revised compensation metrics—must be interpreted and implemented by those who currently exercise governance authority. Where that authority remains concentrated in a small set of intermediaries or insulated boards, new incentives are filtered through the same decision-making frameworks that produced the existing imbalances.

The result is adaptation without transformation: firms may adjust at the margins while preserving practices that prioritize short-term, firm-level gains over long-term, system-wide value. Durable change, therefore, requires more than recalibrating signals; it requires reallocating voice and accountability so that those who bear the long-term risks—diversified investors, workers, and beneficiaries—can meaningfully influence how those signals are applied. Without that shift, reforms risk becoming another layer of policy intent absorbed by structures designed to resist it.

Conclusion

The EY analysis is correct in rejecting the false choice between preserving capitalism and replacing it. The more urgent task is to ensure that capitalism evolves in ways that sustain its legitimacy and effectiveness.

But evolution will not occur solely through changes in incentives. It requires confronting the distribution of power within the system. Without such changes, efforts to expand the definition of value or encourage long-termism may be absorbed into existing structures that continue to favor concentration and short-term returns.

Rebalancing capitalism, in short, requires rebalancing control. Only by narrowing the gap between those who own the system and those who govern it can capitalism deliver on its promise of broad-based, sustainable prosperity.

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2 Responses to Rebalancing Capitalism Requires Rebalancing Power

  1. Bill Fotsch 04/28/2026 at 6:08 am #

    Employee equity ownership is a good thing, as NCEO and Ownership Works have stated. But research consistently shows that the impact of equity ownership is modest unless employees are involved in the management process. Examples of research that documents this abound:
    1) 1987 HBR article, “How Well Is Employee Ownership Working?”
    2) 2021 Inc article: “A Key Strategy to Double Your Profitable Growth”
    3) 2026 Research article: “Employee Share Ownership, Management Practices, and Labor Productivity: An Analysis Using Establishment Level Micro-Data from the U.S. Census”
    All this research shows that while employee equity is good, involving employes as partners in the business, with the shared goal of serving customers profitably, drives business results and consequently job security is better. The good news is that equity and partnership can and should complement one another. This also addresses the declining trend in employee engagement, as captured in this Inc article: “Employee Engagement 2.0: It’s Called Economic Engagement”
    Rather than rebalancing power, this approach puts Owners and Employees on the same side, focused on serving Customers. This is consistent with what Adam Smith envisioned in his book, “Wealth of Nations”

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