Regulation Membership & Shared Capitalism Without Control Capture

Regulation Membership & Shared Capitalism Without Control Capture

Debates over alternative corporate forms are too often framed as a choice between two institutional worlds. Choose the conventional investor-owned corporation, valued for liquidity, transferability, and scalable access to capital, or 2) the cooperative, valued for participation, voice, and use-based ownership. That binary framing is increasingly inadequate. Law should facilitate multiple forms of democratic capital without forcing enterprises to choose between participation and scale. The Blockchain Cooperative Coalition’s proposals for “Regulation Membership” and James McRitchie’s writings on employee ownership without control capture should be read together as complementary responses to that problem.

Note: This post was prompted by a streamed event from the Center for Business Law and Policy (CBLS) entitled Corporate Metamorphosis: How Shifting Ownership from Investors to Customers Will Change the World. It was held at King Hall, UC Davis School of Law, on April 14, 2026, and featured James Wigginton. Since I am having lunch with Wigginton on Tuesday, I thought to compare our two visions in advance so our conversation would be better grounded. Hopefully, a few readers may also find it useful or at least interesting. After our discussion, I may update this post, especially if I find I have misrepresented Regulation Membership.

Aria of Many Owners  and Music for a Democratic Corporate Governance

The Coalition’s project is principally a legal-infrastructure project for patron- and user-based ownership. McRitchie’s project is principally a governance-capacity project for public corporations. The former seeks a federal securities safe harbor for bona fide cooperative membership interests; the latter seeks to improve the informational foundations of corporate governance by broadening the shareholder base inside the conventional corporation through moderate, broad-based employee ownership coupled with meaningful voting rights.

This post advances a sharper thesis: Regulation Membership and shared capitalism without control capture address different failures of modern capitalism, and American law should be revised to permit both models–and hybrids between them–to scale. Regulation Membership is best suited to enterprises in which patron participation, user contribution, or community affiliation is the central economic relationship. Shared capitalism without control capture is best suited to enterprises in which employee knowledge is the central underutilized governance asset. Properly understood, the choice is not between “cooperatives or corporations,” but among institutional forms designed to fit distinct economic functions. American law should not force a choice between these paths. It should revise securities, cooperative, corporate, ERISA, and disclosure rules so both models—and hybrids between them—can scale.

Legal Reform Needed for Both

That thesis has practical consequences. Bringing the Coalition’s vision to fruition would require federal legislation directing the Securities and Exchange Commission to adopt a genuine cooperative safe harbor, clarifying the treatment of tokenized or distributed-ledger-based memberships, adjusting accredited-investor rules so democratic capital aggregation is not structurally disfavored, and preempting duplicative state registration burdens for qualifying memberships. Bringing McRitchie’s vision to fruition would require a different set of reforms: greater pass-through or direct employee voting rights under ERISA-governed structures, standardized disclosure of employee ownership and voting agency, safe harbors for capped employee ownership trusts, and a more intelligible legal framework for treating broad-based employee ownership as orthodox long-term value governance rather than doctrinal deviation.

This post proceeds in five parts. First, we analyze the Coalition’s Regulation Membership proposal, including Exhibit A and Exhibit B to the August 2025 letter and the Coalition’s later Fall 2025 discussion draft. Then, we explain the doctrinal foundations of the proposal in United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., SEC no-action practice, and state-law exemptions. Third, we compare the Coalition’s model with McRitchie’s shared-capitalism model and evaluate their comparative strengths, weaknesses, and likely domains of fit. We then examine the legal changes necessary to make each vision real. Last, we argue for institutional pluralism and sketch a hybrid agenda for democratic capital.

Regulation Membership as a Federal Safe Harbor for Participatory Ownership

The Blockchain Cooperative Coalition’s August 5, 2025, letter to Senator Tim Scott and other members of the Senate Banking Committee proposed a new Section 110 to the Responsible Financial Innovation Act of 2025. The Coalition’s later Fall 2025 discussion draft reworks the idea as a Section 111 addition, but the architecture remains materially the same. In both versions, the proposal directs the SEC to promulgate “Regulation Membership” under the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the Investment Company Act of 1940.

At the center of the proposal is a carefully bounded safe harbor. A cooperative membership interest would not be deemed a security if the cooperative’s governing documents satisfy four principal conditions: first, issuance must be limited to persons who participate in the business of the cooperative or an entity in which the cooperative owns equity; second, distributions must be limited to patronage dividends derived from the member’s own participation; third, transfers must be limited and subject to cooperative control; and fourth, members must retain voting control of the cooperative. The proposal also specifies that a mere investment of money is not “participation.

Exhibit A

Exhibit A to the August 2025 letter is especially important because it translates the proposal’s normative claims into operative legal text.  Section 110(a) would create a rulemaking mandate and timetable. Proposed Section 110(b) would exclude qualifying membership interests from the definition of “security” under the Securities Act and Exchange Act. Proposed Section 110(c) excludes qualifying cooperatives from the definition of “investment company.” Section 110(d) seeks to create a specialized accredited-investor rule for qualifying cooperatives. Proposed Section 110(e) would preempt state securities registration laws only to the extent those laws would require registration of federally qualifying membership interests, while preserving state authority over cooperative governance, fraud, and unfair business practices.

Exhibit B

Exhibit B, a one-page visual summary, is not merely promotional material. It shows the proposal in administrative form: the problem is a regulatory patchwork; the solution is a federal safe harbor; the core conditions are active participation, patronage dividends, limited transferability, and member control; and the intended policy effect is broader ownership in blockchain enterprises, healthcare cooperatives, fan-owned sports franchises, and other user-centered businesses. The importance of Exhibit B lies in its recognition that, for a safe harbor to matter, it must be legible ex ante to founders, lawyers, regulators, and community organizers. A doctrinally elegant rule that cannot be readily operationalized will not meaningfully expand democratic ownership.

Refinements

The Fall 2025 discussion draft makes three notable refinements. First, it places much stronger emphasis on blockchain-enabled and tokenized cooperative memberships, expressly stating that cooperative members may contribute “work, data, time, or service, not just capital.” Second, it aligns the proposal more explicitly with efforts to modernize financial regulation for digital-asset markets. Third, it adds a more explicit reference to guardrails for anti-fraud, dispute resolution, and consumer protection. Those additions make the proposal less vulnerable to the criticism that it is simply seeking a deregulatory carveout for crypto-adjacent instruments.

Still, the proposal is not merely about blockchain. Its broader ambition is to create a national legal pathway for non-speculative, participatory cooperative ownership across sectors. In the August 2025 letter, the Coalition identifies blockchain enterprises, healthcare companies, and fan-owned sports franchises as illustrative use cases. What unites these sectors is not technology alone, but a recurring mismatch between those who create or sustain enterprise value and those who hold formal residual claims. Regulation Membership is designed to narrow the mismatch when patron participation, use, or community contribution is central to the business model.

Doctrinal Foundations: Forman, Howey, SEC No-Action Letters, and State-Law Exemptions

Forman and the Non-Security Character of Use-Based Cooperative Interests

The Coalition places significant weight on United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman. There, the Supreme Court held that shares in a nonprofit housing cooperative were not securities when the economic reality of the transaction was the purchase of housing rather than the acquisition of an investment for profit. The Court emphasized that the shares lacked the ordinary attributes of investment stock: they were not freely negotiable, could not appreciate in market value, and were not marketed on the basis of passive profits to be earned from the efforts of others.

Forman matters because it rejects formalism. The case does not say that anything labeled a “cooperative share” is automatically exempt from securities law. Instead, it asks what the instrument actually is in economic substance. If the interest functions as an incident of use, governance, and participation rather than a vehicle for speculative return, then the policies underlying securities registration may not be implicated. Regulation Membership is, in effect, an attempt to codify the kinds of structural constraints that made the instrument in Forman non-security-like in substance.

That is why the Coalition’s four core conditions matter. Limiting issuance to participants prevents membership from becoming a broad capital-raising device for passive investors. Tying returns to patronage dividends ties economic upside to member use rather than generalized enterprise profit. Restricting transfers prevents the emergence of a secondary speculative market. Requiring member voting control ensures that the cooperative remains a governed association of users rather than a firm controlled by outside capital. Together, these features operationalize Forman’s insight: not every ownership-like instrument is a security when its defining economic reality is participation rather than investment.

Howey and the Investment-Contract Problem

If Forman is central to the Coalition’s account of why these instruments are not properly treated as “stock,” SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. is central to its account of why they should not be treated as “investment contracts.” In Howey, the Supreme Court articulated the now-familiar test for investment contracts: an investment of money in a common enterprise with an expectation of profits to come from the efforts of others.

The Coalition’s safe harbor is designed, element by element, to negate that characterization. First, the proposal states that an investment of money does not count as participation. That is important because it prevents the safe harbor from being used to disguise ordinary passive investing. Second, the proposal permits only patronage dividends derived from the member’s own participation. That feature is intended to negate the expectation that profits come primarily from the efforts of others. Third, transfer restrictions reduce or eliminate speculative resale value. Fourth, member control reinforces the participatory, governance-based nature of the interest.

The Coalition’s repeated emphasis on patronage dividends is not merely rhetorical. Section 1388 of the Internal Revenue Code defines patronage dividends as amounts paid to a patron on the basis of the quantity or value of business done with or for that patron, pursuant to a preexisting obligation, and determined by reference to the cooperative’s net earnings from patron business. By tying returns to that tax-law concept, the Coalition situates cooperative distributions within a longstanding legal framework in which economic participation and economic return are linked.

The safe harbor thus seeks to prevent two opposite errors. On one side lies overreach: treating every tokenized, blockchain-enabled, or innovative cooperative membership as a security simply because it carries some economic consequence. On the other side lies evasion: allowing ordinary speculative schemes to don cooperative language and escape registration. The proposal’s structural conditions aim to separate the first category from the second.

Regulation Membership: SEC No-Action Letters

The August 2025 letter also relies on SEC no-action letters involving mutual insurance companies, purchasing cooperatives, country clubs, real-estate data cooperatives, and other entities. Those letters are significant because they show a long pattern of staff recognition that some membership interests fall outside the core concerns of securities regulation. The recurring themes are use, governance, non-transferability, and the absence of passive profit expectation.

Yet, the Coalition is right to insist that no-action letters are not enough. A no-action letter is a staff response to a specific factual submission. It is not a Commission rule, much less a statutory safe harbor. Reliance on no-action practice therefore advantages well-counseled parties with the resources to obtain bespoke relief and imposes uncertainty on smaller enterprises and communities that might wish to experiment with cooperative ownership. From the standpoint of institutional design, one of the Coalition’s strongest points is that legal clarity cannot depend on piecemeal, staff-level, fact-specific toleration.

Regulation Membership: State-Law Exemptions and the Patchwork Problem

The Coalition’s account of state law is also persuasive. Some states broadly exempt cooperative memberships from their securities laws; some do so only for particular sectors, such as agriculture, housing, or utilities; some exempt only intrastate cooperatives; and some apply a “risk capital” approach that can classify a use-based membership as a security if the purchaser’s funds are substantially at risk.

This patchwork matters not simply because it is complicated, but because it is form-distorting. A legal environment in which a cooperative must perform a fifty-state survey before issuing participatory memberships nationally discourages precisely the kind of experimentation the Coalition seeks to encourage. It also gives an advantage to capital structures already normalized by federal securities law and integrated national markets. Proposed Section 110(e), and the later Section 111(e), therefore seek only a limited preemption: if a membership interest qualifies for the federal safe harbor, state securities registration rules should not independently re-impose registration burdens, though states would retain authority over fraud, unfair practices, and cooperative governance.

That is a relatively modest move toward federalism. It does not displace state entity law. It merely prevents duplicative registration burdens where the federal government has already drawn a specific line between participatory cooperative memberships and securities.

The Accredited-Investor Problem and the Need to Reform Democratic Capital Aggregation

Among the most consequential features of the Coalition’s proposal is its specialized accredited-investor provision. In the August 2025 draft, a cooperative would qualify if it had issued all of its membership interests in compliance with Regulation Membership and if a majority of its governing body were accredited investors. The Fall 2025 discussion draft improves that language by replacing the accredited-investor-majority requirement with a more functional requirement that members of the governing body possess “sufficient financial, industry, or contextual expertise” as determined by SEC rule.

The change is significant. Existing accredited-investor rules under Regulation D are designed principally for private capital markets in which wealth or institutional form proxies for sophistication. They are poorly suited to democratic capital aggregation by users, fans, patients, or other patrons who may wish to form a cooperative to acquire an equity stake in an enterprise they use. If such a cooperative is treated merely as a vehicle “formed for the specific purpose” of acquiring securities, existing rules can frustrate precisely the kind of inclusive ownership project the Coalition seeks to enable.

Shift From Wealth to Expertise

The Coalition’s original instinct was that without some tailored rule, democratic capital pools are structurally disadvantaged relative to concentrated capital pools. But the revised draft’s shift from wealth to expertise is plainly preferable. If the objective is to democratize ownership while protecting cooperative members from imprudent acquisitions, the relevant question is not whether the cooperative’s leaders are wealthy, but whether they are capable, independent, and subject to appropriate safeguards.

Even so, a workable rule would require more than a bare expertise standard. The SEC should specify governance safeguards, disclosure standards, fairness-review requirements, conflict-of-interest limitations, and, perhaps, ongoing reporting obligations when a cooperative acquires a significant stake in an operating company through a private-placement exemption. Otherwise, the risk remains that the cooperative will be treated as sophisticated for purchase purposes without adequate protection for its own members.

In short, the accredited-investor framework needs adjustment. A democratic capital market cannot rest on the premise that only already-wealthy investors may aggregate capital efficiently.

Watch a Regulation Membership Video

Shared Capitalism Without Control Capture

McRitchie’s proposal begins from a different problem. His writings diagnose what he calls a rights-power gap: shareholders formally possess voting rights, proposal rights, and litigation rights, but the practical capacity to exercise those rights effectively is thinly distributed. Institutional investors hold enormous quantities of stock across thousands of firms, yet their stewardship teams face unavoidable capacity constraints. Outside investors, moreover, often lack the firm-specific information needed for close monitoring. Employees, by contrast, possess such information in abundance.

The response is not worker control. McRitchie is explicit that the proposal is one of employee ownership without control capture. Employees would hold meaningful but minority stakes–typically in the range of three to twenty percent of outstanding equity, with a practical focus on roughly ten to fifteen percent–while boards remain subject to orthodox Delaware fiduciary principles, one-share/one-vote remains intact, and capital-market discipline remains operative.

This model has several strengths. First, it is institutionally realistic. Unlike a worker cooperative or full employee buyout, it does not require abandoning public markets or conventional corporate finance. Second, it is doctrinally conservative. Directors continue to owe duties to the corporation and stockholders as a whole; employee ownership does not create a separate governing class. Third, it is informationally ambitious. The proposal seeks to improve governance by increasing the number of informed owners within the shareholder electorate, not by treating employees merely as stakeholders to be consulted from the outside.

Its principal weakness is not doctrinal but operational. In many current employee-ownership structures, especially ESOPs, the economic incidence of ownership does not carry corresponding voting agency. Shares may be voted by trustees, management, or intermediaries rather than by employees themselves. McRitchie is therefore correct that the model requires legal changes if ownership is to become governance-relevant rather than symbolic.

Comparative Strengths, Weaknesses, and Domains of Fit

The Coalition’s model is strongest where patron use, or community participation, is the enterprise’s defining relationship. User-owned platforms, fan-owned sports franchises, health-data cooperatives, community broadband, creator networks, and some blockchain-based businesses fit that description well. In such settings, participatory ownership is not a sideshow. It is part of the enterprise’s core logic. Regulation Membership is attractive precisely because it allows users to become owners without converting every such effort into a conventional securities offering.

Its weakness is equally clear. The same features that make a qualifying membership interest look non-security-like–limited transferability, patronage-based returns, and membership control–also limit the liquidity and outside-capital appeal that characterize conventional public equity. The Coalition attempts to address that problem through accredited-investor reform and exemptive coordination, but the underlying tradeoff remains. A cooperative safe harbor is not a substitute for public equity markets. It is a legal pathway for a different kind of ownership relation.

McRitchie’s model is strongest where the enterprise is already, and likely should remain, a conventional corporation, but where governance quality would benefit from broader informed ownership. Large retailers, logistics companies, service businesses, manufacturers, and other human-capital-intensive firms fit that profile. There, the challenge is not to replace the corporation with a cooperative but to bring more operational knowledge into the governance process without sacrificing liquidity, access to external capital, or fiduciary coherence and case law.

Its limitation is that it leaves users, patients, and other nonemployee constituencies largely outside the ownership frame. For that reason, the two models should not be treated as substitutes. They solve different problems. One democratizes patron ownership. The other democratizes a portion of shareholder governance inside the public corporation.

Legal Changes Needed to Realize Regulation Membership

Bringing the Coalition’s vision to fruition would require more than interpretive goodwill. At a minimum, six legal moves are necessary.

  1. Congress would need to enact a version of the proposed Section 111 or Section 110 that directs the SEC to adopt Regulation Membership. Because the Coalition seeks a durable, generally available federal safe harbor, ordinary exemptive administration is insufficient.
  2. The SEC would need to write detailed implementing rules defining participation, patronage-linked distributions, acceptable transfer restrictions, valuation practices, tokenized membership mechanics, recordkeeping standards, and anti-abuse guardrails. The more the proposal emphasizes digital-ledger-based membership, the more important it becomes to specify operational rules rather than rely on broad concepts alone.
  3. The SEC would need either to amend Regulation D’s accredited-investor rules or to create a functionally equivalent parallel exemption allowing qualifying cooperatives to acquire securities without being structurally disfavored as democratic capital pools.
  4. Congress or the SEC would need to provide the Investment Company Act relief promised in the proposal so that qualifying cooperatives holding equity interests in operating firms are not forced into a regulatory category designed for investment funds rather than participatory ownership vehicles.
  5. Congress would need to enact the limited blue-sky preemption contemplated by the Coalition so that qualifying memberships are not dragged back into the fifty-state registration patchwork.
  6. States would still need to modernize cooperative statutes so that multi-stakeholder, platform, tokenized, and digitally administered cooperatives have clear entity-law foundations. Securities clarity will not help much if state cooperative law remains ill-suited to contemporary forms.

Legal Changes Needed to Realize Shared Capitalism Without Control Capture

McRitchie’s proposal requires a different set of reforms.

  1. ERISA and related plan-governance rules should be amended to permit or require greater pass-through or direct employee voting in ESOP-like and trust-based structures. Without voting agency, broad-based employee ownership does not meaningfully narrow the rights-power gap.
  2. The SEC should require standardized disclosure of employee ownership, including the total percentage of outstanding shares held by employees, the distribution between executives and rank-and-file workers, the distinction between direct and plan-based holdings, and, crucially, who controls the vote attached to those shares.
  3. Tax and corporate-law safe harbors should be developed for capped employee ownership trusts that are clearly noncontrolling and that preserve one-share/one-vote governance while facilitating long-term employee holdings.
  4. SEC proxy rules and exchange governance frameworks should make it easier for employee-shareholders to communicate, vote confidentially, and participate in ordinary corporate governance without thereby becoming a separate legal class.
  5. Financial reporting and human-capital disclosure should be improved so that investors can actually observe the scale and character of workforce investment and employee ownership. McRitchie’s work correctly emphasizes that current accounting and disclosure systems leave too much of this invisible.

Toward Institutional Pluralism and Hybrid Forms

The best reading of the Coalition’s proposals and McRitchie’s writings is not that one model should triumph over the other. It is that American law should support a more pluralist ecosystem of democratic capital.

Some enterprises are best organized around patron ownership. Others are best organized around conventional investor ownership supplemented by employee ownership without control capture. Still others may justify hybrids. A digital platform, for example, might remain conventionally incorporated and publicly traded while including a capped employee ownership trust for internal governance capacity and a cooperative layer through which users hold governance or economic rights tied to participation. A sports franchise might combine outside capital, fan cooperative ownership, and broad-based employee equity. A healthcare enterprise might include patient, provider, and worker ownership in different legally differentiated forms.

The law today makes such experimentation too cumbersome to be realized. Securities regulation is often calibrated to a world of conventional passive investment. Cooperative law is often calibrated to legacy agricultural or local retail forms. Employee-ownership law is often calibrated more to retirement-plan administration than to governance design. The task now is not to abolish these older frameworks but to update them so that flexible participatory ownership can develop at scale where it is economically appropriate.

Conclusion

The Blockchain Cooperative Coalition’s Regulation Membership proposal and James McRitchie’s shared-capitalism model share a common ambition. Reconnect ownership, participation, and accountability in sectors where those relationships have been thinned out by legal form, capital-market convention, and institutional intermediation. The two visions differ chiefly in the class of owners they seek to elevate. The Coalition looks to patrons, users, fans, patients, and other participants in community-centered enterprises. McRitchie looks to employees inside conventional corporations.

Those are not rival projects. They are complementary institutional responses to different forms of democratic deficit in modern enterprise. American law should, therefore, be revised not to choose between them, but to permit both separate and in combination. A legal system capable of supporting patron cooperatives, employee ownership without control capture, and thoughtful hybrid forms would not abolish capitalism. It would broaden its ownership base, improve its information flows, strengthen its democratic legitimacy and grow the economy.

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