Protect Rule 14a-8 when we head to court

Keep the Door Open: A Bridge Proposal While Rule 14a-8 Heads to Court

The SEC’s comment period on its proposal to rescind Rule 14a-8 closes November 20, 2026. I have filed several comment letters and will file more. I want a complete record because a court will review it. Only the evidence included in comment letters will be admissible. I once thought the SEC would listen to reason. But I no longer believe the record will change the Commission’s mind. It is time to ask companies directly to keep the door open with a bridge proposal.

Why I expect rescission regardless of the record

The Commission is down to two members, both Republicans, after Commissioner Hester Peirce’s departure on October 2. Days earlier, on September 30, the SEC amended its quorum rule (Release No. 34-106537) so that a single commissioner can act for the agency when the others are disqualified. It did so without notice or public comment, calling the change a matter of agency management.

I have petitioned the SEC to rescind that amendment (Petition 4-938). Congress created a bipartisan, five-member body so debate and dissent would test major decisions. As Investment Executive quoted from my letter, “The proper response to vacancies is to fill them.”

A Commission willing to rewrite its own quorum rule without public input is unlikely to be persuaded by comment letters on Rule 14a-8, however strong the evidence. I expect the rule will be rescinded, and the court will ultimately decide its fate. Litigation takes years. Shareholders need a bridge until it is resolved, and a bridge proposal asks companies to provide one.

The P&G vote changes the conversation

At Procter & Gamble’s October 13 annual meeting, the National Legal and Policy Center (NLPC) asked the board to keep today’s Rule 14a-8 eligibility thresholds even if federal requirements change. The proposal received 26.9% of votes cast for and against.

That is a striking result for NLPC. By my review of voting data, NLPC’s 72 proposals voted since January 2024 averaged 8.2% support, and its environmental and social proposals averaged about 4%. Investors who seldom back NLPC backed this one. They see continued access as a basic shareholder right, not ideology.

P&G’s board opposed the proposal, saying it preferred to preserve “discretion and the opportunity for thoughtful review.” That is precisely the concern. Discretion without defined standards gives shareholders no assurance.

Others are already moving. Microsoft agreed with NLPC in writing to keep accepting proposals under its existing thresholds through its 2027 meeting. New York State Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli called on every publicly traded American company to continue accepting shareholder proposals. Several investor groups are circulating their own proposals. Support runs from right to left.

What the bridge proposal asks

My bridge proposal, Continued Access to the Proxy for Shareholder Proposals, asks boards for a bounded, specific commitment rather than an open-ended promise. It requests a publicly disclosed policy that, notwithstanding any change in federal rules:

  • Applies the Rule 14a-8 ownership thresholds in effect on September 1, 2026: $2,000 held for three years, $15,000 for two years, or $25,000 for one year.
  • Keeps every existing exclusion under Rule 14a-8 as in effect on that date, along with applicable state law.
  • Covers the proxy statement and the proxy card, so proposals are actually voted.
  • Requires the company to give proponents written reasons for any exclusion, a modest substitute for the SEC’s no-action process.
  • Expires after the 2030 annual meeting, giving litigation time to run its course.

The specific thresholds matter. Texas has authorized companies to require $1 million or three percent of voting shares to file. Thresholds like that would cut off retail shareholders, who have frequently filed the most widely supported proposals.

How the bridge proposal compares with NLPC’s

NLPC deserves credit for moving first. Its published proposal, filed at Oracle and similar to the one voted at P&G, asks for a policy that includes any proposal meeting today’s three ownership thresholds, and that complies with Rule 14a-8, “regardless of any future federal regulation permitting higher ownership or holding-period requirements.” My bridge proposal shares that core. The differences are mostly about durability and enforceability.

FeatureNLPC proposalBridge proposal
Ownership thresholds$2,000 for 3 years, $15,000 for 2 years, or $25,000 for 1 yearSame
Which version of Rule 14a-8 governs“Rule 14a-8,” with no date specifiedRule 14a-8 as in effect on September 1, 2026
If Rule 14a-8 is rescinded outrightAimed at higher thresholds; unclear if no rule remainsApplies “notwithstanding any change in federal requirements”
DurationOpen-endedAnnual meetings through 2030
Where proposals appearProxy statementProxy statement and proxy card
Excluded proposalsNo explanation requiredWritten reasons to the proponent
Public disclosure of the policyNot specifiedRequired

Neither approach is wrong. NLPC’s open-ended commitment is stronger on paper, and if adopted, it would last indefinitely. That may also be why boards resist it. A bridge proposal trades permanence for a defined end date, making it easier for boards to say yes while leaving room to revisit the issue after the courts rule.

Fixing the rule to a date matters more than it might seem. If Rule 14a-8 disappears, a policy that refers only to Rule 14a-8 invites argument over what compliance even means. Tying the policy to the rule as it stood on September 1, 2026, keeps every familiar exclusion and procedure in place and leaves little room for dispute.

Investors should support both. If your company receives NLPC’s version, vote for it. If it receives a bridge proposal, I hope you will vote for that too.

The alternatives: costlier, more adversarial, and often closed to retail holders

The release suggests shareholders can turn to other tools. Look at what each actually requires.

  • Exempt solicitations and vote-no campaigns. The test is not a percentage of the company. Rule 14a-6(g) requires a Notice of Exempt Solicitation only from a shareholder owning more than $5 million of the company’s securities. That is a sliver of a large company but far beyond most retail investors. Smaller holders once filed these notices voluntarily. Since January 2026, SEC staff have said they will object to voluntary filings (Corporation Finance Interpretation 126.06, cited at 91 Fed. Reg. 59935). Retail shareholders can still blog, write letters or run a website. They can no longer put their case on EDGAR, where institutional investors and proxy advisors look. And an exempt solicitation cannot collect a single proxy.
  • Running your own proxy solicitation. A proponent can file a proxy statement and solicit votes, subject to SEC review and antifraud liability. For contests involving proposals in 2022–2025, the SEC reports median estimated solicitation costs of about $275,000 for proponents and $825,000 for companies (91 Fed. Reg. 59933). That excludes management time and legal work. Even a bare-bones, notice-and-access mailing runs thousands of dollars before lawyers are paid (91 Fed. Reg. 59915). The release itself concedes that for retail investors and smaller groups “independent solicitation could be cost-prohibitive” (91 Fed. Reg. 59941).
  • A stacked ballot. The companion amendment to Rule 14a-4(c) would let a company leave a proponent’s proposal off its own proxy card and vote the proxies it receives against that proposal, unless a shareholder checks a box withholding that authority (91 Fed. Reg. 59923). The default favors management.
  • Special meetings and written consent. Both depend on state law and each company’s charter and bylaws. Many companies deny written consent entirely. Special meeting thresholds are typically 10% to 25% of shares; P&G’s is 25%. Calling a meeting still requires a costly solicitation.
  • Proxy access. Where available, it typically limits access to holders of 3% for three years, in groups of up to 20, and covers only director nominations. It cannot carry a policy proposal.
  • Floor proposals. They must clear advance-notice bylaws and do not appear on the proxy card. Since nearly all shares are voted by proxy before the meeting, a floor proposal is largely symbolic.
  • Divestment. Selling is exit, not voice. Index funds cannot sell at all.

The SEC acknowledges that switching to these mechanisms “might increase costs for both proponents and companies” and that companies’ savings could be offset as proponents turn to them (91 Fed. Reg. 59939, 59941). The likely result is fewer, costlier and more confrontational campaigns, dominated by those who can afford them.

Why boards should agree to a bridge proposal

The SEC’s own release makes the case. It acknowledges that Rule 14a-8 engagement provides companies “a lower friction, lower reputation cost mechanism to come to an agreement and learn about shareholder preferences” (91 Fed. Reg. 59941). It estimates the cost at about $49,000 per proposal (91 Fed. Reg. 59938). Compare that with the $825,000 median a company reports spending on a single proxy contest.

The release also undercuts the claim that small holders file frivolous proposals. From 2022 through 2025, proposals from individual proponents averaged about 32% support, compared with about 20% for institutional proponents (91 Fed. Reg. 59947). Those shareholders are most likely to be priced out. Adopting the policy a bridge proposal requests keeps engagement orderly and gives companies and investors certainty while the courts decide.

The bridge proposal text

Proponents are welcome to use or adapt this. The bracketed paragraph should be tailored to each company.

Continued Access to the Proxy for Shareholder Proposals

Resolved, shareholders of [Company] request that the Board adopt and publicly disclose a policy that, notwithstanding any change in federal requirements governing shareholder proposals, the Company will continue to include in its proxy statement and on its proxy card, for annual meetings held through 2030, proposals from shareholders meeting any of the Rule 14a-8 ownership thresholds in effect on September 1, 2026 — $2,000 held for three years, $15,000 for two years, or $25,000 for one year — and otherwise consistent with Rule 14a-8 as in effect on that date and with applicable state law, and will give proponents written reasons for any exclusion.

Supporting Statement

For more than eighty years, Rule 14a-8 has given shareholders an orderly means of raising concerns with management, the board and fellow shareholders. Declassified boards, majority voting for directors, the elimination of supermajority provisions and proxy access all began as shareholder proposals.

That rule’s future is now uncertain. In September 2026, the SEC proposed rescinding Rule 14a-8. If rescission occurs, no established mechanism will allow most shareholders to place proposals before their fellow owners. This proposal asks the Board to commit, for a defined period, to the eligibility standards that apply today. The policy would preserve every existing exclusion and expire after 2030. Microsoft has already agreed in writing to keep accepting proposals under its existing thresholds through 2027.

[Company-specific paragraph: connect continued access to the company’s business, clients, purpose or stated values.]

Eligibility standards should keep the process accessible to retail shareholders, who have frequently filed the most widely supported proposals. Excessively high thresholds, such as $1 million or three percent of voting shares, recently authorized by Texas statute, would render access virtually impossible.

Support for preserving shareholder proposals spans the spectrum, from the National Legal and Policy Center to New York State Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli, who urged every U.S. public company to continue accepting them. This is not a political issue.

Resolutions have often flagged systemic and company-specific risks before they became costly crises. The SEC concedes that Rule 14a-8 offers companies “a lower friction, lower reputation cost mechanism to come to an agreement and learn about shareholder preferences.” A commitment to continued access would demonstrate the Board’s accountability to [Company]’s owners.

Keep [Company]’s proxy open to its owners.

Vote FOR Continued Access to the Proxy for Shareholder Proposals

Sample policy language for boards

Boards that would rather settle than face a vote can adopt something like this:

Shareholder Proposal Policy. Notwithstanding any change in federal law or regulation governing shareholder proposals, for annual meetings held through 2030, the Company will include in its proxy statement and on its proxy card any shareholder proposal submitted by a shareholder who meets any of the ownership thresholds of Rule 14a-8(b) as in effect on September 1, 2026, provided the proposal is not excludable under Rule 14a-8 as in effect on that date and is a proper subject for action under applicable state law. If the Company excludes a proposal, it will notify the proponent in writing of the reasons. The Company will disclose any material change to this policy promptly on its website.

What comes next

I will be filing this bridge proposal at several companies in the coming weeks. I would much rather reach an agreement than go to a vote, and I will withdraw once a board adopts and discloses a policy that substantially implements the request.

To other proponents: file it, adapt it, improve it. To companies: a bridge costs little and buys certainty. To investors: tell your portfolio companies you expect the door to stay open, and vote accordingly. The P&G vote shows you are not alone.

Disclosure: I am a shareholder proponent and have filed comment letters and a petition with the SEC on these matters.

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