18th-century engraving of Geneva, a republic whose citizens held sovereignty in law but not in practice.

Shareholder Sovereignty in Name Only: Geneva’s Lesson

My friend David Craig Mead-Fox concludes his series on the preservation and spread of democratic knowledge with a story every shareholder should know. On June 19, 1762, Geneva’s Small Council ordered Rousseau’s The Social Contract torn and burned in front of city hall. The irony is that Geneva was a republic whose citizens were, in law, sovereign. That was exactly the problem with the book, and it is a lesson about shareholder sovereignty today.

Let’s Keep the Proxy Free – from Music for a Democratic Corporate Governance

Sovereign in Law, Governed by a Few

In Geneva, the General Council, the assembly of citizens, held legal sovereignty. In practice, a small circle of patrician families ran the city through the Small Council and filled its seats by co-optation. Citizens rose up in 1707 and again in the 1730s. A settlement imposed with outside help left the patricians in charge. One Genevan observer, Jean-Louis de Lolme, wrote that citizens had “little more left to them than the pleasure of being called a Sovereign Assembly.”

Anyone who has filed a shareholder proposal will recognize this. Shareholder sovereignty exists on paper: we own the company and elect the directors. Nominating committees choose the candidates, slates go unopposed, and a precatory proposal can win a majority and still be ignored. Much of the time, we get the pleasure of being called owners.

Mead-Fox describes Geneva’s Représentants as “citizens with a legal claim to sovereignty pressing to make it real.” That is a good description of shareholder proposals. Majority voting, declassified boards, proxy access, and the Right to Cure proposals I am filing on advance-notice bylaws all aim to turn a formal right into a working one.

Practice, Not Just Texts

The essay’s central argument is that democracy spread in the eighteenth century mainly through practice, not books. Jurors, congregations, citizen assemblies, and even crowds began using the arguments themselves.

Consider John Peter Zenger, tried in 1735 for seditious libel. Under the law of that time, truth was no defense. The jury acquitted him anyway. Seditious libel remained a crime, but twelve ordinary men had shown what their community would not tolerate. A precatory shareholder vote works the same way. It does not bind the board, but it shows directors what owners will and will not accept, and over time norms change. Majority voting for directors became standard largely through votes on precatory proposals.

That is why the SEC’s proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 (File No. S7-2026-32) matters so much. Rule 14a-8 is the practice venue for shareholders like me who cannot afford proxy solicitors. Without it, putting a question before fellow owners would again require permission, whether from the company or the Commission. In 1695, England let its Licensing Act lapse, ending prior approval of what could be printed. Rescinding Rule 14a-8 would move us in the other direction.

Montesquieu’s Mechanism, a Different Source

Mead-Fox notes that Montesquieu was the most-cited author in American political writing from 1760 to 1805. Montesquieu was not a democrat. He admired England’s balance among the king, Lords, and Commons. The Americans kept his mechanism of separated powers and changed the source of the power being divided.

Corporate governance needs the same move. Separating the roles of chair and CEO, independent committees, and board oversight are all useful mechanisms. However, their legitimacy must come from the owners, and boards must stay accountable to them.

Who Counts?

Geneva’s reformers pressed for their own rights. The Natifs and Habitants, born or living in the city without political rights, made up a large share of residents and remained excluded, as did women. In Massachusetts, enslaved petitioners such as Felix Holbrook turned the colonists’ language of liberty against the lines the colonists had drawn.

Each expansion of democracy drew a new boundary, and those left out challenged it. In today’s corporation, employees are the most obvious group outside the line. That is one reason I support broad-based employee ownership and governance that reflects a consensus among stakeholders rather than domination by any single interest.

A Bridge to Keep Shareholder Sovereignty Real

I expect the SEC to finalize rescission no matter what the comment record shows, and I expect the courts to decide the question. Until they do, I am asking companies to voluntarily keep the current framework through my Continued Access to the Proxy for Shareholder Proposals, the proposal I call my Bridge Proposal. Comments on the rescission are due November 20, 2026. Please file one.

Geneva burned the book, but the argument outlasted the fire. In 1768, the councils granted the General Council additional powers. Pressure from below works, but only when people keep using their rights. For shareholders, that means filing proposals, voting every proxy, and telling the SEC, before November 20, that Rule 14a-8 should stay.

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