Rule 14a-8: Perhaps There’s Another Way, Sarah Wilson’s post on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, is the most constructive response yet to the SEC’s proposed Rule 14a-8 rescission. Most of the debate has been a binary choice: keep the rule as it is, or scrap it. Wilson offers a third path. I embrace it, with some essential guardrails.
Who Is Sarah Wilson?
Wilson is not a Washington insider or a partisan in America’s ESG wars. In 1994 she founded Manifest, the UK proxy research and voting agency that became Minerva Analytics, where she is CEO. For more than three decades her firm has supplied voting research and stewardship data to investors on thousands of companies. It is now part of Solactive. Minerva tracks shareholder proposals and votes across markets, including U.S. no-action fights. It reported on my lobbying proposal at Amazon when the company excluded it earlier this year.
That vantage point matters. Wilson sees the U.S. system from outside, alongside the UK, Japan and France. She knows which parts of our system are unusual, and which institutions elsewhere have proved stable across changes in government.
Sarah Wilson’s Better Way – and Music for a Democratic Corporate Governance
Her Diagnosis: Two Jobs, One Rule
Wilson’s central insight is that Rule 14a-8 does two different jobs:
- Judging content: deciding whether a proposal is a legitimate governance question or an improper “political” or “ordinary business” one.
- Providing access: ensuring a shareholder who meets ownership and procedural requirements gets onto the company’s proxy so fellow owners can vote.
The SEC has never held the first job steady. It drew a line around “political” and “social” causes in 1952 and has redrawn it repeatedly since, most recently with 2021 guidance, a 2025 reversal, and the staff’s retreat from most no-action responses this year. Chairman Atkins is probably right that no regulator can do that job consistently. But as Wilson says, that is no reason to abolish the second job too. A state-law right to propose is worth little if management controls the only channel for telling other owners about it.
Her solution: reject rescission without a replacement, get the SEC out of content judgments, preserve a content-neutral federal proxy-access right, and hand disputes over the mechanics — ownership, timeliness, form, resubmission, duplication, and substantial implementation — to an independent panel modeled on the UK Takeover Panel. She envisions balanced representation, a rotating chair, a levy instead of appropriations, a 21-working-day decision window, published precedent and an appeal board. Her closing line says it all: “Let shareholders decide what is worth voting on.” I could not agree more.
What Her Paradigm Would Mean for My Proposals
I can speak to this concretely, because several of my proposals died on precisely the content judgments Wilson would eliminate.
Costco. For Costco’s 2027 meeting, I asked the board to study a transaction in which a broad-based employee ownership vehicle would acquire equity in the company or a substantial business unit. Costco notified the SEC it would exclude the proposal as “ordinary business” under Rule 14a-8(i)(7). With no meaningful staff review available, I withdrew. Whether Costco’s workers should have a path to owning more of the company is exactly the kind of question owners should be able to weigh. Under Wilson’s approach, the dispute would shift from whether employee ownership is an appropriate subject to procedural questions such as whether I owned enough shares long enough, filed on time, and otherwise complied with the panel’s mechanical requirements. I did.
Amazon. My proposal asking Amazon to report on direct and indirect lobbying was excluded as “micromanagement” for 2026, as I noted in Proxy Season: Strong Performance for McRitchie. Lobbying disclosure is a mainstream governance topic that has drawn substantial votes at many companies. Micromanagement is a judgment about substance, not mechanics. It would have no standing before Wilson’s panel.
Opponents will say that dropping the ordinary business exclusion invites shareholders to vote on product pricing and store layouts. Wilson’s own data answers that. Anti-ESG proposals averaged about 1.7% support in 2026, and none passed. Shareholders already filter out proposals they consider frivolous or misguided. They don’t need the SEC doing it for them, and most proposals are precatory anyway.
Six Guardrails Before Any Change to Rule 14a-8
Wilson’s model is sound. But dropped into today’s environment without protection, it could accelerate the fragmentation she warns against. Six guardrails would prevent that.
1. No Changes Before 2029
Reform of this magnitude should not be rushed through by a Commission that is not fully constituted (see SEC Quorum Rule), while states like Texas are already rewriting the rules. Texas SB 1057 lets boards of Texas companies opt into much higher thresholds. If Rule 14a-8 is rescinded before a replacement exists, states and boards will fill the vacuum, and the access right Wilson wants to preserve will be gone before her panel is built. Rule 14a-8 should remain in force, and any new system should take effect no earlier than 2029, after a new administration has taken hold and a full Commission can own the result. The transition should be a handoff, not a gap.
2. A Federal Floor No State or Board Can Opt Out Of
Wilson rightly criticizes SB 1057 because it trades a guaranteed floor for one a board can simply decline to offer. Her model only works if the content-neutral access right is federal and mandatory. Access to the federal proxy is a market-structure question, as she says, and market-structure rules should be uniform. Delaware, Texas and Nevada can compete on many things. Whether owners can talk to each other through the proxy shouldn’t be one of them.
3. Keep the Mechanics Mechanical
Several exclusions Wilson would leave with the panel have a history of being stretched into substantive judgments. “Substantial implementation” has been used to exclude proposals when a company adopted a weaker version of what was asked. “Duplication” and resubmission counting have been read expansively to knock out proposals on related but different topics. The panel’s charter should define these narrowly, with any doubt resolved in favor of inclusion. Otherwise, content judgments simply move to a new address.
4. Don’t Hand Shareholder Proposals to an Elite Oligarchy
This is the guardrail that matters most. Ownership thresholds look mechanical, but they decide who gets heard. Set them too high and a “content-neutral” system becomes a private club.
Retail shareholders have driven governance reform in the U.S. Individual investors filed the proposals that made annual elections, majority voting, special meeting rights, written consent and proxy access mainstream. Ideas first dismissed as fringe became best practice because ordinary owners kept putting them on the ballot until institutions voted for them.
The largest asset managers, by contrast, are not meaningful users of the shareholder-proposal process as proponents. BlackRock, Vanguard, State Street and Fidelity hold enormous voting power, but their principal governance tools are voting and private engagement, not filing shareholder proposals. They also face potential conflicts of interest because they compete to manage retirement-plan and other business for many of the companies whose proxies they vote. Quiet engagement behind closed doors, where other shareholders cannot see what was asked or what was conceded, is their dominant mode of negotiating. Institutions vote; individual shareholders frequently supply the proposals. Remove retail proponents and an important source of new governance ideas disappears.
Trivially Low?
Those in favor of Rule 14a-8 rescission like to say the current thresholds are trivially low and anyone can file. The opposite is true. The current thresholds already shut out not only most Americans but most of the wealthiest Americans, at most companies.
To be clear, Wilson does not advocate either the Texas thresholds or the UK’s 5% threshold. She cites those regimes as comparisons and is sharply critical of Texas’s board-controlled opt-in structure. Nor does she specify what ownership thresholds a replacement federal system should adopt. That omission is precisely why thresholds must be treated as an essential guardrail rather than left for later.
Start with everyone. According to the Federal Reserve’s 2022 Survey of Consumer Finances, only about 21% of families hold any individual stock. The median holding among those families is $15,000 spread across several companies, meaning that the median American family owns no stock directly. In my submission to the SEC’s Investor Advisory Committee, Current Thresholds Limit Filing to the Wealthy, I estimated that once required holding periods are taken into account, fewer than 1% of U.S. households qualify to file anywhere.
Now take the top 10%. According to the Fed’s Distributional Financial Accounts, that group owns nearly 90% of U.S. corporate equities and mutual fund shares, so if anyone can file, it should be them. Entry into the top tenth requires a net worth of roughly $2 million, and the median family in that group has about $3.8 million. Yet most of them still can’t file at most companies, for three reasons:
- Most of their wealth doesn’t count. Home equity, business interests, 401(k)s, IRAs invested in funds, mutual funds and ETFs do not confer eligibility. Only shares held in a specific company count. For a typical household near the top-10% line, individually held stock is a minority of net worth, and many hold none at all.
- Eligibility is company by company. There are roughly 4,000 U.S.-listed companies, and a shareholder must meet the threshold separately at each one. Consider a millionaire who holds $1 million in individual stocks weighted like the S&P 500. At the median S&P 500 company, that investor’s position is worth well under $2,000. Clearing even the lowest Rule 14a-8 tier across a broadly diversified portfolio of hundreds of companies would require individual-stock wealth vastly greater than the portfolios of all but a tiny fraction of households. Among the thousands of smaller companies outside the index, positions are smaller still. Wealthy investors are told to diversify, and diversification is exactly what makes them ineligible.
- Holding periods break. The $2,000 tier requires three years of continuous ownership. Rebalancing, tax-loss harvesting, estate planning and ordinary trading can restart the clock.
Long-Term Commitment to Governance
The investors who do qualify are mostly people who deliberately buy and hold specific companies for years so they can participate in governance. Their eligibility comes from long-term commitment, not wealth.
Again, Wilson does not endorse either the Texas approach or the UK’s 5% model; she cites them to illuminate the range of possible systems. But adopting thresholds like those in a U.S. federal proxy-access regime would effectively erase individual proponents. Texas’s $1 million bar would exclude nearly all individual investors. A 5% threshold at a large public company would generally restrict access to very large institutions, founders, controlling holders and other enormous shareholders — precisely the groups least dependent on Rule 14a-8 to obtain management’s attention.
If the current thresholds already exclude most of the top tenth at most companies, higher thresholds would leave shareholder proposals to a handful of institutions with conflicts and a handful of billionaires with their own agendas. That isn’t shareholder democracy. It’s oligarchy.
Shareholder proposals are one of the few mechanisms that allow an ordinary investor, a pension beneficiary or, potentially, an employee-owner to put an idea in front of every other owner on equal terms. My guardrail is therefore straightforward: the federal floor should keep eligibility thresholds no higher than today’s and write them into the rule itself, rather than leaving them to the panel or to the states.
5. Correct the Asymmetry Wilson Identifies
Wilson candidly notes that, unlike takeover disputes, proposal fights pit well-funded issuers against proponents who often have no counsel at all. The panel’s design should account for that: no fees for individual proponents, a levy borne by issuers, plain-language procedures, and proponent-side representatives with real seats, not token ones. A panel that only lawyers can navigate would replicate the imbalance under a new name.
6. The Burden Belongs on the Company
In 2026, companies have been excluding proposals on their own say-so, with the SEC merely saying it won’t object. Wilson rightly observes that a proponent challenging an exclusion now walks into federal court empty-handed. Under a new system, a company should not be able to exclude anything without first obtaining a panel ruling. The default should be inclusion, and proponents should retain an enforceable remedy, including judicial review when the process itself fails.
Why This Can Unite Strange Bedfellows
Wilson documents something remarkable. Heritage, NLPC and Bowyer Research spent years arguing the SEC had too much authority over proposals. Now that Rule 14a-8 rescission threatens their own access, they are defending it. NLPC even co-authored a Wall Street Journal op-ed with Ceres. Heritage’s own 2024 report rejected eliminating the federal inclusion requirement as going too far.
That convergence is the opening. Progressive and conservative proponents both lose under a Balkanized, board-controlled system. Both gain from a content-neutral federal right that no regulator can tilt toward the other side. Companies gain a fast, apolitical process that keeps the SEC out of culture-war rulings. This is the rare reform where everyone gives up the power to silence the other side, and everyone keeps a voice.
It also fits how I think governance should work. No single interest, whether management, a regulator, the largest asset managers or one faction of shareholders, should control what owners may discuss. A panel balancing issuers, proponents and investors, with shareholders deciding the outcomes, comes much closer to consensus governance than what we have now.
What to Do Now
Comments on the SEC’s proposed rescission of Rule 14a-8 (File No. S7-2026-32) are due November 20, 2026. I urge everyone who files proposals, whatever their politics, to ask the Commission to stop and wait. A change this fundamental to shareholder rights should not be made until the SEC is fully constituted as a five-member, bipartisan Commission.
Then, with all perspectives at the table, we can build on Ms. Wilson’s ideas: drop the substantive exclusions, preserve a content-neutral federal floor, keep eligibility accessible to retail proponents, and create an independent procedural panel before anything is handed off.
Sarah Wilson has given us a blueprint. Let’s take the time to build it properly.
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