xplainer graphic with four examples. Section 14(a)(2), added in 2010, lets rules require a company's solicitation to include a shareholder's director nominee; it is not mentioned in the release. Rule 14a-19 requires the company's card to list shareholder nominees. Rule 14a-7 requires the company to mail shareholder material or provide a list. Proposed Rule 14a-4(c)(2) requires management to describe omitted proposals. Conclusion: if these are within the SEC's power, why isn't Rule 14a-8?

Rule 14a-8 Rescission Draft Comment, Part 2: SEC Authority

Part 2 of 3. Working draft for discussion. Comments are due November 20, 2026 (File No. S7-2026-32).  See Part 1.

This part sets out the legal objections in my working draft letter on the SEC’s proposal to rescind Rule 14a-8.  The proposal is published at 91 FR 59904 (Sept. 21, 2026) (PDF). Page citations below are to the Federal Register version. [Bracketed, highlighted notes] mark material to gather, choices to make, and facts to verify. Part 1 explains what we need and how to help; Part 3 discusses economic and voting objections.

Working draft letter

Vanessa A. Countryman, Secretary
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
100 F Street NE, Washington, DC 20549-1090

Re: Rescission of Rule 14a-8’s Federal Regulation of Shareholder Proposals and Amendments to Rule 14a-4, Release No. 34-106383, File No. S7-2026-32, 91 FR 59904 (Sept. 21, 2026) — Fifth Supplemental Comment: Objections for the Commission’s Response

Dear Secretary Countryman:

I incorporate my earlier comments by reference. This letter sets out specific objections and asks the Commission to answer each one before taking final action. Answers to the release’s numbered questions appear in Appendix A. Supporting documents appear in Appendix B.

[DECIDE: Appendix A could hold my answers to Questions 1–49 from my earlier draft. Keeping the body short makes each objection hard to miss.]

My interest

I have filed or co-filed shareholder proposals for more than 25 years. For 2027 meetings I have so far filed proposals asking boards to evaluate broad-based employee ownership and to report lobbying expenditures. Rescission would directly affect those proposals and my ability to file in later seasons.

[GATHER: Name the companies where I hold shares and have pending 2027 proposals, describe my holdings in general terms, and state that I intend to file in 2028 and later. A concrete statement of injury supports standing if the rule is challenged.]

Objection 1. Section 14(a) authorizes Rule 14a-8

Congress amended Section 14(a) on this very point, and the release doesn’t mention it. The release says that when Congress has wanted the Commission to intervene in corporate governance, “it has done so through clear statutory mandates,” citing Sections 10A(m) and 14A (91 FR 59908 & n.53). It doesn’t mention that Congress amended Section 14(a) itself. In 2010 Congress designated the existing text as Section 14(a)(1) and added Section 14(a)(2), which provides that the Commission’s rules under paragraph (1) may include “a requirement that a solicitation of proxy, consent, or authorization by (or on behalf of) an issuer include a nominee submitted by a shareholder to serve on the board of directors of the issuer.” 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)(2); Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. 111-203, § 971(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1915 (2010). By then, the Commission had read Section 14(a) to authorize Rule 14a-8 for 68 years, and the Third Circuit had upheld that reading. Congress is presumed to adopt a settled construction when it re-enacts statutory language. Forest Grove School Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239–40 (2009); see Texas Dep’t of Housing v. Inclusive Communities Project, 576 U.S. 519 (2015).  Section 14(a)(2) presupposes that Section 14(a) can require a company’s proxy to carry shareholder-originated matter. How is the release’s reading consistent with it?

Congress amended Section 14(a) on this very point, and the release doesn’t mention it. The release says that when Congress has wanted the Commission to intervene in corporate governance, “it has done so through clear statutory mandates,” citing Sections 10A(m) and 14A (91 FR 59908 & n.53). In 2010 Congress designated the existing text of Section 14(a) as paragraph (1) and added paragraph (2), providing that the Commission’s rules may require an issuer’s solicitation to include a shareholder’s director nominee. By then the Commission had read Section 14(a) to authorize Rule 14a-8 for 68 years, and the Third Circuit had upheld that reading. When Congress amends a statute without altering language that has a settled construction, it is presumed to accept that construction. Forest Grove School Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 239–40 (2009); see Texas Dep’t of Housing v. Inclusive Communities Project, 576 U.S. 519 (2015).

The release reads Section 14(a) to authorize only rules on how proxies are solicited and what must be disclosed, not rules that determine which matters reach shareholders through the company’s proxy (91 FR 59907). Section 14(a)(2) assumes the opposite. It provides that rules “under paragraph (1),” the existing grant, may require a company’s own solicitation to include a nominee submitted by a shareholder. Congress thus treated that existing authority as broad enough to require a company’s proxy to carry matter originated by a shareholder. How can the release’s reading of paragraph (1) be squared with Congress’s understanding of that same paragraph, and why does the release not address Section 14(a)(2) at all?

The courts have already read the statute. The Third Circuit held: “We entertain no doubt that Proxy Rule X-14A-7 represents a proper exercise” of the Commission’s Section 14(a) authority. SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947). The release says that question was “not squarely presented” (91 FR 59912). However, the court addressed it directly. In 1954, the Commission itself called its state-law standard “consistent with” Transamerica (n.103). Other courts have applied the rule as valid, including Dyer v. SEC (8th Cir. 1959), which the release cites; Roosevelt v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (D.C. Cir. 1992); and Trinity Wall Street v. Wal-Mart Stores (3d Cir. 2015). Under Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), courts decide the best reading for themselves. Transamerica is exactly that kind of independent judicial reading, and it remains binding precedent in the Third Circuit.

[LEGAL: Challenges to Section 14 rules have recently begun in district court under the APA (ISS v. SEC, D.C. Cir. 2025; NAM v. SEC, 5th Cir. 2024). Venue may follow where a plaintiff resides. Ask counsel what that means for plaintiffs in the Third Circuit.]

The release’s own rules concede the mechanism.

  • The release accepts that Section 14(a) supports Rule 14a-19, which requires a company’s proxy card to list shareholder nominees whose right to nominate comes from state law (91 FR 59912). That is the 1942 design: state law defines the right, and federal rules make the proxy carry it.
  • The release keeps Rule 14a-7, which makes a company mail a shareholder’s soliciting material or provide a shareholder list. The 1935 rules required mailing at the requesting shareholder’s expense (n.58). If the Commission can compel use of the company’s machinery, who pays for inclusion is a policy choice, not a limit on its power.
  • Proposed Rule 14a-4(c)(2) would condition management’s discretionary authority on describing an omitted shareholder proposal in the company’s proxy statement. If Section 14(a) supports requiring a description, it supports requiring the proposal. The 1942 rule said management “shall set forth the proposal.”

The release’s own authority helps us. The release quotes Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1990), for the point that federal proxy regulation aims “to enable proxy voters to control the corporation as effectively as they might have by attending a shareholder meeting” (n.34). Shareholders who vote by proxy can’t vote on a proposal that isn’t on the proxy. Making sure they can is what Rule 14a-8 does. The same case cautions against rules that shift “the distribution of voting power.” That describes the proposed opt-out default for management’s discretionary voting better than it describes Rule 14a-8.

A rule that defers to state law doesn’t “alter the federal-state balance.” Rule 14a-8(i)(1) yields to state law, and the Commission has said so repeatedly (n.165). If the Commission now believes the rule preempts state law, it should say so and explain why its earlier statements were wrong.

Funds. The release concedes that the Investment Company Act creates federal voting rights independent of state law. For those subjects its state-law rationale has nothing to act on. A fund rule tied to those votes should be retained.

Objection 2. The policy reasons depend on the legal premise

The release calls its policy reasons “independent” of its authority conclusion (91 FR 59906, 59913). Several restate it. They say resolving these questions “is not the Commission’s role” or “not the appropriate province of the Commission,” and that Section 14(a) does not authorize the Commission to influence governance (91 FR 59914, 59916–18). Agency action “may not stand if the agency has misconceived the law.” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 94 (1943).

For each policy reason, I ask the Commission to state whether it would rescind the entire rule if a court held that Section 14(a) authorizes an inclusion requirement limited to proposals proper under state law, and to identify the evidence supporting that reason without the authority premise. Even if the release’s legal theory were right, it would reach only federal exclusions and presumptions not grounded in state law. It would not reach a bare duty to include proposals that state law permits.

Objection 3. The Commission rejected the alternative that honors state law, and didn’t consider narrower fixes

An agency rescinding a rule must consider alternatives within the ambit of the existing policy, even when it believes part of the policy is unlawful. DHS v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1 (2020); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 51 (1983). The release considered one alternative: a rule deferring entirely to state law. It rejected it because the number of included proposals “could increase compared to the baseline, perhaps significantly,” and because it “would offer companies fewer potential benefits” (91 FR 59958).

That finding means Rule 14a-8 now keeps from shareholders proposals that state law allows. A Commission concerned about federal displacement of state law should welcome an alternative that restores state law’s role. Judging alternatives only by benefits to companies leaves out the protection of investors, which Sections 3(f) and 14(a) require the Commission to weigh.

Each stated rationale has a narrower cure:

Release rationaleNarrower fix
Federal exclusions not grounded in state law (91 FR 59911–12)Require inclusion of any timely proposal proper under state law; drop federal subject-matter exclusions, such as ordinary business
Commission-made presumption for precatory proposals (91 FR 59911)Delete the Note to Rule 14a-8(i)(1) and let state courts decide
Commission drawn into state-law questions (91 FR 59916–17)Already addressed: the staff stopped responding to no-action requests in 2025–2026
Rule inhibits state law (91 FR 59917–18)An express non-preemption clause, and a provision that a state statute, such as Texas’s, governs its own corporations
Private ordering should tailor the process (91 FR 59936)Let a company modify the rule only through a shareholder-approved charter or bylaw provision, as the Commission itself proposed in 1982 (n.170)
Negotiated withdrawals may yield private benefits (91 FR 59915, 59954)Require disclosure of withdrawal agreements
Costs fall on issuers (91 FR 59936)Adjust cost allocation rather than eliminate access

[DECIDE: Which fix do we lead with? I lean toward the state-law inclusion rule plus deleting the precatory presumption and adding a non-preemption clause. Cost-sharing and caps hurt individual filers; we can ask the Commission why they wouldn’t cure its “externality” concern without endorsing them.]

[DECIDE: A note on my earlier draft. I had written that a board or a state should not be able to defeat a federal inclusion floor. Overriding state statutes concedes the Commission’s preemption framing. A better line: a bylaw adopted without shareholder approval should not defeat inclusion, while state statutes and shareholder-approved charter terms govern.]

A procedural review process the Commission can run itself. Sarah Wilson’s essay,  “Rule 14a-8: Perhaps There’s Another Way,” Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (Oct. 7, 2026), proposes separating access to the proxy from judgments about a proposal’s subject matter, with an independent body resolving procedural disputes. That architecture has real merit. An outside, levy-funded panel with binding authority, however, invites the objection that the Commission cannot create it. The same benefits can be pursued within the Commission’s existing structure (see Sarah Wilson Offers a Better Way Than Rule 14a-8 Rescission — With Guardrails, my musings):

  • A content-neutral inclusion rule, so no one decides whether a proposal is too political, too social, or “ordinary business.”
  • A narrow procedural review, limited to federal questions such as ownership, holding period, timeliness, length, duplication, and resubmission. These are federal questions, so the release’s concern about deciding state law does not arise.
  • Determinations by Commission staff under delegated authority, with a right to Commission review and then judicial review. That uses the Commission’s existing structure and avoids appointment and delegation problems.
  • Balanced input on procedural standards from an advisory committee that includes retail investors, issuers, and institutions, in an advisory role only.
  • Inclusion as the default, the burden on the company to show a procedural defect, a right to cure minor defects, and published decisions.

[LEGAL: Confirm the delegated-authority and review provisions (Exchange Act § 4A; 17 CFR 200.30-1; Rules of Practice) and whether binding staff determinations need new rule text. Ask whether an SRO-administered process under Section 19 oversight is a useful second option.]

[ECON: Estimate how much of the release’s 107-hour issuer burden (91 FR 59938) is an exclusion argument that a content-neutral rule would eliminate. Ask companies and their counsel for itemized hours.]

Objection 4. Serious reliance interests

An agency changing a longstanding policy must address serious reliance interests. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009); Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211 (2016); Regents, 591 U.S. 1. The release acknowledges that companies and shareholders “are likely to have shaped” practices around the rule, then sets that aside because “longevity is not a substitute for legal authority” (91 FR 59913). Regents held that a legal conclusion does not excuse weighing reliance.

Much of the rule’s value comes from agreements, not votes. The release says it lacks visibility into the negotiation behind withdrawals (n.361). In 2026, I reached agreements on right-to-cure provisions, which give a shareholder who nominates a director notice of fixable paperwork defects and a chance to correct them, at Exact Sciences, Ionis Pharmaceuticals, Upwork, Yext, United Therapeutics, Intellia Therapeutics, nCino, Veracyte, and Marriott International. Companies talk because a vote is possible. Both sides benefited from a likely reduction in lawsuits.

[GATHER: For each agreement, the 8-K or bylaw amendment showing what changed and when. Attach as exhibits. A court sees documents, not descriptions.]

[GATHER: Institutional investors’ voting policies, engagement programs and client commitments built around one federal standard. This is a positive that reliance state law can’t replace, a point the Shareholder Rights Group guide stresses.]

Continued in Part 3: the economic analysis, who gets priced out, the Commission’s 2020 findings, the opt-out voting default, and process. [LINK TO PART 3]

Sources

  • SEC, Rescission of Rule 14a-8’s Federal Regulation of Shareholder Proposals and Amendments to Rule 14a-4, Release No. 34-106383, 91 FR 59904 (Sept. 21, 2026); SEC version.
  • National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. SEC, No. 22-51069 (5th Cir. June 26, 2024).
  • Shareholder Rights Group, Commenting on the Proposed Rescission of Rule 14a-8: A Guide for Investors (Oct. 2, 2026).
  • Sarah Wilson, “Rule 14a-8: Perhaps There’s Another Way,” Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (Oct. 7, 2026).
  • Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 21.373 (S.B. 1057, 2025).
  • Cases: J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502 (2009); Forest Grove School Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009); Texas Dep’t of Housing v. Inclusive Communities Project, 576 U.S. 519 (2015); Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211 (2016); DHS v. Regents, 591 U.S. 1 (2020); Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024); Ohio v. EPA, 603 U.S. 279 (2024); Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

Collaborate with CorpGov.net on Social Media (or Leave Comments at the bottom)

Linkedin
BlueSky
Facebook
Mastodon
Substack
X (formerly Twitter)

Rule 14a-8 Rescission: Related Posts

Rule 14a-8 Rescission: What We Can Say Now, What We Still Need (Part 1)

SEC Proposes to Rescind Rule 14a-8: Initial Comments

Sarah Wilson Offers a Better Way Than Rule 14a-8 Rescission — With Guardrails

SEC Quorum Rule: A Commission of One, Adopted Without Public Comment

Rule 14a-8: A Failed Experiment in Merit Regulation (Still)

, , , , , , , , , , ,

Comments are closed.

Powered by WordPress. Designed by WooThemes