Explainer graphic. Left: the SEC's Table 7 monetizes $39.6 million a year in issuer savings and only $1,063 in costs, a cost bar barely visible beside the benefit bar. Right: proposals from individual proponents average 32 percent support and 14 percent win a majority, versus 20 percent and 6 percent for institutions. Callout: using the 2.8 percent value gain the release cites, losing one governance reform at one $1.4 billion company offsets a full year of savings.

Rule 14a-8 Rescission (Part 3): The Economics and the VoteRule 14a-8 rescission

Part 3 of 3. Working draft for discussion. Comments are due November 20, 2026 (File No. S7-2026-32). Link to Part 1 and Part 2.

This part discusses some input for my next working draft letter on the SEC’s proposal to rescind Rule 14a-8, 91 FR 59904. Part 2 covered the legal objections (Objections 1–4). Here are the economic, voting, and process objections. [Bracketed, highlighted notes] mark material to gather, choices to make, and facts to verify.

Objection 5. The economic analysis counts only one side

Table 7 reports $39.6 million in annual monetized benefits and $1,063 in monetized costs (91 FR 59952–53). The benefit figure equals 801 proposals times $49,434. In other words, it assumes every proposal disappears, despite the offsets the release itself identifies: state law, voluntary inclusion, and independent solicitation (91 FR 59939). No cost of rescission is put in dollars. An unquantified cost is not zero. The Commission must determine economic effects “as best it can.” Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148–50 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

A break-even test using the Commission’s own source. The release cites a study finding that passing a governance proposal implies about a 2.8% gain in market value (n.391, 91 FR 59943). On that figure, losing one such reform at one company worth about $1.4 billion would offset a full year of the release’s monetized savings. At a $50 billion company, a proposal covers its $49,000 processing cost if it raises value by about one ten-thousandth of one percent. Where benefits cannot be put in dollars, OMB Circular A-4, which the release invokes, points to break-even analysis. I ask the Commission to conduct one.

The release also leaves out the costs that shift to shareholders:

  1. Establishing the right to present proposals, through bylaws, charter amendments, legislation, or litigation;
  2. Enforcing it when a company refuses to recognize it, and
  3. Getting a vote through an independent solicitation. The release’s benchmarks ($5,300–$9,800 and about $14,000, 91 FR 59915) assume solicitation of 67% of voting power and exclude counsel, tabulation, and litigation.

[GATHER: Vendor quotes for soliciting on one precatory proposal at a large and a small company, including counsel, delivery, and tabulation. The Shareholder Rights Group guide estimates $*** or more per proposal at large companies if proponents must solicit all shareholders. Anyone with actual quotes, please share.]

[ECON: Value of right-to-cure provisions in litigation avoided. I don’t yet have a method. Ideas welcome: frequency of nomination-notice disputes, typical costs of expedited Delaware litigation, and so on.]

[GATHER: Examples where proposals flagged risks before they became costly. The SRG guide cites several company. Each needs company, year, vote level, and later outcome, with sources.]

Objection 6. The proposals most likely to be lost are the most broadly supported

The release’s central economic theory is that proponents don’t bear the full cost of proposals, creating an externality (91 FR 59936). It ignores the matching externality on the benefit side. A governance improvement benefits every shareholder, but a proponent captures only a pro-rata share. That is the collective-action problem the release acknowledges elsewhere (n.435). Rule 14a-8 spreads costs across the shareholders who share the benefits. Without it, whether a proposal survives depends on the proponent’s resources, not its value.

The release’s own data make the point. Proposals from individual proponents average 32% support, and 14% of those voted win a majority. The figures for institutional proponents are 20% and 6%. Yet the release finds that individuals are the proponents for whom independent solicitation is most likely “cost-prohibitive” (91 FR 59941). The Commission should explain why rescission will not systematically eliminate the proposals its own data show shareholders support most.

[ECON: The release relies on research about private benefits obtained through union proposals timed to labor negotiations (n.431). Ask the Commission to identify any evidence that individual proponents obtain private benefits.]

Objection 7. The Commission reverses its own 2020 findings without explanation

The release treats the fact that most proposals don’t win a majority as evidence that the rule’s original justifications have not held up (91 FR 59913–14). Chairman Purcell’s 1943 testimony, which the release cites, spoke of proposals that “secured respectable percentages of the votes cast,” not majorities. The release concedes it cannot confirm the support levels from that period (n.106). In 2020, the Commission set resubmission thresholds of 5%, 15%, and 25%, and said they “may also serve as better indicators of the likelihood that a proposal will result in an agreement between the company and the shareholder-proponent.” (Release No. 34-89964, p. 70258) The release now calls negotiated agreements an “unintended consequence” (91 FR 59915). When a new policy rests on facts that contradict earlier findings, the agency must explain the change. Fox, 556 U.S. at 515–16. In 2024, the Fifth Circuit vacated an SEC rescission of proxy rules on exactly that ground. National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. SEC (5th Cir. June 26, 2024).

[GATHER: Proposals that won less than a majority but led to change: company, year, approximate vote and outcome.]

Objection 8. The Rule 14a-4(c) default contradicts the Commission’s own findings

The release finds that the opt-out default may cause votes to be cast “regardless of their actual preferences,” that the effect will fall mostly on retail investors, and that disclosure may not fix it (91 FR 59950). An agency must show a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43. Under an opt-in, inaction leaves a share unvoted. Under the proposal, inaction hands the vote to management. The release also argues that any federal default for proposals would “advantage one side over the other” (91 FR 59918), then adopts a voting default it concedes favors management.

If any discretionary authority remains, require affirmative authorization, a separate box for each proposal, and the full text of each proposal or a direct link. The Commission should also analyze rescission and the Rule 14a-4(c) amendments together. The release acknowledges discretionary voting “may become more frequent if Rule 14a-8 is rescinded” (91 FR 59907). It should also account for issuer-sponsored standing voting instructions now permitted by staff no-action relief.

Objection 9. Data, process and the basis for decision

  • Place in the public file the dataset behind the submission, withdrawal and contest counts, and the cost surveys relied on, and allow comment on them. Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
  • Respond to each significant comment. Ohio v. EPA, 603 U.S. 279 (2024).
  • Repropose any provision or rationale that is not a logical outgrowth of this proposal.
  • The release cites Executive Order 14366, which directed the Commission to consider rescinding shareholder-proposal rules (n.26), and states that retaining “any version” of the rule is unwarranted (91 FR 59906). I ask the Commission to confirm that its decision rests on the statutory factors and on the comment record.

[DECIDE: How much to say about pretext and prejudgment. I’d keep it to the one factual sentence above and let a court draw any inference.]

Conclusion

Rule 14a-8 works mostly out of sight. Boards adopt reforms, companies agree to right-to-cure provisions, and proposals are withdrawn because the parties find common ground. None of that happens without a credible chance of a vote. I urge the Commission to withdraw the proposed rescission and the Rule 14a-4(c) amendments. If it proceeds, it should adopt a narrower alternative within its authority and answer each objection above.

Sincerely,
James McRitchie
Shareholder Advocate and Publisher, CorpGov.net
Elk Grove, California

Sources

  • SEC, Rescission of Rule 14a-8’s Federal Regulation of Shareholder Proposals and Amendments to Rule 14a-4, Release No. 34-106383, 91 FR 59904 (Sept. 21, 2026); SEC version.
  • National Ass’n of Manufacturers v. SEC, No. 22-51069 (5th Cir. June 26, 2024).
  • Shareholder Rights Group, Commenting on the Proposed Rescission of Rule 14a-8: A Guide for Investors (Oct. 2, 2026).
  • Sarah Wilson, “Rule 14a-8: Perhaps There’s Another Way,” Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (Oct. 7, 2026).
  • Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 21.373 (S.B. 1057, 2025).
  • Cases: J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983); FCC v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502 (2009); Forest Grove School Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009); Texas Dep’t of Housing v. Inclusive Communities Project, 576 U.S. 519 (2015); Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211 (2016); DHS v. Regents, 591 U.S. 1 (2020); Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024); Ohio v. EPA, 603 U.S. 279 (2024); Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Business Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).

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