The legal case is hollow. The record is ours to build.” Left column lists why the SEC’s rationale for rescinding Rule 14a-8 fails, per Shadow SEC Statement No. 16. Right column lists four steps for commenters. Comments due November 20, 2026, File No. S7-2026-32.

Rule 14a-8 Rescission: The Shadow SEC, Enshittification and the Path Forward

Two things landed on my screen this week that belong together. The first was Shadow SEC Statement No. 16: Retain Rule 14a-8, a short and devastating legal analysis of the proposed Rule 14a-8 rescission by John Coates, John Coffee, James Cox, Merritt Fox and Joel Seligman.The second was a reminder of Cory Doctorow’s word for how good systems go bad: enshittification. Read together, they explain both what the SEC is doing to shareholder rights and why it is happening. They also point to where we need to go from here.

A Quorum of One – and Music for a Democratic Corporate Governance

The Shadow SEC Takes the Legal Case Apart

The SEC’s release proposing to rescind Rule 14a-8 rests mainly on a legal claim: that the rule exceeds the Commission’s authority under Section 14(a) and intrudes on corporate governance matters reserved to the states. The Shadow SEC dismantles that claim in a few pages.

The rule displaces nothing. Proposals included under Rule 14a-8 are precatory. They bind no one, amend no charter, and take no corporate action that state law does not already control. What the rule regulates is the content of a federal disclosure document, the company’s own proxy statement. That has been squarely within the Commission’s authority since 1934. A shareholder can always raise the same resolution from the floor. Rule 14a-8 decides only whether it also appears in the materials that nearly every voter actually uses.

Congress intended this. The 1934 committee reports describe a proxy system that management controlled and used to perpetuate itself. Congress responded with the goal of “fair corporate suffrage.” Helping dispersed shareholders communicate with one another is the purpose of Section 14(a), not a departure from it.

Eighty years of case law stand against the SEC. The authors list more than a dozen decisions that have held or presumed Rule 14a-8, or its predecessor, to be authorized. The release cites only three cases and offers essentially no reason to reject them beyond the Commission’s disagreement. Nothing in the statute has changed. The shift from in-person to proxy voting that the SEC now treats as decisive was foreseen in 1934 and has been a fact for generations.

The APA and Loper Bright cut the other way. An agency that reverses a consistent 80-year interpretation must give a reasoned explanation and grapple with contrary authority. Without deference, the SEC’s reading must win on its merits. The authors conclude that it reads more like the political commitments of a single-party Commission than an exercise of expertise. A final rule on this rationale would be vulnerable to vacatur as arbitrary and capricious.

The statement also makes a policy point the release largely ignores. Many institutional investors cannot sell. Take away the proposal channel and they will not go quiet. They will turn to proxy fights, activist coalitions, withhold campaigns, binding bylaw amendments and lawsuits, all more disruptive than an advisory vote.

Enshittification Explains the Pattern

Doctorow describes how platforms decay. First they are good to their users. Then they abuse users to benefit business customers. Finally they squeeze everyone to claw back the value for themselves. He has said the word now applies well beyond tech, and the SEC’s treatment of shareholder rights fits his stages closely.

Stage one: serve investors. Since 1942, Rule 14a-8 has given any qualifying shareholder a voice on the company proxy at modest cost. Majority voting, declassified boards and proxy access all advanced this way, often first raised by individual investors. My Part 3 draft notes that proposals from individual proponents have averaged higher support and won majorities more often than those from institutions.

Stage two: tilt toward management. Submission and resubmission thresholds were raised in 2020. The staff stopped responding substantively to no-action requests, and companies began stretching the exclusion grounds. Exempt solicitations moved from push to pull. Then came retail voting programs that offer shareholders a single standing instruction: vote with the board. Doctorow calls this kind of incremental rule adjustment “twiddling.”

Stage three: extraction. Now the SEC proposes to rescind Rule 14a-8 entirely and to expand management’s discretion to vote proxies on proposals it leaves off the ballot. Meanwhile, the Commission adopted, without notice or comment, a rule letting a single Commissioner act as the entire Commission. A bipartisan body designed for deliberation becomes a plurality of one. The release’s own economic analysis monetizes $39.6 million a year in issuer savings and roughly a thousand dollars in costs to shareholders, effectively valuing our voice at nearly zero.

The two analyses meet at one point. The Shadow SEC shows the legal rationale is hollow. Enshittification explains why an agency would advance a hollow rationale anyway. When a regulator is captured, it stops asking what the statute requires and starts asking what its favored constituents want. Then it builds a justification after the fact.

Where the Rule 14a-8 Rescission Fight Goes From Here

Doctorow’s remedies are worth borrowing. He argues platforms should give users what they ask for, not what the platform prefers, and should preserve a real right of exit. In proxy terms, the first principle means a shareholder’s message should reach fellow owners without management deciding whether it gets delivered. On the second, diversified and index investors have no practical exit. Voice is what they have. That is precisely why Rule 14a-8 matters, and why taking it away is extraction rather than deregulation.

Here is what I think we need to do.

  1. Build the record. I expect the Commission to adopt rescission regardless of the comments. The real audience is the court that will review the final rule, and a court can weigh only what is in the record. Comments on File No. S7-2026-32 are due November 20, 2026.
  2. Put the Shadow SEC’s arguments on the record, repeatedly. Cite the statement. Use its case list. Make the Commission respond to it. An agency that fails to address substantial contrary authority is not engaged in reasoned decision-making.
  3. Document the benefits and the costs the release ignores. We need specific proposals that created value, the governance reforms that followed, the costs of the more disruptive alternatives, and evidence that state law and private ordering cannot fill the gap any time soon.
  4. Offer less harmful alternatives. The APA requires an agency to consider reasonable alternatives. Ideas like Sarah Wilson’s independent review approach, kept within the SEC, belong in the file.
  5. Prepare to defend the rule in court, and in the meantime to use state law, bylaws and director votes so shareholder voice survives whatever the Commission does.

My working draft comment, with open questions where I need help, is in three parts:

Enshittification is not inevitable. Platforms decay when the forces that discipline them, such as competition, regulation and the power of users, are removed. Shareholders are among the forces that discipline corporate management, and the SEC is supposed to protect them. If the Commission won’t, we will have to make the record that forces a court to. Please read the Shadow SEC statement, challenge my drafts, send me evidence, and file your own comment.

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