Infographic: At Meta and News Corp, majorities of independent shareholders supported proposals that insiders’ super-voting shares defeated; costs followed, including Meta’s $942 million New Mexico judgment and $18 billion settlement. Rescinding Rule 14a-8 would remove this warning channel at all companies.

Controlled Companies Provide a Warning on Rule 14a-8

Update, October 19, 2026: This post has been replaced. After I filed my supplemental comment letter with the SEC, I rewrote it with additional companies, corrected figures and the full evidence.

Please read the current version: Controlled Companies Warn the SEC: My Comment on Rule 14a-8.

Links to the letter and exhibits on the SEC’s website will be added to the new post once the Commission posts them.

Outdated Post Below With Uncorrected Numbers and Links

The SEC does not need to guess what happens when shareholders cannot effectively use the proposal process. We have been watching the results for years. Controlled companies provide a clear warning, since the super-voting shares of founders allow insiders to defeat any proposal, no matter how the outside owners vote. The results are in. Reducing the impact of shareholder voice is expensive and, in some cases, results in real human tragedy, not just financial loss. (click on the graphic)

On September 16 (Fed. Register, Sept 21), the SEC formally proposed rescinding Rule 14a-8 (File No. S7-2026-32). Comments are due November 20, 2026. Days earlier, Meta agreed to pay up to $18 billion to resolve child-safety claims. Ross Kerber’s Reuters column connected those two events. Here is a closer look at the pattern, and at why rescission would spread it to every public company, building off the important work of Sehr Khaliq and Timothy Smith, Shareholder Proposals as an Early Warning System for Corporate Risk, and the Cost of Ignoring Them.

Voto Negato: Controlled-Companies Provide a Warning on Rule 14a-8 – and Music for a Democratic Corporate Governance

Controlled Companies Provide a Warning: Outside Shareholders Were Outvoted

Meta: Child Safety

Since 2020, shareholders represented by Proxy Impact, including lead filer Lisette Cooper of Fiduciary Trust International, faith-based investors, and a growing group of institutional co-filers, have asked Meta to report on child sexual exploitation and to measure whether its platforms actually reduce harm to children. Independent shareholders agreed:

  • 2022: about 57% of the vote not controlled by management supported a proposal on online child sexual exploitation.
  • 2023: 16.27% of the reported vote, equal to 53.8% of the non-management vote.
  • 2024: 18.5% of the reported vote, equal to 59% of the non-management vote, according to Proxy Impact’s SEC filing.

A majority of independent owners supported the request each year. Each year, Mark Zuckerberg’s super-voting shares defeated it.

Then the risk arrived. In March 2026, a New Mexico jury found Meta willfully violated state consumer protection law and imposed $375 million in penalties. In August, the judge added a $567 million abatement fund. Weeks later, Meta agreed to pay up to $18 billion to settle child-safety claims with 52 attorneys general. Michael Passoff of Proxy Impact called shareholder resolutions “an early-warning system, and Meta’s the perfect example of that.”

Meta: Privacy and Board Oversight

In 2018, with the Cambridge Analytica revelations fresh, almost half of independent shareholders backed a board-level risk committee, and 83% supported one share, one vote. Insiders prevailed. The next year, Facebook paid a $5 billion FTC penalty. Shareholders then sued directors for failing to stop repeated privacy violations, and in April 2026, a $190 million derivative settlement won final approval.

Alphabet: Antitrust

In 2021, shareholders asked Alphabet’s board to report on how it oversaw risks related to anticompetitive practices. Alphabet tried to exclude the proposal; SEC staff refused to concur. The proposal received 12.39% of the votes cast. That number understates outside support because Page and Brin’s Class B shares carry ten votes each, and insiders controlled a majority of the vote.

Federal courts later found that Google illegally monopolized general search and open-web digital advertising. To settle a shareholder suit, Alphabet agreed to spend at least $500 million over up to ten years on compliance and to create a new board Risk and Compliance Committee, essentially what proponents had asked for.

Berkshire Hathaway: Climate Risk

Morningstar found that a steady majority of independent Berkshire shareholders supported a climate-risk management proposal every year from 2021 through 2023. Warren Buffett’s votes defeated it each time. Through 2025, Berkshire’s PacifiCorp recorded about $2.85 billion in estimated wildfire losses, and Berkshire warns that significant additional losses are reasonably possible. To be fair, the 2020 fires came before the first vote; what grew afterward was the size of the bill.

A Natural Experiment: News Corp

News Corp shows what a proposal is worth when it is not on the proxy. After the phone-hacking scandal broke in July 2011, it was too late to file a Rule 14a-8 proposal for that October’s meeting. Christian Brothers Investment Services instead offered an independent-chair resolution from the floor. It drew 1.5 million votes in favor and 680.5 million against. A year later, the same request appeared on the proxy as a 14a-8 proposal and won about two-thirds of independent votes. Directors’ elections told a similar story: in 2011, 67% of independent votes went against James Murdoch and 64% against Lachlan, but family-controlled shares kept both on the board. The scandal ultimately cost News Corp’s UK newspaper unit more than £1 billion. And holders of News Corp’s non-voting Class A shares had no say at all.

Even When Insiders Won, Rule 14a-8 Did Essential Work

Rescission advocates will say these proposals “failed.” That misreads what the rule accomplishes at controlled companies.

  • It created a public, quantified record of outside-owner sentiment. Without the vote, no one could show that most independent Meta shareholders wanted child-safety metrics.
  • It put boards on documented notice. Directors’ oversight duties turn on how they respond to known red flags. A proposal, an opposition statement, and a majority of independent votes are about as clear a red flag as corporate law offers.
  • It sometimes moved boards anyway. After the 2018 risk-committee vote, Facebook’s board renamed its audit committee the “Audit & Risk Oversight Committee” and expanded its mandate to cover privacy, community safety, and cybersecurity.
  • It informed the market. Investors could see what independent holders saw and what the board refused to address.

The No-Vote Future Already Exists

Some companies show what happens when outside shareholders have no proposal channel at all.

Snap lists only non-voting stock. Its public Class A holders cannot vote on anything, and its founders control over 99% of the vote. New Mexico has sued Snap, alleging its design facilitates sextortion and child sexual exploitation.

Roblox’s 2025 ballot had no shareholder proposals: just directors, say-on-pay, the auditor, and a move to Nevada. In December 2025, federal courts centralized nearly 80 child-exploitation suits against Roblox, and the number has grown since. In August 2026, Senators Hawley and Durbin opened an investigation after Roblox reported 65,381 suspected child sexual exploitation cases for 2025, more than double the prior year.

At these companies, the risks were surfaced by plaintiffs’ lawyers, state attorneys general, and Senate investigators. The owners never had a structured, low-cost way to raise them first.

How the Problem Escalates If Proposals Are Eliminated

Rescinding Rule 14a-8 would extend the Snap model to every public company.

  • The early-warning system disappears. A proposal costs the company little more than a page in the proxy and a vote count. The alternatives (proxy contests, derivative suits, or selling the stock) cost far more. Many investors will simply exit and take their information with them.
  • Floor motions are no substitute. At News Corp, an independent-chair resolution offered from the floor got 1.5 million votes in favor; the same request on the proxy a year later won about two-thirds of independent votes. Without Rule 14a-8, owners are left with the floor.
  • Management alone sets the agenda. Boards at widely held companies would gain the insulation that today only founders with super-voting shares enjoy. Unlike those founders, they would have no comparable economic stake.
  • Costs shift from prevention to cleanup. A child-safety metrics report costs a fraction of a $942 million judgment in a single state or an $18 billion settlement. Ignored risks are paid for later by shareholders, by the people harmed, and by the courts.
  • “Leave it to the states” means a race to the bottom. SpaceX went public, combining super-voting shares, tighter proposal rules, and Texas law, and Roblox has moved to Nevada. Without a federal floor, the controlled-company model becomes the default.
  • The accountability record thins out. With no proposals or votes, there is less evidence that boards were warned. That makes it harder to hold directors responsible afterward, and it weakens their incentive to listen beforehand.

What the SEC Should Do Instead

The Commission’s economic analysis must count these costs, not just the administrative burden of processing proposals. Billions in losses followed warnings that independent shareholders raised and insiders overrode. Counting the cost of printing a proposal while ignoring the cost of losing the warning is not a serious analysis.

Rather than rescind Rule 14a-8, the SEC should strengthen the signal it produces. At companies with unequal voting rights, it should require vote results to be reported by share class, or excluding shares held by insiders, so owners, markets, and courts can see what outside shareholders actually think.

I have filed comments opposing rescission (see my September 16 letter) and will be filing a supplemental letter making this argument. If you own stock, directly or through a pension or mutual fund, I urge you to file your own comments on File No. S7-2026-32 before November 20. Tell the Commission what you would lose.

Note: Independent-vote percentages for Meta come from proponents’ calculations (Proxy Impact, Open MIC). The Berkshire figure is Morningstar’s; the News Corp figures are from contemporaneous press reports and Christian Brothers Investment Services.

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