2024 CorpGov.net Proxy Season Results Are In
Shareholders have voted on the vast majority of our proposals this year. I count wins or partial wins on 26 out of 46 proposals, about 57%. We lost on 20 proposals. Six were a result of my inattention. For example, being a day late on the broker letter or failing to correct a deficiency noted by the issuer. I lost four through no-action challenges. The vast majority of wins were as a result of negotiated agreements. Of course, that is the route we hope to take with all our proposals. As You Sow filed a few of my proposals. I did not include them in this discussion.
2024 CorpGov.net Proxy Season Proposals
Fair Elections
Fair Elections were a significant concern this year, with 16 such proposals filed and only one going to a vote. My conception of corrective measures needed to advance notice bylaws evolved over the season. Initially, I perceived the problem as boards failing to treat shareholder nominees equitably and avoiding encumbering such nominations with unnecessary administrative or evidentiary requirements. However, treating all candidates the same is not the answer.
After helpful conversations with Philip Larrieu of the Oregon State Treasury and others at the Fall 2023 CII conference, I focused on the need for boards to limit their evaluation of shareholder candidates to meeting required qualifications, not their “suitability,” since suitability should be a decision left to the vote. Many readers would be surprised how many advance notice bylaws incorporate by reference guidelines that reference suitability to ensure candidates will be a good fit with the current board. Of course, if the current board picks the candidate, almost by definition, the board will think they are a good fit, and others are not.
Ascertain Client Voting Preferences
Our second most prolific type of filing requests companies report the reputational and financial risks to the Company of any misalignment between proxy votes it casts on behalf of clients and its client’s values and preferences, as well as strategies for addressing such misalignments. Another variant requested a report on the feasibility of offering customized proxy voting preferences to maximize portfolio-wide returns by addressing social and environmental externalities.
SEC staff granted no-action relief on these proposals based on the “ordinary business” exclusion. I’ll link one example. SEC staff appear to disagree with my argument that the Proposal transcends ordinary business because it addresses the significant social policy issue of corporations externalizing environmental and social costs in pursuing financial return. These externalized costs harm the economy and diversified investors, such as the Company’s clients and shareholders.
I haven’t given up on this issue, but I do not see an immediate road forward through the proxy proposal process. Especially disheartening was Judge Laster’s movement in the wrong direction in McRitchie v Zuckerberg. In that somewhat related decision, Laster concluded that directors’ fiduciary duties run to “the shares” themselves, which happen to be held by individuals. “That makes the resulting fiduciary obligation inherently . . . firm-specific.”

Grounding fiduciary duties to an agreed-upon figment of our imaginations (shares) rather than to the rights of sentient beings (shareholders) seems a poor foundation for building capitalism or democracy. Why should the rights of shares take precedence over the rights of the people who own shares?
An emancipation proclamation for the rights of shares over the rights of people may be grounded in law and tradition, just as was the divine right of kings. However, I believe reason will eventually prevail since that will pave the way for human progress. Companies will eventually consider the values of their shareholders, which extend beyond short-term financial returns.
Other Topics
The other topics we filed on are widely known and discussed. I will note an issue with competing proposals, such as a shareholder proposal for a 15% threshold to call special meetings and a counter-proposal from the board with a 25% threshold. The board proposal almost inevitably wins a higher vote for three reasons.
Please review if you or your fund vote using a proxy voting policy. When two conflicting policies are presented, ensure you vote for the more favorable Proposal and against the less favorable Proposal.
2024 CorpGov.net Proxy Season Right to Cure
Jim McRitchie
Proxy voting continues throughout the year, with far fewer meetings after June. With the advice of Abbott Cooper, my thinking on how to address bylaws that favor incumbents has evolved. I will be filing many proposals asking boards to include reasonable provisions in their advance notice bylaws to allow a “Right to Cure.” Typically, we seek bylaw amendments requiring boards to notify any shareholder who submits a notice of nomination of any specific defects or deficiencies within fourteen days of receipt and allow the nominating shareholder fourteen days to cure any such defects.
The Proposal addresses the Company’s need for order and disclosure while recognizing shareholders’ right to nominate candidates without unnecessary impediments. We are not set on the time window, so approach the timeframe open-mindedly. As with our earlier “Fair Elections” proposals, we expect to reach agreements with most companies. Linked here is a proposal to MSFT Right to Cure 6-24-24. Comments to improve such proposals are invited.