Shareholders with Voice. That's the part of capitalism an increasing number of boards hate.

Shareholder Primacy

“Shareholder primacy is good for companies, employees, and even for other stakeholders,” Nell Minow recently said in a recent Keynote Address to ICGN. She also referenced an old, but still timely, “New Yorker cartoon with a woman raising her hand at an annual shareholder meeting, and one of the executives whispering to another, ‘This is the part of capitalism I hate.'”

It was funny then because shareholder questions were treated as an annoying but basically harmless, rare intrusion into an otherwise closed, management‑dominated system, so executives openly resenting “this part of capitalism” read as exaggerated, self‑aware satire rather than a realistic threat.

It is harder to laugh now because we have 30 more years of evidence that many insiders really do work systematically to mute, manage, or bypass shareholder voice—through dual‑class structures, dark‑money lobbying, anti‑ESG backlash, and procedural barriers—so the joke lands less as cartoonish discomfort and more as a candid statement of how power actually operates.

I miss conversations I used to have with the late Robert Monks on such issues. See The Appearance of Legitimacy: Board Elections. Over the course of many such conversations, I came to believe in shareholder primacy, but with the proviso that the number and voice of shareholders must be vastly expanded. Employees should earn many more shares than executives, shareholders should be able to vote their shares automatically through systems like iconik, and beneficial owners should at least be consulted concerning how the stock they “own” is voted.  For more on that last point, read Remarks by Jill Fisch Before the Investor Advisory Committee of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission)

Shareholder Primacy: Summary of Findings

The erosion of shareholder primacy in U.S. corporate law—epitomized by Nevada’s 2017 Senate Bill 203 (SB203)—poses an existential threat not only to investor protection but also to effective corporate governance and stakeholder outcomes. In their rigorous empirical study, The Costs of Weakening Shareholder Primacy Bennett, Stulz, and Wang (2025) offer compelling evidence that when boards are legally permitted—and functionally encouraged—to disregard shareholder interests, the consequences for firms, investors, and society are uniformly negative.

The authors examine the adoption of Nevada SB203 as a quasi-natural experiment in stakeholder governance. The statute explicitly removed shareholder primacy from Nevada corporate law, affirming that boards need not prioritize shareholder welfare and shielding them from fiduciary duty litigation. Bennett, Stulz, and Wang deploy a difference-in-differences methodology to evaluate the law’s impact over time on Nevada-incorporated public firms relative to firms incorporated elsewhere.

Their findings are damning:

  • Governance deteriorated: Boards became more entrenched, independent oversight declined, and nepotism increased.
  • Firm value declined: Tobin’s q fell, stock returns worsened, and the cost of capital rose.
  • Investment quality degraded: Firms made more acquisitions but of lower quality and with declining q-sensitivity in investment.
  • ESG performance worsened: Environmental, social, and governance metrics all declined.
  • Managerial agency problems increased: CEO pay rose and became less tied to performance, suggesting rising private benefit extraction.

These findings directly contradict stakeholderism advocates’ claims that broader fiduciary discretion benefits all constituencies. Rather than helping workers, communities, or the environment, the legal slack appears to benefit insiders at the expense of everyone else.

The Risks of Eliminating Shareholder Primacy

These findings carry weighty implications for both corporate governance and economic policy:

  • Reincorporation risk: The precedent set by Nevada—and echoed by Texas and other states seeking to attract incorporations by insulating management—invites similar declines in governance and value.
  • Capital misallocation: The empirical drop in investment efficiency threatens long-term productivity, especially in R&D-intensive sectors.
  • ESG regression: Far from enabling sustainability, weaker shareholder oversight leads to tangible ESG backsliding.
  • Credit market impact: Higher costs of debt and increased auditor concerns signal rising systemic risks.

In aggregate, if such laws proliferate, they risk eroding the very foundations of efficient capital markets and responsible capitalism.

Shareholder Primacy: Prior Support

The Nevada experiment aligns with a growing literature critical of unaccountable stakeholder capitalism. Bebchuk and Tallarita (2020) persuasively argue that stakeholder governance is often a rhetorical shield for managerial discretion. More recent evidence by Eldar and Magnolfi (2022) also find that large firms eschew jurisdictions with weaker shareholder protections, anticipating the especially sharp value declines observed in larger Nevada-incorporated firms.

Not prior to Bennett, et al., Values Primacy and Total Corporate Governance Through Activism by Carliss N. Chatman and Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci is also informative on the issues discussed. They present a nuanced framework that critiques traditional shareholder primacy while offering a roadmap for integrating broader stakeholder concerns through structured, value-aligned shareholder activism. Rather than rejecting shareholder primacy outright, it proposes evolving it to support more inclusive governance goals. Building values-primacy governance requires institutionalizing stakeholder values so they become durable features of corporate decision-making rather than reversible rhetoric.

Values-primacy governance thus transforms stakeholder engagement from episodic pressure into an ongoing civic dialogue that stabilizes corporate identity across political and market cycles, anchoring legitimacy in broad public participation rather than short-term shareholder primacy. Corporations shape our social reality. Values-primacy governance offers a draft blueprint for reconstructing that reality. Instead of corporations imposing reality, it can be co-created by the people it affects.

Shareholder Primacy: Defending Shareholder Rights

Despite the power of corporate insiders and friendly legislatures, individual shareholders and beneficial owners are not powerless. The following actions can bolster shareholder primacy across institutional, state, and federal arenas. The simplest yet most underutilized tool is proxy voting. Individual investors should:

  • Utilize platforms like Proxy Preview and Portfolios on the Ballot to identify proxy proposals coming up for a vote (the 2026 season will be posted soon).
  • Sign up for low-cost or free automated voting of your entire portfolio through As You Vote or Iconik.
  • Vote against entrenched directors and excessive CEO pay.
  • Support ESG and governance proposals that enhance transparency and accountability.

Align with Advocacy Organizations

Coalitions amplify individual voices. Key partners include:

These organizations frequently submit SEC comment letters, coordinate voting strategies, and offer infrastructure to challenge overreach.

Engage Asset Managers

Most shareholders are indirect investors via ETFs or retirement funds. They should:

Participate in SEC Comment Processes

Public comment remains a vital channel whenever the current administration wants to change regulations. Shareholders can:

  • Respond to rulemakings that impact proxy access, ESG disclosure, or shareholder proposal rules.
  • Use templates from Shareholder Rights Group or As You Sow to craft submissions.
  • Advocate for mandatory ESG disclosure, universal proxy access, and restrictions on reincorporation without shareholder approval.

Apply Public Pressure

Corporate behavior is influenced by reputation. Shareholders can:

  • Use media or shareholder forums to challenge reincorporations into Nevada or Texas.
  • Pressure companies to explain ESG stances and reincorporation rationales.
  • Collaborate with coalitions like Ceres or US SIF to raise visibility.

Shareholder Primacy: Conclusion:

The Bennett, Stulz, and Wang study is a landmark contribution to corporate governance research. It offers hard evidence that weakening shareholder rights harms not just investors, but also corporate efficiency and stakeholder outcomes. The findings warn against complacency. As more firms consider Nevada-style reincorporations and as the SEC falters in defending shareholder voice, vigilance is critical.

Beneficial owners—especially those whose retirement savings are at stake—must recognize that the battle for corporate accountability is not theoretical. It affects valuations, environmental outcomes, national productivity, and even the likelihood that our democracy survives.

Shareholder primacy remains the best mechanism for aligning managerial incentives with sustainable, long-term value. To abandon it in favor of discretionary stakeholderism is to invite opacity, entrenchment, and inefficiency. The law should protect investors, not shield insiders. It is time for a recalibration—one driven by informed and organized shareholder action.

However, as long as 84% of corporate stock is owned and controlled by 10% of Americans, corporations will not be trusted. As noted by the president and CEO of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,“Despite overall economic gains nationwide, “many Americans have lost faith in core institutions—public and private alike. They don’t believe that government or business understands the challenges they face, or are willing or able to address them.”

A one percentage point increase in the Gini index for income inequality leads to a fall of two percentage points in the share of individuals who believe that ‘most people can be trusted. [Inequality and Prosperity in the Industrialized World: Addressing a Growing Challenge]

For capitalism to be compatible with democracy, we need most American families to participate in share ownership. We need workers to own more shares than managers and to vote those shares. That should be part of the mission of every corporate director, every fund, and the SEC if our economic system is to maintain legitimacy.

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