Inequality and externalizing costs are design choices

Costco-Walmart and France: Internalization as Governance Design

I’m not raising the Costco–Walmart comparison as an abstract exercise. It stems from decades of practical engagement with corporate governance.  Especially, executive compensation, and the repeated defense of our growing inequality as an economic inevitability rather than an acknowledged design choice.

Costco-Walmart: Recent Insights

Rosanna (Landis) Weaver recently posted a link to The business strategies that make Walmart a ghoul and Costco a mensch, by Mark Sumner.  Rosanna is famous for developing a methodology to identify the most overpaid CEOs. Her reports also tracked how funds voted on pay for As You Sow. Unfortunately, contributions directly tied to that work dried up. Those with the money to fund such work have turned to other concerns. If you think hers was a worthwhile effort and can fund it, contact Rossana, As You Sow, or both. I would love to see the return of her annual assessment of the 100 most overpaid CEOs.

Back to the Costco-Walmart comparison. Rosanna wrote:

I’ve always believed high road companies deliver better returns, and this (the Costco-Walmart comparison) has always been my example. This article talks about general pay philosophy: “Walmart isn’t actually paying out less in overall salary than Costco; it’s just choosing to distribute that salary in a very different way.”

I first became aware of the differential in CEO pay probably more than 20 years ago, when I was looking at McDonald’s proxy. IIRC, McDonald’s removed Costco from its peer group, citing differences in pay philosophies. I tipped off Footnoted & they did a piece on this back in the days when people had blogs.

By the way, Rossanna, Michelle Leder, and I still have blogs.

More recently, two experiences brought these threads together for me. The first was finally meeting Ellen Quigley at the Fall Council of Institutional Investors Conference in San Francisco. Quigley’s work—frequently cited by The Shareholder Commons—has been central to articulating what universal owners already know intuitively: diversified, long-term investors cannot escape the systemic costs of inequality, environmental degradation, or social instability. When those costs are externalized by individual firms, they reappear elsewhere in the portfolio.

The second prompt came from a recent episode of one of my favorite podcasts, Capitalisn’t, where Luigi Zingales and Bethany McLean interviewed Ray Madoff about her book The Second Estate: How the Tax Code Made an American Aristocracy. The discussion underscored how the U.S. tax system now allows wealth to opt out of shared civic obligation—much as low-road corporate models allow firms to offload labor and social costs onto workers and the public.

Taken together, these moments clarify why the Costco–Walmart comparison matters so much—and why extending it to France versus the United States, and then further through the lens of universal ownership, is not merely illustrative but diagnostic. They all point to the same conclusion: inequality is not an unavoidable outcome of markets or scale; it is the predictable result of governance systems that permit cost externalization and elite exit. Follow my quick and painless logic.

Costco and France: Internalization as Governance Design

Costco shows that a firm can be highly profitable while paying higher wages, offering broad benefits, maintaining low turnover, and compressing internal pay ratios. Its business model—anchored by membership fees rather than labor extraction—means the firm internalizes labor and community costs rather than externalizes them. From a governance perspective, Costco practices predistribution. It prevents inequality from being generated inside the firm, rather than pushing it off on society to fix after the fact.

France applies the same logic at the national scale. Through sectoral bargaining, universal healthcare, social insurance, and fewer tax loopholes, France embeds shared responsibility directly into its economic architecture. Inequality is reduced before taxes and transfers because wages, benefits, and risks are collectively structured. The result is not the absence of markets, but markets with countervailing power and fewer avenues for elite exit.

In contrast, Walmart and the United States rely on a strategy of apparent “efficiency” achieved by shifting costs out and/or downward. Walmart’s low prices are partly subsidized by public assistance to workers; the U.S. economy’s “flexibility” is subsidized by household precarity, medical debt, student debt, and underinsurance. In both cases, the system looks cheap because costs are shifted, not eliminated.

Costco-Walmart: Universal Ownership Changes the Meaning of Fiduciary Duty

Universal ownership is not an ESG preference, as politicians in Texas, Florida, Oklahoma, West Virginia, Kentucky, Indiana, Kansas, Idaho, Utah, Wyoming, Arkansas, Missouri, Ohio, Arizona, and North Carolina seem to believe. Conservative policy groups driving anti‑ESG laws are heavily funded by wealthy donors and foundations tied to fossil‑fuel, extractive, and other regulated industries, aligning their campaigns with those businesses’ interests in weakening scrutiny of climate and social risks. Politicians and the public are being “taken for a ride.” The destination looks much bleaker than it could be.

ESG is a structural condition of modern capital markets. Large pension funds, index funds, and diversified asset managers do not own isolated companies—they own the economy. As Quigley’s work emphasizes, these investors cannot diversify away from wage stagnation, demand shortfalls driven by inequality, political instability, or climate risk. When one firm suppresses wages or externalizes costs, those harms reappear elsewhere in the portfolio as higher public spending, weaker consumption, and lower long-term returns.

From this vantage point, what appears to be firm-level value maximization also results in portfolio-level value destruction. Walmart-style cost externalization is not just socially harmful. It is irrational for universal owners whose beneficiaries depend on a stable, prosperous economy. This reality strains traditional interpretations of fiduciary duty that treat firms as isolated profit centers. (McRitchie v Zukerberg)

Costco-Walmart: Predistribution as Fiduciary Logic

Costco’s pay philosophy and France’s social-market institutions illustrate what universal ownership theory predicts. Internalizing costs upstream beats redistributing losses downstream. Both models reduce inequality before taxes and transfers. Both support stability, demand, and legitimacy—outcomes that universal owners disproportionately benefit from.

This insight should reframe the debate. Internalization is not altruism. It is risk management. In an economy owned broadly and held for the long term, externalization is self-harm.

Human Capital Governance: What the Evidence Adds

Recent research summarized on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance—What CHRO Compensation Tells Us About a Firm’s Human Capital Strategy—adds an evidence-based bridge between universal ownership and boardroom decisions.  Charles G. McClure and the other authors show that how firms compensate their Chief Human Resource Officer (CHRO) reliably signals whether human capital is strategic or merely rhetorical.

Key findings matter for fiduciary duty:

  • Relative pay signals authority: CHRO pay closer to CEO pay indicates real influence over strategy.
  • Better workforce outcomes: Higher CHRO pay ratios correlate with improved employee sentiment on compensation, culture, career opportunities, and work-life balance.
  • Innovation and returns: These workforce improvements are associated with greater intangible asset creation and higher future abnormal returns.
  • Markets can tell the difference: Investors respond more positively when CHRO appointments come with real authority, not symbolic titles.

This evidence undercuts a familiar defense of inequality—that investing in workers is “soft” or inconsistent with shareholder returns. It is neither. Human capital governance is value-relevant, and universal owners have a direct interest in it. We all do better With All the Brains in the Room, or as Paul Wellstone used to say, “we all do better when we all do better.”

Costco-Walmart: Fiduciary Duty, Reframed

Taken together, universal ownership theory and human-capital evidence should point to a modern understanding of fiduciary duty:

  • Duty of care should require boards to consider systemic risks arising from inequality and workforce degradation.
  • Duty of loyalty should require fiduciaries to prioritize beneficiaries’ long-term economic welfare over short-term extraction.
  • Executive compensation—including how authority is distributed across the management team—is a primary mechanism by which these duties are either honored or violated.
  • Costco’s model passes this test. Walmart’s does not.

Costco-Walmart: Looping Back to Executive Pay

This brings the argument back to where we began—with Rosanna Weaver’s observation and that long-ago McDonald’s proxy. When companies exclude Costco from peer groups due to “different pay philosophies,” they are quietly admitting the truth: pay philosophy is governance philosophy.

Executive compensation is not merely about incentives for one individual. It encodes how value is distributed, which functions are empowered, whose interests are prioritized, and which costs are internalized versus externalized. The CHRO pay ratio shows boards already understand this logic. They just apply it unevenly.

For universal owners—and for anyone serious about both corporate and civic governance—the implication is unavoidable:

If inequality is a systemic risk, then executive pay structures that entrench it are fiduciary failures, not neutral market outcomes.
Costco and France show what internalization looks like in practice. Universal ownership explains why it is now unavoidable. The choice is no longer between efficiency and equity. It is between internalizing costs now or paying for systemic collapse later. Of course, many people will be dead by then, so they may not care, resulting in many more deaths or discomfort for those left behind.

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