The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission was created to protect investors, ensure fair markets, and promote capital formation. Recent actions by SEC Chair Paul Atkins, however, risk undermining all three pillars—by disrupting shareholder rights, misapplying state law, and circumventing the transparent rulemaking process mandated under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).
At the heart of the issue is Rule 14a‑8, the SEC provision that allows shareholders to submit non-binding, or “precatory,” proposals for inclusion in a company’s proxy statement. For over 80 years, these proposals have offered investors a structured, cost-effective way to communicate concerns about governance, compensation, sustainability, and systemic risk. The proposals do not bind boards, but their inclusion has driven meaningful reforms—from majority voting and say-on-pay to ESG disclosure and board diversity.
On October 9, 2025, Chair Atkins proposed a sharp departure from this framework during a keynote address at the John L. Weinberg Center for Corporate Governance. He endorsed a legal theory suggesting that precatory proposals may not be “proper business” under Delaware law and encouraged companies to pursue exclusion under Rule 14a‑8(i)(1), which permits omission of proposals not proper under the laws of the issuer’s state of incorporation.
The speech leaves the uncanny impression that the Commission is now anointing itself the newest Vice Chancellor on the Delaware Court of Chancery, effectively creating new state law (which it can then itself bless), to carry out an agenda that affords companies sweeping rights to reject shareholder proposals without impediment or regard for precedent. (Commissioner Crenshaw)
Just weeks later, the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance announced that it would suspend substantive review of no-action requests for the 2026 proxy season—except for those invoking the “proper subject under state law” exclusion.
This carve-out is consequential. By allowing no-action review only for companies invoking state law to exclude proposals, the SEC effectively invites Delaware counsel to reinterpret or mischaracterize Delaware law to support exclusions. In doing so, the Commission has signaled a willingness to operationalize Chair Atkins’ legal theory without the APA’s statutory process—no notice, no public comment, no cost-benefit analysis. This is policymaking by fiat.
The theory lacks legal support. Delaware law has long accepted precatory shareholder proposals as proper business. Even the legal scholar cited by Chair Atkins, Kyle Pinder, has since clarified that his article was not intended to suggest that Delaware law prohibits precatory proposals, stating,
I was not saying that Delaware law prohibits a precatory proposal.
Indeed, Delaware corporations themselves recognize Rule 14a-8 proposals as “proper business” by expressly carving them out from their advance notice bylaws. And in the 1998 rulemaking release amending Rule 14a‑8, the SEC explicitly stated:
“[M]ost proposals that are cast as recommendations or requests that the board of directors take specified action are proper under state law.”
By shifting review away from the SEC and into state courts—primarily Delaware’s Chancery Court—Chair Atkins effectively forces shareholders into costly, protracted litigation in a jurisdiction that has recently adopted management-friendly laws in response to competition from other states such as Texas and Nevada. Delaware’s interest in preserving franchise fees and attracting incorporations creates a potential conflict when federal regulators attempt to manipulate state legal interpretations for political ends.
This overreach is all the more troubling given the substantial body of evidence showing that responsiveness to shareholder proposals adds value. A recent study of nearly 10,000 proposals submitted to S&P 1500 companies from 2005 to 2021 found that proposals that were either voted on or withdrawn after negotiation correlated with statistically significant increases in firm value (Tobin’s Q)—independent of proposal topic.
Chair Atkins’ strategy not only sidelines shareholder voice, but eviscerates decades of settled expectations, creates legal uncertainty, and undermines investor confidence in U.S. capital markets. It risks replacing the orderly no-action process with chaotic litigation and substitutes political preference for administrative process.
No prior SEC Chair has so blatantly attempted to instruct a state on how to reinterpret its corporate governance laws to sidestep rulemaking norms, with such disregard for public accountability. Such a move calls for scrutiny—not only by courts, but by Congress and the investing public.
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