When I started filing shareholder proposals in 2000, the hostile tender offer was already fading. Today, control usually changes hands differently: an activist hedge fund takes a stake and then brokers a sale, often to a private equity buyer. A new paper by Mike Burkart (LSE), Samuel Lee (Santa Clara), and Paul Voss (HEC Paris), The Evolution of the Market for Corporate Control, forthcoming in the Journal of Finance, gives a strong theoretical account of why. It’s summarized at the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance.
The Argument
The usual story is that takeover defenses spread, and legal changes made activism easier. The authors call that incomplete. In their view, the main driver is the growth in capital held by control-oriented investors, such as activist and buyout funds… not your average investors but part of a wealth elite.
Their model builds on Shleifer and Vishny’s Large Shareholders and Corporate Control (1986). A large shareholder who knows a firm could be worth more has two choices. She can take it over herself, or she can put it in play by inviting an outside bidder to negotiate a deal on behalf of all shareholders.
When a direct takeover is the only option, firms with modest upside never change hands. Small holders free-ride: they won’t tender below full value, so the premium a bidder must pay eats up her gain on her own stake. When she can sell instead, every value-improving control change goes through. The activist works as an intermediary that separates the free-rider problem from the information problem.
The market’s development follows from this. With few control investors, everyone buys stakes and direct takeovers dominate. As the sector grows, the two roles reinforce each other. More bidders make activism more profitable, and the reverse. Competition between bidders then shifts more of the gains to selling shareholders.
The Evidence
Hostile takeovers have declined faster than the number of public companies. Public-to-private buyouts show no downward trend, though. They have simply separated from hostile bids. In one cited sample, activists planned to make a bid themselves in only 3.2% of campaigns. Activists now work on the sell side, and buyout funds on the buy side, which is what the model predicts for a mature market.
Where Rule 14a-8 Fits
The authors note that most firms already had two or more takeover defenses by 1990. Use of staggered boards and poison pills peaked in the 1990s and fell after 2000, “arguably because of activism.” They also credit the 1992 proxy communication reforms with making it easier for shareholders to challenge management.
That is true as far as it goes, but the paper leaves something out. Much of the work of removing defenses was done not by hedge funds but by Rule 14a-8 proposals from retail proponents. John Chevedden, my wife Myra and I, and others filed hundreds of proposals to declassify boards, redeem poison pills, remove supermajority requirements, and let shareholders call special meetings or act by written consent. Those proposals cost almost nothing to introduce (other than our blood, sweat, and tears), won majority votes year after year, and cleared the ground for activists and buyout funds to operate.
That has a direct bearing on the SEC’s proposal to rescind Rule 14a-8. By the authors’ own logic, every defense that must be dismantled before a change in control raises the cost of market discipline. Take away the cheapest tool for dismantling defenses, and the market for corporate control works less well. The same reasoning applies to the newest generation of defenses: strict advance-notice bylaws that allow boards to disqualify nominees for technical defects. That is why I have been filing Right to Cure proposals.
What the Authors Leave Out
In this model, I am the dispersed free-rider, and takeover activism is good for me, since the activist negotiates a price for all shareholders. But the efficient endpoint is often a public-to-private buyout. That shrinks the public market and removes retail investors, employees, and broadly held ownership from the picture entirely. Employees and other stakeholders don’t appear in their model at all.
Efficient control allocation matters, but it shouldn’t be the only goal of good corporate governance. I would rather see more companies with broad employee ownership and governance built on consensus among trusts, public shareholders, employees, and founders, where no single interest can dominate. Ownership should be a lasting voice for many stakeholders, not only a position that specialized funds trade for the primary benefit of a wealthy few.
This paper is a rigorous account of how the market for corporate control works, and it’s worth reading. But the authors seem untroubled by a market in which control ultimately rests with a small circle of activist and buyout oligarchs. That may allocate control efficiently. However isn’t creating an economy that will work for most of us.
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