Ownership Without Voice image

Ownership Without Voice: Reconstructing Democratic Agency Through Public-Company ESOPs

This draft outlines ideas for discussion at The Future of Equity: Silicon Valley Employee Ownership Symposium, June 28-30, Palo Alto, CA. The objective is not simply to give employees stock to enable them to save for retirement or to incentivize them to work “harder.” It is to create forms of ownership that increase participation, improve governance, and build wealth without transferring excessive risk onto workers least able to bear it. Personally, I am also intrigued by the idea that increased employee stock ownership and participation in corporate governance at the firm level is likely to lead to greater involvement and a more robust political democracy.

(Update Post Symposium: Corey Rosen set me straight. ESOP shares are allocated to employees, but are not actually owned by them until they leave the company. I will need to revise my paper to take my misconception into account. Headlines will need toning down but many of my arguments remain valid.)

The paper proceeds from a simple observation: ownership rights have limited practical significance when institutional structures discourage their exercise. The challenge is not merely to expand ownership, but to transform ownership into meaningful governance agency while preserving fiduciary accountability and public-market discipline. We can do so, in part, by removing barriers ESOP stockholders face that ordinary stockholders do not.

This is a rough outline, intended to provoke discussion on broadening participation in ownership without undermining the coherence of governance in public companies. I look forward to learning from your insights at the Symposium or by correspondence to jm@corpov.net, and to substantially revising this draft, which is too long and repetitive, Ownership Without Voice 6-19-2026 draft.

No movement to create accountable companies, stronger markets, and healthier democracies will succeed solely using the written word.  You can listen to a podcast while walking a dog, driving, or working on anything that doesn’t require full attention.  The images, voices, and editing used to create Ownership Without Voice, a 26-minute overview, rely on AI, but the content is from my posts and papers on CorpGov.net, especially the one below. Yes, it is a strange world we live in. The “host” morphs into the “guest” and back using the same voice. However, the recording does a good job of summarizing my 69-page single-spaced draft and several posts.

Also pasted below is the PowerPoint presentation I plan to give at the Symposium. This version is probably better, because I used a script instead of a few notes. However, I’ll be able to have a dialogue with those attending the Symposium. Although I can’t replicate that here, please feel free to leave questions or comments below, and I’ll probably respond. You’ll need to scroll to the bottom of the site (very far down) to see the comment box.

Still too long? Fully Shared Capitalism is a 3-minute summary using “my own” AI voice, with just a little background music for dramatic effect. Or, listen to a 3-minute song trying to convince you to read the paper, Ownership Without Voice: Read the Paper. I don’t give up easily.

Abstract

American corporate law comfortably accommodates governance designs that entrench founders and senior executives with super-voting shares while public investors hold low-vote or even non-voting stock. Yet, many institutional investors and governance scholars remain wary of broad-based employee ownership that would give workers only ordinary common shares.

This asymmetry reveals an unstated premise of modern corporate governance: concentrated managerial control is considered ordinary, but broad-based employee participation in ownership remains institutionally suspect. Governance systems do not merely allocate authority; they also shape expectations regarding who is entitled to participate, whose knowledge is considered relevant, and which forms of voice are regarded as legitimate.

The modern corporation separates ownership from work at precisely the moment when human capital has become its primary—and often most valuable—productive asset, leaving its governance architecture anchored in an industrial-era model. Employees generate firm value through tacit knowledge, collaborative problem-solving, and discretionary effort that increasingly constitute the firm’s core intangible assets. Yet, they often remain excluded from both the financial returns and the governance rights associated with those assets. This separation produces inefficiencies within firms, opacity in capital markets, and a distribution of returns increasingly disconnected from value creation.

To repeat: Modern public companies increasingly derive their value from intangible assets embedded in human capital, innovation, organizational knowledge, and collaborative expertise rather than from traditional physical assets alone. Capital markets increasingly allocate most residual ownership, governance power, and wealth appreciation to founders and financiers reinforced by private equity structures, dual-class voting systems, and other mechanisms of concentrated control. This paper argues that broad-based public-company employee ownership offers a partial response to this systemic imbalance by more closely aligning ownership participation with the employees whose knowledge and productive capacities increasingly constitute the enterprise’s source of value.

Carefully structured employee ownership in public companies can help address these problems without undermining fiduciary governance, board authority, or shareholder-oriented decision-making. I develop a framework of “ownership without control capture,” under which employees hold a material but generally non-controlling equity stake, typically in the range of roughly 3 to 20% of outstanding shares.

My analysis focuses on Employee Stock Ownership Plans (“ESOPs”) because they already have the institutional infrastructure to enable scalable employee ownership in public companies. ESOPs permit tax deferral until retirement, encourage long-term ownership through vesting, and provide established fiduciary and administrative frameworks. However, existing ESOPs are primarily designed as retirement and compensation mechanisms, not as vehicles for governance participation. The laws governing the voting of ESOP shares, for example, do not appear to be as settled as those governing their tax treatment.

Public-company ESOPs, with more than 12 million participants, already recognize employee beneficial ownership in important respects. Because publicly traded employer securities are “registration-type securities” under the Internal Revenue Code, ESOP participants generally possess pass-through voting rights on allocated shares for matters submitted to shareholders. Federal securities law and shareholder proposal practice also appear to recognize at least some standing-related concepts associated with employee beneficial ownership.

Yet, meaningful governance agency often remains constrained by trustee control over unallocated or suspended shares, low participation rates, limited employee influence over ESOP governance structures, and practical barriers to the independent exercise of ordinary shareholder rights. As a result, ownership rights exist, but institutional structures may render them dormant.

For example, I could not find a single instance of an individual beneficial shareholder within an ESOP using those shares to file a shareholder proposal. The persistence of this pattern suggests that ownership rights alone may be insufficient. Institutions influence whether participants perceive themselves as legitimate governance actors capable of exercising those rights in practice.

These barriers are not merely procedural. Existing ESOP structures often treat employees primarily as retirement beneficiaries rather than as active owners. Therefore, we will aim not only to expand ownership, the number of participants, and the shares held, but to create institutional conditions under which ownership becomes a meaningful source of governance agency.

Employee ownership can improve incentives, strengthen long-term firm performance, increase governance accountability, broaden wealth formation, and enhance institutional legitimacy while preserving board primacy and the institutional integrity of U.S. corporate governance. Recent census-based research further suggests that productivity gains are significantly larger where employee ownership is paired with meaningful participatory practices rather than passive ownership alone. Therefore, most shareholders should welcome more emphasis on such participation.

Historical experience demonstrates that non-public companies face an important durability challenge. Highly successful worker-owned enterprises ultimately dissolved not because employee ownership failed economically, but because concentrated and illiquid ownership structures created strong incentives for worker-owners to sell to outside investors. Public-company ESOPs may offer a more stable institutional framework by combining broad-based employee ownership with public-market liquidity, diversified outside ownership, replenishment mechanisms, and bounded, non-controlling governance participation.

The paper proposes a governance-centered reform agenda focused primarily on public-company ESOPs, including:

  • stronger mechanisms for meaningful ordinary shareholder participation by ESOP participants, including voting and shareholder proposal rights;
  • improved transparency regarding trustee governance and voting procedures;
  • safeguards against managerial entrenchment;
  • abstention as the default rule for unallocated shares;
  • enhanced disclosure regarding employee ownership, voting agency, and history;
  • clarification of employee-shareholder rights under federal securities law and SEC proxy rules, including standing to file shareholder proposals and group‑formation parameters under Section 13(d);
  • standardized disclosure of labor-cost and human-capital structures; and
  • ETFs or other vehicles incentivizing the study of and transformation of participatory practices at partially employee-owned public companies.

In summary, this paper argues that public company ESOPs should evolve from primarily being retirement vehicles into mechanisms that also embrace meaningful, non-controlling shareholder participation. The goal is to enable employees to exercise ordinary governance rights—voting, communication, and proposal submission—without creating durable control blocs or undermining board-centered fiduciary governance.

Part I. The Growing Divide Between Those Who Work and Those Who Own

Section A. Growing Wealth Inequality

Graph showing Wealth by Percentile Group

In the fourth quarter of 2025, the top 1% of U.S. households owned roughly 32% of the nation’s wealth—near the highest level since the Federal Reserve began tracking in 1989. The wealthiest 1% held approximately $104 trillion, roughly equal to the combined wealth of the bottom 90% of Americans. The concentration is more pronounced in corporate ownership. Federal Reserve data shows the top 10% of households own 87% of all individually held stocks and mutual funds. The bottom 50% held just 1%. Ownership is increasingly dominated by a narrow financial elite. [Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Distributional Financial Accounts Overview, March 27, 2026]

American capitalism faces growing questions regarding legitimacy, participation, and ownership concentration. At a moment when American capitalism faces increasing scrutiny, one structural feature of the public corporation deserves renewed attention: those who create value rarely participate meaningfully in either ownership or governance despite their central contributions to enterprise production, organizational knowledge, and long-term firm performanc

e. Employees supply firm‑specific human capital, generate innovation, maintain customer relationships, solve operational problems, and transmit institutional knowledge. Yet, in most public companies, their participation in residual claims remains thin and/or highly concentrated among executives.

This disconnect is not simply inequitable or inefficient. It increasingly creates a legitimacy gap in modern corporate governance by excluding many of the individuals who contribute firm-specific knowledge, bear enterprise-specific risks, and participate directly in the firm’s productive activities from meaningful ownership and governance. Governance institutions do more than allocate economic rights; they also teach participation. Reconnecting ownership and work does not require abandoning shareholder governance or rewriting fiduciary duties. It requires expanding the shareholder base itself and allowing employee owners the same governance rights as ordinary shareholders. [Joseph R. Blasi, Richard B. Freeman & Douglas L. Kruse, The Citizen’s Share: Reducing Inequality in the 21st Century (2013)]

Institutions derive durability not solely from economic performance but also from broadly shared perceptions that participation, contribution, and reward remain meaningfully connected. Governance institutions do more than allocate economic rights. They also shape expectations regarding who is entitled to participate, whose knowledge is considered relevant, and which forms of voice are regarded as legitimate. [Peter L. Berger & Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (1966) (arguing that institutions and social conventions become socially real through habitualization, legitimation, and the internalization of expected roles.)]

The point is not merely descriptive. If institutions help construct the social reality within which people act, they can also be reconstructed. Corporate governance does not simply reflect preexisting economic relationships; it teaches participants whether they are owners, beneficiaries, workers, outsiders, monitors, or merely costs. The practical exclusion of employee-shareholders from governance therefore becomes self-reinforcing. When employees are treated as passive plan participants rather than ordinary beneficial owners, they may come to experience ownership itself as passive. A central purpose of this Article is to interrupt that pattern by suggesting we design institutions that make employee ownership socially meaningful as well as legally real.

The consequences of ownership concentration fall unevenly along racial lines. According to the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances, the median white household has approximately $285,000 in net worth, about six times as much wealth as the typical Black family, and five times as much as the typical Hispanic family.  The disparities in equity ownership drive that difference. Broad-based employee ownership cannot solve historical discrimination alone, but it can provide a systematic channel for wealth accumulation that does not depend on inherited capital or family networks. [Aditya Aladangady, Andrew C. Chang, and Jacob Krimmel, Greater Wealth, Greater Uncertainty: Changes in Racial Inequality in the Survey of Consumer Finances, Feds Notes, October 18, 2023]

In 2025, the average S&P 500 CEO earned 281 times the pay of a typical worker, up from 21‑to‑1 in 1965. CEO compensation grew 1,094% between 1978 and 2024, while the typical worker’s compensation grew just 26%, despite an 80.5% increase in productivity. The gap between the value workers generate and the value they capture is not a bug of modern capitalism. It is a feature of its governance architecture. [Economic Policy Institute, “CEO-to-worker pay has skyrocketed over the last six decades” (2025)]

The issue is not simply distributive. Ownership concentrates governance influence, access to information, and agenda-setting power within the institutions that shape economic life. As employees become more central to enterprise value creation, governance structures organized primarily around capital providers or founders become increasingly difficult to justify. Broader employee ownership and voice would also strengthen corporate governance, not only by improving incentives and monitoring, but also by increasing institutional participation, internal accountability, and organizational legitimacy within firms that increasingly function as major social and economic governing institutions.

Section B. The ESOP Framework

How Many Workers Are in ESOPs? TablePublic-company ESOPs provide an important, though incomplete, institutional response to this problem. Over 12 million employees and retirees already participate in public-company ESOP structures, making employee beneficial ownership an established feature of modern American capitalism regulated under ERISA, rather than a speculative institutional alternative. That is more than 4 times the number of ESOP participants in public companies, so they become a sensible focus for transforming the economy.

Privately held ESOPs have often proven more durable as ownership structures, frequently maintaining or increasing employee ownership over decades. Public-company ESOPs, by contrast, face greater risks of dilution and ownership drift. Yet public markets solve many of the liquidity, valuation, succession, and demutualization pressures that have historically challenged employee-owned firms, suggesting that public-company ESOPs may offer a more scalable and institutionally sustainable model of broad-based ownership despite requiring periodic replenishment mechanisms.

Despite the widespread existence of public-company ESOPs, there is no documented instance of an individual ESOP participant using allocated shares to submit a shareholder proposal under SEC Rule 14a-8. The formal rights of ownership exist; the practical agency does not. If millions of employee-shareholders possess ownership rights but none appear to have exercised one of the most basic rights of corporate citizenship, the explanation likely lies not in apathy alone but in institutional design. The rights exist. The mechanisms necessary to exercise them effectively often do not.

Employee ownership occupies an unusual position in contemporary governance debates. Concentrated voting structures that enhance founder or managerial control are routinely accepted as familiar features of corporate governance. Yet, proposals to broaden employee ownership are often met with greater skepticism, even when employees would hold only ordinary common shares and remain far from an influential bloc. The contrast raises an important institutional question: why are some forms of concentrated authority treated as ordinary while broader participation is treated as exceptional? Why do existing ESOP structures typically focus on ownership accumulation rather than ownership participation, even when the evidence suggests that participation is often central to realizing the full benefits of ownership?

ESOPs encourage long-term ownership, gradual vesting, and tax deferral until retirement or distribution. In publicly traded companies, ESOP participants generally possess pass-through voting rights on allocated shares because employer securities constitute “registration-type securities” under the Internal Revenue Code. Yet, these structures often continue to treat employees primarily as retirement beneficiaries, rather than as active governance participants.

The absence of shareholder proposals supported by ESOP-held shares suggests that procedural and institutional barriers may be more significant and purposeful than commonly recognized. The question is not whether employee ownership can exist within public corporations. It already does. The challenge is whether employee owners can participate more meaningfully in corporate governance without creating durable employee-control blocs.

This article advances a model of employee ownership that may reduce governance capture by founders, private equity, or public-market activists. Its premise is that employee ownership should be material enough to shape incentives, monitoring, engagement, and long-term alignment, while remaining sufficiently dispersed to preserve ordinary shareholder governance and board-centered fiduciary authority. Existing evidence suggests that ownership levels in the range of approximately three to twenty percent of outstanding equity may represent a workable institutional range. Ownership within that band appears capable of influencing productivity, retention, monitoring, and firm culture while remaining below levels likely to trigger significant investor concerns regarding labor domination or governance displacement.

Recent Census‑based research, discussed in Part IV, finds that ESOP adoption is associated with meaningful productivity gains, and that these gains nearly double when combined with broad‑based group performance pay.

The proposed three-to-twenty percent ownership range is not derived mechanically from those productivity estimates. Rather, it reflects a governance judgment that employee ownership should be substantial enough to produce meaningful incentive alignment while remaining sufficiently dispersed to avoid durable governance capture or investor concerns regarding coordinated labor control. Within that range, ownership remains broadly distributed across the workforce and embedded within governance structures that preserve fiduciary accountability, board primacy, ordinary shareholder voting, and market discipline. [See Fidan Ana Kurtulus et al., Employee Share Ownership, Management Practices, and Labor Productivity: An Analysis Using Establishment Level Micro‑Data from the U.S. Census, (March 29, 2026).]

This article’s central claim is deliberately modest in legal form but ambitious in consequence. It does not argue that employees should displace shareholders as the firm’s residual claimants. It does not argue for mandatory codetermination, labor‑designated directors, or a general redefinition of fiduciary duty. Nor does it argue that employee ownership should substitute for wages or collective bargaining. Instead, it argues that investor-owned corporations can be made more productive, more legitimate, and more broadly wealth‑building by incorporating employees as significant but non-controlling shareholders using the existing ESOP framework. Increasing the involvement of ESOP shareholders in corporate governance is also likely to lead to increased involvement in civic governance and a stronger democracy.

This approach differs from many stakeholder‑governance proposals. Rather than asking directors to balance stakeholder interests under indeterminate standards, such as those imposed by benefit corporations, this approach preserves the core architecture of corporate law for most companies. Directors remain fiduciaries. The board remains the central decision‑making body. Shareholder voting remains the formal mechanism of accountability. What changes is the composition of the shareholder base. Employees become shareholders in a meaningful, broad‑based, and transparent manner, but without special governance rights that could displace ordinary shareholder governance or insulate management from market discipline. [Cheng-chi (Kirin) Chang, Substance over Symbolism: Do We Need Benefit Corporation Laws? (October 30, 2024).]

This paper refers to this gap as “Ownership Without Voice.” The title emphasizes the gap between beneficial ownership and meaningful governance agency. Governance agency refers to the practical capacity to exercise ownership rights through voting, communication, proposal submission, and other ordinary mechanisms of shareholder participation. As I discuss in Part III.D, even successful privately held employee ownership systems face a “demutualization paradox.” The more economically successful they become, the greater the incentive for members to liquidate collective claims into private wealth. Public-company ESOPs operate within liquid external capital markets that permit diversification, continuous pricing, replenishment of ownership pools, and gradual ownership transitions without requiring sale of the enterprise itself.

The Article proceeds in eleven Parts. Part II explains why the rise of the human-capital-intensive firm exposes the incompleteness of current ownership, disclosure, and governance structures, particularly where employees increasingly function as both workers and beneficial owners through public-company ESOPs. Part III discusses the economic foundations of employee ownership, team production, firm-specific human capital, and the tension between employee risk-bearing and governance participation.

Part IV reviews the empirical evidence regarding employee ownership, productivity, retention, firm performance, and the risks associated with concentrated control or excessive managerial insulation. Part V examines the corporate-law framework governing public corporations, including Delaware fiduciary doctrine, board primacy, and the extent to which existing governance law already tolerates concentrated insider ownership through dual-class, multi-class, and other control-enhancing structures while remaining comparatively underdeveloped with respect to broad-based employee ownership.

Part VI develops the concept of broad-based but non-controlling employee ownership, arguing that employee ownership in the range of roughly three to twenty percent may strengthen incentives, participation, and long-term alignment without displacing ordinary systems of fiduciary governance or diversified public ownership. Part VII analyzes the institutional architecture necessary to make public-company ESOP ownership both economically meaningful and governance-compatible, including pass-through voting, abstention or unallocated shares, trustee accountability, proposal rights, ownership verification, allocation structures, diversification protections, and safeguards against managerial entrenchment or hidden control blocs.

Part VIII contrasts two institutional pathways toward shared ownership—private-company employee ownership models such as Hy-Vee and public-company participation models such as Tractor Supply—illustrating how employee ownership can evolve within both closely held and public-market environments. Part IX proposes a governance-centered policy framework for modernizing public-company employee ownership through enhanced disclosure, stronger governance participation rights, improved transparency regarding trustee authority and ownership concentration, clarification of employee-shareholder rights under federal securities law and SEC proxy rules, and reforms designed to facilitate meaningful employee participation without undermining public-market accountability.

Part X discusses how employee ownership and participation could impact our larger society. Part XI concludes by arguing that broad-based employee ownership is not a departure from shareholder capitalism but a potential institutional modernization of it—one capable of reconnecting human capital, governance participation, and long-term wealth formation within existing systems of public-company ownership.

The central argument of this paper is that public company ESOPs should evolve from primarily serving as retirement and incentive mechanisms into governance participation vehicles—without abandoning their tax-advantaged, fiduciary, or retirement-oriented characteristics.  Download Ownership Without Voice 6-14-2026 – DRAFT.

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