This post on three shareholder rights advocates examines the history and impact of individual shareholder activism in the United States through the figures of Lewis Gilbert, John Chevedden, and James McRitchie. Note: After I posted this article, Carl Hagberg reminded me,
in case you or any other governance geeks like us might be interested, there are profiles on the OPTIMIZERONLINE website – under the HISTORY section – of the Gilbert bothers – and also of the equally colorful and pioneering Wilma Soss – and of Evelyn Y. Davis – who, after years of bizarre acting-up at shareholder meetings also made major changes on the governance scene… and also of Tim Smith, who advanced the end of apartheid by at least 10 years in my book. I HOPE there will always be a few activists like them, but As You Sow, ICCR and others – especially informal coalitions of the public pension funds – are making bigger and faster impacts for the better these days.
(Note: That made it very easy to add a new section at the bottom, drawing heavily from Carl Hagberg’s writing.)
In an era when corporate equity markets in the United States are measured in the tens of trillions of dollars, and institutional investors hold the overwhelming majority of public company shares, it is a remarkable paradox that the corporate governance agenda has been shaped — and continues to be shaped — by a handful of individual shareholders owning tiny slivers of stock. These individuals have used the Securities and Exchange Commission’s shareholder proposal mechanism under Rule 14a-8 to drive reforms that have fundamentally altered the governance landscape of American corporations. [see Jay B. Sykes, The Shareholder Proposal Rule, CRS Report R48855 (Feb. 11, 2026)]
As Professors Kobi Kastiel and Yaron Nili observed in their landmark study, individual shareholder rights advocates present “a puzzling reality” in which “much of [the] corporate governance agenda has been and is still dominated by a handful of individuals who own tiny slivers of most large companies.” (The Giant Shadow of Corporate Gadflies, Review on CorpGov.net). That may be. However, those tiny slivers are primarily held by the wealthiest Americans. The three shareholder rights advocates discussed here held or hold stakes in hundreds of companies. Tiny slivers often grow into substantial piles.
Introduction to Three Shareholder Rights Advocates
This article traces the genealogy of individual shareholder activism across three generational figures: Lewis Gilbert (1907–1993), who pioneered the very concept of shareholder democracy; John Chevedden (active 1994–present), who industrialized the individual proposal model into a governance reform engine of unprecedented scale; and James McRitchie (active 1995–present), who expanded the activist toolkit beyond proposals to include rulemaking petitions, digital infrastructure, and coalition-building. Together, these three advocates represent not merely a sequence of personalities but an evolving institutional form — the individual shareholder as a structural counterweight to managerial entrenchment.
The story of individual shareholder activism is inseparable from the legal infrastructure that enables it: SEC Rule 14a-8, the shareholder proposal rule. Adopted in 1942 and refined over the succeeding eight decades, the rule grants any eligible shareholder the right to include a proposal in a company’s proxy materials for a vote at the annual meeting. [The SEC adopted the predecessor to Rule 14a-8 — then designated Rule X-14A-7 — in 1942. See Marc I. Steinberg, The Federalization of Corporate Governance 157–90 (2018); see also Investor Rights Forum, The History of SEC Rules and Shareholder Proposal Regulation.] It is, in essence, the constitutional foundation of shareholder democracy in the United States — the mechanism through which minority shareholders can place items on the corporate ballot without incurring the prohibitive costs of an independent proxy solicitation.
Yet this foundation is under sustained assault. In September 2025, the House Financial Services Committee convened a hearing titled “Proxy Power and Proposal Abuse: Reforming Rule 14a-8 to Protect Shareholder Value,” at which legislators considered bills that would, among other things, remove the significant social policy exception from the ordinary business exclusion, impose registration requirements on proxy advisory firms, and authorize outright repeal of the shareholder proposal rule itself. (Fair Corporate Suffrage or Federal Overreach? The 1943 Hearings and Rule 14a-8)
State legislatures have introduced their own restrictions, including Texas SB 1057, which would impose a $1 million or 3% ownership threshold for proposal eligibility — effectively eliminating individual shareholder proposals. (Raising the Bar or Closing the Door on Shareholder Democracy?) 
Against this backdrop, it is essential to understand what individual shareholder activism has actually accomplished and what would be lost if the shareholder rights tradition were extinguished. This article provides that analysis through the lens of three generations of practice. A note on perspective: this article is written from a participant’s vantage point. I am one of the three subjects examined and have collaborated extensively with John Chevedden for over two decades. I have endeavored to present the evidence as objectively as the posture permits, but the reader should be aware of the inherent limitations of first-person scholarship.
Three Shareholder Rights Advocates and Music for a Democratic Corporate Governance
The Regulatory Architecture: Rule 14a-8 as the Foundation of Individual Activism
No account of individual shareholder activism is complete without an examination of the legal infrastructure that makes it possible. SEC Rule 14a-8 — the shareholder proposal rule — is the single most important mechanism for shareholder voice in American corporate governance. Its history illuminates both the promise and the fragility of shareholder democracy.
Origins: The 1942 Rule and the Principle of Fair Corporate Suffrage
Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 authorized the SEC to regulate proxy solicitation, but it was not until 1942 that the Commission adopted the predecessor to Rule 14a-8 — then designated as Rule X-14A-7. The rule was grounded in the Commission’s conclusion that proxy materials would be materially misleading if they omitted shareholder proposals of which management had notice. (From Legitimacy to Logic: Reconstructing Proxy Regulation) As one court later explained, “the rationale underlying this development was the Commission’s belief that the corporate practice of circulating proxy materials which failed to refer to the fact that a shareholder intended to present a proposal at the annual meeting rendered the solicitation inherently misleading.” [TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Investor Rights Forum, The History of SEC Rules and Shareholder Proposal Regulation] The rule gave concrete meaning to the concept of “fair corporate suffrage” that the Senate Banking and Currency Committee had identified as a core purpose of the 1934 Act.
The 1943 Hearings: Congressional Pushback and SEC Defense
The new rule immediately provoked congressional opposition. In June 1943, the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce summoned SEC Chair Ganson Purcell to testify on the Commission’s proxy rulemaking authority. The central question was whether the SEC had strayed beyond its statutory mandate of disclosure into the substantive management of corporate affairs. (Fair Corporate Suffrage or Federal Overreach? The 1943 Hearings and Rule 14a-8) The arguments raised in 1943 — that the rule imposed undue burdens on issuers, that it was susceptible to abuse by cranks and individual shareholders, and that it constituted federal overreach into matters properly governed by state corporate law — would prove remarkably durable, resurfacing in virtually identical form in every subsequent debate over the rule’s scope and existence.
This legislative agenda is animated by the same debates that have recurred since 1943: whether the proxy process should remain a disclosure regime grounded in shareholder franchise, or become an arena for regulating corporate governance, social policy, and institutional investor stewardship.
Judicial Validation: SEC v. Transamerica
The legal foundation of the shareholder proposal right was solidified in SEC v. Transamerica Corp., in which the Third Circuit upheld the SEC’s authority to require inclusion of shareholder proposals in proxy materials. The case arose from Transamerica’s refusal to include proposals submitted by the Gilbert brothers — a direct connection between the judicial architecture and the activist tradition that this article traces. The court’s holding established that the SEC’s proxy rules were a legitimate exercise of the Commission’s authority under Section 14(a) and that shareholder proposals were an integral component of the disclosure regime. (The Transamerica Case and the Development of the Shareholder Proposal)
The Substantive Exclusions and Their Evolution
Over the decades, the SEC refined Rule 14a-8 through a series of amendments that established the substantive grounds on which companies may exclude shareholder proposals. The most significant exclusions include: (i) the “ordinary business” exclusion, which permits companies to omit proposals that relate to the company’s ordinary business operations; (Staff Legal Bulletin No. 14M) (ii) the “relevance” exclusion, which allows omission of proposals relating to operations that account for less than 5% of the company’s total assets, net earnings, and gross sales, and that are not otherwise significantly related to the company’s business; and (iii) the “election of directors” exclusion under Rule 14a-8(i)(8), which the SEC broadened in 2007 and which was the focus of the proxy access debate that culminated in Rule 14a-11 and its subsequent invalidation by the D.C. Circuit in Business Roundtable v. SEC.
The Pendulum Swing: Staff Legal Bulletins and Political Cycles
The practical scope of Rule 14a-8 has been shaped as much by SEC staff guidance as by formal rulemaking. The pendulum has swung dramatically in recent years. Staff Legal Bulletins 14I through 14K (2017–2020), issued under the Trump administration, expanded the grounds for excluding shareholder proposals — particularly by allowing boards to invoke “economic relevance” and “ordinary business” exclusions more aggressively and by increasing deference to board-level determinations of significance. Staff Legal Bulletin 14L (2021), issued under the Biden administration, reversed course, narrowing the exclusion grounds and re-establishing the principle that proposals raising significant social policy issues are not excludable as ordinary business. Most recently, Staff Legal Bulletin 14M signaled another reversal, and the SEC announced in November 2025 that during the 2025–2026 proxy season it would not respond to no-action requests other than those raising Rule 14a-8(i)(1) bases — a move that effectively suspended the no-action process for most substantive exclusions.
Current Legislative Threats
The September 2025 House Financial Services Committee hearing “Proxy Power and Proposal Abuse: Reforming Rule 14a-8 to Protect Shareholder Value” may represent the most serious legislative challenge to the shareholder proposal rule since 1943. The proposed bills would, among other measures, remove the “significant social policy” exception from the ordinary business exclusion, authorize issuers to exclude environmental, social, and political proposals entirely, impose registration requirements and expanded liability on proxy advisory firms, and, in one bill, repeal Rule 14a-8 outright. As Doyle and Eccles documented in their analysis of the historical parallels, “the same debates that have recurred since 1943” — burden, abuse, overreach — animate the current proposals.(Fair Corporate Suffrage or Federal Overreach? The 1943 Hearings and Rule 14a-8) The Congressional Research Service’s comprehensive 2026 report on the shareholder proposal rule provides essential context for evaluating these proposals.
Learn more about investor rights, why they are important, and how we have joined together to fight those rolling back our rights. Visit the Investor Rights Forum. Would you like to become an advocate? Visit End Supermajority Requirements: Become an Advocate. That post will lead you to several others that provide hundreds of filing opportunities for proposals that will get majority or near majority votes. I name the companies and provide examples of what to file. Additionally, I provide a Handbook with further details.

Investor Rights Forum
Lewis Gilbert: Patriarch of Shareholder Democracy
The story of individual shareholder activism in the United States begins with Lewis D. Gilbert, who attended his first shareholder meeting in 1933 and spent the next six decades building the conceptual and legal foundations of shareholder democracy. Gilbert’s career illustrates both the power and the limitations of the individual activist model — a personal crusade that achieved permanent structural reforms but ultimately depended on the energy and commitment of a single extraordinary individual.
If dividends are the harvest,
then democracy is the soil management system.
Ignore the soil long enough—
and the harvest stops coming.
Neither of the Gilberts ever said or wrote that. It is just me, reflecting on corporate governance in the 1950s and 60s. Buybacks were long treated as an illegal form of market manipulation. However, in 1982, the SEC’s Rule 10b‑18 gave companies a clear legal “safe harbor” for repurchases. Stock quickly became more important than dividends since they are more flexible for companies and more tax‑efficient for investors and corporate executives. Over the last year or so, U.S. companies spent about $1 trillion on buybacks versus $3/4 trillion on dividends. Buybacks can still be timed and structured to disproportionately benefit corporate executives whose pay is commonly tied to the stock price or earnings per share, but corrupting influences on management are far less of a public concern these days.
Origins: The 1933 Consolidated Gas Meeting
Lewis Gilbert was born in 1907 into a family whose fortune dated to the California Gold Rush, when his great-grandparents sold provisions to the forty-niners. (The Original “Shareholder Activists” and the Founders of the Modern Corporate Governance Movement) After the family relocated to the East Coast in the early 1900s, it was Gilbert’s grandmother who established the family’s position in the equity markets — purchasing, according to legend, shares of every single dividend-paying stock on the New York Stock Exchange after the market crash of 1929 “for literally pennies per share.” The family’s Park Avenue apartment would later serve as the headquarters for the Gilbert brothers’ proxy-proposal operation.
In 1933, Lewis attended the annual meeting of the Consolidated Gas Company (soon to become Consolidated Edison) in Brooklyn, New York. “I expected to be welcomed cordially and to be treated like one of the owners,” he later recalled. He was not. The story Chevedden heard or read about the 1933 meeting was that during the meeting, Gilbert asked a question, and the Chairman said questions would be taken at the end of the meeting. And at the end of the meeting, the Chairman simply said “meeting adjourned” without any opportunity for questions.
The experience — of being treated as an interloper at a meeting of a company he partly owned — catalyzed a lifelong commitment to the principle that corporations exist for the benefit of their shareholders, not their managers. It was a simple proposition, but one that proved revolutionary in its implications.
The Gilbert Brothers and the Campaign for Corporate Democracy
Lewis was joined in his activism by his brother John J. Gilbert (1914–2002). Together, the Gilbert brothers became what one chronicler called “the original champions of, and untiring fighters for ‘Corporate Democracy.'” They founded Corporate Democracy, Inc., an organization dedicated to representing minority shareholders at corporate annual meetings, and published an annual volume — the Annual Report of Stockholder Activities at Corporation Meetings — that documented proxy season results and tracked the adoption of governance reforms across American corporations.
The Gilbert brothers’ core governance demands were straightforward and, by today’s standards, remarkably prescient: cumulative voting for the election of directors, independent auditor ratification by shareholders, the right to submit shareholder proposals for a vote, and meaningful disclosure of executive compensation. (To Change What We See Fit: The Gilbert Brothers’ Transition from Gadflies to Activists) Each of these demands addressed a specific mechanism of managerial entrenchment — and each, over time, became a standard feature of American corporate governance.
The Transamerica Campaign and Its Legal Legacy
The Gilbert brothers’ most consequential campaign targeted Transamerica Corporation in the mid-1940s. When Transamerica refused to include its shareholder proposals in its proxy materials, the SEC intervened on the Gilberts’ behalf, and the resulting litigation culminated in SEC v. Transamerica Corp. — the Third Circuit decision that validated the legal foundation of the shareholder proposal right. The Transamerica campaign is credited with establishing two features of modern shareholder rights that are now taken for granted: (1) the ability of shareholders to ratify the appointment of outside auditors, and (2) the right to submit shareholder proposals for inclusion in the corporate proxy and ballot. Professor Jill Fisch’s detailed analysis of the Transamerica case and its role in the development of the shareholder proposal rule remains the definitive scholarly treatment of this episode. (The Transamerica Case and the Development of the Shareholder Proposal)
Philosophy and Legacy
Gilbert’s philosophy was encapsulated in a single, oft-repeated maxim: “A corporation is run for the benefit of its shareholders and not that of its management.” This was not, at the time, a platitude — it was a radical assertion of ownership rights against a managerial class that had, as Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means documented in their 1932 classic The Modern Corporation and Private Property, effectively seized control of the corporate form while leaving the formal apparatus of shareholder governance intact.
The limitations of Gilbert’s model, however, are equally instructive. As Brian Sarginger documented in his 2023 Business History Conference paper “To Change What We See Fit,” the shareholder movement that Gilbert built was “a mostly personal crusade” whose “particular conditions and personality” meant that “the Shareholder Movement ended with his retirement.” Gilbert had no institutional infrastructure, no digital platform, no coalition of allied filers. His influence depended entirely on his personal energy, his family wealth, and his willingness to show up, year after year, at annual meeting after annual meeting. After filing hundreds of proposals over the course of more than forty years, he finally won majority support for a proposal at Chock Full o’Nuts in 1987. When he died in 1993, the movement he had created might have died with him.
Contrary to Sarginger’s assertion, it did not. The governance reforms the Gilbert brothers championed — auditor ratification, proxy proposals, compensation disclosure — had become permanent features of American corporate governance. And a new generation of individual activists was already emerging, ready to build on the foundations Gilbert had laid. (see also Lewis Gilbert’s Dividends and Democracy Still Timely)
John Chevedden: The Most Successful Filer in History
If Lewis Gilbert created the individual shareholder activist paradigm, John Chevedden scaled it to a volume never seen. Since the mid-1990s, Chevedden has submitted more shareholder proposals than any other individual or organization in American corporate history, transforming what had been a craft practice — one man at one meeting — into a systematic, scalable governance reform operation of extraordinary breadth and impact. Yet, his is still basically a one-person effort. Unlike John Gilbert, he has no brother to help him or to take over when he dies. I estimate Chevedden has filed more than 3,000 proposals.
Origins: From Hughes Aircraft to the Annual Meeting
Chevedden’s path to shareholder activism was, characteristically, unsentimental. After a career at Hughes Aircraft (then a division of General Motors) in the early 1990s, he channeled his technical precision and procedural expertise into the shareholder proposal process. When Lewis Gilbert died in 1993, John Gilbert continued the movement for a few years. John Gilbert met with John Chevedden and introduced him to his style of attending annual meetings. Chevedden met John Gilbert at his hotel, and “we both went to the 1994 Time Warner annual shareholder meeting in Burbank, California. We both then attended the General Motors annual meeting the next day in Shreveport, Louisiana.”
Chevedden’s first proposal, submitted to GM in 1994, was rejected. His revised proposal in 1995 — requesting an independent board chair — received 15% of the vote, a respectable showing that signaled the viability of his approach. From that point forward, Chevedden never stopped filing. Three decades later, he is by far the most prolific filer in the history of Rule 14a-8. Responsible Investor noted in early May 2026, despite SEC changes making getting a filing to the proxy, “of the 25 highest-supported governance resolutions compiled by RBC Capital Markets, 21 were filed by Chevedden.” (Legendary proxy filer slams SEC attack on shareholder proposals)
The Economy-Class Model
Ross Kerber’s Reuters special report aptly dubbed Chevedden an “economy-class activist investor” — a description that captures the essence of his method. Unlike hedge fund activists who acquire significant ownership positions to leverage economic pressure, Chevedden operates on a shoestring. He purchases the shares necessary to qualify under Rule 14a-8 in many companies, as he has explained, “for growth opportunities and for the chance to sponsor resolutions.” The genius of the model is its scalability. By focusing most of his attention on widely adopted and supported corporate governance reforms, Chevedden can submit proposals across a vast swath of corporate America, applying similar governance reform pressures simultaneously to dozens of companies in a single proxy season. I use a giant spreadsheet to keep track of my proposals. Chevedden mostly relies on codes and symbols he has developed over the years that look like hieroglyphics on paper to me.
The scale of his one-man operation is staggering. In the 2025 proxy season alone, Chevedden submitted approximately 256 proposals — roughly one-third of all shareholder proposal submissions and approximately half of all governance-related proposals. Gibson Dunn, Sullivan & Cromwell, and the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance annual tallies often showed Chevedden and his “associates” (William Steiner and me) accounting for approximately 31% of all shareholder proposals and three-quarters of those submitted by individuals.
Core Governance Themes and Notable Successes
Chevedden’s proposals focus on a tightly defined set of governance reforms that are, in the aggregate, aimed at dismantling the structural defenses that insulate incumbent boards and management from shareholder accountability:
- Lower thresholds for calling special meetings — enabling shareholders to convene meetings outside the regular annual cycle to address urgent governance concerns;
- Written consent rights — permitting shareholders to act by written consent without waiting for an annual meeting;
- Elimination of supermajority vote requirements — removing provisions that require 67% or 80% supermajority votes to amend bylaws or charter provisions, which effectively give management a veto;
- Board declassification — requiring annual election of all directors rather than staggered three-year terms that insulate boards from shareholder accountability;
- Proxy access — enabling shareholders to nominate director candidates for inclusion in the company’s proxy materials; and
- Independent chair policies — separating the CEO and board chair roles to enhance board independence.
The support Chevedden’s proposals receive is remarkable. His career average of approximately 41% support for shareholder proposals is extraordinarily high, given that these proposals are typically advisory and often opposed by management. Individual results can be striking: 98.8% support for a simple-majority vote proposal at Domino’s Pizza; 98% support for board declassification at EPAM Systems; 45% support at Home Depot for special meeting rights; and 42% support at McDonald’s for written consent. In 2024, Chevedden’s proposals contributed to a record-breaking proxy season, in which 30 shareholder proposals received majority support under simple-majority voting and related governance reforms, according to Gibson Dunn.
The Ripple Effect: Driving Management-Initiated Reform
Perhaps the most significant — and most underappreciated — dimension of Chevedden’s impact is the management-initiated reform that his proposals catalyze. When companies observe high levels of shareholder support for shareholder proposals at peer firms, boards often pre-empt future proposals by voluntarily adopting the requested reforms or placing their own management proposals on the ballot. The data is compelling. Following the high success rate of shareholder proposals in the 2024 proxy season, management proposals to remove supermajority provisions surged from 44 in 2024 to 76 in 2025; management proposals for board declassification rose from 40 to 54; and management proposals for special meeting rights increased from 20 to 27. These management-initiated reforms are, in a meaningful sense, the product of Chevedden’s shareholder activism. Proposals that were never filed, because the threat of filing backed by demonstrated vote support at comparable companies, was sufficient to drive change.
Litigation Resistance
The scale and effectiveness of Chevedden’s activism have not gone uncontested. Companies have increasingly turned to litigation — filing lawsuits directly against individual proposal sponsors — to block proposals or deter future filings. Notable cases include several lawsuits where Chevedden and I were both named. (EMC v. John Chevedden and James McRitchie: Case Dismissed) These “direct-to-court” actions, in which companies bypass the SEC no-action process and seek judicial orders excluding proposals, have resurfaced industry-wide in the 2020s. Critics argue that such suits are intended less to vindicate legitimate legal rights than to impose costs on individual activists who lack the resources to fund protracted litigation. (ExxonMobil’s Lawsuit Against its Shareholders: A Cautionary Tale) True to his economy-class reputation, Chevedden and I defended ourselves in court, rather than hiring lawyers, thanks to advice from a friend, Phil Goldstein.
The 2024 Innovation: Binding Say on Director Pay
Chevedden has continued to innovate. In the 2024 proxy season, he submitted binding “say on director pay” proposals across multiple companies — a novel approach that, if adopted, would give shareholders a direct vote on the compensation of individual directors. The proposal represents the next frontier in shareholder rights: extending the accountability mechanisms established by Dodd-Frank for executive compensation to directors themselves.
James McRitchie: Computerized Governance
I come to individual shareholder activism from a different angle than either Lewis Gilbert or John Chevedden. Where Gilbert created the activist paradigm through personal moral suasion, and Chevedden scaled it through cryptic coding and a mastery of scale, my contribution has been to expand the toolkit electronically. From the start, I relied on computers, data provider subscriptions, and electronic spreadsheets. I also filed SEC rulemaking petitions, reported on conferences, and worked earlier than Chevedden with various coalitions to advance system-level advocacy. I offer this account in the first person, with the caveat that self-assessment is inherently limited. Readers should weigh the evidence accordingly.
CorpGov.net: Building the Digital Infrastructure of Governance Advocacy
In 1995, I founded CorpGov.net — one of the Internet’s earliest and most comprehensive corporate governance portals. At a time when governance information was scattered across SEC filings, law firm memos, and academic journals. CorpGov.net provided a centralized, publicly accessible repository of governance analysis, proposal tracking, regulatory commentary, and advocacy resources. In 1998, Pensions & Investments credited the site with being “huge” in “helping shareholders win increasing control over America’s corporate boardrooms.” LexisNexis named CorpGov.net one of the 25 best business law blogs in 2010 and 2011.
The significance of CorpGov.net extended beyond its content. It represented a structural innovation in shareholder activism. My personal diary became a persistent, scalable information source that could serve the broader governance reform community. Individual filers, institutional investors, academics, journalists, students, and policymakers turned to it for news and information. In this sense, CorpGov.net is an attempt to answer to the limitation that Sarginger identified in Gilbert’s model: the risk that a “mostly personal crusade” would “end with his retirement.” I have tried to demonstrate to a younger generation what can be done, but so far, no takers. (End Supermajority Requirements: Become an Advocate; Declassify Boards: Become an Advocate; Majority Vote Requirements for Directors: Become an Advocate; Special Meetings: Become an Advocate; Proxy Access Needed: Become an Advocate)
The 2002 SEC Petition: Re-Energizing Proxy Access
On August 1, 2002, I jointly filed a petition for rulemaking with the SEC (File No. 4-461), together with Les Greenberg of the Committee of Concerned Shareholders, requesting that the Commission amend Rule 14a-8(i)(8) to permit shareholder proposals for director nominations — what would come to be known as “proxy access.” The petition was filed in the wake of the Enron, WorldCom, and Global Crossing scandals, and it argued that the real solution to governance failures was not “tweaking rules and regulations at the margins” but giving shareholders the power to nominate directors:
Nobody decided one day to remove the element of democracy from corporations. Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means pointed out in their classic 1932 book, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, simply that it had already occurred. Much has been written about this phenomenon over the past seven decades, but there has been virtually no change in law or practice to reflect a shift in control from Shareholders to Management.
The Council of Institutional Investors credited this petition with having “re-energized” the proxy access debate that would eventually culminate in the SEC’s adoption of Rule 14a-11 in 2010 — a rule that, although subsequently vacated by the D.C. Circuit in Business Roundtable v. SEC, led to the widespread voluntary adoption of proxy access bylaws across the S&P 500. Today, the majority of S&P 500 companies have adopted some form of proxy access — a structural reform whose lineage traces, at least in part, to a petition filed by two individual shareholders in the summer of 2002.
Shareholder Proposals: A Strategy of Strategic Engagement
Like Chevedden, I file shareholder proposals under Rule 14a-8 — typically between 20 and 90 proposals annually, focusing on board declassification, majority vote requirements, special meeting rights, written consent, supermajority removal, proxy access, independent chair policies, and lately, with help from Abbott Cooper, the “right to cure.” My approach differs from Chevedden’s in one important respect. I file far fewer proposals, allowing me the time for strategic negotiations, agreement, and withdrawal. In practice, I reach agreements with nearly half the companies where I file, resulting in governance reforms that are adopted without the proposal ever appearing in the proxy statement or being submitted to a shareholder vote. This means that my actual activity — and impact — may be significantly undercounted in public tallies such as the Gibson Dunn and Sullivan & Cromwell annual surveys, which track only proposals that reach the proxy statement or the SEC no-action process.
Recognition and Broader Advocacy
In 1998, I was invited to speak before a worldwide gathering of corporate secretaries in Hong Kong. In 2000, the State Department sent me to Japan and South Korea to open up markets. The year 2002 found me in China speaking at a conference held by the Asian Development Bank and in London in 2005 (papers). By then, others in corporate governance began using the internet. Still, in 2010, I was named to the NACD Directorship 100 — recognized as “one of the most renowned boardroom influentials who merit serious attention, by virtue of what they do and how they do it.” I was named to the Directorship 100: People to Watch list again in 2011.
Beyond individual proposals, I have sought to expand the conceptual framework of shareholder activism to encompass system-level investing advocacy, fiduciary duty reform, and what I have called “shared capitalism” — the principle that the governance structures of corporations should reflect the interests of diversified, long-term shareholders whose returns depend primarily on the performance of the market as a whole rather than any individual company. This perspective — that “as our corporations become less democratic, so does our country” — connects the tradition of individual shareholder activism to broader questions of political economy and democratic governance
The Collaboration Model
Individual shareholder activism need not be — and, in its most effective contemporary form, is not — a solitary pursuit. Over the past two decades, I have worked closely with John Chevedden, public interest groups, and institutional investors to coordinate filing strategies, share procedural expertise, and build coalitions of support for governance reforms. This collaborative model amplifies the impact of individual filings by ensuring proposals are filed at companies where they are most likely to receive significant vote support and by coordinating engagement.
The Governance Impact Matrix: A Comparative Analysis
The following table provides a structured comparison of the three generational figures of individual shareholder activism across key dimensions of practice, impact, and theory of change. The Governance Impact Matrix reveals a clear evolutionary trajectory in individual shareholder activism — from presence-based activism (Gilbert) to procedural mastery (Chevedden) to institutional infrastructure (McRitchie). Each advocate built on prior achievements while attempting to address its limitations.
Filer | Lewis Gilbert (1933–1993) | John Chevedden (1994–Present) | James McRitchie (1995–Present) |
Primary Mechanism | Shareholder meeting attendance and proposals; personal moral suasion at annual meetings | SEC Rule 14a-8 proposals at scale; procedural mastery of the filing, no-action process, as well as exempt solicitations | Digital infrastructure (CorpGov.net), 14a-8 proposals, SEC rulemaking petitions, coalition-building |
Annual Proposal Volume | Large numbers across career; volume largely limited (mostly inherited) holdings | ~256 in 2025 alone; ~one-third of all submissions and half of governance proposals | 40–90 annually; significant additional impact through strategic withdrawals and settlements |
Core Governance Themes | Cumulative voting, independent auditor ratification, executive pay disclosure, proxy proposal rights | Special meetings, written consent, supermajority elimination, board declassification, proxy access, independent chair | Proxy access, board declassification, majority vote, system-level investing, fiduciary duty (several lawsuits), and procedural reform |
Typical Vote Support | Pre-modern proxy era; often single-digit percentages but profoundly norm-setting | Average 41% support across career; multiple proposals exceeding 90% (e.g., 98.8% at Domino’s Pizza) | High settlement rate; many proposals were withdrawn after achieving governance changes before reaching a vote |
Legal/Regulatory Impact | SEC v. Transamerica (1947); creation and judicial validation of the Rule 14a-8 framework | Defined litigation boundaries (Apache, KBR, Waste Connections); shaped no-action practice; drove management-initiated reform surges | 2002 SEC Petition (File No. 4-461) re-energized proxy access debate; influenced Dodd-Frank era reforms; shaped ongoing rulemaking discourse |
Innovation Model | Created the individual activist paradigm — proved that one shareholder could change corporate governance | Scaled the paradigm through volume, procedural precision, and systematic targeting across hundreds of companies | Expanded the paradigm through digital infrastructure, multi-channel advocacy (proposals, petitions, media, education), and coalition-building |
Theory of Change | Shareholder democracy through physical presence and moral suasion; the shareholder as citizen-owner | Governance improvement through persistent, scaled procedural pressure, the shareholder as reform engineer | Systemic reform through multi-channel advocacy; the shareholder as institutional architect and public intellectual |
Key Limitation / Critique | A “mostly personal crusade” that “ended with his retirement”; no institutional infrastructure to survive its founder | Volume criticized as potentially overwhelming companies with marginal-interest proposals, even though many win majority votes | Dual role as advocate and commentator raises questions about objectivity (which the author acknowledges transparently) |
Patterns Across Shareholder Advocates
Gilbert established the legitimacy of individual shareholder activism. Before Gilbert, the notion that a minority shareholder could use the proxy mechanism to demand governance reforms was not merely unusual. It was conceptually foreign to the prevailing understanding of the relationship between shareholders and management. By attending meetings, filing proposals, and ultimately prevailing in the courts, Gilbert demonstrated that the individual shareholder had both the legal right and the practical capacity to participate meaningfully in corporate governance. His limitation was that the model depended entirely on personal energy and his physical presence.
Chevedden addressed this limitation through scale. By buying qualifying positions across hundreds of companies and mastering the procedural intricacies of Rule 14a-8, Chevedden transformed individual activism from a craft practice into an industrial-scale operation. His proposals reach more companies, receive higher vote support, and drive more management-initiated reform than any individual activist in history. The critique that his volume is excessive misses the structural point. His proposals receive high vote support precisely because they address governance deficiencies that shareholders across the institutional spectrum recognize as value-destroying.
My own contribution, as I see it, has been to expand the activist toolkit beyond the annual proxy cycle. The creation of CorpGov.net, speaking at various conferences, the 2002 SEC petition, my emphasis on coalition-building and settlement, as well as lawsuits, I hope will inspire others. I’ve also contributed money to organizations like The Shareholder Commons and As You Sow, and pay membership dues with the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility and the Shareholder Rights Group. I invested in iconikapp.com and its predecessors to enable retail shareholders to vote automatically, as institutional investors do. These and other financial contributions, memberships, and investments have been small relative to what wealthy people could do, but, in total, they have been significant for me, and I hope helped the cause. These have been efforts to create an institutional infrastructure that can sustain governance reform advocacy across political cycles, regulatory regimes, and individual lifespans. The goal is to ensure that individual shareholder activism is not, as it was in Gilbert’s era, a “mostly personal crusade” that ends when the crusader retires.
The Causal Evidence: Do Individual Shareholder Advocates Proposals Create Value?
The normative case for individual shareholder activism for most people ultimately depends on an empirical question: do shareholder proposals create economic value for shareholders? The evidence — from multiple independent studies using rigorous causal-identification strategies — is strikingly consistent in finding that they do.
The Regression-Discontinuity Evidence
The most methodologically rigorous evidence comes from Cuñat, Giné, and Guadalupe, whose 2012 Journal of Finance study, The Vote is Cast, used a regression-discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of governance proposals on shareholder value. By comparing proposals that passed by a narrow margin with those that failed by a narrow margin — thereby isolating the causal effect of passage from the confounding effects of firm characteristics — the authors found that passing a governance proposal produces significant positive abnormal returns on the meeting day. Their estimates imply that adopting one governance proposal increases shareholder value by approximately 2.8%. The effect is larger in firms with more antitakeover provisions, higher institutional ownership, and stronger investor activism — precisely the conditions under which governance reform is most needed and most valuable.
Majority Voting and Director Elections
Ertimur, Ferri, and co-authors found abnormal returns of 1.43% to 1.60% when majority-voting proposals — a staple of the individual shareholder advocate’s toolkit — narrowly pass, providing additional evidence that governance reforms driven by shareholder proposals create measurable value.
Proxy Access and Firm Valuation
The proxy access evidence is particularly relevant to the shareholder advocate genealogy, given the central role that proxy access has played in the advocacy of both Chevedden and me. Cohn, Gillan, and Hartzell, in a 2016 Journal of Finance study, found that proxy-access rule shocks were associated with higher firm valuations — consistent with the hypothesis that shareholder empowerment creates economic value. (On Enhancing Shareholder Control) Conversely, Becker, Bergstresser, and Subramanian found that firms most exposed to proxy access lost value when the D.C. Circuit vacated the SEC’s proxy-access rule in Business Roundtable v. SEC — providing what amounts to a mirror-image confirmation that proxy access is value-enhancing.
The Entrenchment Evidence
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell’s influential study demonstrated that an “entrenchment index” — constructed from provisions including staggered boards, supermajority vote requirements, and poison pills — is linked to lower firm valuations and lower stock returns. The provisions that comprise the entrenchment index are precisely the provisions that individual shareholder activists have spent decades seeking to dismantle. The Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell evidence thus provides a direct link between the governance reform agenda of the individual shareholder advocate tradition and measurable economic value. That finding alone has been cited in over 3,600 studies.
The Indirect Value Channel
It is essential to note that the empirical evidence on proposal passage captures only one dimension of the value that individual shareholder activism creates. As documented above, individual shareholder advocate proposals also create value through an indirect channel: they drive management-initiated reforms and voluntary adoptions once boards become aware of shareholder sentiment. When a company observes that a peer firm’s shareholders voted 98% in favor of board declassification, the rational response is to declassify voluntarily rather than wait for a proposal. This indirect channel — which is, by definition, not captured in studies of proposal passage — may account for a substantial portion of the total value created by individual shareholder activism.
The Procedural Battleground: Current Threats and the Future of Rule 14a-8
The shareholder proposal rule has survived eight decades of periodic challenge. But the current constellation of legislative, regulatory, and judicial threats is among the most serious in the rule’s history — and, if successful, would fundamentally alter the governance landscape of American corporations.
The September 2025 Congressional Hearing
The House Financial Services Committee hearing of September 10, 2025 — “Proxy Power and Proposal Abuse: Reforming Rule 14a-8 to Protect Shareholder Value” — considered a suite of proposed bills that would, collectively, gut the shareholder proposal mechanism. The proposals include:
- Registration requirements for proxy advisory firms — imposing regulatory burdens and expanded liability on firms like ISS and Glass Lewis that provide voting recommendations to institutional investors;
- Removal of the “significant social policy” exception — eliminating the carve-out that protects proposals raising important policy issues from exclusion under the ordinary business exception;
- Codification of existing exclusions — converting SEC staff guidance on exclusion grounds into statutory provisions that would be harder to modify through administrative action;
- Authorization to exclude ESG proposals entirely — permitting issuers to omit any proposal relating to environmental, social, or political matters; and
- Outright repeal of Rule 14a-8 — eliminating the shareholder proposal right altogether.
State-Level Restrictions
The federal proposals are complemented by state-level initiatives that would achieve similar results through different mechanisms. The most notable is Texas SB 1057, which would impose a $1 million or 3% ownership threshold for shareholder proposal eligibility — a standard that would disqualify virtually every individual shareholder and most institutional investors. It was adopted, and its thresholds will effectively eliminate the individual shareholder proposal as a governance mechanism at Texas firms opting in to its limitations.
The SEC’s Suspension of the No-Action Process
Adding to the uncertainty, the SEC announced in November 2025 that during the 2025–2026 proxy season, it would not respond to no-action requests other than those raising Rule 14a-8(i)(1) bases — that is, bases relating to whether the proposal is a proper subject for action under state law. While the practical effect of this announcement has been debated, it effectively suspended the no-action process through which companies and shareholders have historically resolved disputes over proposal eligibility, leaving both sides without the staff guidance that has been a central feature of the Rule 14a-8 ecosystem for decades.
The “Exit Strategy” Proposal
Former SEC Commissioner Daniel Gallagher and John Cook proposed in 2015 what they called an “exit strategy” for the SEC from Rule 14a-8 — arguing that the Commission should abandon the shareholder proposal rule entirely and leave questions of shareholder access to the proxy to state corporate law. Chairman Atkins made much the same proposal in 2025 in a speech at the Weinberg Center. The proposal reflects a longstanding view among some practitioners and scholars that Rule 14a-8 constitutes federal overreach into matters properly governed by state law — a view that Professor Alan Palmiter articulated in his influential 1994 article (updated in 2026), which characterized the rule as “a failed experiment in merit regulation.”
The counterargument, which I find more persuasive, is that the federal proxy rules exist precisely because state corporate law has systematically failed to provide shareholders with meaningful governance rights, and that abandoning the federal role would leave shareholders without any effective mechanism for participation in corporate governance. Corporate ownership also transcends state lines.
The Business Community’s Divided Position
It is worth noting that the business community itself is divided on the question of Rule 14a-8 reform. While some trade groups and corporate executives have called for significant restrictions on the shareholder proposal rule, many oppose outright repeal. They recognize that the proposal mechanism, for all its inconveniences, serves a valuable function as a low-cost channel for shareholder communication that can surface governance concerns before they metastasize into more costly proxy contests or litigation.
The Historical Echo
As Doyle and Eccles observed in their analysis of the 1943 hearings, the arguments currently deployed against Rule 14a-8 are virtually identical to those raised when the rule was first adopted: the proposals impose undue burdens on issuers; the rule is susceptible to abuse by unrepresentative individuals; the federal government is overreaching into matters properly governed by state law. These arguments were unpersuasive in 1943, and they are unpersuasive today because they consistently fail to account for the structural asymmetry between shareholders and management in the American corporate form. Without Rule 14a-8, individual shareholders have no cost-effective mechanism for placing governance proposals before their fellow shareholders. The “burden” that the rule imposes on issuers is the burden of responding to the concerns of their owners. Therefore, it is not a burden at all but a feature of some semblance of democratic governance.
These proposals would, in my view, make corporations democratic-free zones. As our corporations become less democratic, so does our country.
Conclusion: The Individual Shareholder Advocate as a Structural Feature of American Corporate Governance
Individual shareholder activism is not an anomaly in the American corporate governance system. It is a structural feature — a mechanism that fills a gap left by institutional investor passivity, regulatory capture, and the inherent power asymmetry between shareholders and management in the publicly traded corporation.
The genealogy of individual shareholder advocates traced in this article, from Lewis Gilbert’s moral suasion to John Chevedden’s procedural mastery to my own contribution, reveals an evolving form that adapts to governance challenges. Gilbert established the legitimacy of individual shareholder voice at a time when the very concept of shareholder democracy was novel. Chevedden demonstrated that individual activism could operate at scale, filing hundreds of proposals that received consistently high vote support and drove reform. And the digital, regulatory, and coalition-building infrastructure I have developed is designed to ensure that individual shareholder activism can persist across political cycles, regulatory regimes, and individual lifespans.
The empirical evidence demonstrates that individual shareholder advocate proposals create measurable economic value. Cuñat, Giné, and Guadalupe’s regression-discontinuity estimates show that passing a governance proposal increases shareholder value by approximately 2.8%. The proxy access evidence shows that shareholder empowerment mechanisms are value-enhancing. The entrenchment evidence shows that the very governance provisions that individual activists seek to dismantle are associated with lower firm valuations and lower returns. These are not marginal effects. They are economically significant and robust across multiple identification strategies.
Current legislative threats to Rule 14a-8 would eliminate not merely a procedural mechanism but a structural counterweight to managerial entrenchment that has served American capitalism for over eight decades. The arguments deployed in favor of these restrictions — burden, abuse, overreach — are the same arguments that were raised in 1943, in 1952, in 1983, in 1997, in 2010, and in 2020. They have been repeatedly considered and repeatedly rejected. A corporate governance system in which management faces no cost-effective mechanism of accountability to dispersed shareholders is worse.
What of the next generation? The individual shareholder advocate tradition has shown a remarkable capacity for self-renewal, adapting its methods to each era’s opportunities and constraints. The next generation of individual activists will likely operate in a governance landscape shaped by artificial intelligence, blockchain-based proxy systems, and the continued growth of passive index investing. They will face new versions of old challenges. The tension between shareholder empowerment and managerial discretion will remain. Who speaks for diversified shareholders? The effort to restrict the mechanisms through which minority shareholders can make themselves heard will persist. If history is a guide, shareholders will find a way. The individual shareholder advocate, like democracy itself, is harder to repress than its opponents imagine.
Addendum, with Thanks to Carl Hagberg: Tim Smith, Wilma Soss, and Evelyn Y. Davis
Tim Smith well deserves a full post. He isn’t an “individual” shareholder rights advocate. Instead, he is probably history’s most prominent representative of institutional investors. I will briefly include him here, along with notes on Wilma Soss and Evelyn Davis. As mentioned at the top of this post, Carl Hagberg reminded me of the History section in the Optimizer. The following are brief notes, mostly from that highly recommended site.
Tim Smith
First, I’ll just note that Tim Smith’s work certainly influenced my decision to become a shareholder advocate. I started subscribing to ICCR’s The Corporate Examiner in the mid to late 1970s. Tim Smith had joined ICCR in the early 1970s and ultimately served about 24 years as ICCR’s executive director, during which ICCR’s shareholder activism and publications, including The Corporate Examiner, expanded in scope and influence. I kept all my issues of the publication for decades but, unfortunately, threw them out 10 or 15 years ago.

Tim Smith at an AGM
In a 1989 statement at the Bristol‑Myers stockholder meeting, ICCR Executive Director Timothy Smith crystallized the faith‑based investor case against corporate complicity in apartheid: “Our resolution is precise. It asks for a complete severing of ties with South Africa, a decision which we urge be taken in consultation with workers and unions.” Speaking on behalf of religious investors and the New York State Common Retirement Fund, Smith framed divestment not only as a moral imperative but also as a pragmatic response to mounting political and business risks, predicting that companies like Bristol‑Myers would soon conclude that continued operations under apartheid were no longer viable. The episode illustrates ICCR’s broader shareholder‑activist strategy: use targeted resolutions and floor statements to connect human‑rights demands to concrete corporate decisions about supply chains, markets, and risk, while explicitly aligning with workers and unions rather than treating divestment as a purely investor‑centric stance.
Directly from Carl Hagberg’s History page:

Jesse Jackson, Tim Smith, Donna Katzin: demonstrating against-Citibanks apartheid govt-lending. Photo from GreenMoney
Tim Smith, who began his career in the early 1970s at the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility (ICCR) – has retired from the Boston Trust Walden Company at year-end 2022, where he’d worked for over 20 years. But – great news, and no big surprise to us – in January 2023 he returned to work at ICCR to serve as a Senior Policy Advisor, where he will continue to work on issues related to corporate lobbying and political spending, among others.
Your editor-in-chief first met Tim in the early 1970s – when he formally proposed at all the big NYC bank Shareholder Meetings, year after year, that they not lend to companies based in or doing business with South Africa until the apartheid system was eliminated. He was and is a “gentle lion” – always a perfect gentleman, who listens patiently and politely to chairmen like ours at Manufacturers Hanover Trust, who felt that the proposal would seriously harm black workers if adopted, but always stood his ground effectively. We are convinced that his efforts hastened the end of apartheid by ten years or more. Like Sister Pat, it was and is impossible not to take notice – and to like and respect him whenever he takes a stand. Please take a few minutes to read the post below – which we will also post permanently in our History section. See “Reflecting on the ESG Industry’s Strong Foundation and Bright Future” @GreenMoney Journal
Wilma Soss
Directly from the Optimizer:
Wilma Porter Soss (b. March, 1900 in San Francisco, d. Oct. 1986 in Brooklyn) was one of the most colorful, persistent and totally unforgettable people ever to storm an Annual Shareholder Meeting… and actually one of the most successful, and widely admired shareholder activists ever.

Wilma Soss
In 1948, she and eight other women founded The Municipal Bond Women’s Club of New York. Shortly thereafter she founded the Federation of Women Shareholders in American Businesses, Inc.
And then, in 1949, she launched her second career – as a shareholder activist – when she descended on the U.S. Steel meeting in a long, purple, Victorian costume – set off by an enormous purple hat – and where she had obviously tipped-off the press in advance: “This costume represents management’s thinking on stockholder relations” she announced at top volume, in her cultured and rather melodious voice…and then went on to demand that U.S. Steel put at least one woman on their board.
And here’s one of Carl Hagberg’s own memories, direct from the Optimizer:
We have our own indelible memory of Wilma – where we were so embarrassed we wanted to hide behind the draperies. We still laugh out loud every time we think of the “who’s on first” shareholder meeting imbroglio at the Japan Fund, which was held in the old Manny Hanny’s swankiest conference room, because one of our most senior officers was a director.
For the first time ever, the Fund wanted their Chairman to preside, instead of the U.S. based President, so he came specially, from Japan, to do so. But OUCH! He did not speak a word of English. And despite the last-minute efforts to coach him with the “phonetics” – no one – and least of all Wilma, who had become very hard of hearing – could understand a single word. “This is an outrage” she shouted…not knowing, or perhaps forgetting how much the Japanese value courtesy and proper respect for their ‘seniors.’ “So the honorable Chairman will speak in Japanese, and our honorable Vice President will translate” the Corporate Secretary gamely announced. But OUCH AGAIN! The Vice President’s English was nearly as incomprehensible as the Chairman’s was. Wilma went wild…while all the other attendees (except for those on the dais) were laughing uncontrollably. A meeting to remember, for sure.
Hagberg notes New York Times Chairman Arthur Ochs Sulzberger remarked that Soss “represented the small shareholders with dignity, pride and courtesy. Sometimes we may have grown a little impatient with her long lists of questions, but she never provoked dismay or anger.” (except for the incident above, where she also joined in the laughter.) Many of us have much different memories of the last advocate I’ll mention here.
Evelyn Y. Davis
Directly from the Optimizer:
One of the most complex, contentious, egotistical, infuriating and relentless people – and in many ways one of the saddest people on the corporate scene – due, perhaps, to her terrible experiences as a Holocaust survivor, which were rarely mentioned until late in her life…
But in the last decade or so years of her career, she changed her tune – and her tone – and ultimately became one of the most highly successful people on the corporate governance front – and a financially successful person to boot.
A few first-hand EYD stories from the OPTIMIZER’s editor-in-chief:

Evelyn Y. Davis
“Evelyn Davis was at the very first shareholder meeting I ever attended – at the then-new, postmerger Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company. A callow youth in the mid-1960s, I was pressed into duty because I was good at long-division. The only ‘calculators’ back then, other than human ones, were mechanical monsters that weighed about 75 pounds and made ear-shattering noises as they literally ‘spun their wheels’ to come up with percentages.
“From the moment Evelyn Y. Davis grabbed the mike, in the old American Stock Exchange auditorium, I knew this was a business I wanted to stick close to.
”Davis had just begun to branch out from her first career in the world’s oldest profession – and what a first impression she made on the audience. All of them but her were in their best business attire, as was the custom then. She was wearing what was her best business attire back then – a tight black sweater with a plunging neckline, a mini-skirt that was 10 or 11 inches long at most, black net stockings, thigh-high black boots, and a short chinchilla jacket.
Her opening remarks were to fawningly compliment the Chairman – and to ask if she could come up on stage, sit on his lap, and give him “a big juicy kiss.” Our then Chairman, Jeff McNeill, was an incredibly straitlaced, old-school Southern Baptist, with a big old fashioned Florida drawl – and when he recovered himself sufficiently to politely demur, she turned on him with a vengeance, peppering him with one question after another, never pausing to wait for the answer, which was her usual habit at all meetings. Her loud, high-pitched voice, and the sarcastic-sounding tone she favored during the first half of her career – screeched through the air like a jagged knife-blade on a blackboard. After a few minutes, people in the audience began to shout, “Sit down! Shut up! Go home!” ….
In the last decade of her career, however, perhaps as a result of the life-changing White House experience, Evelyn totally changed her tune – and her tone – and her overall demeanor – and began to rack up some big successes on issues that are still important ones today.
Between 2001 and 2009 her proposals to “de-stagger” corporate boards won majorities at 36 companies, according to activist James McRitchie. Since then, the annual election of all directors – instead of what the Gilbert brothers used to colorfully and sometimes aptly call “the stagger system” – has become the best practice at most of the S&P 500 companies. And the march to de-stagger boards – especially where the most obvious “staggerers” exist – continues apace. Many other of her pet issues – such as better disclosure of executive comp – and of corporate political donations – which she wanted to ban entirely – have been gaining a lot of traction in recent years. Our great friend Steve Norman, the former Corporate Secretary at American Express, and the longest-serving Corporate Secretary ever, summed her up perfectly: “She was absolutely relentless.
Special Thanks to Carl Hagberg
Thank you, Carl Hagberg, for reminding me of the History section in the Optimizer. As readers can tell from the excerpts above, Carl has a great sense of humor, so you are sure to find his History page both fascinating and entertaining.
If you want to stay up to date on what is going on today, the Optimizer is a fantastic resource. For many years, it was behind a paywall. Now you can subscribe for free! If you have read this far, I know you will, and that you won’t be sorry.
Hagberg is a veteran securities-industry executive with more than 45 years of experience in shareholder services, proxy voting, and investor relations. After senior leadership roles at Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company and Chemical Bank, he founded a consulting firm focused on helping public companies improve shareholder communications and services more efficiently. Widely regarded as an expert on individual stock ownership programs and proxy voting, he has advised more than 100 companies worldwide and served as an independent inspector of elections at over 300 shareholder meetings. He has also been active in governance, publishing, and industry organizations, while contributing to major securities-processing reforms that helped lead to the creation of the Depository Trust Company.
Raising the Bar or Closing the Door on Shareholder Democracy?
John Chevedden: Economy-Class Investor Advocate
The Giant Shadow of Corporate Gadflies
Letter to SEC-IAC
Kenneth Steiner Continues Father’s Work
Stanford Law 11/13 Guest Speaker
Small Shareholders Critical to Democracy
Gadfly Proposals Reduce Value?
Gadfly Importance Key to Democratic CorpGov

Comments are closed.