Stanford Law Activism Class – Jim McRitchie
I was a one-time guest speaker at Stanford Law in a class taught by lecturers Derek Zaba and Ram Sachs on 11/13/24. In preparation for the class, I wrote down a few notes and added a bit after class, now shared with readers:
Stanford Law: My Journey
I have always been concerned with economic systems, wealth inequality, and health.
- NIMH Fellow studying what governance systems work best for society, individuals, and businesses: cooperatives.
- Headed California’s Co-op Development Program
- After a friend’s death, I wrote legislation to address chemical hypersensitivity, which was voted on at the request of the Chemical Manufacturers Association and the California Medical Association.
- Headed legislation, rulemaking, and CEQA review functions and realized industry lobbyists have too much power.
Stanford Law: Most Significant Issues in Corporate Governance
The biggest issue is the disconnect between shareholders and their agents. Boards are primarily unaccountable. Shares are held mainly by passive index companies who compete on low cost, have conflicts of interest, and have little incentive to spend on monitoring. Individual investors have little input into the process, except through iconikapp.com, As You Vote, and other small but growing efforts. Multi-class shares, different forms of corporate control, and a reduced voice for increasingly alienated employees have led to oligarchic governance while maintaining the appearance of democracy through annual elections and the trappings of external accountability.
Stanford Law: Shareholder Proposals
In 1999, I filed my first ten proposals—seeking a contest for proxy advice sponsored by each company and voted on by each company’s shareholders. This was an idea of Mark Latham of VoterMedia. Activists probably have more relevant information than proxy advisors, so they would provide a great supplement. Read his paper, Proxy Voting Brand Competition, which has heavily influenced my work in corporate governance.
Topics
I file mostly on governance topics like declassifying the board, requiring a majority vote for directors, and special meeting rights. An early focus was proxy access (2002 petition), but company limitations have made it almost unworkable. As far as I know, it has only been used once. More recently, I have sought disclosures on political contributions, lobbying, DEI, climate, etc., and to address concerns around advance notice bylaws by allowing shareholder nominators a right to cure. I attempted to require companies to report shares awarded to non-named executive officers (NEOs) and encourage companies managing funds to consider passing through or assigning proxy votes to another entity, like iconikapp.com where individuals can adjust voting policies to reflect their preferences. Real investors, with money on the line, should help determine what is considered “material.”
Targets
I can only target companies in my portfolio, which I choose because they either have the potential to make money for investors or have services or products that have a positive impact. I’m limited to about 200 companies. Next year, that might be 250, but I’m gradually backing away from spending so much time filing shareholder proposals, believing other strategies could be more effective.
Partners
I work closely with organizations like ICCR, AYS, TSC, Center for Political Accountability, The Shareholder Rights Group, unions, and public pension funds. I attend many meetings discussing issues and what shareholder proposals or other initiatives will most likely be effective. These organizations have subject matter expertise that I increasingly rely on. It is one thing, for example, to ask a company to reach zero carbon neutrality by 2050. It is another thing entirely to evaluate the efficacy of how they propose to get there.
Tesla
My filings at Tesla were simply matters of good governance. I think I began filing there in 2014 to remove supermajority provisions, or maybe it was to require a majority vote to elect uncontested directors. They gave in to adopting majority voting for directors in 2015 but maintain supermajority provisions to prevent changes in their bylaws. We won majority votes to declassify the board in 2021 and 2024. As I recall, the board even endorsed their own proposal to do so, but I suspect Elon voted against it. They make great cars. They would do better with less of a “friends and family” board, more experts related to autos or manufacturing, and more independence.
Stanford Law: Engagement
Since I am an individual investor and was initially virtually unknown to companies, I didn’t often engage with them before filing proposals. That has only changed slightly. Some corporate secretaries contact me in the off-season to ask what I may have in mind for their company.
I’m very flexible and consider the needs and wishes of corporate representatives. Sometimes, I have negotiated a delayed start date for an initiative. Other times, the company has proposed implementing an utterly different reform in return for dropping or delaying the one I filed. Recently, I often work with a partner, either an expert on the topic and best practices or an attorney, and have become more dependent on them for follow-up. That can be very helpful in the negotiation process since they may have more experience in that particular practice or more data than I do.
Lobbying SEC-IAC, SEC, Congress, CalPERS, academics. Lawsuits, books and records, Zoom meetings, podcasts, etc. Public opinion.
Stanford Law: Defining Wins and Losses
Usually, a win comes through successful negotiations, and the proposal doesn’t go on the proxy. If it does, of course, I would like to see a vote of at least 50%. However, on a new topic, I am happy just to be able to refile in the following year, allowing companies, shareholders, and proxy advisors to learn more about how the benefits of the proposal outweigh any costs.
Another type of win, especially on a new topic or with a new administration, sometimes just getting a proposal through the no-action process can be a win. In most cases, public opinion is the main driver.
It also helps when academics document that, when adopted, my proposals lead to better outcomes. For example, a study found that gadfly proposals constitute a significant fraction of proposals that pass. “For example, in 2018, over 53% of the passed proposals were submitted by gadflies.” A Diligent Institute report found that equity returns for 2017 and 2018 of the top 20% of S&P 500 companies exhibiting strong corporate governance (many adopted due to gadfly proposals) outperformed the bottom 20% by 17%. Good governance included shareholder rights, such as the annual election of directors and simple majority vote standards.
Stanford Law: Advanced Notice Bylaws
My recent emphasis on advance notice bylaws grew out of a fear that they would go the way of proxy access, with boards adopting onerous requirements.
Kellner identified overbroad, ambiguous provisions designed to thwart proxy contests rather than ensure transparency. Generally, my strategy on such provisions is to file 220 requests and negotiate revisions. We will search for troublesome bylaw provisions. For a general-purpose bylaw provision to draw attention to the fairness issue, I am filing “right to cure” proposals. So far, no one has chosen to have it go to a vote since it is a simple way to indicate a company’s intention to be fair.
Stanford Law: McRitchie v Zuckerberg
The idea and funding came from Rick Alexander of The Shareholder Commons. Rick has a fantastic write-up on the case. In retrospect, BlackRock or another large, mostly passive fund may have been a better target. However, I believe the case draws the curtain on the Wizard of Oz notion of fiduciary duty. Almost through a sleight of hand, it focuses attention on shares rather than shareholders.
Duty to the company came as no surprise. What was surprising was Laster’s concession that shareholders will increasingly engage with companies on system-level concerns that implicate portfolio value. Second, no court previously addressed how the phrase “for the benefit of shareholders” is interpreted when most shareholders own diversified portfolios. Others could find differently.
Here’s the critical paragraph, as far as I’m concerned:
Technically, under this framework, the directors’ duties run to the corporation for the ultimate benefit of the shares. Stockholders enter the mix only because shares have owners, and the owners of shares benefit when the value of the firm increases because that value accrues proportionately to the shares… from the directors’ standpoint, the ultimate human beneficiaries of that value are incidental. The obligation is an economic one: care for the capital entrusted to the firm, protect and grow the value of the firm, and thereby increase the value of the shares.
Under Delaware law, reified shares have been given more agency than shareowners. The world becomes a dangerous place when the law codifies more rights for our creations than for us as living sentient beings. Fiduciary duty must be redefined and grounded in the values of real human beings, not on the assumption that our highest value is greed, with little consideration of future generations or the natural world.
Investing and stewardship must be based on shared concepts of justice. Jill E. Fisch argues that funds could survey investors. Under the law, who is the “reasonable investor” who determines which facts should be considered when making investments? Real investors and genuine people should have some voice in these decisions. The natural frontier here is the social construction of materiality. Backtesting data predicts what the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB) adopts. What about forward testing?
Your Biggest Successes?
Data-tagging proxy votes, reporting in N-PX filings, and getting funds to announce votes in advanceare developments that help efforts such as OxProx, rezonanz, iconikapp.com, and others increase corporate governance participation. Shareholders will be able to choose funds based on proxy voting, direct their votes, and compare their own votes with those of large passive funds.
Upcoming Projects
I intend to focus less on proposals and more on mechanisms that alert investors to the dangers of not taking a more systems approach to governance. For example, funds vote most of their shares as if they are voting as they are on the board of each individual company. They are not balancing potential conflicts across their entire portfolio. Maybe we should have sued a fund, not Meta. Does anyone want to help me sue a fund for breach of fiduciary duty? (Warning: as far as I know, no fund has ever been penalized for voting against the interest of beneficiaries. See this 1995 post. Yes, progress in corporate governance is slow.
I am also exploring a database to find companies where one or more of Norges, L&G, CalPERS, or CalSTRS could file director candidates under proxy access. If someone else did the work, these funds or others might be willing to file under proxy access. Are there any volunteers to help sort through a spreadsheet to find 12 consecutive quarters of 3% or more ownership by my target funds?
Additionally, I will consider accounting, rather than inequality (no-actioned), as the rationale for a proposal for companies to report on employee ownership below the NEO level. More widespread share ownership by workers could dramatically increase productivity and decrease wealth inequality in the US. (see Overview of the University Consortium on Employee Share Ownership) It would be helpful to have someone summarize the advantages of ESOPs from an accounting standpoint.
Finally, I am also looking into where an academic program focused on empowering shareholders should be based. There are plenty of corporate governance centers but most focus on corporate boards and management. Let’s have one focused on shareholders.
Collaboration with students, professors, funds, foundations, family offices, wealth advisors, proxy advisors, and others on these or other efforts is always welcome. Want a shareholder advocate to talk with your class? Contact Jim McRitchie.

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