Graphic explainer of votes at selected controlled companies

Controlled Companies Warn the SEC: My Comment on Rule 14a-8

This post updates my October 15 post, Controlled Companies Provide a Warning on Rule 14a-8, and is now based on the supplemental comment letter I filed with the SEC on October 19, 2026. Link to the letter and its many GB of exhibits. The SEC does not need to guess what will happen when boards can disregard their shareholders (if Rule 14a-8 is rescinded). Controlled companies have been running that experiment for years. At controlled companies, shareholder proposals still reach the proxy, but super-voting shares let insiders defeat them no matter how outside owners vote. Independent shareholders repeatedly flagged risks. Boards declined to act. The companies later paid in lawsuits, judgments, settlements, penalties and, in some cases, real human harm. [Click on the graphic to see it all.]

On September 16, the SEC proposed rescinding Rule 14a-8 (File No. S7-2026-32). Comments are due November 20, 2026. Days before the rescission notice, Meta agreed to pay up to $18 billion to resolve child-safety claims. Ross Kerber’s column connected those two events for me and for anyone else reading it. Today I filed my fifth comment on the proposal, building on the excellent work of  Sehr Khaliq and Timothy Smith in Shareholder Proposals as an Early Warning System for Corporate Risk, and the Cost of Ignoring Them. My letter asks the Commission to do three things: withdraw the rescission, require controlled companies to report what outside shareholders actually said, and redo its economic analysis using this evidence, while expanding their study beyond the few companies I considered to include all proposals filed at all controlled companies.

Controlled companies are a quasi-experiment in what happens when boards can disregard their shareholders’ advice. At these companies, shareholder proposals still reach the proxy, but super-voting shares or concentrated insider holdings allow insiders to defeat them, no matter how outside owners vote. The evidence below shows the result. Independent shareholders repeatedly identified risks, boards declined to act, and the companies later bore the costs in lawsuits, judgments, settlements, penalties, and, in some cases, human harm, at costs far exceeding the expense of any proposal. The rulemaking fails to take such costs into account.

Let’s start with a little opera:

Il Voto Negato (The Vote Denied) – from Music for a Democratic Corporate Governance

Read the lyrics

Il Voto Negato (The Vote Denied)
An opera in one act

I. Recitative
(The Shareholder, soprano, alone at the annual meeting)

I filed my plea by the deadline’s light,
one modest page, a lamp against the night.
Ahimè! I asked for nothing grand—
just count the harm, and let us understand.

II. Aria
(The Founder, baritone, grandly)

Ten votes for every share I hold,
ten voices loud to your one voice cold!
Your counsel’s sweet, your warning wise,
but my ledger, friend, has the final size.
Sì, sì! The board is mine,
each vote a vassal, each seat a sign—
ten votes for every share I hold!

III. Chorus of Independent Owners
(sotto voce, building)

We are the many, the most of the rest,
we marked our ballots and gave our best.
Year after year, the warning rang;
year after year, the outside owners sang.
Count us apart and the truth comes clear:
the majority spoke, but you would not hear!

IV. Duet
(Shareholder and Founder, quick and overlapping)

Shareholder: The children, sir! The risk is real!
Founder: Your numbers bore me; my votes are steel!
Shareholder: The courts will come!
Founder: Let lawyers wait!
Both: Then let us see who reads the fate!

V. Finale
(A Messenger, tenor, bursts in with a bundle of judgments)

Messenger: Ecco! From Santa Fe, the verdict’s due—
and nearly every state has billed you too!
Founder (faltering): Ten votes… ten votes… for every share…
Chorus (fortissimo): We warned and warned! You did not care!
Shareholder (soaring above all):
Now Washington would tear the page away—
then who will warn the board another day?
Keep the ballot, keep the page—
or face the courts and not the stage!
All: Keep the ballot! Keep the page!

VI. Coda
(Shareholder, alone, softly; the orchestra fades)

One modest page… a lamp against the night…
Keep the page… keep the light…

Independent Majorities, Overridden

Reported vote totals hide what outside owners think, because insider votes are counted with everyone else’s. Set the insider shares aside, and a pattern appears.

  • Meta. Shareholders asked Meta to report on how it protects children on its platforms. The proposal received 16.27% of votes cast in 2023 but 53.8% of the vote not controlled by management, and 18.5% in 2024 but 59% of independent votes, according to Proxy Impact’s SEC filing. Mark Zuckerberg’s Class B shares defeated it both years.
  • Alphabet. In 2019, after reports that Google paid large exit packages to executives accused of sexual misconduct, shareholders voted on a clawback covering misconduct, including conduct creating a hostile work environment. It drew 24.7% of votes cast, according to Alphabet’s 8-K. Excluding Larry Page and Sergey Brin, it won about 61% of other votes.
  • Tyson Foods. As COVID-19 swept through meatpacking plants, a human rights due diligence proposal received 18.4% of reported votes but 81.2% of shares not held by insiders. A 2024 child labor audit proposal received 12.1% but 54.5% of independent shares, as the proponent’s statement in Tyson’s own proxy notes.
  • Hershey. A 2022 proposal to end child labor in Hershey’s cocoa supply chain received 7.8% of reported votes but 52.6% once the Hershey Trust’s shares were excluded.
  • Berkshire Hathaway. A 2022 climate reporting proposal received 26.5% of votes cast but about half of independent votes. In 2023, Morningstar calculated that half of independent shareholders supported a similar proposal.
  • News Corp. At the 2011 meeting, months after the phone-hacking scandal broke, 67% of independent votes went against James Murdoch and 64% against Lachlan Murdoch, according to journalism.co.uk. Family-controlled shares re-elected both.

These are not isolated anecdotes. Morningstar Sustainalytics found that in the 2024 proxy season, insider votes at dual-class companies shifted shareholder proposal outcomes by an estimated 19 percentage points across 47 proposals, and eight resolutions likely would have passed but for insider control. (Thank you Jackie Cook, and coauthers.)

Then the Bills Arrived

  • Meta. In March 2026, a Santa Fe jury found Meta willfully violated New Mexico’s consumer protection law and awarded the State $375 million. In August, the judge ordered another $567 million for a youth-harm abatement fund. Weeks later, Meta agreed to pay state attorneys general up to $18 billion over ten years. Earlier, after insiders defeated a 2018 board risk committee proposal backed by more than 45% of independent votes, Facebook paid a $5 billion FTC penalty.
  • Alphabet. In 2020, Alphabet settled derivative litigation by committing $310 million to diversity and anti-harassment programs, ending mandatory arbitration of harassment claims and denying severance to employees who leave while under investigation. That is substantially what independent shareholders had asked for, obtained only after litigation. After courts found Google illegally monopolized search and ad tech, Alphabet agreed to spend $500 million on compliance and create a board Risk and Compliance Committee.
  • Tyson Foods. Tyson agreed to pay $188 million to settle claims that it conspired to suppress wages for poultry and red-meat workers, squarely within the risks the due diligence proposal asked its board to examine.
  • Berkshire Hathaway. Wildfire suits against PacifiCorp sought about $8 billion before any doubling or trebling, according to Berkshire’s 2023 10-K, and its 2024 10-K disclosed mass complaints seeking $48 billion more.

I do not claim that heeding every warning would have prevented every loss. But counting only Meta, Alphabet and Tyson, the latter costs exceed $19 billion. The SEC estimates that eliminating every shareholder proposal would save companies about $38.5 million a year (786 proposals at $49,000 each). The costs that followed these overridden warnings are roughly 500 times that figure. I believe that is just the tip of the iceberg.

The Proxy Ballot Is What Makes a Vote Count

News Corp also shows what a proposal is worth when it is not on the proxy. After the phone-hacking scandal broke in July 2011, it was too late to file a Rule 14a-8 proposal for that October’s meeting. Christian Brothers Investment Services offered an independent-chair resolution anyway. It drew only 1.5 million votes in favor and 680.5 million against. A year later, a similar request appeared on the proxy and won about two-thirds of independent votes. Without Rule 14a-8, owners are left with the floor.

Controlled companies and Rule 14a-8, from overridden shareholder warnings at Meta, Alphabet, Tyson and Hershey to the costs that followed and the remedy.

The No-Vote Future Already Exists

Some companies show what happens when public shareholders have no proposal channel at all, or when insiders hold enough votes that no one bothers to use it. Snap’s public Class A shares carry no votes, and New Mexico has sued Snap alleging its platform facilitates sextortion and child sexual exploitation. Roblox founder David Baszucki holds all of its Class B shares and 58.8% of the voting power, and no shareholder proposal has appeared on its ballot in at least four years. In 2025, Roblox reported 65,381 instances of suspected child sexual exploitation, more than double its 2024 figure, and Senators Hawley and Durbin opened an investigation.

At these companies, plaintiffs’ lawyers, attorneys general, regulators and Senate investigators surfaced the risks after the damage was done. Rescinding Rule 14a-8 would push every public company toward this model. Shareholders would still elect directors, but unless a company chose to include their proposals, the only way to put a risk to a vote would be an independent solicitation at many times the cost.

Answering the SEC’s Objections

In 2020, the SEC declined to quantify the benefits of shareholder proposals because the studies presented in evidence against their proposed amendments showed correlation rather than causation, and because it said the value of a proposal is properly left to the company’s owners to determine. Controlled companies answer both points. They supply the variation those studies lacked, and peer-reviewed research now isolates the effect of insulating boards from outside owners, including the finding that the dual-class valuation premium dissipates as firms age and insiders’ voting power outruns their economic stake. Rescinding Rule 14a-8 would remove the very vote through which owners judge a proposal’s value. At controlled companies, independent owners made that judgment, by majorities, only to be overruled.

One comment in the current rulemaking record, by Berg, van der Kroft, Palacios, Rigobon and Zheng, estimates that contested proposals reaching the ballot reduce firm value slightly. Their design is careful, but it measures short-window stock reactions to a contested subset of proposals, finds no harm from governance proposals, and its authors themselves warn that management might contest proposals that benefit firms but harm managers privately. It cannot measure what ignored warnings ultimately cost. Another commenter, Seth Oranburg, argues companies can write proposal rights into their charters and bylaws. At controlled companies, they cannot: the controller blocks any such amendment.

Ignoring this evidence would not survive review. When the D.C. Circuit vacated the SEC’s proxy access rule in Business Roundtable v. SEC, it faulted the Commission for failing to quantify costs or explain why they could not be quantified, and for failing to respond to substantial problems raised by commenters. The data and method are now in the record.

What I Asked the SEC to Do

  1. Withdraw the proposed rescission and retain Rule 14a-8.
  2. Require controlled and multi-class companies to report each vote two ways: in total, as now, and excluding shares held by directors, executive officers, and controlling holders. Both figures should count votes for divided by votes for and against, the method the SEC staff already applies to resubmissions, so abstentions are not silently counted as opposition. (Thank you, Bruce Herbert.)
  3. Revise the economic analysis to measure what overridden warnings cost, using data the Commission already holds.

When New York City Retirement Systems asked Tyson to report results by share class, its board objected that doing so “would position the company as an outlier in the market.” That is an argument for a uniform rule, not against one.

Why This Is Personal

I have relied on Rule 14a-8 since 2000. My first proposal, asking Equus II to hire a proxy advisory firm chosen by shareholder vote, won 18% of the vote at its May 3, 2001 meeting. (Thank you, Mark Latham) Diligent Market Intelligence, which tracks only proposals voted on since October 2011, records 381 proposals filed or co-filed by my wife, Myra K. Young, or me that reached a vote. That count misses proposals filed earlier, those excluded through no-action decisions or left off the ballot in error, and the many we withdrew after companies agreed to act.

I do not have the resources to hire a proxy solicitor and run independent solicitations if Rule 14a-8 is rescinded. In more than 25 years of advocacy, I have engaged a proxy solicitor only once, as part of a 13(d) group exploring a proxy contest. We reached an agreement, but the expense was substantial. Without Rule 14a-8, retail shareholders like me would be priced out of raising risks with boards at all.

The Evidence Is in the Record

To make the evidence hard to dismiss, I filed it along with the letter. Exhibit A recomputes the key votes in the letter from companies’ Form 8-K results and proxy-statement holdings. Exhibit B reproduces every source cited by URL, with the relied-on evidence highlighted, and is filed in six parts due to the SEC’s 5 MB upload limit. Links to the letter and exhibits will be added here once the SEC posts them. My earlier comments, starting with my September 16 letter, are on the SEC’s site now.

If you own stock, directly or through a pension or mutual fund, please file your own comment on File No. S7-2026-32 before November 20. Tell the Commission what you would lose. Your own experience is what matters most.

Listen: Voto Negato: Controlled Companies Provide a Warning on Rule 14a-8, from Music for a Democratic Corporate Governance.

Note on figures: “excluding insiders” percentages come from proponents’ and analysts’ calculations, each checked against company filings in Exhibit A; the Alphabet and Berkshire figures are my estimates from those filings, assuming all insider votes were cast against.

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